The Royal Navy's New Mission...

With the end of the Iron Curtain, the armed forces of Great Britain have lost their former semi-static roles as part of NATO's counterbalance to the Warsaw Pact. The more recent involvement in NATO and US-lead brushfire wars such as Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan, have highlighted the change needed from massive counter-armour formations to a far more mobile and all-services approach. Regrettably, the Army and Royal Air Force have been most unwilling to act as part of a multi-service scenario, so their weapons procurement has not melded with the abilities of each other. The only service which historically has had combined services capability and the willingness to integrate with it is the Senior Service, the Royal Navy.

The Royal Marine Commando is the Royal Navy's Army, even as the Fleet Air Arm should be the Royal Naval Air Service. The Royal Navy, in its carriers, cruisers, logistics train and amphibious capability, is literally the only service that can deploy worldwide and operate without airstrips and depots elsewhere in the world. Furthermore, it already has control of the UK nuclear deterrent and provides the heart of national defence.


This post proposes :-
  • Expansion of the Royal Marines to Divisional strength as a rapid deployment force.
  • Replacement of the RAF with a Royal Naval Air Service based at a handful of shore bases and on several carriers.
  • Expansion of the Royal Navy to provide two balanced task forces around major carriers and an amphibious force for the Marines.
  • Reduction of the Army to a Home Defence Reserve based on a core cadre of professional officers and trained Nation Service reservists.
  • Replacement of the civil service departments of the RAF and Army with a single and more compact Admiralty (Combined Armed Services Ministry) under a single permanent Inner Cabinet Minister of Defence.
This could be headed 'The Day the Generals Screamed', but I thought the title more apt.

Your comments please.
 
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While I beliieve that the RAF should be merged with the navy and the army.

There is simply no way that the navy would be made into the sole service of any importance. Every single war in the last 20 years has been massive blitskrieg with armour and air forces followed by infantry intensive counter- insurgency. The Navy despite being missmanaged badly has not had a direct opponent since the Falklands war that could challenge it.
 
The thing that strikes me immediately about this is that the huge reduction in numbers of trained Army personnel is going to lead to a massive overstretch for the Marines in any sort of prolonged operation. Any sort of ongoing deployment is going to make it very important to be able to rotate troops, and National Service troops are simply not up to the same standard as regulars without an extended period of training prior to deployment. A division of regulars just doesn't seem like very much for a nation with Britain's wide-ranging commitments. If Britain is expected to take part in any sort of operation other than short, sharp strikes (or more than one operation at a time), this lack of numbers is going to become a major issue.
It's also essentially giving up on the option of using heavy armoured or mechanised forces, along with medium or heavy artillery. While those might not be important right now, it takes a long time to rebuild the capability once it's gone and having the option to employ them might be useful.
 
So what you're proposing is in effect turning the clock back to 1914.
The RN as the main strike force and Britannia's shield against a hostile world, with the standing army reduced to just large enough to retain skills and act as a well armed quasi colonial police force.

I assume you would leave the Army Air Corps pretty much alone other than transfering the RAF's transport helicopters to their control.

The RAF Regiment and Airborne forces transfered to the Marines along with Commando trained army units and SAS.

I'd be interested to know how you would bring this about as it would probably take a large military disaster to cause such a shake up. Also would this prevent the total balls up that the 2010 treasury led defence review has been shown to be?
 
Are you quite certain about this...?

The Falklands may be typical of the kind of brushfire gunboat-based war of the future. Does Britain's role have to be as an element of a US heavy battle force?

Taking Libya and Yugoslavia as examples - how much of the work was done by cruise missiles, carrier-based strike aircraft and air/sea deployed special forces? Was on the ground force really needed in Libya, for example? Is Britain more effective with naval air and special forces strike teams? The situation in Oman and the poorly-handled analogue of Somalia comes to mind...

Mission mobility from a task force seems an important thing these days. So does precise targetting by fewer but technically advanced forces. We may be facing as radical a change as Liddell Hart's advocacy of armored forces - a between-wars example of mobility.

And, yes, PLP, the 2010 Defence Review is one thought. Another is the actual need for heavy artillery formations by Britain. Anti-armour kinetic flechettes and cluster munitions come to mind... With aircraft, we can think of interceptors and strike aircraft, AEW and transportation. Fixed wing, rotary and drone.
 
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The Falklands may be typical of the kind of brushfire gunboat-based war of the future. Does Britain's role have to be as an element of a US heavy battle force?

Just looking at this part of your post, Britain deployed several brigades in Operation Corporate at very short notice. This would not have been possible if they only had a division of regular troops in total. Whether it's as part of a US or multi-national force or not, a division really isn't very many soldiers.
 
Taking Libya and Yugoslavia as examples - how much of the work was done by cruise missiles, carrier-based strike aircraft and air/sea deployed special forces? Was on the ground force really needed in Libya, for example? Is Britain more effective with naval air and special forces strike teams? The situation in Oman and the poorly-handled analogue of Somalia comes to mind...

There was a reason that the U.S. navy had a Marine Expeditionary Unit off the coast of Libya during the conflict - we came very close to losing that war when the rebels were almost overwhelmed. It was a very close run thing. Even then, it stretched Britains aviation abilities to the hilt.

Russell
 
Good - debate!

The question is not what is nice to have around, but what one actually needs. I deliberately wanted to see how few ground forces were required. Does Britain need to be able to project an armoured brigade across the world?
 
Though I hate to say it you could also go down the Canadian route and merge all three services into a single force. The Royal National Defence Force or RN for short. To wipe away the inefficiencies of the M.O.D. past have at least the senior officers bassed in the old Admiralty and Sandhurst and Cranwell closed with the cadets being trained at Dartmouth.
 
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I'm not so cruel...

An RN by any other name...

The Canadian RN is an idea, but the Joint Staff Colleges of Dartmouth, Sandhurst/Camberley and Cranwell should continue. Until, of course, this is regarded by the Admiralty as inefficient and Dartmouth is worth expanding.

I'm a past member of the Royal United Services Institute, who come up with some remarkably-AH ideas...
 
The question is not what is nice to have around, but what one actually needs. I deliberately wanted to see how few ground forces were required. Does Britain need to be able to project an armoured brigade across the world?

I don't feel that a capable Army would be a luxury. As a former gunner I might be biased, but artillery at the very least is pretty much essential for any operation that might involve actual combat against a determined enemy. Light artillery and mortars are mobile but lack range and weight of fire, while naval gunfire and air support suffer from inherent limitations of the platform delivering them.

Mechanised forces in addition to their increased protection have considerably more mobility and firepower than the light infantry units which Marines field, although they also demand a lot more of a logistics train. Again, if you're anticipating doing anything other than marching and using light weapons, they or an equivalent will be needed.

I'd also note that while people sometimes talk about the "teeth to tail ratio", they don't usually recognise the importance of the work done by the logistics and engineering arms of service. A capable engineer component is valuable in practically any type of operations from peace-support on up, and someone has to keep the troops supplied. If you are trying to do things on the cheap this becomes more difficult in direct proportion to its increased importance; same applies when you rely on technology as a force multiplier. One of the reasons the US armed forces have been so uniformly successful over the last century is because they appreciated the importance of secure and reliable supply lines and used them well.

I'm less sure about the importance of tank units, I think someone with more experience than I would have to address that issue.
 
A major issue I have with this is that the Navy as the largest most important service will be the one that gets to choose what to develop. What the army in Afganistan needs for example is a all terrain vehicle that can suvive IED's the navy does not need this and as R&D will be focussed on them it wont be developed.

Just an example.

Unifying all the services might be a good idea bulking up one at the exspense of the others is a disaster waiting to happen.
 
One thing is certain, with the down sizing of the Regular Army the Territorial Army would have to be greatly expanded, and its personel's civillian jobs would have to be protected by law when they were on extended active service. It would help recruiting for the T.A. if in the event of redundancy the T.A. soldiers could fairly easily transfer to the regular force. In fact it might be benificial if the Regular force in this scenario was recruited entirely from members of the Territorial Army. At least then newly recruited regulars would be able to be deployed within a few weeks of signing up as their branch training would already have been done.
 
I do have an idea for rebuilding the RN that doesnt require quite so drastic a change.

What I propose is that when the type 45s and 26s are in service instead of scrapping or selling off the older ships they be refitted as general purpose patrol vessels, leaving the new ships to escort the expiditionary forces.

I would also order two Canberra class amphibious ships to replace first the Illustrious and then the Ocean as they could also serve as light fleet carriers to support the Queen Elizabeth Class Fleet carriers.

For the submarine force I would cancel the Trident replacements instead building extra Astute class optimised for launching cruise missiles. I would also order a small number of SSKs with Air Independant Systems for work close inshore.

The Fleet Air Arm would get all the F35bs while the RAF got 30 Cruise Missile capable aircraft, probably converted airliners that could also act as tankers.

Some of the refitted older frigates would be used by the RNR as training ships so that in time of need the reservists could be called up for imediate service at sea.
 
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The question is not what is nice to have around, but what one actually needs. I deliberately wanted to see how few ground forces were required. Does Britain need to be able to project an armoured brigade across the world?

I'm not sure if its needed, but you do need to be able to support units in other places if you are gonna build a Navy of this size. As Gunnarnz pointed out, every modern army requires a considerable logistical tail, and that tail has to be guarded in itself. Even the fastest-moving of armed forces use tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, largely for that reason. The RN is also going to have a hard time supporting their newer fleets if they cannot provide sufficient support vessels to them, to keep the fleets fueled and fed and armed and supplied with all the support parts and services needed to keep a carrier group running, and at this point I'm not sure the RFA has sufficient ships to do that. (It would probably also benefit Britain's shipbuilding industry to get a few such ships built, too.) I'd add four more MARS class ships (for eight total) before I sent to Wave, Rover and Leaf class vessels off to the breakers. Likewise, even a small army with sharp teeth isn't gonna be useful unless well-supplied, which sorta causes a few problems with keeping an army small, but the idea of drawing the Regular Army from the Territorial Army is actually pretty smart.

I feel that most of the Western nations are putting too much priority on too few ships. The RN is an extreme case of this - the six Type 45s are gonna have very hard lives, you can bank on it. They need more ships out in the fleet - 19 destroyers and frigates is much too few.
 
I feel that most of the Western nations are putting too much priority on too few ships. The RN is an extreme case of this - the six Type 45s are gonna have very hard lives, you can bank on it. They need more ships out in the fleet - 19 destroyers and frigates is much too few.

Which is why I sugest keeping the older frigates in service as patrol ships for duties like suppressing Piracy, Drug running and People smuggling. This leaves the new ships free to escort the carriers and amphibious force.
 
Which is why I sugest keeping the older frigates in service as patrol ships for duties like suppressing Piracy, Drug running and People smuggling. This leaves the new ships free to escort the carriers and amphibious force.

I'mnot sure about this idea. If the ships are still in good shape then it could work, but in that case why are they not still in service? If they're not in good shape, the cost of keeping them operational might be substantially more than that of a smaller patrol vessel. Don't forget manpower costs as well, although having a few of the older vessels around might be good training for people not used to dealing with machinery that breaks down all the time.
 
Which is why I sugest keeping the older frigates in service as patrol ships for duties like suppressing Piracy, Drug running and People smuggling. This leaves the new ships free to escort the carriers and amphibious force.

The problem with that concept is that those vessel are personal intensive (I mean alot), there are old hulls, and the vessels are relative overkill for glorified policing duties that you are mentioning. The best although it does cost more money is simple to build the C3 Type 26 Frigates or some variation there of; the main cost in any vessel is always weapon and electronic systems thus if the C3 type is actual produced the cost would be relative minimal due to light armaments and minimal electronic warfare assets. In addition the C3 type will most likely be far more modular (plug-in and swap systems) and utilize more crew automation; along with more economical possible commercial grade engines systems.

This said I saw this idea floated back when someone started a thread about keeping HMS Eagle in service until the Falklands, the plausibility and validity of using only the RN is a pipe dream at best. What this TL is proposing is that the UK is reduced to four types of warfare fighting; full spectrum naval warfare, low-intensity warfare, limited amphibious warfare, and full out MAD warfare. This removes the possibility of ever engaging in mechanized warfare, in-depth defence or offensives operations (lacks logistical assets, armoured, support, mechanization, VTOL assets, possible CAS assets, artillery support, and alot more) serious aerial warfare (long range interception, fighter-attack assets, tanker, AWACS, strategic transport ext...) continuous aerial electronic warfare, parachute capable land assets, and once again alot more.

For example the UK for whatever reason is embroiled in a land centric conflict say in Europe or central Africa. The Royal Navy deploys all assets (i.e. both task forces, and whatever available Royal Marine assets), the Royal Navy gains naval and coastal dominance in all spectrum (air, surface, and subsurface). The Royal Marines began their landings, with both the sub launched cruise missile, CAS assets, and naval gunfire support they manage quickly to create and secure a beach head. However the primary enemy military formation is about sixty kilometers inland; the Royal Marines advance. By day 3 the Royal Marines after forced marches reach the general outskirts of the urban area the opposing force is hold up in. Initial cruise missile strikes, air strikes, and light artillery bombardment began. Mid-way the subs have exhausted there cruise missile capacity, and a the L118 simple lack the punch to effectively reduce the enemy to manageable levels. The 43 and 45 Commandos advance on foot with artillery and CAS support on day five, enemy heavy artillery and tank support fire on advancing RM formation. CAS is directed to intercept artillery and tank support, low-level sams and MANPADS are fired; near totally loss of CAS flight. HMS Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales scramble alert assets however, local flight area is to heavy for effective CAS support. There is no attack helis available, and the RM light artillery has been destroyed due to counter-battery fire support half way through assault. Midway through the advance the 43 and 45 Commandos are given a general retreat order, by end of Day 5 the 3rd Marine Commando Brigade has suffered serious losses has become combat ineffective. By Day 6 the enemy counterattacks beach head with armoured and mechanized artillery support; RM forces already exhausted from forced marches, and significant combat losses are forced into a fighting withdrawal. By Day 7 the 5th RM Division is pinned to coastal areas, as a hasty retreat is ordered. Due to overwhelming enemy artillery and anti-air assets both aerial and surface warfare assets of the RN are unable to provided effective support to RM units. By Day 9 the 5th RM Division has evacuated after leaving all heavy equipment on the beach head, and suffering over a sixty percent causality rate due to inability of effectively countering or even engaging enemy armoured and artillery support; in addition to being constantly out flanked by superior enemy mechanized formations during an attempt of movement on the RM part.
 
PLP and Peace Monger...

...A nomination each for a Cordite Medal for inspired Ideas. Good ideas well-reasoned.

Some Bloke - yes, I'll keep the 1919 Heligoland TL going.

So what should we see, if not the current mess and not what this Tl's OP proposes?
 
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