Looking at that map, I wonder if Greek will survive as a language. More probably, it will evolve into a "Rhomance" family of languages with a disjunct distribution throughout the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, each influenced by their conquerors' language.

At the very least it strikes me as plausible that there will be many different "Greek" languages, with a variety of influences, mostly Iranian and Slavic.
The real test, for the long term survival of the regime is what happens when a weak ruler inevitably comes along, and that the institutions of the state are strong enough to withstand it. With the purge of the nobility, in such a scenario, we could see a top general become what is essentially a de-facto 'Magister Militum', a man who has dictatorial power and is Emperor in all but name with the Emperor as a puppet.

Yeah, that definitely seems like a risk. While Sergius still has a while left on earth, his heir might not have his talents, and I'm not sure how strong the state is without a strong Emperor. Outside of the major cities, the only power really is the army.
I really hope that the Mauri can get their act together and solidify control over at least part of their territory. A bit of centralization would do them some good.

Didn't someone mention post-Roman city-states being left mostly alone? I hope I'm not mixing up this timeline with another one.

Bmao is right in regards to your first part, centralization is probably not enough. The climate itself is turning against them, and while that's by no means a deathblow, combined with a weak monarchy it certainly hurts. Still, they'll be difficult to dislodge from their various islands and the walled cities of North Africa are easily capable of defending against inland raiders.

Bmao is right again, the city states you're thinking of are those currently under the Rhom Shahdom, where they are allowed relative autonomy in exchange for tribute. Over time, this arrangement has solidified. The Rhom Eftal keep a delegation in each city, but they manage their affairs with a light hand. In general its a system that works, especially because the cities know very well the alternative would look something like the Balkans, where urban civilization has all but collapsed.
 
Yeah, that definitely seems like a risk. While Sergius still has a while left on earth, his heir might not have his talents, and I'm not sure how strong the state is without a strong Emperor. Outside of the major cities, the only power really is the army.

There is still the Bishop of Rome who could come to wield considerable power in such a scenario. Even a top general would be hesitate to try and take down a Pope, as he would be a god fearing man who would fear being sent to hell.
 
Maukhani
[good point, good point. Although a Papal-dominated Isidorian Empire would suffer from many of the same problems as a militarily dominated one. But anyways, now for something completely different: apologies for the spoilery-title.]

The Fall of the Maukhani Empire

The fifty years between 670 and 720 are regarded as the final stage of the Maukhani Empire. While later historians would sometimes see them as a mere successor or continuation of the Gupta era, this overlooks the distinctive trends of the Maukhani dynasty, the changes in religion, culture, government, and warfare that would affect the entire subcontinent. Where feudalism not wholly unlike that seen in Europe had grown with the Gupta decline, the Maukhani nipped this feudal, regional tendency in the bud. Their artistic and architectural styles may have resembled the Gupta, but they drew inspiration from as far afield as Indonesia and East Africa. They were insular to some degree, isolated from the changes happening in Central Asia and Persia, but their periphery was tightly bound to the networks of maritime Indian Ocean trade, networks that had only grown more potent as overland trade became a risky endeavor.

The Maukhani frontier had become somewhat solidified during the reign of Dhruvasena. The city of Vinukonda became a center of resistance, with the surrounding region of Andhra becoming heavily fortified. Bankrolled by the wealth of Narasimhavarman Pallava, a mercantile king whose coastal empire was heavily involved in the East Asian trade, Maharaja Vikramaditya Yuvaraja of Vinukonda was able to serve as a buffer state of sorts. Maukhani armies were ground down against the fortresses of Andhra and the walls of Vinukonda, and Vikramaditya's capture of Amaravati and subsequent campaigns into the Deccan Plateau. His victory at Vengi in 673 was perhaps the best example of his military capability, defeating a Maukhani army perhaps three times the size of his own force.

Vikramaditya proved to be a wily commander, more than a match for the Maukhani on his home turf. His origins are unknown - his surname Yuvaraja meaning "Son of a King" we can infer that he was born into royalty, perhaps to some local client of the Maukhani. His regime was never more than local, but its ability to resist the central authority projected from Pataliputra showed the growing weakness of the Maukhani Empire and inspired others at the periphery to assert their own independence more strongly.

With the death of Dhruvasena in 676, his son, Naravardhana took power smoothly. There were few options for the throne that had not been eliminated in the earlier purges. Uncomfortable amongst large groups of people and prone to bouts of spontaneous shaking and nervousness, Naravardhana would be dominated utterly by his Brahmin prime minister, Sumalya. Sumalya, for his part, was paralyzed not by crowds but by fear of the military, whose commanders he feared saw themselves as petty kings in their own right. He continuously shuffled the command structure, purging commanders who he felt had remained too long at important postings on the frontiers, and granting these vital positions to inexperienced commanders. This would in turn cause local polities and viceroys to look elsewhere for their defense.

The samanta system of the latter Gupta had represented a semi-feudal approach to governance. Indeed, no small part of the reason for their collapse had been the feudatory kings whose power eroded direct royal control. The Maukhani, in undoing that power, had reduced many of these kings to impotent figureheads, bound by guild-councils (sangha or ayat) and the local viceroys (uparika and vishyapati). Within their Gangetic heartlands, these kings had been bound directly to the extended royal clan and gradually denied authority except through ceremonial offices at court. By taking the Kings away from their territories, the guild-councils, run by local Rajas, established their power to solve disputes at the local level. The appointed, non-hereditary uparika who generally chosen with a degree of input from these local councils, became arbitrators and judges who more often than not were persuaded to take a hands-off approach to local affairs.

Semi-republican governance on the Indian subcontinent had a long tradition, dating back to before the Maurya. This was not to say that these societies were not deeply stratified along social and ethnic lines, but rather that the tradition of communal self-governance existed to be drawn upon, and in many ways represents a regression to the pre-imperial era. Where the Maukhani sought to undo the decentralization and feudalization of the latter Gupta, they instead only defeated the feudal Kings. Decentralization was inevitable. The urban population of India was growing once more after several centuries of marginal decline under Gupta mismanagement. As this population of skilled urban workers grew, with it the power of the local community. As the professional Maukhani military atrophied under Sumalya's mismanagement, portions of the kshatriya of these communities banded together to form militarized guilds, which would contract themselves to the uparika.

This can be seen as regression - an advanced polity collapsing along primitive, tribal lines. However, in truth it was far more complicated than that. The sangha or ayat was not an inherently tribal affiliation, but is indeed better seen as an alliance of local powers. Indeed, this was a renaissance of the Indian republican tradition, repressed during the era of the Three Empires and their various feudal interludes. Unified by shared religious and philosophical traditions and shared local languages and customs, these sangha laid the foundation for networks of city-states.

The uparika and vishyapati may have slowly taken on royal titles, but this royalism was based not around their own claims to rule but the approval of the broader communities and the assemblies of kshatriya. As Sumalya lost power, he attempted to turn the military on these viceroys, only to find that his weakening of the military allowed the small but well-equipped guild-armies to hold their own against his reprisals. In 684 the Adhikarana of Ayodhya, within the traditional heartlands of the Maukhani broke away. The Ayodhyan viceroy, Hasti, led a coalition of local cities and successfully was able to defeat the royal army in a pitched battle.

With the rebellion of Prayaga two years later in 686, the empire was effectively split in two. The two cities dominated the Gangetic plain north of Pataliputra, denying the empire access to many of its provinces. While the Empire would totter on for some time, reaching various accommodations with the rebels, its fate was sealed. As various local potentates realized how easy it was to extract concessions from their viceroys, and by extension the Maharajadhiraja himself, rebellions became frequent. Kakushthvarma of Pratisthana in 689 established his own kingdom on the Deccan, mixing the feudalism of South India with the communal republicanism of the north. By allying with the coastal metropolises such as Sopara, he was able wrest control of the valuable trade lanes, and by subjugating the local petty kings, who here on the frontier still retained power, he established a source of vital military manpower.

With Naravadhana's somewhat suspicious death in 698, his cousin Visnuvadhana took the throne. While Visnuvadhana lacked those aspects of Naravadhana that made him a weak king, Visnuvadhana had been isolated, like much of the royal clan. He had never left Pataliputra, and never would. He spent his days in luxurious palaces and gardens, meditating and speaking to philosophers. He was a lover of beauty, an artist at heart. Sumalya encouraged these hobbies up until he was executed by the general Amogha Karkha in 701. Amogha was determined to restore the power of the Maukhani, but his futile wars against the cities of Bengal sapped the strength of his armies and earned him the ire of many Buddhists, whose holy sites he did not treat with respect.

Regardless, Amogha would stutter on for twenty more years as prime minister, until 721. As part of a court intrigue, Visnuvadhana attempted to act against him at the urging of a collection of lesser councilors. Ernaged by this lack of respect to his efforts to restore the empire, Amogha would order his mercenary corps, largely foreigners with no great loyalty to the Maharajadhiraja, to execute a coup. He massacred the royal clan in their apartments and ruled the city for a few years until a collection of ministers assassinated him and established a greatly reduced kingdom which consisted essentially of Pataliputra and its hinterlands.
In Gandhara, the fall of the Johiyava and the rise of the Siyaposha led to a paradigm shift in the greater Hindu Kush and Balkh as well. Unlike the Johiyava, the Siyaposha were Turko-Eftals who were Indianized to a moderate degree. Unlike in the interior, where local communities were required to defend themselves, in this portion of the Maukhani frontier as the military atrophied it was an open invitation for the Siyaposha and their Turko-Eftal retainers to take over the role of 'protectors'. Much of the Punjab was smoothly annexed with a minimum of warfare. Between 670 and 700, a few local military commanders provided only isolated resistance which had little chance of victory.

Between the Siyaposha and the Sogdians to the north, overland trade did continue, albeit much reduced. The early Kapisa Shahs, as the Siyaposha became known, left little sign of their dominion. They were largely forced to repurpose Johiyava fortifications and structures, repairing and renovating those which had fallen into disrepair, but otherwise they left no architectural mark on their territory. Cities such as Purusapura and Takasashila which did expand in this time period did so under the auspices of their ayat councils, in styles which seem imported from other parts of the subcontinent rather than in any authentic Gandharan style.

Further south, the Siyaposha were met with stiff resistance. The descendents of the Saka and Kushan satraps had never abandoned their warlike ways and fought as cavalrymen every bit the equal of the Siyaposha, and the Gurjars of Srimal prevented their entry into the Thar desert. Along the Indus, the Rai dynasty led by Rai Sinhasena Raja, was equally capable of defending their river valley, resurgent in the wake of the collapse of the Maukhani. Recognizing these borders, the Siyaposha did not push their luck overmuch. The Thar desert was marginal territory in the estimations of the Siyaposha kings, and the Indus valley while wealthy would be a hard fought conquest. Indeed, the majority of the strength of the Kapisa Shahs would be focused westward, where another ambitious Turkic warlord could rise up just as easily as they had and take what they had won.

[Thoughts on the plausibility of making India a patchwork of kingdoms underpinned by local councils? Questions? I feel like this is one of the bigger risks I've taken so far in terms of changing history, but it made little sense to me for the Maukhani, who fought feudalism from nearly the beginning, to be succeeded by kingdoms that resembled those of OTL.]
 
I know jack shit about Indian history during late-Antiquity/early Middle Ages, so I'm basically taking you at your word here.
 

Deleted member 67076

Wasn't India for much of its history operating under an international system that resembled the HRE? If so you could see devolution to local states, but I would expect pushback attempts by ambitious rulers to re-unite the place.
 
The system of the later Gupta and OTL's Harsha was based around local kings with significant levels of autonomy. You could call it HRE like, I suppose. Regardless, it was generally feudal, with oaths of loyalty and obligations. It was complimented by a bureaucracy, but the local kingdoms were the bedrock of the administration.

The difference is that in this timeline the Gupta stick around longer so it never gets as bad. No Sveta Hunas means less damage to the local economy and things never regress to subsistence in parts of the subcontinent as the Gupta collapse - indeed India becomes more interconnected through trade, and along the coasts and a little distance inland up rivers, urbanization is taking off anew. The Maukhani rise up as effectively a successor dynasty rather than an overhaul of the system.

But then, unlike Harsha, the Maukhani have a lot more resources. They don't have to depend upon subjugated kings. So in all the ways I described, they fetter their subject kings. Thus, when the Maukhani fall, it isn't subject kings but local councils and bureaucrats who remain. Because of the tradition of these local councils having authority that dates back for a millennia or so, the new rulers are beholden to their councils.

Will ambitious rulers unify larger regions? Certainly. Even by 720 in my timeline, that is happening. And foreign kings and armies are crossing into the subcontinent now. But the councils are here to stay.
 
Yet another excellent read.
The republicanisation along guild councils seems both plausible and attractive to me.
I tried a similar approach in my althistory.wikia TL Abrittus.
India not only had a republican tradition, but also lots of other prerequisites of such a constitution: large cities, connected by trade which brought forth a commercially minded class, very stable social organizations; a large group of highly respected and educated people, who were also outspoken on social matters. Hierarchies and inequalities are no obstacle; Athens wasn't egalitarian, either.
India's lack of city republics IOTL is the miracle actually, explainable perhaps only with the influence of monarchic empires as their civilised "neighbours", Eran and the Middle Kingdom(s).

I'm actually excited where this goes. IOTL, India exported its model of overlapping imperial circles (mandalas) of competing suzerains above local (post)tribal dynasties to much of South East Asia, continental and maritime alike. Might we see a coexistence offederations of city republics and empires in the Pyu, Dvaravati, Dai and Nusantaran realms?! And what does that do to cultural and religious developments there? No Angkor Wat...?
 
Thanks! I'm glad you like this.

Might we see a coexistence of federations of city republics and empires in the Pyu, Dvaravati, Dai and Nusantaran realms?! And what does that do to cultural and religious developments there? No Angkor Wat...?

The course of Southeast Asia is certainly changed, and large scale effects are reaching them. But the kingdoms and cities there are already Indianized, urban to varying degrees, and definitely invested in trade. The city-state of Srivijaya is on the rise as in OTL.

I'll have to cover them in a post sometime soon, as well as China. However, suffice it to say that India will continue to export her "new" ideas and philosophies to the various kingdoms of the southeast for some time to come.

Arabia and East Africa will of course also be influenced to varying degrees. I intend to write another post on both shortly.
 
Spice and Ivory
The Savahila

By the death of Citrasena in the late 670's, the merchant-prince's heirs could safely say their father was the founder of a civilization. It was not, perhaps, a traditional society. While it had retained much of the culture of its colonial forefathers in India, Persia, and Hadhrami Arabia, it was also deeply influenced by the native Cushites who made up the vast majority of the population. While Savahila cities might have aesthetically retained Persian architectual styles due to similar building materials, out in the rural regions made use of a mixture of mud brick and stone. Merely a few miles inland, the foreigners could be seen to have little impact. While their crops had allowed population densities unknown previously, and their religion (Buddhism, mostly) was being spread by bright-eyed missionaries in saffron and ochre robes, if one traveled but a little further, away from navigable rivers and the long coast, even these tokens of foreign dominion were absent.

Most of the population, including a good number of urban-dwellers, were engaged in agriculture. A wide variety of products - rice, sorghum, oranges, bananas, tamarind, grapes, sugar-cane, and honey. Cattle and fish were plentiful, with the former being a symbol of status to those living in the hinterlands. Horses and sheep also existed in some numbers. But agriculture was not what brought foreigners to the shores of Savahila. Rather, that was the potential luxury trade goods which could be extracted. These included slaves (typically captured in warfare), aloe, ivory, ambergis, leopard skins, tortoiseshell, gold and iron. To the north, an incense and spice trade developed to rival that of southern Arabia and Awalastan.

The coastal cities, even as they blended with the Bantu and Cushitic peoples found themselves looking eastward, to India and Arabia, rather than westward. They were part of a global network there - wealth and prosperity lay to the east, and their trade ships and manufacturing did not benefit the peoples of the interior one iota.

Penetrating the interior remained difficult indeed. Alternatives were sought, including major naval expeditions further south, both to find trading partners and to find additional sites for cities. Perpetual rumors of great kingdoms inland and to the south spurred this interest. But after a few failed naval expeditions, the cost was generally judged too exorbitant for no gain. The whole south of the continent was sparsely peopled and the Savahila themselves were small enough in number that the additional living space was unneeded. Further, there seemed to be no goods available in the far south that could not be acquired much closer to home.

Those who chose to travel inland finally came to the great lakes, where rumors of great kings and golden cities compelled them to search far and wide. What they did find was small and disorganized by their standards, and disinterested in anything they had to offer, be it religion or trade. The early Rutara-Ganda had large villages with a degree of social stratification rarely found in their neighbors, but these were not cities in the Savahila imagination. These expditions had come from Mzishima, its domed temples adorned with terracotta carvings, its bustling marketplaces and grand apartments rising out of the waterfront like a golden hill. They had wandered the streets of Vayubata, her avenues red from river-clay. Invariably, they would return home disappointed.

However, by the early eighth century some tribes closer by, notably the Kw'adza and Iringa, had begun more involved trade. While they had little to offer the sedentary cities of Savahila, they did have two utilities - their cattle were valuable to that portion of the Savahila elite that did not hold cows sacred, and further, their raiding against the migratory Bantu provided a source of slaves. While the Savahila had little need for slaves, the floodplains of Mesopotamia and the spice plantations of Awalastan did. Slaves were one good among many, but they did provide a medium by which coinage was introduced to these tribes, thus allowing them to interact with the Savahila markets and by extension the Indian Ocean trade network. It was only a matter of time before ambitious merchants from the cities established inland forts from which to sell goods.

Across the water, the island of Izaoraika, still ruled by the Sakalava tribe, had begun to unify the island more thoroughly. By laying down stone fortifications, sometimes with the insight of Arab advisors, they were able to garrison the territories of their one-time enemies, extracting tribute more efficiently and creating an imposing reminder of who ruled the island. Certain local tribes were exalted above others, based on the order in which they had submitted to the Sakalava. These tribes in turn provided the garrisons for forts far from their ancestral territories, creating a system in which all were ruled from a distance.

Apart from a few holdouts, such as the Antaisaka and the Sihanaka, who waged low-intensity war against the Sakalava on-and-off for the better half of the seventh century, the island was subdued. By 700, Izaoraika had a thriving port city, Mahapura, which although often counted among the Savahila cities had a distinctly local identity. Like the Savahila cities, it provided an avenue for Indic and Arabic culture to enter the native consciousness. Both the South Indian model of kingship, wherein one great king ruled a host of lesser ones, and the ideas of Tantric Hinduism had appeal to the Izaoriaka, who saw in these ideas concepts that reinforced their right to rule. Unlike with their traditional beliefs, these more universal ideologies could assert the necessity of a universal ruler, seated at the heart of an intricate mandala.

The Land of Spice and Ivory

The "Missions of Heshana" claim to have converted the Makurians, who had long retained to varying degrees their traditional faith, to Christianity as early as 670. While previously many smaller kingdoms had been Christian, and there had been many pockets of Monophysites within the Nubian nation, the conversion of the Makurian King marked the beginning a new era. By 700, it seems that the Makurian King, Qalidurut, had united most of ancient Nubia under his control once more.

The Kingdom of Makuria was a curious creation. Its ruling elite looked to Rome and to Heshanid Egypt for inspiration, adopting their manner of dress and technology such as the water-wheel irrigation system around this time. Coptic was the language of the Church, and consequently the language of the high elite. Their governance, however, was done in a distinctly Nubian style, with high officials taking on some aspects of priestly dress and authority. Enormous cathedrals such as at Dongola and Faras were built out of baked brick in the cruciform style that had characterized their ancient pagan temples.

Aksum, to the south, was tottering on the verge of insignificance. With the unification of their northern neighbors, trade up and down the Nile became more profitable, and their more vibrant neighbors to the north, unmolested by Somali raids were able to reap the rewards. On sea, the Hadhramut was still preeminent, and based on architectural finds we can see that the amount of foreign goods dropped enormously, even in ports such as Massawa, and major cities such as Aksum and Senafe.

With the collapse of Kaoshid Awalastan in the south, a new local power was rising in the form of the Hawiya clan. Once a marginal tribe in even more marginal land, they had over the past hundred years slowly clawed their way to prominence. In the absence of any central authority, they prospered. With Axum on the decline and the Hadhramut quarreling amongst themselves, there was little to stop them from taking Amoud in 656. With the seizure of the Aksumite cities of Adigrat and Maqale, they put the final nail in the coffin of Axumite predominance.

Taking advantage of the bureaucracy and tributary system successfully employed by Awali Shahs, the Hawiya simply stepped into their role. No longer just a powerful clan, they expected to rule with a degree of absolute authority. While at first many of the Awali tribes might have questioned that choice, the Hawiya had the backing of the Hadhramut traders whose estates produced the spices for which Europe had an insatiable appetite. It was economics, not military power that ensured the rise of the Hawiya. While certainly their initial victories were won by the sword, their long term pre-eminence was designed by the deals they could make with the Arab and Indian merchant elite.

As the Hawiya Shahdom became more solid, they slowly moved away from their traditional roots. The language and customs of South Arabia blended with their own. The Persian styles of Amoud became the styles of their patriarchs. The Jewish merchants, long persecuted by the Hadhrami, brought their own mystical form of monotheism to pre-eminence. Much like the southern cities of the Savahil, Awalastan was a melting pot for refugees and travelers. For example, in 690, a thriving monastic community of Svetambara Jains lived adjacent to the spice plantations of a Jewish tribe, outside of the Perso-Arab city of Amoud, where carts of ivory from Sofala and silk from China might be offloaded.

[Good news, I found some sources to flesh out Berber North Africa!]

Berbers raiding the Mauri
Heresy had always been somewhat popular in Roman Africa - it served as a breeding ground for dissent from Rome, and under the Mauri this continued. The more philosophically inclined among the feudal nobility and the merchant-lords often harbored those with heterodox ideas. In part, this can be traced to a certain bitterness among the Romans of North Africa - they disliked having their religion defined by Rome rather than some more local city. Were there not many patriarchates in the East? With the fall of those patriarchs to heresy and the heathen Eftal, renewed feeling that there should be a Patriarch of Hippo or Carthage reached a fever pitch. Furthermore, the Pope in Rome was a puppet of the Isidorians.

The monasteries of North Africa were mainly of the Cassadorian school, which, while founded in Italy, nevertheless followed the liberal teachings of Cassordius, a man who some might have considered a heretic himself for his approach to the Arians. Those monasteries that were not Cassordian were often practicing what the more orthodox of the Church saw as Gnosticism. Christian North Africa was an thorn in the side of the Roman Church, and the stage was set for a spiritual battle between Carthage and Rome.

Even by the mid 7th century, Christianity was not widespread amongst the Berbers of the interior. The Romanized coastal peoples did certainly extend their dominion towards the interior, but they regarded themselves as Romans or Mauri, under the dominion of the King of Mauritania and Africa. While these people were wealthy, powerful, and cosmopolitan, connected intimately to the Mediterranean trading world, they were also on the decline. The climatological shifts favored the traditional, semi-nomadic peoples of the interior. Warlike and numerous, they were for the most part pagans, worshipping a mixture of local gods and cults.

The very climate changes which encouraged the collapse of the Garamantes, would threaten the Mauri during a period of their greatest weakness. Under King Takfarinas the Mauri possessions overseas would find themselves forced to choose between religion and their King. In many cases, this was not a difficult choice. The Mauri of Sicily in particular began adopting Roman names in this period. Factions developed within the aristocracy - and no small number of these factions sought to overthrow the King and replace him with a different candidate. Things reached a state of crisis when the Count of Caesarea was revealed to secretly be a Gnostic, and Takfarinas did not act.

Azerwal, the Mauri chancellor, did not believe that the Mauri could endure a religious conflict with Rome. Tax revenues in the interior had been on an inexorable decline for decades. Trade was the lifeblood of the Mauri economy, and trade depended on the coastal cities and overseas possessions - the very people most Romanized and most loyal to the Church in Rome. In 671, he overthrew Takfarinas and sent him to a monastery, promising a new era of religious uniformity and, in a private letter to the Pope, attempted to reassure the Papacy that he would do "all in his power to drive out the agents of Satan who dwell among us." Marrying Queen Tagwerramt to attempt to ensure his legitimacy, the new royal couple passed new edicts, reaffirming the power of the state to persecute those the Church deemed heretical, and if necessary overthrow them with violent force, as he had done.

What followed was a systematic persecution of much of the Mauri aristocracy, ostensibly for heresy but also to ensure the loyalty of the remainder to his throne. Between the Battle of Rhegium and this persecution, the inland Mauri were critically weakened at a time they could not afford to be. As the desert spread, the prominent Iznagen tribe of the Awares mountains, led by a local chief named Afalawas, began to raid into Mauri Africa. These raids culminated in the brutal sack of Theviste in 674.

The Iznagen were but a prominent example of a broader trend. Mauretania Tingitana was wholly lost in 682, after the Masamida tribe won the eight month siege of Tingis. The tribe of Iktamen, led by the famous Immeghar, known to his people as "the Prophet" came to reside in Mauretania, within striking distance of the ancient Mauri capital of Caesarea. As these tribes moved, they did not necessarily displace the agriculturalists who remained - rather they took in many cases land which the agriculturalists had been forced to abandon due to climactic changes, finding these ideal for their pastoral lifestyle. Numidia itself was threatened by two allied tribes, the Tumzabt and the Isawiyen, united by a woman named Tazdayet. Constantinia was besieged off and on between 679 and 683, when it would finally fall.

Through all of this, the Mauri did fight back. Numerous small battles between local lords and the Berber invaders more often than not saw the Mauri outmatched. While inland cities would often fall if starved, coastal cities generally fell only rarely, and most of those that fell were at the far periphery of Mauri control. Azerwal would rule until 686, when his nephew Aghilas would take the throne. Three years into his reign, Aghilas would be killed in battle near Sufes, attempting a punitive action against the Iznagen. Dying without an obvious successor, a group of prominent merchant families returned to the capital and there elected one of their own, the aging Sicilian Mauri merchant named Constans, who took the more Mauri name Amawal upon his ascension to the throne.

Constans took a different approach to his predecessors. Instead of warring against the Berbers, he sought to define the territories of each tribe and make peace. Through a combination of generous arrangements and the threat of swift reprisals if those arrangements were broken, he was able to buy his kingdom time. Urban militias were raised and he personally toured the coastal cities, ensuring their land walls were in good shape. The tax burden on the peasantry and landed nobility was lightened, in exchange for regular terms of military service - not merely being levied when called but rather as constant frontier garrisons. In spite of their losses the Mauri remained powerful, and in 693, when the Isawiyen began renewed attacks on the coastal cities and their hinterlands, they were able to resist with relative ease.

However, many Mauri were realizing than an ocean was a safer defense than walls. A not insignificant portion of those with the means fled to Sardinia and Sicily. This northwards shift would weaken the claims of North Africa to deserving its own Patriarchate, and put an anticlimactic end to the religious conflicts which had divided their society. With the collapse of inland Mauri society, many of the monasteries that had attracted the ire of the Church were in the hands of polytheist Berbers who had little concern for the broader world and their religious schisms.
 
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The Mauri aren't going to last much longer, under the pressure of both climate change and nomadic expansion. If things get bad enough, the Roman and Mauri population could conceivably find themselves in a position where they have to come hat in hand to Sergius so that they can remain under 'civilized' Roman rule, even if they have to bite the bullet.

By the way, your descriptions of the civilizations in the Horn of Africa and beyond are fascinating; once again its an area of the world I know very little about, and its as much an educational opportunity as it is reading a timeline.
 
The Mauri aren't going to last much longer, under the pressure of both climate change and nomadic expansion. If things get bad enough, the Roman and Mauri population could conceivably find themselves in a position where they have to come hat in hand to Sergius so that they can remain under 'civilized' Roman rule, even if they have to bite the bullet.
Oh, that would be a sad ending for them. Of course it helps that a lot of the Mauri have always thought of themselves as African Romans, and another portion are coming around to that notion more recently. Besides, at least the Romans aren't pagan.

I'm glad you're enjoying the descriptions. It's been a great learning opportunity for me as well, figuring out what things were really like and then figuring out how they'd be (drastically!) changed in this timeline. I've seen a lot of timelines without Islam, but a world without a Caliphate is a world where East Africa evolves down a totally different path.
It would be interesting if the Berbers were eventually converted by the Gnostic monks now in their territory (i.e. Arianism 2.0). I don't know how plausible it is, though.
Me either. Historically Berber polytheism endured until the coming of Islam and after, and though they had many opportunities prior to that, they never converted to Christianity. If anyone could shed light on that I'd be interested to know. Islam seems to have had a unique appeal to them, and some of the speculation I've read seems to indicate they thought of the Arabs as very similar to them and the feeling was somewhat mutual.
 
Nice update.

I've got a soft spot for the little shahdom of Awalastan. Seems like the Hawiya are on more solid footing than their Kaoshan predecessors as well now that they've cut off a huge chunk of Axum's coast and have a tighter relationship with the eastern foreign traders.

Also seems like the Mauri immigration into Sicily and Sardinia will make Sergius' negotiation with the local governors there more likely than not. Otherwise, I'd think they'd be a hard nut to crack with force.
 
Eastern Promises
The Eastern Mediterranean

After the death of Basileus Heshana II in 683, he was succeeded by his son, Timotheos Heshana. Like his father, Timotheos had grown up in the luxurious palace of Hvarabad, tutored by both Coptic monks and the descendents of the Arab and Eftal warriors who had conquered Egypt. Unlike his father, however, all of his instruction was in a mixture of Greek and Coptic. According to the biographer Anathasios of Cyrene, he struggled with Eftal and would only learn Aramaic as a young man. At sixteen, he was betrothed and married to a woman of the Banu Shayban, one of the Christianized Arab tribes on the frontier and an important buffer against the growing power of the Ghatafan to the southeast and Akhsaman the Younger to the north.

Transplanted Arabs made up a not insignificant portion of the Egyptian military, especially after the conquest of Palestine. Having resided among the Roman population of Palestine for some time, they were largely Christian and largely Aramaic speaking. They retained their tribal affiliations and provided a useful auxiliary force with personal, tribal loyalties to the monarchy. A legacy of Syavush, the Heshanid line never quite forgot their historic paranoia. Hvarabad was still very much their city, stately, decadent, and very much separate from the bustle of Alexandria and Tamiathis. Their reliance on foreigners and their own small elite for military strength showed a waning but still present distrust of the Copts. Even as they assimilated in dress, speech, culture, and faith, they never stopped feeling themselves distinct from the people they ruled.

This does not seem to have been reciprocated by the Copts. Timotheos Heshana's mother was a Copt, and when he took the throne most of his chancellery would be populated by Copts. Whatever paranoia the royals felt, it was perhaps excessive. They had little to fear. Indeed, Egypt was entering into a sort of golden age. The treasures of the south and east flowed abundantly through their ports. As the era of the Mauri came to a close, Coptic traders took a greater and greater share of these goods north to the Anatolian cities, Italy, and Francia. Egypt and the Rhom Shahs had the only two major fleets in the eastern Mediterranean, and in 694, they would collaborate to put an end the pirate fleets holding Crete and Rhodes. The former was given a Coptic governor, a cousin-in-law of Heshana's, and the latter became a tributary of the Eftal, and an Eftal garrison was established on the island near the small town of Afantou.

The construction of a proper Eftal fleet marked a change in the power of the Rhom Shah. The islands of the Aegean, briefly independent of any power in the wake of the collapse of the Roman Empire, were brought to heel. Shah Disiapata's power was still loose and very feudal, but it was nevertheless growing quickly. A strategic marriage between his sister and the Alan Khan Chodainos solidified his northern borders, and after the death of Kormisosh in 677, he engineered it so the childless mercenary left his "Shahdom" to Disiapata.

As soon as this was discovered, the Nicomedians rebelled. Under a local patrician named Dioscoros, they intended to restore Roman rule in Constantinople and the Empire as a whole. Dioscoros played his hand cleverly, assuring his supporters that the Isidorians would assist them and that the other Roman cities would rise up behind them. But Disiapata struck quickly, riding north with his Eftal and Bulgarian forces before the Nicomedians could more than a few local towns to their cause - the only Roman city to join was Sardis. After a three week siege, Dioscoros and his compatriots were shown no mercy, and Sardis had its independence revoked. Disiapata assigned one of his companions the city and its hinterlands as a personal fief after short but vicious sack - a reminder that the Roman cities, though wealthy and economically powerful were alone far too weak to resist the Eftal.

After the defeat of the Nicomedians, Disiapata moved his capital once more - this time to Constantinople. Depopulated and thoroughly plundered, the costs of repairing the city would be high, but as a symbolic gesture it was effective. Practically speaking Ikonion would remain the heart of the kingdom, populated as it was by the majority of the Eftal in the Shahdom, and the seat of Avyaman, his heir apparent and by 690, co-Shah. However, by holding court in the Imperial Palace once more, even if the population of the city amounted to an Eftal garrison, a Sahu trading post, and perhaps thirty thousand Roman citizens, Disiapata was asserting a sort of continuation of the prestige and power of the Roman Empire. That he did so from a vast ruin undermined that message to a certain degree.

The renovations of Constantinople, undertaken on-and-off for roughly twenty years after 680 represented a major endeavor. Restoration of the walls and the Imperial Palace took precedence, followed by a series of fortifications along the first hill, linking to the sea walls. These constructions were expensive and time consuming, but they gave a certain sense of grandeur back to the Second Rome. A striking Buddhist temple was built, very much in the style of a Roman Basilica - except for the painted iconography of the Buddha across the roof, and the adjacent shrines to various Eftal and Sahu gods, which were in the springtime heavy with flowers. This construction, while meaningful to the large Sahu and Eftal trade community, and eventually to a decent number of the Bulgars and Slavs who migrated to the city, nevertheless earned the ire of the Christians of the former Roman Empire. The unbelievers had truly tarnished their city, where the Equal to the Apostles once ruled.

By 700, the population of the city had risen dramatically. Large portions were still in poor shape, but healthy trade was restored and those who lived there, a cosmopolitan mixture of many peoples, felt relatively safe behind the restored Land Walls. The city might have been a shadow of its former splendor, but it was growing once more.

Across the straits, the three Slavic Princedoms, Thrace, Thessaloniki, and Epirus, entered into an age of revival as well, free from Avar Hegemony. Coreligionists of their Greek population, the latter half of the 7th century and the early decades of the eighth saw increasing homogeny between the Slavic and Greek populations. Increased local trade between the diminished cities and their hinterlands slowly blended regional dialects and also the Slavic and Greek languages. Thessaloniki and Adrianople became bustling local capitals, and apart from sporadic Bulgar raids it was a time of relative peace. The Avars, distracted to their north, did little to threaten the safety of the Princes.

Furthermore, the Balkans became once more involved in trade on a large scale. Merchants from Ephesus and Alexandria sailed to harbors in Thessaloniki and Corinth, Heraclea and Arta. Those tribal leaders who had found themselves with large landholdings were able to trade minerals, timber, and agricultural products for the foreign luxuries which they were quickly developing a taste for. These societies were essentially feudal. Their urban areas were atrophied fortifications with central marketplaces. These landholders were lords capable of raising not insignificant tribal levies - a legacy of the Slavic raids of the previous century. They acknowledged central royal authority out of obligation, loose kinship bonds, and a desire for protection. In some ways this was not so different from the Rhom Shahdom across the water - except in general the Rhom Shahdom drew from a more sophisticated, urban, cultural heritage that the Slavs did not have access to, having destroyed their links to the Roman past more thoroughly and lacking the eastern influences that the Eftal had acquired.

Eastern Promise

Sotkhri Nyentsen ascended to the Imperial Throne of Bod in 675, amid much celebration. His father and grandfather had been brilliant leaders, the first as a unifier and the second as a conqueror. It was a difficult legacy to live up to, and Sotkhri Nyentsen was perhaps not the man for the job. By all accounts he was a beautiful and arrogant young man who shunned the advice of his councilors and the growing Tibetan monastic community. He had the turbulent manner of one born into incredible power - alternately mild and wrathful. Arbitrary, lustful, and dangerously cunning, he ensured the disgrace and exile of his two older brothers. Perhaps obviously, he was not well liked by the nobility, who had to live with him in Rhasu, or his wife, the Sogdian princess Roshana.

The young Emperor's energies had to be diverted. His councilors believed that An-hsi, the frontier was weak, and thus goaded him into organizing a military campaign against the Qi. The Governor-General of An-hsi, Wu Dan, had failed to train his soldiers to an acceptable standard. Many lacked adequate armor and weapons, and as such when the Bod army attacked the initial battles were massacres. Many walled cities fell, and the Bod came within striking distance of Chang'an itself before new armies could be levied to stem the tide. Uighur mercenaries were called upon in great numbers to counteract the superior Tibetan cavalry, well-armored and riding excellent Ferghanian horses.

The Qi dynasty, however, was resilient. Chang'an was too large to easily besiege, and well garrisoned. The campaign stalled and the Emperor, growing frustrated, delegated more and more to his general, Tritsu. Tritsu proved to be exceptionally competent. Though the Chinese armies were too numerous to wear down through attrition, he nevertheless bloodied them badly and forced the Qi Emperor to make an embarrassing peace. Many border cities were ceded, and a small annual tribute was arranged - ostensibly a gift to the western barbarians.

The Bod would go on to have more campaigns. Their energies would go into a conquest of Nanzhao (683-685) and raids into Assam (687-694). However, perhaps the greatest ramification of these wars was not the plunder and glory Sotkhri Nyentsen sought to attain, or the conquered peoples who contributed soldiers and tribute and solidified Tibetan power, but rather several anonymous bureaucrats captured in the first Bod-Qi war. These prisoners would turn out to have knowledge of papermaking techniques, techniques which would be seized upon by the ministers of the Tibetan court, but also further disseminated from there after a group of Sogdian merchants acquired the knowledge with a small bribe. By the early eighth century, paper could be found in Ayodhya and Samarkand, in Kapisa and Takasashila.

With age, Sotkhri would become more moderate. An Eftal historian and Buddhist missionary named Hravadata, who lived in Rhasu much of his adult life attributed this moderation to the influences of Roshana and the birth of several children. In truth however, Sotkhri may have merely became tired. His youth was spent in ceaseless activity, much of it for little gain. Delegating to his nobles suited him, and the structure of the Tibetan state, thanks to the labors of his ancestors, was strong enough to survive his inattention.
 

Deleted member 67076

Rebirth and Revival in the Eastern Med.

I suspect that the Rhom will start to centralize soon. They've got access to Constantinople and trade money is now filling up their coffers nicely, giving the central government more resources to better equip and organize itself. Besides, there's more need for that. Feudalism is hell the bigger your realm is.

At the same time, I think Thrace will eat the rest of the Balkan statelets. Its naturally more fertile, can access large amounts of mercenaries and levies and has plenty of incentive to corner the trade market.

Oh and it looks like Tibet might end up majority Bengali soon enough.
 
I suspect that the Rhom will start to centralize soon. They've got access to Constantinople and trade money is now filling up their coffers nicely, giving the central government more resources to better equip and organize itself. Besides, there's more need for that. Feudalism is hell the bigger your realm is.
The real important question is can they centralize? As much as they want to, the Eftal are predominant only on the central plateau, the Bulgars are fewer in number than they'd like to be and while the cities may have learned that military force isn't going to throw off the Eftal but I bet they'll find a way to maintain a lot of their traditional privileges.

As for Thrace, any idea what a Slavic mega-state in the Balkans would be called? I guess something like the Grand Principality of Rome? It would be fun to have most states in the Mediterranean in some way trace their heritage to the Roman Empire.

Oh and it looks like Tibet might end up majority Bengali soon enough.
Tibet hasn't reached Bengal? I don't know if they ever will in this timeline, where the Qi dynasty is a weaker foe than the more martial Tang dynasty.
 
As for Thrace, any idea what a Slavic mega-state in the Balkans would be called?

Sclavinia, Slavonia or Slavia perhaps. After all it is a state of Slavs united against foreign and alien peoples. If you look around the ethnographic maps you will see certain interesting fact: that slavic communities living at the border of Slavic world or surrounded by other ethnicities were using not some exotic indigenous names but the very name which indicated that they were Slavs (like Slovenes in northern Dalmatia and Carinthia, Ilmen Slovene around Novgorod, Slovaks which were subjugated first to Avars then to Hungarians). I may be mistaken but I think that young shahs of southern Slavic state would like to sen a message that they aren't Avars nor Romans nor Eftal - especially if the state would begin as an union of sort or alliance not as en effect of conquest. In the latter case probably the dominant tribe would give it's name to the whole like in OTL happened with Poland.
Though maybe I am mistaken. I don't know well Balkan history, only a handfull of facts.

Practical Lobster said:
I guess something like the Grand Principality of Rome? It would be fun to have most states in the Mediterranean in some way trace their heritage to the Roman Empire.

I doubt it. You yourself wrote:
"...the Rhom Shahdom drew from a more sophisticated, urban, cultural heritage that the Slavs did not have access to, having destroyed their links to the Roman past more thoroughly...".

And Constantinople itself - the Second Rome - already belongs to Eftal state which is called Rhom. I doubt anybody would call neighboring Slavic state "Roman" as it would create confusion.
 
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That seems like a good point, thank you! Sklavenia perhaps.

The next post, for those who are curious, will cover the aftermath of Husrava's conquests and defeat. I may experiment with writing it more as a story-post.

Then we'll probably swing back and look at North and West Africa some more. And Francia too. Although especially the latter of those will require a lot more research, I know very little about the early Franks and I think it shows.
 
I just binged this over the past couple days, absolutely love the timeline. It's incredibly detailed, broad in scope, and doesn't play favorites or feel contrived. It's interesting to see a timeline like this, where basically no states from the time of the PoD survive two centuries in any form (I guess you could argue the Heshanids are Roman inheritors?). It is, all in all, an incredibly impressive timeline.

What is happening in Arabia? I know the Saihists pushed north into the other Arab lands, and the Hadhramut seem to be muddling along and just gradually declining but... everything there feels pretty vague. I guess without Islam, the Arab peninsula isn't as important, but the relative obscurity of the events there still feel odd given its geographical closeness to most of the major surviving states. Given the Saihist apparent successes in northern areas, are their neighbors looking at raids from these Arabs? Missionaries? Or is their only effect to push out the nonbelievers?

I don't want to seem nitpicky or anything - this is, again, an incredibly detailed timeline - but once you introduced the Saihists and gave these enticing little glimpses into their successes, theology, and influence, I kept waiting for something that gives them an in-depth look, and I kept not seeing one.

(If you're already planning on covering it in more depth later, or it's only going to matter later, ignore this. ;) )
 
Thanks, Haplogroup!

What is happening in Arabia? I know the Saihists pushed north into the other Arab lands, and the Hadhramut seem to be muddling along and just gradually declining but... everything there feels pretty vague. I guess without Islam, the Arab peninsula isn't as important, but the relative obscurity of the events there still feel odd given its geographical closeness to most of the major surviving states. Given the Saihist apparent successes in northern areas, are their neighbors looking at raids from these Arabs? Missionaries? Or is their only effect to push out the nonbelievers?

Arabia does indeed deserve a post and I have one planned to cover the past 50 years or so. In the interim I've tried to circle around the edges and hint at developments a little bit while I figure out precisely what's going on. I think I'll do that in the next post then.

But to quickly provide some insight into why I haven't gotten around to it: The Saihists are still relatively new. The Suwar wasn't compiled totally until maybe five to ten years after [FONT=&quot]Nu'maan ibn Mundhir al-Sa'ih got his hands on it in 640 and would be revised/edited more after his death. The religion has spread like wildfire through the Hejaz, and there are some communities in East Africa, but it really hasn't had much time yet.

I wanted to wait a little so I would have a little bit longer timespan to cover. Also I'm wary with something like Saihism because it's difficult, I think, to write a convincing and plausible religion out of whole cloth. So I really want to make sure it feels authentic and plausible.

As for the rest of Arabia, it would be difficult to cover them in isolation from the Saihist movement. [/FONT]
 
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