The Rise of a Militaristic Carthage?

Lots of people start with the idea that Carthage was a city of merchants, and then extrapolate all kinds of conclusions about what this means without basing them in the evidence. Carthage was almost constantly at war, and war had a direct effect on the city's trading. Archaeologists theorize based on amphorae finds that Carthage began a long period of expansionism to conquer agricultural land in the Tunisian sahel, Sicily, and Sardinia to feed growing demands for cereal grains in the eastern Mediterranean, especially Athens.

I'm hardly going to dispute this. Though, as you bring up Athens I will also point out that like that state many of their wars ended in the pursuit of trade concessions rather than territorial ones (at least as far as I recall,correct me if I'm wrong). What I'm pointing out is that an increase in militerization to the point it becomes a more defining feature to the Carthginians than merchantile activity is hardly going to come to the benefit of the commercial classes relative to their elite rivals. If nothing else, sucking your landowning farmers off into the military would decrease the retention of and development on Carthage's historical acheivements in agricultural innovations.
 
Well, while Carthage actually DID match the Romans many times on the field, sources pretty clearly state that in sheer numbers, Rome had the edge, by far. One could argue, regarding the Second Punic War, that the individual tactical ability of Hannibal offset the undeniable Roman advantage in number may times. I don't think it was the only factor (most Carthaginian soldiers were full time troops - "mercenaries" -, which was not really yet the case for the Roman counterparts, mostly; this means the possibility of better training on the Carthaginian side) but certainly Hannibal was an exceptionally gifted commander.

But Hannibal's army was pretty much his personal army (or an army of his family if we count the troops operating in Spain). After Scipio's landing in Africa Carthage raised some troops of its own but their "professionalism" (as in regular training, organizational structure, etc.) was seemingly not on the same level as one of their opponent and they did heavily rely upon the Numidian allies.

Of course, something can be said about the Roman consular system which was more than once delivered command of an army to a political demagogue with a minimal military experience and no talent whatsoever and/or resulted in the army being split between 2 independent commanders with a limited tenure. OTOH, Scipio hold uninterrupted (IIRC) command in Spain between 211 BC and 206 BC and in Sicily/Africa in 205 BC - 203 BC.
 
But Hannibal's army was pretty much his personal army (or an army of his family if we count the troops operating in Spain). After Scipio's landing in Africa Carthage raised some troops of its own but their "professionalism" (as in regular training, organizational structure, etc.) was seemingly not on the same level as one of their opponent and they did heavily rely upon the Numidian allies.

Of course, something can be said about the Roman consular system which was more than once delivered command of an army to a political demagogue with a minimal military experience and no talent whatsoever and/or resulted in the army being split between 2 independent commanders with a limited tenure. OTOH, Scipio hold uninterrupted (IIRC) command in Spain between 211 BC and 206 BC and in Sicily/Africa in 205 BC - 203 BC.

Yes, Hannibal's army being highly trained is related to its being Hannibal's (as in, the exceptional value of his generalship extended to expetionally good training of troops under his command, a point I think is explicitly stated somewhere by Livy IIRC). And by all accounts, they were fiercely loyal to him.
But it is not the first time Carthage relied on "professional" troops and the superior training they should be displaying by the fact of being such, limiting other advantages of enemy forces (such as numbers).
Of course, troops raised in the wake of the invasion by Scipio would not have been trained. Carthage probably had, and paid, professional soldiers, sometimes very good, but, unlike mid-Republican Rome (and many Hellenic city states, again), was not a polity of (even half professional) soldiers almost in its entirety.
The third Punic War however would prove, how fanatical was the loyalty that Carthage could inspire in ts ordinary citizenship.
 
Yes, Hannibal's army being highly trained is related to its being Hannibal's (as in, the exceptional value of his generalship extended to expetionally good training of troops under his command, a point I think is explicitly stated somewhere by Livy IIRC). And by all accounts, they were fiercely loyal to him.
But it is not the first time Carthage relied on "professional" troops and the superior training they should be displaying by the fact of being such, limiting other advantages of enemy forces (such as numbers).

The main problem with the mercenary troops at all times was that they had to be well paid (or adequately "compensated" otherwise). The same goes for their leadership: where is a guarantee that a popular general is not going to turn against the government or decide to switch sides (if he is also a mercenary)? Which is what pretty much happened with the Numidians during Scipio's campaign in Africa.

Then of course, there was a potential problem with getting more high quality mercenary troops during a protracted war: you begin the war with the well-trained cadres but the newly-recruited ones are not up to the same standard and you start having problems (as seems to be the case with Hannibal's brothers and other generals operating out of Spain). OTOH, the fact that the Rome was a highly militarized state, most of the citizens already had military training and there was a good system for training the new recruits. In other words, Rome could "squeeze" more out of its population than Carthage (pretty much as Napoleonic France could raise more troops as a percentage of its population than its opponents which relied on less efficient systems).

Of course, troops raised in the wake of the invasion by Scipio would not have been trained. Carthage probably had, and paid, professional soldiers, sometimes very good,

and sometimes not good enough so it had a mercenary rebellion after the 1st Punic War and had to exterminate its own military cadres.


but, unlike mid-Republican Rome (and many Hellenic city states, again), was not a polity of (even half professional) soldiers almost in its entirety.
The third Punic War however would prove, how fanatical was the loyalty that Carthage could inspire in ts ordinary citizenship.

Yes, this was very impressive but, just as earlier during the siege of Tyre by Alexander or later during the Judean War, it was proven that almost no matter how fanatical are the defenders and how good are the fortifications, the city is going to fall to the well-organized assault.
 
and sometimes not good enough so it had a mercenary rebellion after the 1st Punic War and had to exterminate its own military cadres.

I meant "good" referring to the quality of the troops, not the pay they were getting. ;)


Yes, this was very impressive but, just as earlier during the siege of Tyre by Alexander or later during the Judean War, it was proven that almost no matter how fanatical are the defenders and how good are the fortifications, the city is going to fall to the well-organized assault.

Of course.
 
Well, while Carthage actually DID match the Romans many times on the field, sources pretty clearly state that in sheer numbers, Rome had the edge, by far.
Do they? At the beginning of the war, the Carthaginians mobilized about 120,000 men, whereas the Romans began with two consular armies and reserve forces in Cisalpine Gaul, amounting to 60,000 men in total; at their peak in 215/4 BC, Carthaginian forces totaled perhaps 165,000 men, with two armies in Italy, an army in Sardinia, and large armies in Spain, when Roman strength in the field was at most 145,000, and perhaps more realistically about 100,000. If Hannibal had concentrated on beating the Romans before taking the desired territory, he might have powered on to Rome with about 100,000 men (between Hannibal's main army, the detached force under Hanno, Mago's new army, and the army OTL sent to Sardinia) in Italy.
 
Do they? At the beginning of the war, the Carthaginians mobilized about 120,000 men, whereas the Romans began with two consular armies and reserve forces in Cisalpine Gaul, amounting to 60,000 men in total; at their peak in 215/4 BC, Carthaginian forces totaled perhaps 165,000 men, with two armies in Italy, an army in Sardinia, and large armies in Spain, when Roman strength in the field was at most 145,000, and perhaps more realistically about 100,000. If Hannibal had concentrated on beating the Romans before taking the desired territory, he might have powered on to Rome with about 100,000 men (between Hannibal's main army, the detached force under Hanno, Mago's new army, and the army OTL sent to Sardinia) in Italy.

That would have been a logistical nightmare, and the siege of a big city with walls is no small thing to carry on, especially when you’re in enemy territory. Besides, Carthage might have had the edge in numbers right after Cannae, but in the long run, manpower was definitely on Rome’s side, she could even allow herself to send some men fighting around Greece while coping with Hannibal.
 
Yes, this was very impressive but, just as earlier during the siege of Tyre by Alexander or later during the Judean War, it was proven that almost no matter how fanatical are the defenders and how good are the fortifications, the city is going to fall to the well-organized assault.

I thought Carthage fell because the defenders were starved to death?
 
I thought Carthage fell because the defenders were starved to death?

Carthage fell because the Romans conquered and destroyed it piece by piece, using ruins and corpses as ramparts in the process. It had been 3 years, the Romans had no intention of just sitting around and watch Carthage getting starved into surrender.
 
Carthage fell because the Romans conquered and destroyed it piece by piece, using ruins and corpses as ramparts in the process. It had been 3 years, the Romans had no intention of just sitting around and watch Carthage getting starved into surrender.

I may have to read sth up... what's your source?
 
That would have been a logistical nightmare, and the siege of a big city with walls is no small thing to carry on, especially when you’re in enemy territory. Besides, Carthage might have had the edge in numbers right after Cannae, but in the long run, manpower was definitely on Rome’s side, she could even allow herself to send some men fighting around Greece while coping with Hannibal.
'Oh no, let's forego our best chance to win the war and destroy our most powerful enemy in this fight to the death because ...?'
This is the mindset of someone who's afraid to use healing potions during the final boss battle; if Rome is taken and forced to accept a dictated peace, it won't matter if the men endured privation during the march and siege. Moreover, a large proportion of these reinforcements would not be serving in the army deployed to besiege Rome, but rather in the subordinate force guarding Hannibal's operational base and lines of communication to Capua. A general whose army suffers privation in Campania is frankly a bigger problem than the enemy. From Capua, Hannibal could have been in the area of Rome in a week or two, and based on his secure lines of communication to the richest region in Italy, maintained his army much longer than a blockaded city of a quarter million could survive. More likely, the Romans would not submit to a siege of their city made with secure communications, and would be forced to offer battle, giving Hannibal a chance to destroy their main force.
 
'Oh no, let's forego our best chance to win the war and destroy our most powerful enemy in this fight to the death because ...?'
This is the mindset of someone who's afraid to use healing potions during the final boss battle; if Rome is taken and forced to accept a dictated peace, it won't matter if the men endured privation during the march and siege. Moreover, a large proportion of these reinforcements would not be serving in the army deployed to besiege Rome, but rather in the subordinate force guarding Hannibal's operational base and lines of communication to Capua. A general whose army suffers privation in Campania is frankly a bigger problem than the enemy. From Capua, Hannibal could have been in the area of Rome in a week or two, and based on his secure lines of communication to the richest region in Italy, maintained his army much longer than a blockaded city of a quarter million could survive. More likely, the Romans would not submit to a siege of their city made with secure communications, and would be forced to offer battle, giving Hannibal a chance to destroy their main force.

If Hannibal could take Rome in a week or two, sure, but he couldn’t. Rome would have rather freed all her slaves, and given citizenship to all her allies, and lynched all pessimists and defeatists, rather than surrender. The Latin allies never seriously contemplated switching sides, the Italian allies were fickle and unreliable, as Pyrrhus had realized 64 years before, and things in Spain were going sufficiently well for the Romans to not warrant a surrender. Romans would have never been so stupid to give Hannibal the open battle he wanted, they would have done exactly what they did at Nola, stay in their position and force the man to retreat. Hannibal would have had to build siege engines, ramparts, ladders and the whole shabang, all this in enemy territory, with exhausted soldiers, with the winter season approaching. No matter what Maharbal supposedly said, I believe that if a general like Hannibal believed he couldn’t take Rome, he had sound reason to believe so.
 
If Hannibal could take Rome in a week or two, sure, but he couldn’t. Rome would have rather freed all her slaves, and given citizenship to all her allies, and lynched all pessimists and defeatists, rather than surrender. The Latin allies never seriously contemplated switching sides, the Italian allies were fickle and unreliable, as Pyrrhus had realized 64 years before, and things in Spain were going sufficiently well for the Romans to not warrant a surrender. Romans would have never been so stupid to give Hannibal the open battle he wanted, they would have done exactly what they did at Nola, stay in their position and force the man to retreat. Hannibal would have had to build siege engines, ramparts, ladders and the whole shabang, all this in enemy territory, with exhausted soldiers, with the winter season approaching. No matter what Maharbal supposedly said, I believe that if a general like Hannibal believed he couldn’t take Rome, he had sound reason to believe so.
The POD of this thought experiment is that things in Spain are going badly for the Romans (or at least stalemated), so there's no need for Hannibal to divert reinforcements to that theatre, and that the Sardinian expedition never happens. Moreover, the Romans would need a very large army to credibly threaten Hannibal's communications with Campania, which they didn't have in 215. 100,000 men isn't enough to fight 60,000 men Spain, 60,000 in Latinum, and 40,000 in Campania. Either they would have to surrender their gains in Spain, risk losing Rome to assault, or give up on menacing Hannibal's communications to Campania. By repeatedly dividing his resources attempting to build a post war order before the Romans were defeated, Hannibal gave the Romans an opportunity to recover. Hannibal's judgement was certainly imperfect; if you're right, he began a war he never could have won, but if I'm right, his brothers in Iberia lost the chance to win a war he could have won. If we agree on his brilliance, my interpretation is more consistent with this axiom.
 
The POD of this thought experiment is that things in Spain are going badly for the Romans (or at least stalemated), so there's no need for Hannibal to divert reinforcements to that theatre, and that the Sardinian expedition never happens. Moreover, the Romans would need a very large army to credibly threaten Hannibal's communications with Campania, which they didn't have in 215. 100,000 men isn't enough to fight 60,000 men Spain, 60,000 in Latinum, and 40,000 in Campania. Either they would have to surrender their gains in Spain, risk losing Rome to assault, or give up on menacing Hannibal's communications to Campania. By repeatedly dividing his resources attempting to build a post war order before the Romans were defeated, Hannibal gave the Romans an opportunity to recover. Hannibal's judgement was certainly imperfect; if you're right, he began a war he never could have won, but if I'm right, his brothers in Iberia lost the chance to win a war he could have won. If we agree on his brilliance, my interpretation is more consistent with this axiom.

Honestly, I was seeing things through OTL. With a POD like that, things might be different, however, taking Rome by assault still is no easy task, even with a steady supply line. All cities he conquered in Italy either opened their doors to him, or were delivered to him by treason, or were simply easy to storm. In Rome’s case, months, if not more, would have been required. Hannibal hoped that defeating one Roman army after the other would make the entirety of her allies switch sides, and he also believed the Italian allies could be relied upon to wage war effectively against Rome. He was wrong in both cases, but that’s more due to the exceptional nature of Rome’s network of allies than anything else. If what happened to Rome had happened to Carthage, every single one of her allies would have turned in on her, so Hannibal thought the same would happen to Rome. As it turns out, unless things had drastically changed in Spain, he really fought a war he couldn’t win.
 
I thought Carthage fell because the defenders were starved to death?
Some of them died from starvation but the city had been taken by storm with a fierce house-to-house fighting that lasted for at least 6 days after the Romans penetrated outsde wall. 50,000 survivors had been sold into slavery so the rumors about all of them dying from a starvation are, to quote Mark Twain, "greatly exaggerated".;)
 
Honestly, I was seeing things through OTL. With a POD like that, things might be different, however, taking Rome by assault still is no easy task, even with a steady supply line. All cities he conquered in Italy either opened their doors to him, or were delivered to him by treason, or were simply easy to storm. In Rome’s case, months, if not more, would have been required. Hannibal hoped that defeating one Roman army after the other would make the entirety of her allies switch sides, and he also believed the Italian allies could be relied upon to wage war effectively against Rome. He was wrong in both cases, but that’s more due to the exceptional nature of Rome’s network of allies than anything else. If what happened to Rome had happened to Carthage, every single one of her allies would have turned in on her, so Hannibal thought the same would happen to Rome. As it turns out, unless things had drastically changed in Spain, he really fought a war he couldn’t win.

I don't think Carthaginian victory in Spain requires that drastic a change; in most of the main battles, and in the theatre as a whole, the Carthaginians had numerical parity with the Romans, but Hasdrubal Barca and Hasdrubal son of Ghisco ended up losing them. This led to a shift in the momentum of the war, as the Romans were able to make Iberian manpower work for them, which enabled them to win more battles. If Carthage had been winning or consistently stalemating the Romans in Spain, perhaps fighting a Fabian strategy of their own in Iberia, it would free up reinforcements for Hannibal, since the Romans would be limited to the comparatively small expeditionary forces they could send to Spain. With greater strength in Italy, Hannibal would be able to extend greater protection for the cities of his Italian league, enticing more Socii to follow Capua and Tarentum's examples.

Carthage repeatedly raised large armies through the war, even after the loss of Spain; as long as Hasdrubal could hold his own in Iberia, they could keep sending Hannibal reinforcements. While this might not have led to an actual siege of Rome, the Romans would have to keep prepared for the possibility with large armies in Italy, hindering their efforts to cleave away Carthage's recruiting grounds in Spain or Numidia and suppress the revolts in Sardinia. With time, momentum would solidify on the Carthaginian side, and Rome would be stuck on the strategic defensive, unable to threaten Carthage's main sources of manpower while Hannibal's army lived off their territory and constantly threatened their allies. While Rome did have an strong manpower system, it was not unlimited, and by the later stages of the war even the Latin colonies were increasingly tapped out; the Romans needed a Fabian strategy precisely because manpower collapse was a real risk.

Simply put, Carthage had a great offensive general in Hannibal and a mediocre defensive commander in Hasdrubal, while the Romans had a great attacker and a great defender with both Scipio and Fabius.
 
I don't think Carthaginian victory in Spain requires that drastic a change; in most of the main battles, and in the theatre as a whole, the Carthaginians had numerical parity with the Romans, but Hasdrubal Barca and Hasdrubal son of Ghisco ended up losing them. This led to a shift in the momentum of the war, as the Romans were able to make Iberian manpower work for them, which enabled them to win more battles. If Carthage had been winning or consistently stalemating the Romans in Spain, perhaps fighting a Fabian strategy of their own in Iberia, it would free up reinforcements for Hannibal, since the Romans would be limited to the comparatively small expeditionary forces they could send to Spain. With greater strength in Italy, Hannibal would be able to extend greater protection for the cities of his Italian league, enticing more Socii to follow Capua and Tarentum's examples.

Carthage repeatedly raised large armies through the war, even after the loss of Spain; as long as Hasdrubal could hold his own in Iberia, they could keep sending Hannibal reinforcements. While this might not have led to an actual siege of Rome, the Romans would have to keep prepared for the possibility with large armies in Italy, hindering their efforts to cleave away Carthage's recruiting grounds in Spain or Numidia and suppress the revolts in Sardinia. With time, momentum would solidify on the Carthaginian side, and Rome would be stuck on the strategic defensive, unable to threaten Carthage's main sources of manpower while Hannibal's army lived off their territory and constantly threatened their allies. While Rome did have an strong manpower system, it was not unlimited, and by the later stages of the war even the Latin colonies were increasingly tapped out; the Romans needed a Fabian strategy precisely because manpower collapse was a real risk.

Simply put, Carthage had a great offensive general in Hannibal and a mediocre defensive commander in Hasdrubal, while the Romans had a great attacker and a great defender with both Scipio and Fabius.

I agree, with drastic changes in Spain I meant Carthage properly defeating Rome in Spain. If that were to happen, things would probably go as you said.
 
Would their manpower pool be as limited as OTL's? Because that seems like a serious problem.
Carthage really didn't attempt to immerse other groups with citizenship until after Tyre was conquered, and the number of Phoenician immigrants stopped. I think Hannibal had a plan to reform Carthiginian citizenship to also include Libyans, similar to Caracalla who gave all inhabitants in the empire Roman citizenship.
 
Carthage fell because the Romans conquered and destroyed it piece by piece, using ruins and corpses as ramparts in the process. It had been 3 years, the Romans had no intention of just sitting around and watch Carthage getting starved into surrender.

The way you describe this, it sounds like the fighting had gone on for more than six days the other posters mentioned. Unless your sources know better, I haven't read them yet.
 
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