Disclaimer: The text is based on an edited Google translation, so if you see errors anywhere, please let me know.
And so, I decided to write a TL about the absence of Yeltsin. The specific PoD that led to Boris Yeltsin not becoming a political leader in the late 1980s is not particularly important. This may be either an early death (before 1989), or the absence of a political career in his biography.
The absence of the popular leader of the democratic opposition, which was Boris Yeltsin, begins to influence the 1st Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) of the RSFSR in May 1990. Prior to this, democratic opposition to Gorbachev, both in the union parliament (Inter-Regional Deputies’ Group) and in the RSFSR (Democratic Russia Movement) will be formed even without him, not to mention the popular fronts in the republics.
Although, most likely, the “Yeltsin factor” influenced the result in some constituencies in the Russian elections, the final results will not change. The characteristic of the Slavic republics of the USSR general trends speak in favor of this. Therefore, I postulate that out of 1068 people's deputies of Russia in the democratic and national-patriotic camps there will be approximately 300-400 deputies, and the rest will belong to the centrists, whose position will determine the results of the vote. It is also worth noting that there will be several parliament democratic and natpatist factions in Russian at the same time like OTL.
The 1st Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR opened on May 16, 1990. The people's deputies were to elect the head of state: the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, his deputies, the cabinet and the Supreme Soviet – a compact parliament of 252 deputies, which was supposed to adopt laws between congresses.
Communists proposed the candidacy of one of the leaders of the conservative wing of the CPSU, Ivan Polozkov, IOTL, and after he couldn't defeat Yeltsin, they replaced him with the Prime Minister of the RSFSR Aleksandr Vlasov, who was considered as a candidate for the Chairman post even before the start of the Congress. Here is what the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR in 1988-1990 Vitaly Vorotnikov writes about this in the "Chronicle of the Absurd – the Separation of Russia from the USSR":
... During the break, here, in the Kremlin Palace, M. S. Gorbachev had a conversation with members of the Politburo, the Presidential Council, and secretaries of the Central Committee. (A. V. Vlasov was not there).
Gorbachev raised the question of what the specific situation is in relation to the proposed candidates. According to him (which one? from whom? he didn't explain), the Congress wasn't satisfied with the A. V. Vlasov's report, and especially with his answers. He believes that it is necessary to talk with the heads of delegations about A. V. Vlasov and I. K. Polozkov. Whether to leave two candidates or one. What? (How out of place these fluctuations were. After all, it’s already May 22!) Kryuchkov and Manaenkov confirmed that they now consider I.K. Polozkov’s rating higher...
... In the break, again, the M.S. Gorbachev conversation with members of the Politburo and secretaries of the Central Committee here in the Grand Kremlin Palace. The problem is who to nominate again? “We have to decide! (Here, after all, what fluctuations!) According to Kryuchkov and Manaenkov, Vlasov's rating continues to decline. Polozkov has great chances. As for Vlasov, to recommend him for the post of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR "...
... In the evening, at 19.00, the Central Committee of the CPSU. Meeting with secretaries of regional party committees deputies. The meeting was chaired by V. A. Medvedev. He reported on the recommendation of the Central Committee for the post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR - I. K. Polozkov. Shouts for and against. But if necessary, we will support. And again complaints, why is the issue resolved so late? They said one thing, now another. There is no time to work anymore. No guarantee. The secretaries were outraged.
I. K. Polozkov is worried: “Why did they set me up at the last moment? I had already calmed down. It would be better to go along with A. V. Vlasov. This would give a greater effect "...
Most likely, these gestures were part of Gorbachev's cunning plan. He counted on the fact that neither Yeltsin nor Polozkov would be able to get a majority at the Congress and thereby eliminate each other. That would allow Gorbachev to impose a moderate candidate convenient to him. In pursuance of this cunning plan, the Communists of Russia faction proposed to hold elections with new candidates after the second round and proposed Vlasov from their faction, but Yeltsin didn't go about them and won in the third vote.
The situation ITTL differs from the OTL. The Democrats are weaker and do not have a ready-made charismatic leader who threatens Gorbachev's position. The main threat to the general secretary is not the reformist demagogue Yeltsin, but the communist fundamentalists within the Party. Therefore, OTL intrigues didn't happen because the risk of Polozkov being elected in this case is too great, which, together with his influence in the newly formed Communist Party of the RSFSR, turns him into a competitor to Gorbachev.
ITTL, the Communists immediately put forward Aleksandr Vlasov candidacy without OTL story with the Polozkov candidacy. Without Yeltsin, the Democrats didn't field a single candidate, and Democratic leaders run for Speaker separately. Although the Democrats united in the second round around the leader of the Democratic Party of Russia, Nikolai Travkin, this didn't help to avoid Vlasov's victory in the third round of voting by a narrow margin. The Democrats will rally around Travkin, and not, say, one of the leaders of Democratic Russia, Yury Afanasyev, because as a production worker he is socially closer to the centrist "swamp" of the Congress.
A representative of national minorities will be elected as the First Vice-Chairman, like IOTL. The most likely "vice-president" is Ramazan Abdulatipov, consultant of the Department of National Relations of the Central Committee of the CPSU, who headed the Council of Nationalities of the RSFSR SupSov IOTL. Travkin will be elected vice-speaker (without OTL amendments to the Constitution, the only one). The Democrats will also get some of the committee seats. The democratic opposition had these posts in the Ukrainian SSR and the Belarusian SSR, so the transfer of this practice to Russia is completely natural.
Unfortunately, there is no data on who Vlasov could have planned for the Russian Prime Minister role. According to the logic of things, this should be an official who has passed the path to the heights of the Soviet bureaucracy. OTL Yeltsin's Prime Minister of the RSFSR Deputy Prime Minister of the Union Government and former Minister of the Aviation Industry Ivan Silayev fits the necessary criteria, and, as the example of Vlasov himself shows, the transition from Union posts to Russian ones was in the order of things. Therefore, butterfly net works, and Silayev heads the Russian government ITTL, because why not.
The Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR will be adopted in formulations close to the OTL. This idea was not the Democrats' invention. The communists not only supported the Declaration IOTL, but also included it on the Congress agenda with the Vitaly Vorotnikov light hand. Although it is perceived as a nail in the coffin of the USSR IOTL, in honor of which the Russian Independence Day was established, it is the result of the OTL struggle between Yeltsin and Gorbachev under the Russian sovereignty slogan. The Russian Declaration's text, unlike the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine, didn't contain anything undermining Soviet federalism.
The struggle between Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev was the defining event of 1990-1991 IOTL. It set the tone for relations in the triangle of Gorbachev - democratic opposition - national patriots, pushing Gorbachev to an alliance with the latter. The "War of Laws" and "War of Taxes" directly influenced the New Union Treaty negotiations and the economic situation in the USSR. The actual victory of Yeltsin in this struggle was the beginning of the USSR agony, the August coup was the most striking manifestation of which. ITTL, the Russian parliament and government will act in the Gorbachev's policy wake until the end of the Aleksandr Vlasov reign.
Without Yeltsin leading the RSFSR and fighting against Gorbachev, the main line of confrontation will be between Gorbachev and party fundamentalists, dissatisfied with what they see as a rejection of principles, the threat of the Party losing power and the Union losing its great power status. One of the conservatives' leaders, Ivan Polozkov, was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the RSFSR at the RCP (Russian Communist Party) founding congress held at the end of June. The Conservatives tried to consolidate their success at the 28th Congress of the CPSU, held the following month, but despite their dominance in the party, they could not defeat Gorbachev, who, contrary to the Democrats' calls, didn't go to a disengagement from the Conservatives. He won the congress, being re-elected general secretary and promoting a number of his candidacies for positions in the party. Without the Yeltsin demarche, who left the Party right at the congress, the Democrats departure, who dissatisfied with compromises with retrogrades, was somewhat smoother, but by the end of 1990, the Democratic Platform fell off the CPSU, creating a number of parties in the republics.
Although Russia didn't lay mines under the USSR's financial and budgetary systems ITTL, the structural problems that led to its economic collapse didn't disappear. The Union economic reform program made headlines in May, when the Ryzhkov government raised the issue of a two-year-overdue price reform that was supposed to bring the price structure to a more or less reasonable form at the cost of raising consumer prices, too. The 500 Days program was also created ITTL, but remained only the Democratic Russia economic program. Gorbachev tends to the gradualist concept of reform like IOTL, fearing the "shock therapy" consequences. Without a conflict with the Russian government, the coordination of the Union economic program with the republics went faster, but it started after Ryzhkov's resignation.
Fears about the USSR fate were not unfounded. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia declared independence in the spring of 1990. In August – Armenia. The Supreme Soviet of Georgia adopted a law on the transitional period until the restoration of the independent Georgian Democratic Republic on 14 November 1990. The new Moldovan government sought to reunite with the Romanian brothers. Although Gorbachev was opposed to their secession, he rejected the National Patriots' proposals to introduce direct presidential rule in the separatist republics. The President of the USSR believed that the issue of their status should have been resolved within the framework of negotiations and the Law of the USSR "on the procedure for resolving issues related to the withdrawal of a union republic from the USSR" adopted in April 1990.
Gorbachev countered separatist tendencies with the idea of a New Union Treaty, which was supposed to re-establish the Soviet federation, expanding the rights of the republics of the Union. Together with Gorbachev, representatives of nine republics that (so far) didn't want to secede from the Union participated in its development: the RSFSR, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. Yeltsin successfully torpedoed efforts to preserve the Soviet federation IOTL. ITTL, Russian leadership follows Gorbachev's lead and, together with the Central Asian republics interested in union subsidies, supports the federalist project proposed by Gorbachev.
Although in Ukraine, unlike the six secessionist republics, the communists won the republican elections, the communist majority in the Ukrainian parliament was in no hurry to support the federalist plans of the Union government. Ukraine, unlike other republics, saw the future of the Union in the form of a confederation. On July 17, the republic’s SupSov adopted the Declaration on State Sovereignty, which, among other things, proclaimed the Ukrainian SSR’s right to create its own currency system and armed forces, as well as its desire for a neutral status in the future. Excessive focus on Moscow cost the leader of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Chairman of Ukraine Volodymyr Ivashko, whom Gorbachev made vice-secretary general, the power in Ukraine. Although Ivashko's successor in the party line, Stanislav Hurenko, was a conservative unionist, Leonid Kravchuk, the new Chairman of the Supreme Soviet (aka Verkhovna Rada), assumed power in the Ukrainian SSR.
During the autumn the New Union Treaty negotiations, Gorbachev, despite the special position of Ukraine, achieved the approval of the federalist project. IOTL, the rejection of key federalist issues, primarily the federal tax, occurred only after the August coup. Without Yeltsin's opposition ITTL, Gorbachev's position is stronger, and therefore in November the treaty draft will be ready for signing.
In addition to the union republics, the ASSR, which were part of them, also had to sign the NUT. The status of the ASSR as a subject of the Soviet Federation was established by the Constitution of 1977 and, especially, by the Law on the delimitation of powers between the USSR and the subject of the federation, adopted in April 1990. The union republics, which included the ASSR, feared that their participation in the New Union Treaty would be the first step towards secession from the parent republics. Although the NUT spelled out the status of the ASSR as part of the corresponding union republic, similar to modern Russian matryoshka regions such as the Tyumen oblast, this didn't prevent problems from arising.
The national-patriotic opposition tried to resist Gorbachev's course of "destruction of a great power." Communist fundamentalists and statists from the Soyuz (“Union” in Russian) faction fiercely criticized the government at every the Supreme Soviet meeting, but this didn't bear fruit. The National Patriots didn't hesitate to criticize Gorbachev IOTL, but his position is stronger ITTL.
The 4th Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, held in December, served to strengthen Gorbachev's power. The impeachment attempt by the National Patriots failed. The Congress amended the Constitution, strengthening the presidential power and introducing the post of vice president. Gorbachev chose Yanaev as vice-president IOTL for the sake of flirting with the conservatives, but he preferred Yevgeny Primakov, a member of his team, ITTL. Also in December, the chairman of the KGB was replaced. Instead of the hardliner Kryuchkov (the liberal Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin was dismissed in December 1990 IOTL), Leonid Shebarshin became the chairman of the KGB.
Another victory for Gorbachev was the appointment for March 17 of a referendum on the draft New Union Treaty. Unlike OTL, where voters were asked to vote "for all the good things and against all the bad things", they had to vote for or against a specific project ITTL. This hit both the natpats, who criticized the NUT from a unitary position, and the “special position” of Ukraine, whose representatives declared that they were ready to sign something only after a referendum in the republic.
Valentin Pavlov replaced Ryzhkov, who had fallen ill with a heart attack, as the Prime Minister. He quickly joined the hardliners IOTL because the weakness of the Union government prevented him from realizing his vision of economic policy, but by the end of 1990, unlike Kryuchkov, he was not seen as sympathetic to tightening the screws. Although such figures as Yury Maslyukov, Nursultan Nazarbayev, Arkady Volsky and others were named in addition to Pavlov, his reputation as a specialist in finance and support from republican leaders played in his favor.
The new government first step, planned by its predecessors, was a price reform that raised state prices by 60%. On January 1, a new wholesale price list began to operate, and on February 1, retail prices were raised. The latter happened two months earlier than OTL, because without the Russian opposition, the agreement and approval of new prices went faster. Although the new price list didn't mean the complete elimination of the price subsidies system, the reform led to some temporary improvement in commodity markets. Price increases reduced the surplus money supply, but without price liberalization or confiscatory currency reform, this could only have short-term results.
Although the OTL collapse of the union budget system caused by the "War of taxes" with the RSFSR didn't happen, the Union and the republics financial situation in the first half of 1991 left much to be desired. High budget deficits continued to be covered by the emission of money. The government tried to do something about it. Since the beginning of the year, a 5% sales tax has been introduced, a turnover tax replacement by the VAT has been planned, and the Ministry of Finance has been sequestering budgets with varying degrees of success. The fight against the deficit was hampered by the growth of the republican and local budgets expenditures. The republics not only compensated the people for higher prices, but also expanded social programs. At the same time, the economy has already begun to decline. Since January 1991, a decline in production has been recorded by about 10% compared to the last year levels.
There was a crisis in the Baltic States with the entry of Soviet troops into Lithuania and clashes in Vilnius and Riga IOTL on January 1991. Without confrontation with Russia, the Soviet Union position in negotiations with the Baltic republics after they declared independence in March-May 1990 is stronger. Despite this, Gorbachev was unable to get them to return to the fold, and the question was already about the division of property after a divorce by the beginning of 1991. The natpats, supported by the local Russian (read Soviet) population who moved to the Baltic States after 1944, demanded the introduction of presidential rule, but Gorbachev ignored their demands.
It is not clear to what extent Gorbachev is involved in the introduction of troops and clashes near the Vilnius TV tower, or whether this is an initiative of law enforcement agencies. ITL, the most likely author of the idea to overthrow the Lithuanian government (Kryuchkov) was dismissed, so there is simply no one in the Kremlin to come to the conclusion that it’s a twenty minutes adventure and convince Gorbachev of this / decide to put him before the fact. Republican leaders in the Federation Council would be expected to speak out against any intervention. Also, the absence of OTL Gorbachev's flirting with the National Patriots and attempts to tighten the screws because of the "War of Laws" and the Parade of Sovereignties works against the possible entry of troops into Lithuania in January 1991. Therefore, protests due to price increases in Lithuania will be local Lithuanian history.
Although there will be strikes due to price increases in February, including in the hitherto calm BSSR (price reform also led to protests in Belarus IOTL), without a confrontation between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, they will not reach the level of OTL scope and the protest politicization. The country was going to a referendum, which supposedly was supposed to decide its fate. Nine out of fifteen republics voted for the New Union Treaty on March 17, and in all of them, more than 60% of the votes were in favor of the Union like IOTL.
Russia obviously voted "yes" because the RSFSR was the USSR "supporting structure", and the Russian electorate has not yet reached the idea that the Union is a burden to them. The BSSR was perhaps the most Sovietized republic, since Belarusian nationalism was weaker than Ukrainian even before 1917. In the five Asian republics, the local CPSU branches power was strongest, and they were interested in maintaining the Union as a subsidies source. In the case of Azerbaijan, the Karabakh issue was added to the communists in power factor. Azerbaijan was interested in the Union support in its conflict with Armenia.
Ukraine has not yet experienced its public opinion evolution that took it from loyalty to the USSR to 90% in the independence referendum. Therefore, only three Galician regions and Kyiv voted against the Union. The Ukrainian leaders, understanding Gorbachev's game, held a republican referendum, which asked about support for "joining the USSR on the basis of the Declaration of State Sovereignty." The Ukrainians answered “yes” to both questions.
The referendum cut the ground from under the opponents of the Union feet, including in the Ukrainian SSR. Anti-unionists greeted the referendum results with mass protests. Passions were also seething in the Verkhovna Rada. As a result, Ukraine nevertheless decided to join the NUT with the proviso that the Union Constitution should reflect the Declaration of State Sovereignty.
On April 2, 9 union and 19 autonomous (16 Russian ASSRs, Karakalpakstan, Crimea, Nakhichevan) republics signed the New Union Treaty in Moscow. Until recently, there were doubts about the Ukrainian position, but, despite the opposition, Kravchuk signed the Treaty, and the Ukrainian parliament ratified it with a minimal majority.
The last 5th Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR opened on April 5. Its task was to ratify the New Union Treaty and amend the Constitution of the USSR, bringing it into line with it. It didn't cause problems. The Congress almost unanimously ratified the Treaty, and then brought the 1977 Constitution into line with it, eliminating the two-tier structure of parliament at the Union level. Elections to the 13th Supreme Soviet of the USSR (the Supreme Soviet elected in 1989 was supposed to be No. 12, but instead a CPD structure was created) were scheduled for August 11. On them, the inhabitants of the nine union republics that ratified the New Union Treaty were to elect 693 members of the Council of the Union (which corresponded to the total number of territorial electoral districts in the republics that signed the NUT in the 1989 elections). Another 308 people's deputies (11 from each republic), who were members of the Council of the Republics, were to elect by republican parliaments.
The natpatist group "Soyuz", for which the Congress was the last chance to fight for the 1945 borders preservation, raised the topic of six republics in which the NUT referendum was not held. The Baltic States and Georgia held republican referendums in February-March, in which the vast majority supported secession from the USSR. Gorbachev is obviously discouraged by these results, since he believed in the support of the Union by the "silent majority" in these republics, but is forced to accept the fact of secession. Referendums in Moldova and Armenia were to be held in June and September, respectively.
The Congress of People's Deputies called on the peoples of Armenia and Moldova to make a choice in favor of the Union in the upcoming referendums. Despite an attempt by the Soyuz faction to declare the plebiscites in the Baltic States and Georgia inconsistent with the Union referendum law and, accordingly, void, the Congress voted in favor of negotiations on the four republics secession conditions.
After failing to prevent the secession of the Baltic States and Georgia as a whole, the National Patriots raised the issue of minority regions in them, which were in opposition to local nationalist governments. So, only a quarter of the voters voted for the independence of Estonia in Narva, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia boycotted the Georgian referendum. At the same time, Abkhazia separately participated in the All-Union referendum, and in South Ossetia there was already a war between Georgians and Ossetians. There were also problems with pro-Soviet minorities in Moldova, where Gagauzia and Transnistria sought to remain in the USSR. On the eve of the Moldovan referendum, the natpatsts had the tact not to raise this topic, but calls for a revision of the Moldovan borders also sounded from the stands of the Congress. These initiatives failed because of the position of the union republics, who feared that the revising the republican borders precedent would hit them too.
The Russian Congress of People's Deputies, which was supposed to ratify the New Union Treaty, opened on April 11. By that time, the NUT had been ratified by almost all the union republics except Azerbaijan and most of the autonomies. Only Tatarstan caused problems. The republic had long aspired to the union republic status and saw a way to achieve this in the New Union Treaty by joining it separately from the RSFSR. That caused opposition from the union republics, who opposed undermining the RSFSR territorial integrity. Although the Tatarstan participation in the NUT and, accordingly, the Subject of the Union status didn't provide for its separation from the RSFSR, the Supreme Soviet of the Republic, upon its ratification on April 8, announced it.
The Union supported the RSFSR in the Tatar crisis. While it will seem to some that the Kremlin is by definition interested in dismantling Republic number one, this is an afterthought related to the conflict between Yeltsin and Gorbachev. For Gorbachev, both IOTL and ITTL, the support of the union republics, which weren't interested in the changing the republic territory without its consent precedent is vital for the implementation of reforms.
The Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which met at its first meeting after the 5th Congress on April 12, decided that the withdrawal of Tatarstan from the RSFSR was the Union Treaty violation. The Union Parliament called on Tatarstan and Russia to come to an agreement. Shaimiev, faced with the consolidated position of Russia and the Union, backtracked. At the suggestion of the Union Parliament, the Trilateral USSR-RSFSR-TatSSR Commission was formed, which was supposed to work out an agreement between Russia and Tatarstan.
The Tatar crisis became an opportunity for the deputies to show dissatisfaction with Aleksandr Vlasov. The national patriots, including the anti-Gorbachev CPSU faction, considered Vlasov a puppet of Gorbachev, who didn't allow the use of the RSFSR resources to save the Union. Democrats condemned Vlasov's excessive, in their opinion, slowness in the reforming the RSFSR. Ironically, it was the very traits that made Vlasov the Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet in 1990 that led to his downfall a year later. The deputies made Vlasov a scapegoat for the failure in relations with the autonomies and the Tatarstan demarche and announced a vote of no confidence in him.
A serious battle unfolded for the post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. About a dozen candidates participated in the first round of the speaker's election, but two favorites quickly emerged. Despite the conflict between Nikolai Travkin and the Democratic Russia leaders, the Democrats united around his figure. He was opposed by the young "Russia" faction leader, Sergey Baburin, around whom the National Patriots rallied. Abdulatipov, who was supported by autonomies representatives, took third place.
Travkin and Abdulatipov, either individually or together, could not stop Baburin's rise to power. Although many considered him too young for the main post in the republic, Baburin was able to rally his base and get the votes of the centrist swamp (the author recalls that during the attempt to elect the Chairman in July 1991 IOTL, Baburin walked ahead of Khasbulatov for some time). An important role in this was played by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Karelian SSR and one of the leaders of the Communists of Russia faction, Viktor Stepanov, who withdrew his candidacy in favor of Baburin IOTL in July 1991. He brought Baburin part of the votes of the autonomies.
Why Baburin? At that time, he was at the height of his influence among the national-patriotic people's deputies of Russia IOTL, and he was close to taking the post of speaker IOTL in the summer of 1991. His radical ultra-unionist position at the time of the vote was still not discredited. Sergey Baburin, unlike Nikolai Travkin, was able to take advantage of his chance and get to the top of power in Russia.
The Congress, despite its anti-autonomy orientation and fear of separatism, was able to find a compromise with the autonomous oblasts that wanted to become "republics within Russia" - Adygea, Gorny Altai, Karachay-Cherkessia and Khakassia. Although the CPD didn't immediately introduce amendments to the Constitution that would change the status of the four AOs, it agreed to their accession to the Federative Treaty as republics. This made it possible to temporarily relieve tension in relations between the Russian Federation and them.
The Central Committee of the CPSU plenum was held on April 28-29, the last one before the start of registration of candidates for elections and constituency party conferences. It was supposed to adopt a party platform with which the CPSU would go to the Supreme Soviet elections.
The conservatives, inspired by the Russian natpatists successes, who had promoted their man to the "president" of the republic post, wanted to achieve Gorbachev's resignation. They hoped that this would weaken their opponents in the party positions and allow the CPSU to be used to seize power after the parliamentary elections. Conservatives brought down a flurry of criticism on the Secretary General. Let's give the floor to OTL Gorbachev's memoirs:
… The Plenum first day passed relatively calmly. The Novo-Ogarevo Statement made publication a stunning impression. Those rushing into battle were probably held back by my opening remarks. But not for long. Apparently, they held the council at night, and the next day a clip of orators, inflaming the hall, settled on the General Secretary. Especially sharply, even rudely, Hurenko spoke, declaring: "They did to the country what the enemies could not do." He demanded "legislatively fix the ruling party status for the CPSU", restore the previous leading cadres placement system, the party control over the media. It was hard to believe that it was possible to be a slave to prejudices to such an extent and break away from life.
Prokofiev, Gidaspov, Malofeev didn't lag behind him. The Communist Party of Belarus First Secretary directly demanded that the president introduce an emergency state. As a matter of fact, other the General Secretary critics also led to this: let him either introduce an emergency state or leave. After the toughest of these speeches – I think it was Zaitsev from Kuzbass – I took the floor. I said: enough demagoguery, I'm resigning.
I was asked whether such a decision was made under the influence of impulse, irritation and annoyance caused by attacks on the general secretary, or was it a tactical step that was deliberately considered, thought out "in a cold head"? Surprisingly, both are true to some extent. Of course, not without emotions, there was a desire to immediately put an end to this. And on the other hand, the fact that I didn't rule out such a denouement in advance, was also ready for it. Well, I thought then, probably, the “moment of truth” has come when you need to cast aside hesitation and make a decision...
The plenum voted overwhelmingly against the Gorbachev's resignation IOTL. The intra-party opposition to Gorbachev was forced to look at the Yeltsin's shadow IOTL and feared the intra-party split consequences. The conservatives were afraid of losing power in the event of the CPSU collapse and the dissolution of the Union without the Party holding it together. Conservatives have less reason to fear ITTL. The threat of an immediate collapse of the USSR was temporarily averted, and Baburin's victory in the RSFSR inspired them. The conservatives hoped, by depriving Gorbachev of the levers of power in the CPSU, to consolidate the Party and, having won the elections, to take power in the USSR into their own hands. Therefore, the plenum accepted Gorbachev's resignation with a majority of one vote and appointed a congress for the end of May, which was supposed to elect a new general secretary.
Party conferences were to be held to nominate CPSU candidates in the elections in the first half of May. They also became the site for the selection of candidates for the 29th CPSU Congress. If the party conferences in the Asian republics and most Russian autonomies showed the continued local party bosses control over the party organization, then in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus they showed the depth of the split between the reformist and conservative wings of the party. Although this was not a problem for the candidates who lost at the conferences – they simply went to the polls either as "self-nominated" from labor collectives or as candidates from ideologically close movements, such as the Soyuz or the Democratic Reform Movement, then it became a disaster for the Communist Party as an institution.
The 29th CPSU Congress was the last in its history. The reformists and conservatives couldn't agree on a common election platform and a new general secretary, so the Communist Party ceased to exist as a single organization. Several organizations had taken shape by the end of autumn, two of which, the Democratic Party of Communists (DPC) and the All-Union Communist Party (AUCP), claimed succession with the CPSU. The AUCP, headed by Oleg Shenin, united party conservatives around itself, standing in the "defending the socialist choice" and Soviet unionism position. It had the greatest influence in the BSSR, the southern half of the RSFSR and the central and eastern regions of Ukraine. It was allied with the Agrarian Party, which served as the Kolkhoz CEO Lobby political tool in the union and republican parliaments.
The DPC adopted a social democratic program while remaining loyal to Soviet unionism. It united the reformist communists in the RSFSR and the BSSR around itself, having a much weaker position in the Ukrainian SSR. The party organizations of the Muslim republics and Russian autonomies, which hastened to swear allegiance to Gorbachev, also joined the DPC.
Both Soviet communist parties had far fewer members than the old CPSU as of May 1991. This applied not only to ordinary members, but also to the nomenklatura that sat in councils and executive bodies. This de-ideologized "party of power" thought more about their own interests and didn't seek to bind themselves with the wrong party they would join.
Despite national patriots' criticism, the Union didn't put forward territorial claims against the Baltic states. As I wrote above, the union republics position on this issue was unequivocal, and Gorbachev could not ignore it. The National Patriots, who took power in the RSFSR, changed the republic's position in favor of the Milošević-style irredentist policy. The Narva, Kohtla-Järve and Sillamäe city councils, at a joint meeting in the Chairman of Russia Sergey Baburin presence, proclaimed the Narovan SSR on May 16, which was to become part of the RSFSR or directly to the USSR. Baburin, speaking in Kohtla-Järve , not only supported the right of Narovia to self-determination, but also put forward territorial claims against Lithuania, calling for the return of Vilnius and Klaipeda to the Union (ignoring the 1920 Moscow Treaty and the Nazi annexations non-recognition principle), and Georgia. I, describing this Baburin's trick and its consequences, rely on his actions and views, repeatedly expressed by Baburin himself IOTL.
The principle, commonly known as the “Baburin Doctrine”, provided for the exclusion from the republics leaving the Union of territories where the population somehow expressed dissatisfaction with this step, or which, according to Baburin, were “illegally” attached to the seceding republics. The Baburin doctrine provoked protests not only from the Baltic States and Georgia, but also from the republics of the Union, led by Ukraine and Kazakhstan, who feared that the opening of the border revision Pandora's box would hit them. This concerned not only claims to “originally Russian” lands, but also a possible revision of borders in Central Asia and Karabakh. Despite the natpats' appeals in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Kremlin also didn't support the Baburin doctrine for reasons that I have repeatedly mentioned.
The Baburin Doctrine proclamation had the exploding bomb effect. The republics, both seceded and union, protested against the Russian leader actions. The union republics announced their Baburin's actions condemnation at the Federation Council meeting of convened on the initiative of Ukraine. Baburin's enemies also became more active inside Russia. He, unwittingly, gave the Russian autonomies a tool to defend their sovereignty. From the very beginning, they feared that the Russian regions and republics equality principle declared by Baburin (another position voiced by him in 1991) would serve to eliminate their sovereignty. Tatarstan withdrew from the Trilateral USSR-RSFSR-TatSSR Commission and scheduled the secession from Russia referendum on August 11.
The crisis in relations between Russia and other subjects of the Union led to the fall of Baburin. On May 20, a "statement of six" was published: the deputies of the Chairman, chairmen of the chambers and their deputies appeal, in which they called for the Baburin's resignation, accusing him of the existence of the Russian Federation threatening. Despite the parliament's leaders rebellion, Baburin was able to achieve the next day the proclamation by the Supreme Soviet of the right to join the RSFSR Narovia, Klaipeda, the Vilna Territory, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and in the event of a negative vote on the issue of membership in the USSR in Moldova - Gagauzia and Transnistria.
The anti-Baburin opposition hoped to take revenge at the Congress of People's Deputies, which was supposed to open on May 31: three days after the 29th CPSU Congress start. On May 24, the fifteen Russian ASSRs' leaders gathered in Ufa and announced their withdrawal from the Federative Treaty negotiations. They delivered an ultimatum to the federal government, demanding that their sovereign rights be respected; otherwise they will raise the issue of secession from the Russian Federation.
The first issue on the 4th Congress of People's Deputies of Russia agenda was a vote of no confidence in Chairman Baburin. Although the people's deputies of Russia generally supported Baburin's desire to preserve the Soviet Union, outskirts they saw that his policies would only lead to the collapse of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the overwhelming people's deputies' majority supported the vote of no confidence, dismissing Sergey Baburin on June 1. Reigning for only 44 days, Baburin turned out to be the shortest-term ruler of Russia, not counting Irina Godunova.
Ramazan Abdulatipov was elected as the new Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, who began to repair what Baburin had broken. The Congress condemned the Baburin Doctrine. The RSFSR went for the forced signing of the Federative Treaty inorder to regulate relations with the regions, primarily with the republics, which took place on August 5. These were three agreements concluded between the Federal Center and the republics, autonomous districts and the oblast and regions (oblasts, territories and cities of republican significance), respectively. These three groups of Russian regions transferred different packages of powers from the federal center. The republics received, among other things, unlike the OTL, the right to secede from the RSFSR. The Federal Treaty was ratified and implemented into the RSFSR Constitution on August 16 by the 5th Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, specially assembled for this purpose.
Abdulatipov achieved an agreement with Tatarstan. Although he was forced to recognize the right of the republics to secede, the Federative Treaty included a deferral of this right for four years. This decision, supported by the Union, undermined Tatarstan's claims for immediate secession. The President of the Tatar SSR, Shaimiev, was forced to sign the Federative Treaty, because he understood that without the Union support he wouldn't be able to secede from the RSFSR, and the only way to get it was to wait until 1995.
The Moldova's membership in the USSR referendum was held in June. The republic was split between an independence-seeking central government and the unionist national regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia. Since in Moldova, unlike Ukraine, no referendums were held that could provide data on people's position at a certain point in time, it will be necessary to extrapolate the results for the Right Bank of the Dniester from the 1994 and 1998 parliamentary elections results and the Ukrainian data on voting for the left in the 1998 parliamentary elections and March 1991 referendum. These extrapolations show that more than 50% of the Right Bank of the Dniester population in the spring of 1991 would have voted for the Union. They have a fairly large error associated with the need to take into account the changes in public opinion in 1991 and the differences between Moldova and Ukraine, but we don't have other data. Therefore, I prescribe that within the borders of the former Moldavian SSR (including Transnistria and Gagauzia), 52% of the population will vote for membership in the USSR. The independence of Moldova supporters will dominate in the center of the republic, and unionists in the north, east and south, where there is a large minorities' share.
The referendum results led to a political crisis in Moldova. The parliamentary majority, consisting of the Popular Front and moderate communists, collapsed. Prime Minister Mircea Druc resigned and Andrei Sangheli became his successor. Chisinau was engulfed in protest rallies against the Union Treaty ratification, which took place on June 30. The reintegration of Moldova into the USSR meant a drop in tension in Transnistria and Gagauzia. By-elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were scheduled for September 15, 1991.
On July 21, Gorbachev and the Baltic States leaders signed similar agreements in Minsk on the relations after their independence restoration. The state border, despite the opposition of the radicals on both sides, was established along the line of the administrative border on January 1, 1990. The USSR transferred Union property to the Baltic States (except for military property, the fate of which was negotiated separately) and a share in the Union internal debt attributable to them. The Baltic States renounced any claims to the gold reserves and external assets of the USSR and, of course, didn't pay the Soviet external debt. The Baltic States remained part of the customs territory of the USSR until January 1, 1992, and part of the Ruble zone until April 1. Soviet troops were to be withdrawn from the territory of Lithuania and Estonia until 1995, and from Latvia, where the Skrunda-1 radar station was located, until 1999. The Minsk agreements were ratified by the old Supreme Soviet, despite the natpatist opposition.
The agreement with Georgia was supposed to be an analogue of the Minsk agreements with the Baltic States, but problems with minorities in Georgia prevented it from being signed immediately. Although ethnic minorities also created problems for the Baltic governments, they were no match for Georgia's not-so-successful war in South Ossetia and Abkhazia's claim to membership in the Union. The Abkhaz SSR was the only republic outside the "nine" in which a referendum was held on March 17. The non-Georgian half of the population voted for membership in the Soviet Union on it. The Georgians, who boycotted the All-Union referendum, voted for the independence of Georgia. Unlike Ossetia, neither the government of Georgia nor Abkhazia were ready for war and even showed some willingness to compromise.
Gorbachev was ready to throw Abkhazia and South Ossetia under the bus. Although the President himself would have preferred not to do so, he was dependent on republics such as Ukraine and Azerbaijan firmly upholding the republics territorial integrity principle. On the other hand, any agreement with Georgia that didn't regulate the Abkhazia and South Ossetia status could not pass through the Supreme Soviet before the elections. Therefore, Gorbachev delayed the negotiations until autumn.
Elections were held for the 13th Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 11 and 25. Formally, the majority of 704 (including Moldova, where elections were held in September) people's deputies were elected as "self-nominated" from labor collectives, but their political position and the factions they belonged to make it possible to divide them into several large groups, within which people's deputies flowed much freer than between them. Determining the quantitative composition of these groups, I focus more on the elections of 1993-1995 in single-mandate constituencies (I hope there is no need to explain why it is more correct to focus on the majoritarian system, and not party lists) results in the Slavic republics than on the elections of 1989-1990. The 1990 elections differed from the next ones in the existence of the dominant party system and its political machine, which had already collapsed by this time ITTL.
Gorbachev's ratings will fall, which will negatively affect the Democratic Party of Communists prospects in the Slavic republics. The democratic opposition popularity will grow, despite its blocking with Gorbachev against the National Patriots. The Natpats will also benefit from the Gorbachev's ratings fall, as they did from the economic situation after January 1992 IOTL. Therefore, I assume just such results for the 1991 parliamentary elections in the USSR.
The August 1991 elections will be a big disappointment for the national patriots (and they will obviously regret that they were not held in October-November). If they dominated the parliament elected in 1989, now the three factions (AUCP, Agrarian Party, Soyuz) accounted for 191 deputies. On the right flank, only the DPC faction at first consisted of 135 people. It united two wings around the president figure: pro-Gorbachev moderate democrats, mainly from Russia, who gravitated towards the democratic camp, and Asian deputies, ideologically close to the Alliance for Sovereignty, but who joined the DPC because of Gorbachev’s alliance with their patrons in the republics. Another 118 deputies were members of various groups united in the Democratic Bloc.
The already mentioned Alliance for Sovereignty (AfS) was the third force in the Union Parliament. He united 81 deputies, mainly from the republics and autonomies, on the platform of strengthening the sovereignty of the subjects the Union. The Alliance can be conditionally divided into Ukrainian confederalists and more moderate representatives of Central Asia and Russian autonomies. AfS had a very large influence in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, as it played a key role in many votes, providing or not providing the pro-government coalition with the necessary majority. The Alliance's “evil twin” on the national platform was the Nationalist Bloc, which united various national democratic movements’ representatives headed by Rukh. They, striving for the collapse of the USSR, in most cases took an obstructionist position.
The remaining 136 the Council of the Union deputies were members of various centrist factions or were independent deputies, and the National Patriots and Democrats fought for their votes.
The Council of the Republics composition was fundamentally different from the lower house. This was due to the fact that Ukraine and, say, Mordovia were represented by the same number of people's deputies, who were elected by parliaments elected a year and a half ago. Since the Council of the Republics, as the name implies, represented republican interests, it was dominated by two factions oriented towards them: the DPC and the AfS, which together had 269 deputies out of 363 (including the new Russian republics that joined the Union in August). The National Patriots had 85 more seats, while the Democratic Bloc had only 9.
In general, the elections went smoothly, except for Tajikistan. Unlike other Asian republics, the positions of the local nomenklatura were not strong enough to suppress the National Democratic and Islamist opposition. They won in three of the republic's nine constituencies (the nationalists also won in some other constituencies in Central Asia, but not enough to claim more) and contested the vote in others. Massive protests led to the Tajik President Qahhor Mahkamov resignation in September and re-elections scheduled for November. Tajikistan was a weak link in the nomenklatura regimes in Central Asia IOTL. Mahkamov retired the August coup IOTL and there were competitive presidential elections in the republic. Internal conflicts led to the civil war of 1992-1997, which was won by the nomenklatura leader Emomali Rahmonov with Russian and Uzbek support.
And so, I decided to write a TL about the absence of Yeltsin. The specific PoD that led to Boris Yeltsin not becoming a political leader in the late 1980s is not particularly important. This may be either an early death (before 1989), or the absence of a political career in his biography.
The absence of the popular leader of the democratic opposition, which was Boris Yeltsin, begins to influence the 1st Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) of the RSFSR in May 1990. Prior to this, democratic opposition to Gorbachev, both in the union parliament (Inter-Regional Deputies’ Group) and in the RSFSR (Democratic Russia Movement) will be formed even without him, not to mention the popular fronts in the republics.
Although, most likely, the “Yeltsin factor” influenced the result in some constituencies in the Russian elections, the final results will not change. The characteristic of the Slavic republics of the USSR general trends speak in favor of this. Therefore, I postulate that out of 1068 people's deputies of Russia in the democratic and national-patriotic camps there will be approximately 300-400 deputies, and the rest will belong to the centrists, whose position will determine the results of the vote. It is also worth noting that there will be several parliament democratic and natpatist factions in Russian at the same time like OTL.
The 1st Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR opened on May 16, 1990. The people's deputies were to elect the head of state: the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, his deputies, the cabinet and the Supreme Soviet – a compact parliament of 252 deputies, which was supposed to adopt laws between congresses.
Communists proposed the candidacy of one of the leaders of the conservative wing of the CPSU, Ivan Polozkov, IOTL, and after he couldn't defeat Yeltsin, they replaced him with the Prime Minister of the RSFSR Aleksandr Vlasov, who was considered as a candidate for the Chairman post even before the start of the Congress. Here is what the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR in 1988-1990 Vitaly Vorotnikov writes about this in the "Chronicle of the Absurd – the Separation of Russia from the USSR":
... During the break, here, in the Kremlin Palace, M. S. Gorbachev had a conversation with members of the Politburo, the Presidential Council, and secretaries of the Central Committee. (A. V. Vlasov was not there).
Gorbachev raised the question of what the specific situation is in relation to the proposed candidates. According to him (which one? from whom? he didn't explain), the Congress wasn't satisfied with the A. V. Vlasov's report, and especially with his answers. He believes that it is necessary to talk with the heads of delegations about A. V. Vlasov and I. K. Polozkov. Whether to leave two candidates or one. What? (How out of place these fluctuations were. After all, it’s already May 22!) Kryuchkov and Manaenkov confirmed that they now consider I.K. Polozkov’s rating higher...
... In the break, again, the M.S. Gorbachev conversation with members of the Politburo and secretaries of the Central Committee here in the Grand Kremlin Palace. The problem is who to nominate again? “We have to decide! (Here, after all, what fluctuations!) According to Kryuchkov and Manaenkov, Vlasov's rating continues to decline. Polozkov has great chances. As for Vlasov, to recommend him for the post of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR "...
... In the evening, at 19.00, the Central Committee of the CPSU. Meeting with secretaries of regional party committees deputies. The meeting was chaired by V. A. Medvedev. He reported on the recommendation of the Central Committee for the post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR - I. K. Polozkov. Shouts for and against. But if necessary, we will support. And again complaints, why is the issue resolved so late? They said one thing, now another. There is no time to work anymore. No guarantee. The secretaries were outraged.
I. K. Polozkov is worried: “Why did they set me up at the last moment? I had already calmed down. It would be better to go along with A. V. Vlasov. This would give a greater effect "...
Most likely, these gestures were part of Gorbachev's cunning plan. He counted on the fact that neither Yeltsin nor Polozkov would be able to get a majority at the Congress and thereby eliminate each other. That would allow Gorbachev to impose a moderate candidate convenient to him. In pursuance of this cunning plan, the Communists of Russia faction proposed to hold elections with new candidates after the second round and proposed Vlasov from their faction, but Yeltsin didn't go about them and won in the third vote.
The situation ITTL differs from the OTL. The Democrats are weaker and do not have a ready-made charismatic leader who threatens Gorbachev's position. The main threat to the general secretary is not the reformist demagogue Yeltsin, but the communist fundamentalists within the Party. Therefore, OTL intrigues didn't happen because the risk of Polozkov being elected in this case is too great, which, together with his influence in the newly formed Communist Party of the RSFSR, turns him into a competitor to Gorbachev.
ITTL, the Communists immediately put forward Aleksandr Vlasov candidacy without OTL story with the Polozkov candidacy. Without Yeltsin, the Democrats didn't field a single candidate, and Democratic leaders run for Speaker separately. Although the Democrats united in the second round around the leader of the Democratic Party of Russia, Nikolai Travkin, this didn't help to avoid Vlasov's victory in the third round of voting by a narrow margin. The Democrats will rally around Travkin, and not, say, one of the leaders of Democratic Russia, Yury Afanasyev, because as a production worker he is socially closer to the centrist "swamp" of the Congress.
A representative of national minorities will be elected as the First Vice-Chairman, like IOTL. The most likely "vice-president" is Ramazan Abdulatipov, consultant of the Department of National Relations of the Central Committee of the CPSU, who headed the Council of Nationalities of the RSFSR SupSov IOTL. Travkin will be elected vice-speaker (without OTL amendments to the Constitution, the only one). The Democrats will also get some of the committee seats. The democratic opposition had these posts in the Ukrainian SSR and the Belarusian SSR, so the transfer of this practice to Russia is completely natural.
Unfortunately, there is no data on who Vlasov could have planned for the Russian Prime Minister role. According to the logic of things, this should be an official who has passed the path to the heights of the Soviet bureaucracy. OTL Yeltsin's Prime Minister of the RSFSR Deputy Prime Minister of the Union Government and former Minister of the Aviation Industry Ivan Silayev fits the necessary criteria, and, as the example of Vlasov himself shows, the transition from Union posts to Russian ones was in the order of things. Therefore, butterfly net works, and Silayev heads the Russian government ITTL, because why not.
The Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR will be adopted in formulations close to the OTL. This idea was not the Democrats' invention. The communists not only supported the Declaration IOTL, but also included it on the Congress agenda with the Vitaly Vorotnikov light hand. Although it is perceived as a nail in the coffin of the USSR IOTL, in honor of which the Russian Independence Day was established, it is the result of the OTL struggle between Yeltsin and Gorbachev under the Russian sovereignty slogan. The Russian Declaration's text, unlike the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine, didn't contain anything undermining Soviet federalism.
The struggle between Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev was the defining event of 1990-1991 IOTL. It set the tone for relations in the triangle of Gorbachev - democratic opposition - national patriots, pushing Gorbachev to an alliance with the latter. The "War of Laws" and "War of Taxes" directly influenced the New Union Treaty negotiations and the economic situation in the USSR. The actual victory of Yeltsin in this struggle was the beginning of the USSR agony, the August coup was the most striking manifestation of which. ITTL, the Russian parliament and government will act in the Gorbachev's policy wake until the end of the Aleksandr Vlasov reign.
Without Yeltsin leading the RSFSR and fighting against Gorbachev, the main line of confrontation will be between Gorbachev and party fundamentalists, dissatisfied with what they see as a rejection of principles, the threat of the Party losing power and the Union losing its great power status. One of the conservatives' leaders, Ivan Polozkov, was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the RSFSR at the RCP (Russian Communist Party) founding congress held at the end of June. The Conservatives tried to consolidate their success at the 28th Congress of the CPSU, held the following month, but despite their dominance in the party, they could not defeat Gorbachev, who, contrary to the Democrats' calls, didn't go to a disengagement from the Conservatives. He won the congress, being re-elected general secretary and promoting a number of his candidacies for positions in the party. Without the Yeltsin demarche, who left the Party right at the congress, the Democrats departure, who dissatisfied with compromises with retrogrades, was somewhat smoother, but by the end of 1990, the Democratic Platform fell off the CPSU, creating a number of parties in the republics.
Although Russia didn't lay mines under the USSR's financial and budgetary systems ITTL, the structural problems that led to its economic collapse didn't disappear. The Union economic reform program made headlines in May, when the Ryzhkov government raised the issue of a two-year-overdue price reform that was supposed to bring the price structure to a more or less reasonable form at the cost of raising consumer prices, too. The 500 Days program was also created ITTL, but remained only the Democratic Russia economic program. Gorbachev tends to the gradualist concept of reform like IOTL, fearing the "shock therapy" consequences. Without a conflict with the Russian government, the coordination of the Union economic program with the republics went faster, but it started after Ryzhkov's resignation.
Fears about the USSR fate were not unfounded. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia declared independence in the spring of 1990. In August – Armenia. The Supreme Soviet of Georgia adopted a law on the transitional period until the restoration of the independent Georgian Democratic Republic on 14 November 1990. The new Moldovan government sought to reunite with the Romanian brothers. Although Gorbachev was opposed to their secession, he rejected the National Patriots' proposals to introduce direct presidential rule in the separatist republics. The President of the USSR believed that the issue of their status should have been resolved within the framework of negotiations and the Law of the USSR "on the procedure for resolving issues related to the withdrawal of a union republic from the USSR" adopted in April 1990.
Gorbachev countered separatist tendencies with the idea of a New Union Treaty, which was supposed to re-establish the Soviet federation, expanding the rights of the republics of the Union. Together with Gorbachev, representatives of nine republics that (so far) didn't want to secede from the Union participated in its development: the RSFSR, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. Yeltsin successfully torpedoed efforts to preserve the Soviet federation IOTL. ITTL, Russian leadership follows Gorbachev's lead and, together with the Central Asian republics interested in union subsidies, supports the federalist project proposed by Gorbachev.
Although in Ukraine, unlike the six secessionist republics, the communists won the republican elections, the communist majority in the Ukrainian parliament was in no hurry to support the federalist plans of the Union government. Ukraine, unlike other republics, saw the future of the Union in the form of a confederation. On July 17, the republic’s SupSov adopted the Declaration on State Sovereignty, which, among other things, proclaimed the Ukrainian SSR’s right to create its own currency system and armed forces, as well as its desire for a neutral status in the future. Excessive focus on Moscow cost the leader of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Chairman of Ukraine Volodymyr Ivashko, whom Gorbachev made vice-secretary general, the power in Ukraine. Although Ivashko's successor in the party line, Stanislav Hurenko, was a conservative unionist, Leonid Kravchuk, the new Chairman of the Supreme Soviet (aka Verkhovna Rada), assumed power in the Ukrainian SSR.
During the autumn the New Union Treaty negotiations, Gorbachev, despite the special position of Ukraine, achieved the approval of the federalist project. IOTL, the rejection of key federalist issues, primarily the federal tax, occurred only after the August coup. Without Yeltsin's opposition ITTL, Gorbachev's position is stronger, and therefore in November the treaty draft will be ready for signing.
In addition to the union republics, the ASSR, which were part of them, also had to sign the NUT. The status of the ASSR as a subject of the Soviet Federation was established by the Constitution of 1977 and, especially, by the Law on the delimitation of powers between the USSR and the subject of the federation, adopted in April 1990. The union republics, which included the ASSR, feared that their participation in the New Union Treaty would be the first step towards secession from the parent republics. Although the NUT spelled out the status of the ASSR as part of the corresponding union republic, similar to modern Russian matryoshka regions such as the Tyumen oblast, this didn't prevent problems from arising.
The national-patriotic opposition tried to resist Gorbachev's course of "destruction of a great power." Communist fundamentalists and statists from the Soyuz (“Union” in Russian) faction fiercely criticized the government at every the Supreme Soviet meeting, but this didn't bear fruit. The National Patriots didn't hesitate to criticize Gorbachev IOTL, but his position is stronger ITTL.
The 4th Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, held in December, served to strengthen Gorbachev's power. The impeachment attempt by the National Patriots failed. The Congress amended the Constitution, strengthening the presidential power and introducing the post of vice president. Gorbachev chose Yanaev as vice-president IOTL for the sake of flirting with the conservatives, but he preferred Yevgeny Primakov, a member of his team, ITTL. Also in December, the chairman of the KGB was replaced. Instead of the hardliner Kryuchkov (the liberal Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin was dismissed in December 1990 IOTL), Leonid Shebarshin became the chairman of the KGB.
Another victory for Gorbachev was the appointment for March 17 of a referendum on the draft New Union Treaty. Unlike OTL, where voters were asked to vote "for all the good things and against all the bad things", they had to vote for or against a specific project ITTL. This hit both the natpats, who criticized the NUT from a unitary position, and the “special position” of Ukraine, whose representatives declared that they were ready to sign something only after a referendum in the republic.
Valentin Pavlov replaced Ryzhkov, who had fallen ill with a heart attack, as the Prime Minister. He quickly joined the hardliners IOTL because the weakness of the Union government prevented him from realizing his vision of economic policy, but by the end of 1990, unlike Kryuchkov, he was not seen as sympathetic to tightening the screws. Although such figures as Yury Maslyukov, Nursultan Nazarbayev, Arkady Volsky and others were named in addition to Pavlov, his reputation as a specialist in finance and support from republican leaders played in his favor.
The new government first step, planned by its predecessors, was a price reform that raised state prices by 60%. On January 1, a new wholesale price list began to operate, and on February 1, retail prices were raised. The latter happened two months earlier than OTL, because without the Russian opposition, the agreement and approval of new prices went faster. Although the new price list didn't mean the complete elimination of the price subsidies system, the reform led to some temporary improvement in commodity markets. Price increases reduced the surplus money supply, but without price liberalization or confiscatory currency reform, this could only have short-term results.
Although the OTL collapse of the union budget system caused by the "War of taxes" with the RSFSR didn't happen, the Union and the republics financial situation in the first half of 1991 left much to be desired. High budget deficits continued to be covered by the emission of money. The government tried to do something about it. Since the beginning of the year, a 5% sales tax has been introduced, a turnover tax replacement by the VAT has been planned, and the Ministry of Finance has been sequestering budgets with varying degrees of success. The fight against the deficit was hampered by the growth of the republican and local budgets expenditures. The republics not only compensated the people for higher prices, but also expanded social programs. At the same time, the economy has already begun to decline. Since January 1991, a decline in production has been recorded by about 10% compared to the last year levels.
There was a crisis in the Baltic States with the entry of Soviet troops into Lithuania and clashes in Vilnius and Riga IOTL on January 1991. Without confrontation with Russia, the Soviet Union position in negotiations with the Baltic republics after they declared independence in March-May 1990 is stronger. Despite this, Gorbachev was unable to get them to return to the fold, and the question was already about the division of property after a divorce by the beginning of 1991. The natpats, supported by the local Russian (read Soviet) population who moved to the Baltic States after 1944, demanded the introduction of presidential rule, but Gorbachev ignored their demands.
It is not clear to what extent Gorbachev is involved in the introduction of troops and clashes near the Vilnius TV tower, or whether this is an initiative of law enforcement agencies. ITL, the most likely author of the idea to overthrow the Lithuanian government (Kryuchkov) was dismissed, so there is simply no one in the Kremlin to come to the conclusion that it’s a twenty minutes adventure and convince Gorbachev of this / decide to put him before the fact. Republican leaders in the Federation Council would be expected to speak out against any intervention. Also, the absence of OTL Gorbachev's flirting with the National Patriots and attempts to tighten the screws because of the "War of Laws" and the Parade of Sovereignties works against the possible entry of troops into Lithuania in January 1991. Therefore, protests due to price increases in Lithuania will be local Lithuanian history.
Although there will be strikes due to price increases in February, including in the hitherto calm BSSR (price reform also led to protests in Belarus IOTL), without a confrontation between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, they will not reach the level of OTL scope and the protest politicization. The country was going to a referendum, which supposedly was supposed to decide its fate. Nine out of fifteen republics voted for the New Union Treaty on March 17, and in all of them, more than 60% of the votes were in favor of the Union like IOTL.
Russia obviously voted "yes" because the RSFSR was the USSR "supporting structure", and the Russian electorate has not yet reached the idea that the Union is a burden to them. The BSSR was perhaps the most Sovietized republic, since Belarusian nationalism was weaker than Ukrainian even before 1917. In the five Asian republics, the local CPSU branches power was strongest, and they were interested in maintaining the Union as a subsidies source. In the case of Azerbaijan, the Karabakh issue was added to the communists in power factor. Azerbaijan was interested in the Union support in its conflict with Armenia.
Ukraine has not yet experienced its public opinion evolution that took it from loyalty to the USSR to 90% in the independence referendum. Therefore, only three Galician regions and Kyiv voted against the Union. The Ukrainian leaders, understanding Gorbachev's game, held a republican referendum, which asked about support for "joining the USSR on the basis of the Declaration of State Sovereignty." The Ukrainians answered “yes” to both questions.
The referendum cut the ground from under the opponents of the Union feet, including in the Ukrainian SSR. Anti-unionists greeted the referendum results with mass protests. Passions were also seething in the Verkhovna Rada. As a result, Ukraine nevertheless decided to join the NUT with the proviso that the Union Constitution should reflect the Declaration of State Sovereignty.
On April 2, 9 union and 19 autonomous (16 Russian ASSRs, Karakalpakstan, Crimea, Nakhichevan) republics signed the New Union Treaty in Moscow. Until recently, there were doubts about the Ukrainian position, but, despite the opposition, Kravchuk signed the Treaty, and the Ukrainian parliament ratified it with a minimal majority.
The last 5th Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR opened on April 5. Its task was to ratify the New Union Treaty and amend the Constitution of the USSR, bringing it into line with it. It didn't cause problems. The Congress almost unanimously ratified the Treaty, and then brought the 1977 Constitution into line with it, eliminating the two-tier structure of parliament at the Union level. Elections to the 13th Supreme Soviet of the USSR (the Supreme Soviet elected in 1989 was supposed to be No. 12, but instead a CPD structure was created) were scheduled for August 11. On them, the inhabitants of the nine union republics that ratified the New Union Treaty were to elect 693 members of the Council of the Union (which corresponded to the total number of territorial electoral districts in the republics that signed the NUT in the 1989 elections). Another 308 people's deputies (11 from each republic), who were members of the Council of the Republics, were to elect by republican parliaments.
The natpatist group "Soyuz", for which the Congress was the last chance to fight for the 1945 borders preservation, raised the topic of six republics in which the NUT referendum was not held. The Baltic States and Georgia held republican referendums in February-March, in which the vast majority supported secession from the USSR. Gorbachev is obviously discouraged by these results, since he believed in the support of the Union by the "silent majority" in these republics, but is forced to accept the fact of secession. Referendums in Moldova and Armenia were to be held in June and September, respectively.
The Congress of People's Deputies called on the peoples of Armenia and Moldova to make a choice in favor of the Union in the upcoming referendums. Despite an attempt by the Soyuz faction to declare the plebiscites in the Baltic States and Georgia inconsistent with the Union referendum law and, accordingly, void, the Congress voted in favor of negotiations on the four republics secession conditions.
After failing to prevent the secession of the Baltic States and Georgia as a whole, the National Patriots raised the issue of minority regions in them, which were in opposition to local nationalist governments. So, only a quarter of the voters voted for the independence of Estonia in Narva, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia boycotted the Georgian referendum. At the same time, Abkhazia separately participated in the All-Union referendum, and in South Ossetia there was already a war between Georgians and Ossetians. There were also problems with pro-Soviet minorities in Moldova, where Gagauzia and Transnistria sought to remain in the USSR. On the eve of the Moldovan referendum, the natpatsts had the tact not to raise this topic, but calls for a revision of the Moldovan borders also sounded from the stands of the Congress. These initiatives failed because of the position of the union republics, who feared that the revising the republican borders precedent would hit them too.
The Russian Congress of People's Deputies, which was supposed to ratify the New Union Treaty, opened on April 11. By that time, the NUT had been ratified by almost all the union republics except Azerbaijan and most of the autonomies. Only Tatarstan caused problems. The republic had long aspired to the union republic status and saw a way to achieve this in the New Union Treaty by joining it separately from the RSFSR. That caused opposition from the union republics, who opposed undermining the RSFSR territorial integrity. Although the Tatarstan participation in the NUT and, accordingly, the Subject of the Union status didn't provide for its separation from the RSFSR, the Supreme Soviet of the Republic, upon its ratification on April 8, announced it.
The Union supported the RSFSR in the Tatar crisis. While it will seem to some that the Kremlin is by definition interested in dismantling Republic number one, this is an afterthought related to the conflict between Yeltsin and Gorbachev. For Gorbachev, both IOTL and ITTL, the support of the union republics, which weren't interested in the changing the republic territory without its consent precedent is vital for the implementation of reforms.
The Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which met at its first meeting after the 5th Congress on April 12, decided that the withdrawal of Tatarstan from the RSFSR was the Union Treaty violation. The Union Parliament called on Tatarstan and Russia to come to an agreement. Shaimiev, faced with the consolidated position of Russia and the Union, backtracked. At the suggestion of the Union Parliament, the Trilateral USSR-RSFSR-TatSSR Commission was formed, which was supposed to work out an agreement between Russia and Tatarstan.
The Tatar crisis became an opportunity for the deputies to show dissatisfaction with Aleksandr Vlasov. The national patriots, including the anti-Gorbachev CPSU faction, considered Vlasov a puppet of Gorbachev, who didn't allow the use of the RSFSR resources to save the Union. Democrats condemned Vlasov's excessive, in their opinion, slowness in the reforming the RSFSR. Ironically, it was the very traits that made Vlasov the Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet in 1990 that led to his downfall a year later. The deputies made Vlasov a scapegoat for the failure in relations with the autonomies and the Tatarstan demarche and announced a vote of no confidence in him.
A serious battle unfolded for the post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. About a dozen candidates participated in the first round of the speaker's election, but two favorites quickly emerged. Despite the conflict between Nikolai Travkin and the Democratic Russia leaders, the Democrats united around his figure. He was opposed by the young "Russia" faction leader, Sergey Baburin, around whom the National Patriots rallied. Abdulatipov, who was supported by autonomies representatives, took third place.
Travkin and Abdulatipov, either individually or together, could not stop Baburin's rise to power. Although many considered him too young for the main post in the republic, Baburin was able to rally his base and get the votes of the centrist swamp (the author recalls that during the attempt to elect the Chairman in July 1991 IOTL, Baburin walked ahead of Khasbulatov for some time). An important role in this was played by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Karelian SSR and one of the leaders of the Communists of Russia faction, Viktor Stepanov, who withdrew his candidacy in favor of Baburin IOTL in July 1991. He brought Baburin part of the votes of the autonomies.
Why Baburin? At that time, he was at the height of his influence among the national-patriotic people's deputies of Russia IOTL, and he was close to taking the post of speaker IOTL in the summer of 1991. His radical ultra-unionist position at the time of the vote was still not discredited. Sergey Baburin, unlike Nikolai Travkin, was able to take advantage of his chance and get to the top of power in Russia.
The Congress, despite its anti-autonomy orientation and fear of separatism, was able to find a compromise with the autonomous oblasts that wanted to become "republics within Russia" - Adygea, Gorny Altai, Karachay-Cherkessia and Khakassia. Although the CPD didn't immediately introduce amendments to the Constitution that would change the status of the four AOs, it agreed to their accession to the Federative Treaty as republics. This made it possible to temporarily relieve tension in relations between the Russian Federation and them.
The Central Committee of the CPSU plenum was held on April 28-29, the last one before the start of registration of candidates for elections and constituency party conferences. It was supposed to adopt a party platform with which the CPSU would go to the Supreme Soviet elections.
The conservatives, inspired by the Russian natpatists successes, who had promoted their man to the "president" of the republic post, wanted to achieve Gorbachev's resignation. They hoped that this would weaken their opponents in the party positions and allow the CPSU to be used to seize power after the parliamentary elections. Conservatives brought down a flurry of criticism on the Secretary General. Let's give the floor to OTL Gorbachev's memoirs:
… The Plenum first day passed relatively calmly. The Novo-Ogarevo Statement made publication a stunning impression. Those rushing into battle were probably held back by my opening remarks. But not for long. Apparently, they held the council at night, and the next day a clip of orators, inflaming the hall, settled on the General Secretary. Especially sharply, even rudely, Hurenko spoke, declaring: "They did to the country what the enemies could not do." He demanded "legislatively fix the ruling party status for the CPSU", restore the previous leading cadres placement system, the party control over the media. It was hard to believe that it was possible to be a slave to prejudices to such an extent and break away from life.
Prokofiev, Gidaspov, Malofeev didn't lag behind him. The Communist Party of Belarus First Secretary directly demanded that the president introduce an emergency state. As a matter of fact, other the General Secretary critics also led to this: let him either introduce an emergency state or leave. After the toughest of these speeches – I think it was Zaitsev from Kuzbass – I took the floor. I said: enough demagoguery, I'm resigning.
I was asked whether such a decision was made under the influence of impulse, irritation and annoyance caused by attacks on the general secretary, or was it a tactical step that was deliberately considered, thought out "in a cold head"? Surprisingly, both are true to some extent. Of course, not without emotions, there was a desire to immediately put an end to this. And on the other hand, the fact that I didn't rule out such a denouement in advance, was also ready for it. Well, I thought then, probably, the “moment of truth” has come when you need to cast aside hesitation and make a decision...
The plenum voted overwhelmingly against the Gorbachev's resignation IOTL. The intra-party opposition to Gorbachev was forced to look at the Yeltsin's shadow IOTL and feared the intra-party split consequences. The conservatives were afraid of losing power in the event of the CPSU collapse and the dissolution of the Union without the Party holding it together. Conservatives have less reason to fear ITTL. The threat of an immediate collapse of the USSR was temporarily averted, and Baburin's victory in the RSFSR inspired them. The conservatives hoped, by depriving Gorbachev of the levers of power in the CPSU, to consolidate the Party and, having won the elections, to take power in the USSR into their own hands. Therefore, the plenum accepted Gorbachev's resignation with a majority of one vote and appointed a congress for the end of May, which was supposed to elect a new general secretary.
Party conferences were to be held to nominate CPSU candidates in the elections in the first half of May. They also became the site for the selection of candidates for the 29th CPSU Congress. If the party conferences in the Asian republics and most Russian autonomies showed the continued local party bosses control over the party organization, then in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus they showed the depth of the split between the reformist and conservative wings of the party. Although this was not a problem for the candidates who lost at the conferences – they simply went to the polls either as "self-nominated" from labor collectives or as candidates from ideologically close movements, such as the Soyuz or the Democratic Reform Movement, then it became a disaster for the Communist Party as an institution.
The 29th CPSU Congress was the last in its history. The reformists and conservatives couldn't agree on a common election platform and a new general secretary, so the Communist Party ceased to exist as a single organization. Several organizations had taken shape by the end of autumn, two of which, the Democratic Party of Communists (DPC) and the All-Union Communist Party (AUCP), claimed succession with the CPSU. The AUCP, headed by Oleg Shenin, united party conservatives around itself, standing in the "defending the socialist choice" and Soviet unionism position. It had the greatest influence in the BSSR, the southern half of the RSFSR and the central and eastern regions of Ukraine. It was allied with the Agrarian Party, which served as the Kolkhoz CEO Lobby political tool in the union and republican parliaments.
The DPC adopted a social democratic program while remaining loyal to Soviet unionism. It united the reformist communists in the RSFSR and the BSSR around itself, having a much weaker position in the Ukrainian SSR. The party organizations of the Muslim republics and Russian autonomies, which hastened to swear allegiance to Gorbachev, also joined the DPC.
Both Soviet communist parties had far fewer members than the old CPSU as of May 1991. This applied not only to ordinary members, but also to the nomenklatura that sat in councils and executive bodies. This de-ideologized "party of power" thought more about their own interests and didn't seek to bind themselves with the wrong party they would join.
Despite national patriots' criticism, the Union didn't put forward territorial claims against the Baltic states. As I wrote above, the union republics position on this issue was unequivocal, and Gorbachev could not ignore it. The National Patriots, who took power in the RSFSR, changed the republic's position in favor of the Milošević-style irredentist policy. The Narva, Kohtla-Järve and Sillamäe city councils, at a joint meeting in the Chairman of Russia Sergey Baburin presence, proclaimed the Narovan SSR on May 16, which was to become part of the RSFSR or directly to the USSR. Baburin, speaking in Kohtla-Järve , not only supported the right of Narovia to self-determination, but also put forward territorial claims against Lithuania, calling for the return of Vilnius and Klaipeda to the Union (ignoring the 1920 Moscow Treaty and the Nazi annexations non-recognition principle), and Georgia. I, describing this Baburin's trick and its consequences, rely on his actions and views, repeatedly expressed by Baburin himself IOTL.
The principle, commonly known as the “Baburin Doctrine”, provided for the exclusion from the republics leaving the Union of territories where the population somehow expressed dissatisfaction with this step, or which, according to Baburin, were “illegally” attached to the seceding republics. The Baburin doctrine provoked protests not only from the Baltic States and Georgia, but also from the republics of the Union, led by Ukraine and Kazakhstan, who feared that the opening of the border revision Pandora's box would hit them. This concerned not only claims to “originally Russian” lands, but also a possible revision of borders in Central Asia and Karabakh. Despite the natpats' appeals in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Kremlin also didn't support the Baburin doctrine for reasons that I have repeatedly mentioned.
The Baburin Doctrine proclamation had the exploding bomb effect. The republics, both seceded and union, protested against the Russian leader actions. The union republics announced their Baburin's actions condemnation at the Federation Council meeting of convened on the initiative of Ukraine. Baburin's enemies also became more active inside Russia. He, unwittingly, gave the Russian autonomies a tool to defend their sovereignty. From the very beginning, they feared that the Russian regions and republics equality principle declared by Baburin (another position voiced by him in 1991) would serve to eliminate their sovereignty. Tatarstan withdrew from the Trilateral USSR-RSFSR-TatSSR Commission and scheduled the secession from Russia referendum on August 11.
The crisis in relations between Russia and other subjects of the Union led to the fall of Baburin. On May 20, a "statement of six" was published: the deputies of the Chairman, chairmen of the chambers and their deputies appeal, in which they called for the Baburin's resignation, accusing him of the existence of the Russian Federation threatening. Despite the parliament's leaders rebellion, Baburin was able to achieve the next day the proclamation by the Supreme Soviet of the right to join the RSFSR Narovia, Klaipeda, the Vilna Territory, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and in the event of a negative vote on the issue of membership in the USSR in Moldova - Gagauzia and Transnistria.
The anti-Baburin opposition hoped to take revenge at the Congress of People's Deputies, which was supposed to open on May 31: three days after the 29th CPSU Congress start. On May 24, the fifteen Russian ASSRs' leaders gathered in Ufa and announced their withdrawal from the Federative Treaty negotiations. They delivered an ultimatum to the federal government, demanding that their sovereign rights be respected; otherwise they will raise the issue of secession from the Russian Federation.
The first issue on the 4th Congress of People's Deputies of Russia agenda was a vote of no confidence in Chairman Baburin. Although the people's deputies of Russia generally supported Baburin's desire to preserve the Soviet Union, outskirts they saw that his policies would only lead to the collapse of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the overwhelming people's deputies' majority supported the vote of no confidence, dismissing Sergey Baburin on June 1. Reigning for only 44 days, Baburin turned out to be the shortest-term ruler of Russia, not counting Irina Godunova.
Ramazan Abdulatipov was elected as the new Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, who began to repair what Baburin had broken. The Congress condemned the Baburin Doctrine. The RSFSR went for the forced signing of the Federative Treaty inorder to regulate relations with the regions, primarily with the republics, which took place on August 5. These were three agreements concluded between the Federal Center and the republics, autonomous districts and the oblast and regions (oblasts, territories and cities of republican significance), respectively. These three groups of Russian regions transferred different packages of powers from the federal center. The republics received, among other things, unlike the OTL, the right to secede from the RSFSR. The Federal Treaty was ratified and implemented into the RSFSR Constitution on August 16 by the 5th Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, specially assembled for this purpose.
Abdulatipov achieved an agreement with Tatarstan. Although he was forced to recognize the right of the republics to secede, the Federative Treaty included a deferral of this right for four years. This decision, supported by the Union, undermined Tatarstan's claims for immediate secession. The President of the Tatar SSR, Shaimiev, was forced to sign the Federative Treaty, because he understood that without the Union support he wouldn't be able to secede from the RSFSR, and the only way to get it was to wait until 1995.
The Moldova's membership in the USSR referendum was held in June. The republic was split between an independence-seeking central government and the unionist national regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia. Since in Moldova, unlike Ukraine, no referendums were held that could provide data on people's position at a certain point in time, it will be necessary to extrapolate the results for the Right Bank of the Dniester from the 1994 and 1998 parliamentary elections results and the Ukrainian data on voting for the left in the 1998 parliamentary elections and March 1991 referendum. These extrapolations show that more than 50% of the Right Bank of the Dniester population in the spring of 1991 would have voted for the Union. They have a fairly large error associated with the need to take into account the changes in public opinion in 1991 and the differences between Moldova and Ukraine, but we don't have other data. Therefore, I prescribe that within the borders of the former Moldavian SSR (including Transnistria and Gagauzia), 52% of the population will vote for membership in the USSR. The independence of Moldova supporters will dominate in the center of the republic, and unionists in the north, east and south, where there is a large minorities' share.
The referendum results led to a political crisis in Moldova. The parliamentary majority, consisting of the Popular Front and moderate communists, collapsed. Prime Minister Mircea Druc resigned and Andrei Sangheli became his successor. Chisinau was engulfed in protest rallies against the Union Treaty ratification, which took place on June 30. The reintegration of Moldova into the USSR meant a drop in tension in Transnistria and Gagauzia. By-elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were scheduled for September 15, 1991.
On July 21, Gorbachev and the Baltic States leaders signed similar agreements in Minsk on the relations after their independence restoration. The state border, despite the opposition of the radicals on both sides, was established along the line of the administrative border on January 1, 1990. The USSR transferred Union property to the Baltic States (except for military property, the fate of which was negotiated separately) and a share in the Union internal debt attributable to them. The Baltic States renounced any claims to the gold reserves and external assets of the USSR and, of course, didn't pay the Soviet external debt. The Baltic States remained part of the customs territory of the USSR until January 1, 1992, and part of the Ruble zone until April 1. Soviet troops were to be withdrawn from the territory of Lithuania and Estonia until 1995, and from Latvia, where the Skrunda-1 radar station was located, until 1999. The Minsk agreements were ratified by the old Supreme Soviet, despite the natpatist opposition.
The agreement with Georgia was supposed to be an analogue of the Minsk agreements with the Baltic States, but problems with minorities in Georgia prevented it from being signed immediately. Although ethnic minorities also created problems for the Baltic governments, they were no match for Georgia's not-so-successful war in South Ossetia and Abkhazia's claim to membership in the Union. The Abkhaz SSR was the only republic outside the "nine" in which a referendum was held on March 17. The non-Georgian half of the population voted for membership in the Soviet Union on it. The Georgians, who boycotted the All-Union referendum, voted for the independence of Georgia. Unlike Ossetia, neither the government of Georgia nor Abkhazia were ready for war and even showed some willingness to compromise.
Gorbachev was ready to throw Abkhazia and South Ossetia under the bus. Although the President himself would have preferred not to do so, he was dependent on republics such as Ukraine and Azerbaijan firmly upholding the republics territorial integrity principle. On the other hand, any agreement with Georgia that didn't regulate the Abkhazia and South Ossetia status could not pass through the Supreme Soviet before the elections. Therefore, Gorbachev delayed the negotiations until autumn.
Elections were held for the 13th Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 11 and 25. Formally, the majority of 704 (including Moldova, where elections were held in September) people's deputies were elected as "self-nominated" from labor collectives, but their political position and the factions they belonged to make it possible to divide them into several large groups, within which people's deputies flowed much freer than between them. Determining the quantitative composition of these groups, I focus more on the elections of 1993-1995 in single-mandate constituencies (I hope there is no need to explain why it is more correct to focus on the majoritarian system, and not party lists) results in the Slavic republics than on the elections of 1989-1990. The 1990 elections differed from the next ones in the existence of the dominant party system and its political machine, which had already collapsed by this time ITTL.
Gorbachev's ratings will fall, which will negatively affect the Democratic Party of Communists prospects in the Slavic republics. The democratic opposition popularity will grow, despite its blocking with Gorbachev against the National Patriots. The Natpats will also benefit from the Gorbachev's ratings fall, as they did from the economic situation after January 1992 IOTL. Therefore, I assume just such results for the 1991 parliamentary elections in the USSR.
The August 1991 elections will be a big disappointment for the national patriots (and they will obviously regret that they were not held in October-November). If they dominated the parliament elected in 1989, now the three factions (AUCP, Agrarian Party, Soyuz) accounted for 191 deputies. On the right flank, only the DPC faction at first consisted of 135 people. It united two wings around the president figure: pro-Gorbachev moderate democrats, mainly from Russia, who gravitated towards the democratic camp, and Asian deputies, ideologically close to the Alliance for Sovereignty, but who joined the DPC because of Gorbachev’s alliance with their patrons in the republics. Another 118 deputies were members of various groups united in the Democratic Bloc.
The already mentioned Alliance for Sovereignty (AfS) was the third force in the Union Parliament. He united 81 deputies, mainly from the republics and autonomies, on the platform of strengthening the sovereignty of the subjects the Union. The Alliance can be conditionally divided into Ukrainian confederalists and more moderate representatives of Central Asia and Russian autonomies. AfS had a very large influence in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, as it played a key role in many votes, providing or not providing the pro-government coalition with the necessary majority. The Alliance's “evil twin” on the national platform was the Nationalist Bloc, which united various national democratic movements’ representatives headed by Rukh. They, striving for the collapse of the USSR, in most cases took an obstructionist position.
The remaining 136 the Council of the Union deputies were members of various centrist factions or were independent deputies, and the National Patriots and Democrats fought for their votes.
The Council of the Republics composition was fundamentally different from the lower house. This was due to the fact that Ukraine and, say, Mordovia were represented by the same number of people's deputies, who were elected by parliaments elected a year and a half ago. Since the Council of the Republics, as the name implies, represented republican interests, it was dominated by two factions oriented towards them: the DPC and the AfS, which together had 269 deputies out of 363 (including the new Russian republics that joined the Union in August). The National Patriots had 85 more seats, while the Democratic Bloc had only 9.
In general, the elections went smoothly, except for Tajikistan. Unlike other Asian republics, the positions of the local nomenklatura were not strong enough to suppress the National Democratic and Islamist opposition. They won in three of the republic's nine constituencies (the nationalists also won in some other constituencies in Central Asia, but not enough to claim more) and contested the vote in others. Massive protests led to the Tajik President Qahhor Mahkamov resignation in September and re-elections scheduled for November. Tajikistan was a weak link in the nomenklatura regimes in Central Asia IOTL. Mahkamov retired the August coup IOTL and there were competitive presidential elections in the republic. Internal conflicts led to the civil war of 1992-1997, which was won by the nomenklatura leader Emomali Rahmonov with Russian and Uzbek support.
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