The Rise and Fall of the Vlasov's Russia: The last years of the Soviet Union without Boris Yeltsin

Disclaimer: The text is based on an edited Google translation, so if you see errors anywhere, please let me know.

And so, I decided to write a TL about the absence of Yeltsin. The specific PoD that led to Boris Yeltsin not becoming a political leader in the late 1980s is not particularly important. This may be either an early death (before 1989), or the absence of a political career in his biography.

The absence of the popular leader of the democratic opposition, which was Boris Yeltsin, begins to influence the 1st Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) of the RSFSR in May 1990. Prior to this, democratic opposition to Gorbachev, both in the union parliament (Inter-Regional Deputies’ Group) and in the RSFSR (Democratic Russia Movement) will be formed even without him, not to mention the popular fronts in the republics.

Although, most likely, the “Yeltsin factor” influenced the result in some constituencies in the Russian elections, the final results will not change. The characteristic of the Slavic republics of the USSR general trends speak in favor of this. Therefore, I postulate that out of 1068 people's deputies of Russia in the democratic and national-patriotic camps there will be approximately 300-400 deputies, and the rest will belong to the centrists, whose position will determine the results of the vote. It is also worth noting that there will be several parliament democratic and natpatist factions in Russian at the same time like OTL.

The 1st Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR opened on May 16, 1990. The people's deputies were to elect the head of state: the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, his deputies, the cabinet and the Supreme Soviet – a compact parliament of 252 deputies, which was supposed to adopt laws between congresses.

Communists proposed the candidacy of one of the leaders of the conservative wing of the CPSU, Ivan Polozkov, IOTL, and after he couldn't defeat Yeltsin, they replaced him with the Prime Minister of the RSFSR Aleksandr Vlasov, who was considered as a candidate for the Chairman post even before the start of the Congress. Here is what the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR in 1988-1990 Vitaly Vorotnikov writes about this in the "Chronicle of the Absurd – the Separation of Russia from the USSR":

... During the break, here, in the Kremlin Palace, M. S. Gorbachev had a conversation with members of the Politburo, the Presidential Council, and secretaries of the Central Committee. (A. V. Vlasov was not there).

Gorbachev raised the question of what the specific situation is in relation to the proposed candidates. According to him (which one? from whom? he didn't explain), the Congress wasn't satisfied with the A. V. Vlasov's report, and especially with his answers. He believes that it is necessary to talk with the heads of delegations about A. V. Vlasov and I. K. Polozkov. Whether to leave two candidates or one. What? (How out of place these fluctuations were. After all, it’s already May 22!) Kryuchkov and Manaenkov confirmed that they now consider I.K. Polozkov’s rating higher...

... In the break, again, the M.S. Gorbachev conversation with members of the Politburo and secretaries of the Central Committee here in the Grand Kremlin Palace. The problem is who to nominate again? “We have to decide! (Here, after all, what fluctuations!) According to Kryuchkov and Manaenkov, Vlasov's rating continues to decline. Polozkov has great chances. As for Vlasov, to recommend him for the post of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR "...

... In the evening, at 19.00, the Central Committee of the CPSU. Meeting with secretaries of regional party committees deputies. The meeting was chaired by V. A. Medvedev. He reported on the recommendation of the Central Committee for the post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR - I. K. Polozkov. Shouts for and against. But if necessary, we will support. And again complaints, why is the issue resolved so late? They said one thing, now another. There is no time to work anymore. No guarantee. The secretaries were outraged.

I. K. Polozkov is worried: “Why did they set me up at the last moment? I had already calmed down. It would be better to go along with A. V. Vlasov. This would give a greater effect "...


Most likely, these gestures were part of Gorbachev's cunning plan. He counted on the fact that neither Yeltsin nor Polozkov would be able to get a majority at the Congress and thereby eliminate each other. That would allow Gorbachev to impose a moderate candidate convenient to him. In pursuance of this cunning plan, the Communists of Russia faction proposed to hold elections with new candidates after the second round and proposed Vlasov from their faction, but Yeltsin didn't go about them and won in the third vote.

The situation ITTL differs from the OTL. The Democrats are weaker and do not have a ready-made charismatic leader who threatens Gorbachev's position. The main threat to the general secretary is not the reformist demagogue Yeltsin, but the communist fundamentalists within the Party. Therefore, OTL intrigues didn't happen because the risk of Polozkov being elected in this case is too great, which, together with his influence in the newly formed Communist Party of the RSFSR, turns him into a competitor to Gorbachev.

ITTL, the Communists immediately put forward Aleksandr Vlasov candidacy without OTL story with the Polozkov candidacy. Without Yeltsin, the Democrats didn't field a single candidate, and Democratic leaders run for Speaker separately. Although the Democrats united in the second round around the leader of the Democratic Party of Russia, Nikolai Travkin, this didn't help to avoid Vlasov's victory in the third round of voting by a narrow margin. The Democrats will rally around Travkin, and not, say, one of the leaders of Democratic Russia, Yury Afanasyev, because as a production worker he is socially closer to the centrist "swamp" of the Congress.

A representative of national minorities will be elected as the First Vice-Chairman, like IOTL. The most likely "vice-president" is Ramazan Abdulatipov, consultant of the Department of National Relations of the Central Committee of the CPSU, who headed the Council of Nationalities of the RSFSR SupSov IOTL. Travkin will be elected vice-speaker (without OTL amendments to the Constitution, the only one). The Democrats will also get some of the committee seats. The democratic opposition had these posts in the Ukrainian SSR and the Belarusian SSR, so the transfer of this practice to Russia is completely natural.

Unfortunately, there is no data on who Vlasov could have planned for the Russian Prime Minister role. According to the logic of things, this should be an official who has passed the path to the heights of the Soviet bureaucracy. OTL Yeltsin's Prime Minister of the RSFSR Deputy Prime Minister of the Union Government and former Minister of the Aviation Industry Ivan Silayev fits the necessary criteria, and, as the example of Vlasov himself shows, the transition from Union posts to Russian ones was in the order of things. Therefore, butterfly net works, and Silayev heads the Russian government ITTL, because why not.

The Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR will be adopted in formulations close to the OTL. This idea was not the Democrats' invention. The communists not only supported the Declaration IOTL, but also included it on the Congress agenda with the Vitaly Vorotnikov light hand. Although it is perceived as a nail in the coffin of the USSR IOTL, in honor of which the Russian Independence Day was established, it is the result of the OTL struggle between Yeltsin and Gorbachev under the Russian sovereignty slogan. The Russian Declaration's text, unlike the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine, didn't contain anything undermining Soviet federalism.

The struggle between Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev was the defining event of 1990-1991 IOTL. It set the tone for relations in the triangle of Gorbachev - democratic opposition - national patriots, pushing Gorbachev to an alliance with the latter. The "War of Laws" and "War of Taxes" directly influenced the New Union Treaty negotiations and the economic situation in the USSR. The actual victory of Yeltsin in this struggle was the beginning of the USSR agony, the August coup was the most striking manifestation of which. ITTL, the Russian parliament and government will act in the Gorbachev's policy wake until the end of the Aleksandr Vlasov reign.

Without Yeltsin leading the RSFSR and fighting against Gorbachev, the main line of confrontation will be between Gorbachev and party fundamentalists, dissatisfied with what they see as a rejection of principles, the threat of the Party losing power and the Union losing its great power status. One of the conservatives' leaders, Ivan Polozkov, was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the RSFSR at the RCP (Russian Communist Party) founding congress held at the end of June. The Conservatives tried to consolidate their success at the 28th Congress of the CPSU, held the following month, but despite their dominance in the party, they could not defeat Gorbachev, who, contrary to the Democrats' calls, didn't go to a disengagement from the Conservatives. He won the congress, being re-elected general secretary and promoting a number of his candidacies for positions in the party. Without the Yeltsin demarche, who left the Party right at the congress, the Democrats departure, who dissatisfied with compromises with retrogrades, was somewhat smoother, but by the end of 1990, the Democratic Platform fell off the CPSU, creating a number of parties in the republics.

Although Russia didn't lay mines under the USSR's financial and budgetary systems ITTL, the structural problems that led to its economic collapse didn't disappear. The Union economic reform program made headlines in May, when the Ryzhkov government raised the issue of a two-year-overdue price reform that was supposed to bring the price structure to a more or less reasonable form at the cost of raising consumer prices, too. The 500 Days program was also created ITTL, but remained only the Democratic Russia economic program. Gorbachev tends to the gradualist concept of reform like IOTL, fearing the "shock therapy" consequences. Without a conflict with the Russian government, the coordination of the Union economic program with the republics went faster, but it started after Ryzhkov's resignation.

Fears about the USSR fate were not unfounded. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia declared independence in the spring of 1990. In August – Armenia. The Supreme Soviet of Georgia adopted a law on the transitional period until the restoration of the independent Georgian Democratic Republic on 14 November 1990. The new Moldovan government sought to reunite with the Romanian brothers. Although Gorbachev was opposed to their secession, he rejected the National Patriots' proposals to introduce direct presidential rule in the separatist republics. The President of the USSR believed that the issue of their status should have been resolved within the framework of negotiations and the Law of the USSR "on the procedure for resolving issues related to the withdrawal of a union republic from the USSR" adopted in April 1990.

Gorbachev countered separatist tendencies with the idea of a New Union Treaty, which was supposed to re-establish the Soviet federation, expanding the rights of the republics of the Union. Together with Gorbachev, representatives of nine republics that (so far) didn't want to secede from the Union participated in its development: the RSFSR, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. Yeltsin successfully torpedoed efforts to preserve the Soviet federation IOTL. ITTL, Russian leadership follows Gorbachev's lead and, together with the Central Asian republics interested in union subsidies, supports the federalist project proposed by Gorbachev.

Although in Ukraine, unlike the six secessionist republics, the communists won the republican elections, the communist majority in the Ukrainian parliament was in no hurry to support the federalist plans of the Union government. Ukraine, unlike other republics, saw the future of the Union in the form of a confederation. On July 17, the republic’s SupSov adopted the Declaration on State Sovereignty, which, among other things, proclaimed the Ukrainian SSR’s right to create its own currency system and armed forces, as well as its desire for a neutral status in the future. Excessive focus on Moscow cost the leader of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Chairman of Ukraine Volodymyr Ivashko, whom Gorbachev made vice-secretary general, the power in Ukraine. Although Ivashko's successor in the party line, Stanislav Hurenko, was a conservative unionist, Leonid Kravchuk, the new Chairman of the Supreme Soviet (aka Verkhovna Rada), assumed power in the Ukrainian SSR.

During the autumn the New Union Treaty negotiations, Gorbachev, despite the special position of Ukraine, achieved the approval of the federalist project. IOTL, the rejection of key federalist issues, primarily the federal tax, occurred only after the August coup. Without Yeltsin's opposition ITTL, Gorbachev's position is stronger, and therefore in November the treaty draft will be ready for signing.

In addition to the union republics, the ASSR, which were part of them, also had to sign the NUT. The status of the ASSR as a subject of the Soviet Federation was established by the Constitution of 1977 and, especially, by the Law on the delimitation of powers between the USSR and the subject of the federation, adopted in April 1990. The union republics, which included the ASSR, feared that their participation in the New Union Treaty would be the first step towards secession from the parent republics. Although the NUT spelled out the status of the ASSR as part of the corresponding union republic, similar to modern Russian matryoshka regions such as the Tyumen oblast, this didn't prevent problems from arising.

The national-patriotic opposition tried to resist Gorbachev's course of "destruction of a great power." Communist fundamentalists and statists from the Soyuz (“Union” in Russian) faction fiercely criticized the government at every the Supreme Soviet meeting, but this didn't bear fruit. The National Patriots didn't hesitate to criticize Gorbachev IOTL, but his position is stronger ITTL.

The 4th Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, held in December, served to strengthen Gorbachev's power. The impeachment attempt by the National Patriots failed. The Congress amended the Constitution, strengthening the presidential power and introducing the post of vice president. Gorbachev chose Yanaev as vice-president IOTL for the sake of flirting with the conservatives, but he preferred Yevgeny Primakov, a member of his team, ITTL. Also in December, the chairman of the KGB was replaced. Instead of the hardliner Kryuchkov (the liberal Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin was dismissed in December 1990 IOTL), Leonid Shebarshin became the chairman of the KGB.

Another victory for Gorbachev was the appointment for March 17 of a referendum on the draft New Union Treaty. Unlike OTL, where voters were asked to vote "for all the good things and against all the bad things", they had to vote for or against a specific project ITTL. This hit both the natpats, who criticized the NUT from a unitary position, and the “special position” of Ukraine, whose representatives declared that they were ready to sign something only after a referendum in the republic.

Valentin Pavlov replaced Ryzhkov, who had fallen ill with a heart attack, as the Prime Minister. He quickly joined the hardliners IOTL because the weakness of the Union government prevented him from realizing his vision of economic policy, but by the end of 1990, unlike Kryuchkov, he was not seen as sympathetic to tightening the screws. Although such figures as Yury Maslyukov, Nursultan Nazarbayev, Arkady Volsky and others were named in addition to Pavlov, his reputation as a specialist in finance and support from republican leaders played in his favor.

The new government first step, planned by its predecessors, was a price reform that raised state prices by 60%. On January 1, a new wholesale price list began to operate, and on February 1, retail prices were raised. The latter happened two months earlier than OTL, because without the Russian opposition, the agreement and approval of new prices went faster. Although the new price list didn't mean the complete elimination of the price subsidies system, the reform led to some temporary improvement in commodity markets. Price increases reduced the surplus money supply, but without price liberalization or confiscatory currency reform, this could only have short-term results.

Although the OTL collapse of the union budget system caused by the "War of taxes" with the RSFSR didn't happen, the Union and the republics financial situation in the first half of 1991 left much to be desired. High budget deficits continued to be covered by the emission of money. The government tried to do something about it. Since the beginning of the year, a 5% sales tax has been introduced, a turnover tax replacement by the VAT has been planned, and the Ministry of Finance has been sequestering budgets with varying degrees of success. The fight against the deficit was hampered by the growth of the republican and local budgets expenditures. The republics not only compensated the people for higher prices, but also expanded social programs. At the same time, the economy has already begun to decline. Since January 1991, a decline in production has been recorded by about 10% compared to the last year levels.

There was a crisis in the Baltic States with the entry of Soviet troops into Lithuania and clashes in Vilnius and Riga IOTL on January 1991. Without confrontation with Russia, the Soviet Union position in negotiations with the Baltic republics after they declared independence in March-May 1990 is stronger. Despite this, Gorbachev was unable to get them to return to the fold, and the question was already about the division of property after a divorce by the beginning of 1991. The natpats, supported by the local Russian (read Soviet) population who moved to the Baltic States after 1944, demanded the introduction of presidential rule, but Gorbachev ignored their demands.

It is not clear to what extent Gorbachev is involved in the introduction of troops and clashes near the Vilnius TV tower, or whether this is an initiative of law enforcement agencies. ITL, the most likely author of the idea to overthrow the Lithuanian government (Kryuchkov) was dismissed, so there is simply no one in the Kremlin to come to the conclusion that it’s a twenty minutes adventure and convince Gorbachev of this / decide to put him before the fact. Republican leaders in the Federation Council would be expected to speak out against any intervention. Also, the absence of OTL Gorbachev's flirting with the National Patriots and attempts to tighten the screws because of the "War of Laws" and the Parade of Sovereignties works against the possible entry of troops into Lithuania in January 1991. Therefore, protests due to price increases in Lithuania will be local Lithuanian history.

Although there will be strikes due to price increases in February, including in the hitherto calm BSSR (price reform also led to protests in Belarus IOTL), without a confrontation between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, they will not reach the level of OTL scope and the protest politicization. The country was going to a referendum, which supposedly was supposed to decide its fate. Nine out of fifteen republics voted for the New Union Treaty on March 17, and in all of them, more than 60% of the votes were in favor of the Union like IOTL.

Russia obviously voted "yes" because the RSFSR was the USSR "supporting structure", and the Russian electorate has not yet reached the idea that the Union is a burden to them. The BSSR was perhaps the most Sovietized republic, since Belarusian nationalism was weaker than Ukrainian even before 1917. In the five Asian republics, the local CPSU branches power was strongest, and they were interested in maintaining the Union as a subsidies source. In the case of Azerbaijan, the Karabakh issue was added to the communists in power factor. Azerbaijan was interested in the Union support in its conflict with Armenia.

Ukraine has not yet experienced its public opinion evolution that took it from loyalty to the USSR to 90% in the independence referendum. Therefore, only three Galician regions and Kyiv voted against the Union. The Ukrainian leaders, understanding Gorbachev's game, held a republican referendum, which asked about support for "joining the USSR on the basis of the Declaration of State Sovereignty." The Ukrainians answered “yes” to both questions.

The referendum cut the ground from under the opponents of the Union feet, including in the Ukrainian SSR. Anti-unionists greeted the referendum results with mass protests. Passions were also seething in the Verkhovna Rada. As a result, Ukraine nevertheless decided to join the NUT with the proviso that the Union Constitution should reflect the Declaration of State Sovereignty.

On April 2, 9 union and 19 autonomous (16 Russian ASSRs, Karakalpakstan, Crimea, Nakhichevan) republics signed the New Union Treaty in Moscow. Until recently, there were doubts about the Ukrainian position, but, despite the opposition, Kravchuk signed the Treaty, and the Ukrainian parliament ratified it with a minimal majority.

The last 5th Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR opened on April 5. Its task was to ratify the New Union Treaty and amend the Constitution of the USSR, bringing it into line with it. It didn't cause problems. The Congress almost unanimously ratified the Treaty, and then brought the 1977 Constitution into line with it, eliminating the two-tier structure of parliament at the Union level. Elections to the 13th Supreme Soviet of the USSR (the Supreme Soviet elected in 1989 was supposed to be No. 12, but instead a CPD structure was created) were scheduled for August 11. On them, the inhabitants of the nine union republics that ratified the New Union Treaty were to elect 693 members of the Council of the Union (which corresponded to the total number of territorial electoral districts in the republics that signed the NUT in the 1989 elections). Another 308 people's deputies (11 from each republic), who were members of the Council of the Republics, were to elect by republican parliaments.

The natpatist group "Soyuz", for which the Congress was the last chance to fight for the 1945 borders preservation, raised the topic of six republics in which the NUT referendum was not held. The Baltic States and Georgia held republican referendums in February-March, in which the vast majority supported secession from the USSR. Gorbachev is obviously discouraged by these results, since he believed in the support of the Union by the "silent majority" in these republics, but is forced to accept the fact of secession. Referendums in Moldova and Armenia were to be held in June and September, respectively.

The Congress of People's Deputies called on the peoples of Armenia and Moldova to make a choice in favor of the Union in the upcoming referendums. Despite an attempt by the Soyuz faction to declare the plebiscites in the Baltic States and Georgia inconsistent with the Union referendum law and, accordingly, void, the Congress voted in favor of negotiations on the four republics secession conditions.

After failing to prevent the secession of the Baltic States and Georgia as a whole, the National Patriots raised the issue of minority regions in them, which were in opposition to local nationalist governments. So, only a quarter of the voters voted for the independence of Estonia in Narva, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia boycotted the Georgian referendum. At the same time, Abkhazia separately participated in the All-Union referendum, and in South Ossetia there was already a war between Georgians and Ossetians. There were also problems with pro-Soviet minorities in Moldova, where Gagauzia and Transnistria sought to remain in the USSR. On the eve of the Moldovan referendum, the natpatsts had the tact not to raise this topic, but calls for a revision of the Moldovan borders also sounded from the stands of the Congress. These initiatives failed because of the position of the union republics, who feared that the revising the republican borders precedent would hit them too.

The Russian Congress of People's Deputies, which was supposed to ratify the New Union Treaty, opened on April 11. By that time, the NUT had been ratified by almost all the union republics except Azerbaijan and most of the autonomies. Only Tatarstan caused problems. The republic had long aspired to the union republic status and saw a way to achieve this in the New Union Treaty by joining it separately from the RSFSR. That caused opposition from the union republics, who opposed undermining the RSFSR territorial integrity. Although the Tatarstan participation in the NUT and, accordingly, the Subject of the Union status didn't provide for its separation from the RSFSR, the Supreme Soviet of the Republic, upon its ratification on April 8, announced it.

The Union supported the RSFSR in the Tatar crisis. While it will seem to some that the Kremlin is by definition interested in dismantling Republic number one, this is an afterthought related to the conflict between Yeltsin and Gorbachev. For Gorbachev, both IOTL and ITTL, the support of the union republics, which weren't interested in the changing the republic territory without its consent precedent is vital for the implementation of reforms.

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which met at its first meeting after the 5th Congress on April 12, decided that the withdrawal of Tatarstan from the RSFSR was the Union Treaty violation. The Union Parliament called on Tatarstan and Russia to come to an agreement. Shaimiev, faced with the consolidated position of Russia and the Union, backtracked. At the suggestion of the Union Parliament, the Trilateral USSR-RSFSR-TatSSR Commission was formed, which was supposed to work out an agreement between Russia and Tatarstan.

The Tatar crisis became an opportunity for the deputies to show dissatisfaction with Aleksandr Vlasov. The national patriots, including the anti-Gorbachev CPSU faction, considered Vlasov a puppet of Gorbachev, who didn't allow the use of the RSFSR resources to save the Union. Democrats condemned Vlasov's excessive, in their opinion, slowness in the reforming the RSFSR. Ironically, it was the very traits that made Vlasov the Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet in 1990 that led to his downfall a year later. The deputies made Vlasov a scapegoat for the failure in relations with the autonomies and the Tatarstan demarche and announced a vote of no confidence in him.

A serious battle unfolded for the post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. About a dozen candidates participated in the first round of the speaker's election, but two favorites quickly emerged. Despite the conflict between Nikolai Travkin and the Democratic Russia leaders, the Democrats united around his figure. He was opposed by the young "Russia" faction leader, Sergey Baburin, around whom the National Patriots rallied. Abdulatipov, who was supported by autonomies representatives, took third place.

Travkin and Abdulatipov, either individually or together, could not stop Baburin's rise to power. Although many considered him too young for the main post in the republic, Baburin was able to rally his base and get the votes of the centrist swamp (the author recalls that during the attempt to elect the Chairman in July 1991 IOTL, Baburin walked ahead of Khasbulatov for some time). An important role in this was played by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Karelian SSR and one of the leaders of the Communists of Russia faction, Viktor Stepanov, who withdrew his candidacy in favor of Baburin IOTL in July 1991. He brought Baburin part of the votes of the autonomies.

Why Baburin? At that time, he was at the height of his influence among the national-patriotic people's deputies of Russia IOTL, and he was close to taking the post of speaker IOTL in the summer of 1991. His radical ultra-unionist position at the time of the vote was still not discredited. Sergey Baburin, unlike Nikolai Travkin, was able to take advantage of his chance and get to the top of power in Russia.

The Congress, despite its anti-autonomy orientation and fear of separatism, was able to find a compromise with the autonomous oblasts that wanted to become "republics within Russia" - Adygea, Gorny Altai, Karachay-Cherkessia and Khakassia. Although the CPD didn't immediately introduce amendments to the Constitution that would change the status of the four AOs, it agreed to their accession to the Federative Treaty as republics. This made it possible to temporarily relieve tension in relations between the Russian Federation and them.

The Central Committee of the CPSU plenum was held on April 28-29, the last one before the start of registration of candidates for elections and constituency party conferences. It was supposed to adopt a party platform with which the CPSU would go to the Supreme Soviet elections.

The conservatives, inspired by the Russian natpatists successes, who had promoted their man to the "president" of the republic post, wanted to achieve Gorbachev's resignation. They hoped that this would weaken their opponents in the party positions and allow the CPSU to be used to seize power after the parliamentary elections. Conservatives brought down a flurry of criticism on the Secretary General. Let's give the floor to OTL Gorbachev's memoirs:

… The Plenum first day passed relatively calmly. The Novo-Ogarevo Statement made publication a stunning impression. Those rushing into battle were probably held back by my opening remarks. But not for long. Apparently, they held the council at night, and the next day a clip of orators, inflaming the hall, settled on the General Secretary. Especially sharply, even rudely, Hurenko spoke, declaring: "They did to the country what the enemies could not do." He demanded "legislatively fix the ruling party status for the CPSU", restore the previous leading cadres placement system, the party control over the media. It was hard to believe that it was possible to be a slave to prejudices to such an extent and break away from life.

Prokofiev, Gidaspov, Malofeev didn't lag behind him. The Communist Party of Belarus First Secretary directly demanded that the president introduce an emergency state. As a matter of fact, other the General Secretary critics also led to this: let him either introduce an emergency state or leave. After the toughest of these speeches – I think it was Zaitsev from Kuzbass – I took the floor. I said: enough demagoguery, I'm resigning.

I was asked whether such a decision was made under the influence of impulse, irritation and annoyance caused by attacks on the general secretary, or was it a tactical step that was deliberately considered, thought out "in a cold head"? Surprisingly, both are true to some extent. Of course, not without emotions, there was a desire to immediately put an end to this. And on the other hand, the fact that I didn't rule out such a denouement in advance, was also ready for it. Well, I thought then, probably, the “moment of truth” has come when you need to cast aside hesitation and make a decision...


The plenum voted overwhelmingly against the Gorbachev's resignation IOTL. The intra-party opposition to Gorbachev was forced to look at the Yeltsin's shadow IOTL and feared the intra-party split consequences. The conservatives were afraid of losing power in the event of the CPSU collapse and the dissolution of the Union without the Party holding it together. Conservatives have less reason to fear ITTL. The threat of an immediate collapse of the USSR was temporarily averted, and Baburin's victory in the RSFSR inspired them. The conservatives hoped, by depriving Gorbachev of the levers of power in the CPSU, to consolidate the Party and, having won the elections, to take power in the USSR into their own hands. Therefore, the plenum accepted Gorbachev's resignation with a majority of one vote and appointed a congress for the end of May, which was supposed to elect a new general secretary.

Party conferences were to be held to nominate CPSU candidates in the elections in the first half of May. They also became the site for the selection of candidates for the 29th CPSU Congress. If the party conferences in the Asian republics and most Russian autonomies showed the continued local party bosses control over the party organization, then in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus they showed the depth of the split between the reformist and conservative wings of the party. Although this was not a problem for the candidates who lost at the conferences – they simply went to the polls either as "self-nominated" from labor collectives or as candidates from ideologically close movements, such as the Soyuz or the Democratic Reform Movement, then it became a disaster for the Communist Party as an institution.

The 29th CPSU Congress was the last in its history. The reformists and conservatives couldn't agree on a common election platform and a new general secretary, so the Communist Party ceased to exist as a single organization. Several organizations had taken shape by the end of autumn, two of which, the Democratic Party of Communists (DPC) and the All-Union Communist Party (AUCP), claimed succession with the CPSU. The AUCP, headed by Oleg Shenin, united party conservatives around itself, standing in the "defending the socialist choice" and Soviet unionism position. It had the greatest influence in the BSSR, the southern half of the RSFSR and the central and eastern regions of Ukraine. It was allied with the Agrarian Party, which served as the Kolkhoz CEO Lobby political tool in the union and republican parliaments.

The DPC adopted a social democratic program while remaining loyal to Soviet unionism. It united the reformist communists in the RSFSR and the BSSR around itself, having a much weaker position in the Ukrainian SSR. The party organizations of the Muslim republics and Russian autonomies, which hastened to swear allegiance to Gorbachev, also joined the DPC.

Both Soviet communist parties had far fewer members than the old CPSU as of May 1991. This applied not only to ordinary members, but also to the nomenklatura that sat in councils and executive bodies. This de-ideologized "party of power" thought more about their own interests and didn't seek to bind themselves with the wrong party they would join.

Despite national patriots' criticism, the Union didn't put forward territorial claims against the Baltic states. As I wrote above, the union republics position on this issue was unequivocal, and Gorbachev could not ignore it. The National Patriots, who took power in the RSFSR, changed the republic's position in favor of the Milošević-style irredentist policy. The Narva, Kohtla-Järve and Sillamäe city councils, at a joint meeting in the Chairman of Russia Sergey Baburin presence, proclaimed the Narovan SSR on May 16, which was to become part of the RSFSR or directly to the USSR. Baburin, speaking in Kohtla-Järve , not only supported the right of Narovia to self-determination, but also put forward territorial claims against Lithuania, calling for the return of Vilnius and Klaipeda to the Union (ignoring the 1920 Moscow Treaty and the Nazi annexations non-recognition principle), and Georgia. I, describing this Baburin's trick and its consequences, rely on his actions and views, repeatedly expressed by Baburin himself IOTL.

The principle, commonly known as the “Baburin Doctrine”, provided for the exclusion from the republics leaving the Union of territories where the population somehow expressed dissatisfaction with this step, or which, according to Baburin, were “illegally” attached to the seceding republics. The Baburin doctrine provoked protests not only from the Baltic States and Georgia, but also from the republics of the Union, led by Ukraine and Kazakhstan, who feared that the opening of the border revision Pandora's box would hit them. This concerned not only claims to “originally Russian” lands, but also a possible revision of borders in Central Asia and Karabakh. Despite the natpats' appeals in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Kremlin also didn't support the Baburin doctrine for reasons that I have repeatedly mentioned.

The Baburin Doctrine proclamation had the exploding bomb effect. The republics, both seceded and union, protested against the Russian leader actions. The union republics announced their Baburin's actions condemnation at the Federation Council meeting of convened on the initiative of Ukraine. Baburin's enemies also became more active inside Russia. He, unwittingly, gave the Russian autonomies a tool to defend their sovereignty. From the very beginning, they feared that the Russian regions and republics equality principle declared by Baburin (another position voiced by him in 1991) would serve to eliminate their sovereignty. Tatarstan withdrew from the Trilateral USSR-RSFSR-TatSSR Commission and scheduled the secession from Russia referendum on August 11.

The crisis in relations between Russia and other subjects of the Union led to the fall of Baburin. On May 20, a "statement of six" was published: the deputies of the Chairman, chairmen of the chambers and their deputies appeal, in which they called for the Baburin's resignation, accusing him of the existence of the Russian Federation threatening. Despite the parliament's leaders rebellion, Baburin was able to achieve the next day the proclamation by the Supreme Soviet of the right to join the RSFSR Narovia, Klaipeda, the Vilna Territory, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and in the event of a negative vote on the issue of membership in the USSR in Moldova - Gagauzia and Transnistria.

The anti-Baburin opposition hoped to take revenge at the Congress of People's Deputies, which was supposed to open on May 31: three days after the 29th CPSU Congress start. On May 24, the fifteen Russian ASSRs' leaders gathered in Ufa and announced their withdrawal from the Federative Treaty negotiations. They delivered an ultimatum to the federal government, demanding that their sovereign rights be respected; otherwise they will raise the issue of secession from the Russian Federation.

The first issue on the 4th Congress of People's Deputies of Russia agenda was a vote of no confidence in Chairman Baburin. Although the people's deputies of Russia generally supported Baburin's desire to preserve the Soviet Union, outskirts they saw that his policies would only lead to the collapse of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the overwhelming people's deputies' majority supported the vote of no confidence, dismissing Sergey Baburin on June 1. Reigning for only 44 days, Baburin turned out to be the shortest-term ruler of Russia, not counting Irina Godunova.

Ramazan Abdulatipov was elected as the new Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, who began to repair what Baburin had broken. The Congress condemned the Baburin Doctrine. The RSFSR went for the forced signing of the Federative Treaty inorder to regulate relations with the regions, primarily with the republics, which took place on August 5. These were three agreements concluded between the Federal Center and the republics, autonomous districts and the oblast and regions (oblasts, territories and cities of republican significance), respectively. These three groups of Russian regions transferred different packages of powers from the federal center. The republics received, among other things, unlike the OTL, the right to secede from the RSFSR. The Federal Treaty was ratified and implemented into the RSFSR Constitution on August 16 by the 5th Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, specially assembled for this purpose.

Abdulatipov achieved an agreement with Tatarstan. Although he was forced to recognize the right of the republics to secede, the Federative Treaty included a deferral of this right for four years. This decision, supported by the Union, undermined Tatarstan's claims for immediate secession. The President of the Tatar SSR, Shaimiev, was forced to sign the Federative Treaty, because he understood that without the Union support he wouldn't be able to secede from the RSFSR, and the only way to get it was to wait until 1995.

The Moldova's membership in the USSR referendum was held in June. The republic was split between an independence-seeking central government and the unionist national regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia. Since in Moldova, unlike Ukraine, no referendums were held that could provide data on people's position at a certain point in time, it will be necessary to extrapolate the results for the Right Bank of the Dniester from the 1994 and 1998 parliamentary elections results and the Ukrainian data on voting for the left in the 1998 parliamentary elections and March 1991 referendum. These extrapolations show that more than 50% of the Right Bank of the Dniester population in the spring of 1991 would have voted for the Union. They have a fairly large error associated with the need to take into account the changes in public opinion in 1991 and the differences between Moldova and Ukraine, but we don't have other data. Therefore, I prescribe that within the borders of the former Moldavian SSR (including Transnistria and Gagauzia), 52% of the population will vote for membership in the USSR. The independence of Moldova supporters will dominate in the center of the republic, and unionists in the north, east and south, where there is a large minorities' share.

The referendum results led to a political crisis in Moldova. The parliamentary majority, consisting of the Popular Front and moderate communists, collapsed. Prime Minister Mircea Druc resigned and Andrei Sangheli became his successor. Chisinau was engulfed in protest rallies against the Union Treaty ratification, which took place on June 30. The reintegration of Moldova into the USSR meant a drop in tension in Transnistria and Gagauzia. By-elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were scheduled for September 15, 1991.

On July 21, Gorbachev and the Baltic States leaders signed similar agreements in Minsk on the relations after their independence restoration. The state border, despite the opposition of the radicals on both sides, was established along the line of the administrative border on January 1, 1990. The USSR transferred Union property to the Baltic States (except for military property, the fate of which was negotiated separately) and a share in the Union internal debt attributable to them. The Baltic States renounced any claims to the gold reserves and external assets of the USSR and, of course, didn't pay the Soviet external debt. The Baltic States remained part of the customs territory of the USSR until January 1, 1992, and part of the Ruble zone until April 1. Soviet troops were to be withdrawn from the territory of Lithuania and Estonia until 1995, and from Latvia, where the Skrunda-1 radar station was located, until 1999. The Minsk agreements were ratified by the old Supreme Soviet, despite the natpatist opposition.

The agreement with Georgia was supposed to be an analogue of the Minsk agreements with the Baltic States, but problems with minorities in Georgia prevented it from being signed immediately. Although ethnic minorities also created problems for the Baltic governments, they were no match for Georgia's not-so-successful war in South Ossetia and Abkhazia's claim to membership in the Union. The Abkhaz SSR was the only republic outside the "nine" in which a referendum was held on March 17. The non-Georgian half of the population voted for membership in the Soviet Union on it. The Georgians, who boycotted the All-Union referendum, voted for the independence of Georgia. Unlike Ossetia, neither the government of Georgia nor Abkhazia were ready for war and even showed some willingness to compromise.

Gorbachev was ready to throw Abkhazia and South Ossetia under the bus. Although the President himself would have preferred not to do so, he was dependent on republics such as Ukraine and Azerbaijan firmly upholding the republics territorial integrity principle. On the other hand, any agreement with Georgia that didn't regulate the Abkhazia and South Ossetia status could not pass through the Supreme Soviet before the elections. Therefore, Gorbachev delayed the negotiations until autumn.

Elections were held for the 13th Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 11 and 25. Formally, the majority of 704 (including Moldova, where elections were held in September) people's deputies were elected as "self-nominated" from labor collectives, but their political position and the factions they belonged to make it possible to divide them into several large groups, within which people's deputies flowed much freer than between them. Determining the quantitative composition of these groups, I focus more on the elections of 1993-1995 in single-mandate constituencies (I hope there is no need to explain why it is more correct to focus on the majoritarian system, and not party lists) results in the Slavic republics than on the elections of 1989-1990. The 1990 elections differed from the next ones in the existence of the dominant party system and its political machine, which had already collapsed by this time ITTL.

Gorbachev's ratings will fall, which will negatively affect the Democratic Party of Communists prospects in the Slavic republics. The democratic opposition popularity will grow, despite its blocking with Gorbachev against the National Patriots. The Natpats will also benefit from the Gorbachev's ratings fall, as they did from the economic situation after January 1992 IOTL. Therefore, I assume just such results for the 1991 parliamentary elections in the USSR.

The August 1991 elections will be a big disappointment for the national patriots (and they will obviously regret that they were not held in October-November). If they dominated the parliament elected in 1989, now the three factions (AUCP, Agrarian Party, Soyuz) accounted for 191 deputies. On the right flank, only the DPC faction at first consisted of 135 people. It united two wings around the president figure: pro-Gorbachev moderate democrats, mainly from Russia, who gravitated towards the democratic camp, and Asian deputies, ideologically close to the Alliance for Sovereignty, but who joined the DPC because of Gorbachev’s alliance with their patrons in the republics. Another 118 deputies were members of various groups united in the Democratic Bloc.

The already mentioned Alliance for Sovereignty (AfS) was the third force in the Union Parliament. He united 81 deputies, mainly from the republics and autonomies, on the platform of strengthening the sovereignty of the subjects the Union. The Alliance can be conditionally divided into Ukrainian confederalists and more moderate representatives of Central Asia and Russian autonomies. AfS had a very large influence in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, as it played a key role in many votes, providing or not providing the pro-government coalition with the necessary majority. The Alliance's “evil twin” on the national platform was the Nationalist Bloc, which united various national democratic movements’ representatives headed by Rukh. They, striving for the collapse of the USSR, in most cases took an obstructionist position.

The remaining 136 the Council of the Union deputies were members of various centrist factions or were independent deputies, and the National Patriots and Democrats fought for their votes.

The Council of the Republics composition was fundamentally different from the lower house. This was due to the fact that Ukraine and, say, Mordovia were represented by the same number of people's deputies, who were elected by parliaments elected a year and a half ago. Since the Council of the Republics, as the name implies, represented republican interests, it was dominated by two factions oriented towards them: the DPC and the AfS, which together had 269 deputies out of 363 (including the new Russian republics that joined the Union in August). The National Patriots had 85 more seats, while the Democratic Bloc had only 9.

In general, the elections went smoothly, except for Tajikistan. Unlike other Asian republics, the positions of the local nomenklatura were not strong enough to suppress the National Democratic and Islamist opposition. They won in three of the republic's nine constituencies (the nationalists also won in some other constituencies in Central Asia, but not enough to claim more) and contested the vote in others. Massive protests led to the Tajik President Qahhor Mahkamov resignation in September and re-elections scheduled for November. Tajikistan was a weak link in the nomenklatura regimes in Central Asia IOTL. Mahkamov retired the August coup IOTL and there were competitive presidential elections in the republic. Internal conflicts led to the civil war of 1992-1997, which was won by the nomenklatura leader Emomali Rahmonov with Russian and Uzbek support.
 
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Disclaimer: The text is based on an edited Google translation, so if you see errors anywhere, please let me know.

Having done away with political problems: the NUT and elections, the Government was finally able to deal with unpopular measures and attempts to save the Soviet economy. Here is what the USSR Ministry of Economy (former Gosplan) writes in its report of June 20, 1991:

… The functioning of the industry at the beginning of this year took place in difficult conditions of restructuring organizational, economic, environmental, labor and financial relations. Over the five months of this year, industrial production decreased by 5.6% compared to the corresponding period last year.

In general, in the industry, according to the first option
[successful the Government anti-crisis program implementation - here and below my notes in square brackets] the production volume stabilization is predicted, starting from the end of the second quarter, and its very noticeable increase from about September 1991. In this case, for the year as a whole, the decrease in the total industrial production volume will be only about 4%, with approximately equal rates of decline in groups "A" and "B" [production of means of production and production of consumer goods] of industry. According to this variant, in the 4th quarter of 1991, industrial production will reach the 1990 level in terms of average daily volume.

According to the second option
[when something goes wrong], for the second half of the year, the curve of changes in industrial production volumes, typical for the same period in 1989 and 1990, is preserved. In this case, in general, for the year, the decrease in the total volume of industrial production will be approximately 10%. At the same time, the largest decrease will occur in group "B" industry...

… Therefore, there is a need for additional measures in the current emergency conditions. Two options for getting out of their current situation are considered.

The first option is based on the implementation of strict non-economic methods of limiting the monetary incomes of the population.

These include:

1. Reducing budget spending on social programs. Moreover, we are talking not only about a newly adopted programs moratorium, but also about the suspension of those already introduced in 1991. To reduce the total deficit of the budget system to the level envisaged for the current year (taking into account the change in the scale of prices - about 100 billion rubles), it is necessary to suspend the implementation of social programs by 30-35 billion rubles.

2. Freeze wages in all sectors of economicy as of July 1 of the current year. This would make it possible to limit the population's money income growth by about 100 billion rubles. If this decision is made, it would be possible to introduce an additional mechanism for channeling funds due for wages in excess of the fixed level for the denationalization and privatization purposes.

In addition, it is necessary to reduce to the maximum extent possible the capital construction centralized funds expenditure, with all the ensuing consequences for the economic development of the national economy.

This option is theoretically possible. However, in the current socio-political situation, it can hardly be implemented. In the current conditions, the second option seems to be more reasonable, based on the inflationary processes inevitability recognition, their conscious use in order to achieve macroeconomic stabilization and protect against inflation only a limited circle of the population with a fixed income, bearing in mind that workers in the sphere of material production must compensate for losses from growth prices mainly due to an increase in output and its sale on the goods market.

The essence of this option is consistent, starting from July of this year, the all prices liberalization in order to maintain fixed and regulated prices only for a limited list of fuel and raw materials, tariffs for bulk transportation of goods, and retail prices for goods by the beginning of 1992, which form the basis of the consumer budget. Along with the further prices liberalization, periodic prices revision for products where their state regulation is still preserved will be required. This will make it possible already in the second half of this year to increase the level of balance between income and the supply of goods and services...


That is, the Union Government came to understand the inevitability of price liberalization here and now already in June 1991. Goskomtsen (State Committee on Prices) writes about pricing policy in a report dated May 28, 1991:

... The price reform [there is a price increase carried out IOTL in January-April, and in ITTL – in January-February] superimposed on a general decline in production in all sectors of the economy. Wages continued to grow rapidly, raising costs in material production and increasing the imbalance in the consumer market. As a result, the instability of the system of mixed prices increases, which in turn negatively affects the volumes and structures of production...

… According to the Goskomtsen, it would be wrong to administratively raise retail prices for basic food and non-food products again, since this will lead to unpredictable socio-political consequences in the country. It is necessary for the population to get used to the newly introduced prices this year.

At the same time, taking into account that as a result of the reform, the population will be paid more funds than the price increase amount, to stabilize the market, the possibilities of market adjustment of prices for those types of goods that are sold at free and regulated prices should be used to the maximum. It must be said frankly that industry and trade have not yet learned how to use the price mechanism to balance the market and are trying to restrain the formation of an objectively emerging level of these prices. As a result, high-priced prestige goods are sold in long queues. For example, by introducing free prices for a number of goods from November 15, 1990, we are only now beginning to normalize the jewelry trade...

... since 1992, a transition to a permanent increase in fixed prices for energy resources and basic types of materials, machinery and equipment, as well as purchase prices to ensure economic parity between rural and urban areas is inevitable. This does not contradict the idea of transition to a flexible price system and active use of prices as an economic regulator. If this option is adopted, there will be no need for a system of two prices: for the state order and free sale...

... In connection with the broad discussion of the concept of the national economy development for 1992 forecast forming, within the Government of the USSR anti-crisis program framework Goskomtsen, carried out evaluation calculations various policy options and prices in 1992.

Option #1

This option provides for the introduction of a dual prices system for the main types of resources – fixed prices for the state orders volume and free prices for 10-20% of the volume of production. Establishing higher prices for a part of the production, according to the this solving the problem method supporters, will allow maintaining the fixed prices level for the main volume of production.

The option implementation will lead to serious negative consequences:

with a multiple difference in the price of the same product, the fulfillment of contractual obligations at fixed prices for enterprises will become an economic burden;

for many types of products it will be impossible to maintain the fixed prices level due to the uneven new increases distribution in prices across the range of products and enterprises...

… contract prices in the presence of a single regulator, marginal profitability, push enterprises to increase costs through the inflated contract prices for consumed resources coordination...

… If different prices are applied for resources consumed in the republic and exported outside it, and this practice already exists, then this will lead to a contradictions aggravation between the republics and to the destruction of the union market…

... Option #2

A complete rejection of administrative regulation of all types of prices with simultaneous indexation of socially unprotected categories of the population incomes...

… If we proceed from the fact that the main part of the price increase is indexed, then the withdrawal of the economy from hyperinflation is not expected in the foreseeable future. Price stabilization can only be achieved by limiting the growth of household incomes and government spending. Calculations have shown that the maximum allowable amount of compensation in order to extinguish the inflationary spiral in about 2-3 years is 50-60% of the price increase...

… The budget financing sphere will be reduced in a very short time and sharply, it will be necessary to abandon state investments in all sectors, to carry out the public utilities privatization, including housing, most of health care, and education, transferring them to commercial self-sufficiency conditions. It is government consumption at the monetary emission expense that causes high inflation rates. A sharp public consumption funds reduction will raise the question of additional amounts of compensation for the part of the population.

In addition, the uncompetitive enterprises ruin will inevitably begin, and the population monetary incomes indexation limiting in practice will lead to the number of employees reduction with their transfer to unemployment benefits.

As a result, relative balance in finance and money circulation, according to expert estimates, can occur with an increase in production resources prices by about 7-10 times and the level of retail prices by 15-20 times, while expanding the payment sphere. At the same time, we should expect a drop in production volumes and the real living standards of the population by 30-40%.

An almost complete capital investment reduction, and above all in industry, will undermine the development of the entire economy for a long time and will be an irreparable blow to technical progress...

… Calculations based on a comparison of world prices with new domestic prices show that the ruble exchange rate for industrial and technical products should be 0.8-1 per dollar, instead of the predicted auction rate of 20 rubles per dollar. For consumer goods, a comparison of German retail prices with current retail prices allows us to conclude that the ruble exchange rate against the dollar (the mark is recalculated at the current exchange rate against the dollar) is 1.3-1.5 rubles per dollar ...

... Such a difference between the market and economically justified exchange rate is due to the complete breakdown of the country's financial and credit system, huge disproportions in the structure of demand and an acute shortage of currency...

… The free market exchange of rubles for dollars introduction and granting enterprises the right to freely sell their products in foreign markets can lead to a serious national wealth drain abroad and huge economic losses for the state. It will be profitable for enterprises to sell machines, equipment (at the price of scrap metal) and other products for next to nothing, and exchange the received currency for ruble potential, thereby covering any costs and ensuring "high" efficiency...

... Due to the fact that the levels and, especially, price ratios in the domestic market will be formed under the world market influence, a number of sectors of the national economy will be in a critical situation. The performed calculations showed that agriculture will not withstand competition and will be unprofitable; a significant part of food and light industry enterprises, individual branches of civil engineering will go bankrupt...


And here is what the Ministry of Economy writes about urgent measures to normalize finances and monetary circulation 3 days before the August coup:

… An analysis of the first half of the year results and forecast calculations for the future show that with a reduction in the current year of the gross national product, according to optimistic estimates, by 10 percent, national income by 15 percent, the deficit of the country's budget system will be at least 200 billion rubles, including the union budget – 120 billion rubles. If social programs adopted by a number of republics in addition to the all-Union programs are implemented, then the deficit will reach 240 billion rubles...

… The second option "mirrorly" differs from the first one [repeating 1929 and 1937 with a return to the 1970s economic system] and is based on the recognition not only of the inevitability of inflationary processes, but also of active use on the principle: the market will somehow adjust the proportions. In this scenario, the forces of the state at all levels are concentrated primarily on protecting only a limited circle of the population with a fixed income (mainly the unable to work) from inflation, bearing in mind that workers in the material production sphere must compensate for losses from rising inflation by increasing output and selling it in the commodity market. However, as calculations show, the economic recession will reach 25-30 per cent; unemployment becomes real during peak periods on approximately the same scale (i.e., 35-40 million people).

Practical measures for the this scenario implementation consist in the immediate liberalization of all prices, primarily for fuel and raw materials, tariffs for the transportation of goods, retail prices for food and other goods...

… A necessary condition for the revival of the economy is the implementation of a monetary reform of a restrictive nature and a 3-4 one-time devaluation of the official exchange rate of the ruble against the dollar with its general decrease approximately to the level of the exchange (30-35:1)…


Further, Minister of Economy Shcherbakov spoke about the union program, which was supposed to stop such horrors by the "managed crisis" method and that delays in its implementation would not lead to anything good:

... It is necessary to understand that in 2-4 months, completely different measures will have to be applied to normalize the situation, and the anti-crisis program can simply be thrown into the trash. Only the second scenario of the development of events [shock therapy] will become the only and uncontested.

The measures proposed below, which must begin to be implemented no later than October 1, were prepared by the joint efforts of the ministers of economy and finance of 13 republics, the heads of republican banks, and a number of specialists as mandatory and inevitable for the implementation of the third scenario for overcoming the crisis ...

… Elimination of the mismatch between the levels of income and expenditure within the budget system itself. The budgetary systems expenses are made mainly from the Union and Republican budgets, while revenues are concentrated primarily in the local Councils budgets - as a result, the real deficit of the budgetary system is much higher than it appears in the consolidated budget.

The decision to expand the revenue base of local budgets, especially while maintaining the main burden of financing social programs at the federal and republican levels, led to the concentration of large free financial resources in local budgets ...

... A situation is emerging in which the budget system can actually throw out a deficit of not 240 billion rubles, but approximately 310-320 billion rubles, of which 240 billion rubles will be made at the expense of bank credit resources and, in essence, represent a monetary emission...

... Under these conditions, it would be necessary, by the presidents of the republics special decrees, firstly, to revise the statutory local budgets revenue base in favor of the republican and union budgets, or to shift to the local part of the republican and union budgets expenses Secondly, to significantly reduce the costs of the budgetary system itself, including those for the implementation of social programs.

In our opinion, with the consent of the republics, it would be possible by the President of the USSR Decree to implement the decision to immediately (September 1) freeze all all-Union and republican programs of a social nature that had not been started by funding as of August 1, providing for the extension of this measure at least for the first half of 1992 of the year)…

… The proposed measures will reduce the budget deficit by about 25 billion rubles.

2. To a large extent, the financial and monetary crisis is due to strategic miscalculations in tax policy made in 1990-1991 both in the Center and in the regions. The current corporate profits taxation system is based on an unprecedented low in the world practice tax rate, combined with a wide range of tax incentives…

… In 1991, in connection with the tax rates reduction and the introduction of broad tax incentives, the budget system revenues will be reduced by 188 billion rubles. At the same time, even taking into account the decrease in production volume by 10-12%, the increase in material consumption by 5%, the decrease in labor productivity by 12%, the funds left at the disposal of enterprises will increase by 256 billion rubles, or 2.5 times, compared with the calculations , including a profit of 153 billion rubles, or 1.5 times ...


After describing the problems, Shcherbakov moves on to what needs to be done to save the economy:

… Pursuing a strong coordinated tax policy. The state cannot exist at the tax revenues current level. Therefore, along with the current income tax, it is proposed as an emergency measure to introduce a tax on the legal entities property in the amount of 6 per cent of their production assets value. This will make it possible to increase the revenues of the budgets of all levels of government by 100 billion rubles per year, to bring the withdrawal of profits to about 45-48 percent...

... To redistribute part of the income of an all-Union character (tax on turnover, personal income tax) from local budgets in favor of the Union and republican ones.

3. In order to adapt the taxation system to the inflation conditions, in order to withdraw additional enterprises income resulting from price increases, it is necessary to reform the taxation system on a large scale. In this regard, it is proposed to replace the turnover tax with a value added tax and excise taxes on certain goods...

… The effective economic methods for regulating the population income introduction. In the course of their implementation, two sets of interrelated measures should be implemented.

At the first stage, it is necessary immediately, as an emergency stabilization measure, from September 1, 1991, to freeze the level of prices and wages for a period of three months ...

... At the second stage (after December 1, 1991), a transition to predominantly free pricing is carried out with the inclusion of a new mechanism for the formation of wage funds, regulation of wages through tariff negotiations and the introduction of indexation of incomes of the disabled population ...




If you've made your way through this wall of text, we can talk about what's going on ITTL. Macroeconomic indicators such as GDP and inflation as of August 1991 were close to OTL. The economy was shrinking by 5-10%. Prices have doubled since the beginning of the year, mainly due to the price reform in the first quarter. The market exchange rate of the ruble was in the corridor of 25-30 rubles per US dollar (IOTL, it was at the level of 30-35 rubles per dollar by August). The difference between the market rate and the price level in the economy, which was about 20 times, was caused by the money circulation disorder associated with excessive emission in the period 1965-1991. Official exports and imports were declining, while the illegal trade growth associated with the astronomical export-import operations profitability.

The only sphere in which the economic situation was better than IOTL was the budgetary one. Without the confrontation between Yeltsin and Gorbachev and the War of Taxes that it caused, tax rates, primarily in Russia, didn't decrease. Therefore, the budgetary system of the USSR deficit in 1991 is not 240 billion rubles, but only 110 billion rubles, which is twice as much as the planned 52 billion rubles and equals approximately 5.8% of the Soviet GDP. Due to the two times smaller deficit, the money emission is much less, which has a positive effect on the markets in relation to OTL.

The union government, as shown above, understood the risks of an inflationary surge and economic depression associated with price liberalization and the domestic market opening. The Prime Minister of the USSR Valentin Pavlov believed that the only way to avoid an inflationary surge was a confiscatory monetary reform like in Germany in 1948 or the USSR in 1947. IOTL, Pavlov commited an unreasonable withdrawal of 50 and 100 rubles banknotes due the worsening of the situation in the Soviet Union and his impulsiveness. ITTL, Pavlov didn't recognize situation in the Soviet monetary sphere as critical, so the monetary reform, as planned, will be in the second half of 1991. The Union government IOTL also considered it necessary (see the wall of text above) even after it was discredited in January 1991, and this idea figured among democratic economists as well (see the Russian Finance Minister Boris Fedorov memoirs).

Monetary reform started after the elections and took place from 2 to 8 September. All banknotes of the 1961 model were seized. Freely exchanged for new money was up to 350 rubles (with a minimum wage of about 250 rubles per month). Amounts above this limit were exchanged on a progressive scale. According to the same scheme, the bank accounts balances were recalculated. The sums seized in this way were credited to special accounts with Sberbank, blocked until 1994, which already contained the February the price increase compensation. The further fate of the actually confiscated in this way savings will be a political issue throughout the 1990s.

The ratio of M2 money supply (excluding funds blocked on special accounts) to GDP decreased from 70% to 21%, which corresponded to the 1960s level, as well as the level established immediately after price liberalization IOTL. Thus, the money overhang that had formed in 1965-1991 was eliminated, which led to the first half of 1992 inflationary shock IOTL.

The monetary reform removed the pressure of excess money supply on the commodity markets, which had already appeared by that time, the stock and currency markets, which disappeared as a result of the inflation of the ruble in early 1992 IOTL. Speaking of this, I am guided by the German 1948 monetary reform results, which led to the elimination of similar distortions and the strengthening of the mark, which made it possible to liberalize the German economy without hyperinflation bouts.

Prices on the free market fell several times, almost equaling state prices. The nascent stock market experienced its first major drop in the indices. The ruble strengthened 7 times, stabilizing at the level of 3.6 rubles. per US dollar. This is still below the purchasing power parity rate, which, according to my calculations, was about 1.05 rubles / $, but now the ratio of the PPP and market ruble exchange rate was in line with countries like Poland and Romania. The strengthening of the ruble has sharply reduced the profitability of exports of raw materials and imports of goods. Thus, the domestic price of oil (70 rubles/ton), calculated in dollars at the market rate, increased from 0.34 $/bbls to $2.7/bbls, which was higher than the OTL domestic Russian price at the end of 1992.

The relative monetary circulation normalization made it possible to take the next step: the prices liberalization from October 1, 1991. At the same time, control over the price level for a number of socially significant consumer goods and services (bread, milk, transport, energy) was left to the state, like IOTL after January 1992 liberalization. Since the money supply was dried up by the monetary reform, the jump in prices was only 15% in October, and in November-December prices rose by about 4% per month.

The monetary reform and earlier price liberalization made it possible to avoid the OTL collapse of the ruble in the second half of 1991, when the dollar was worth 150 rubles at the end of the year, which meant that the average salary at the market rate corresponded to about $6, and the episode of hyperinflation in the first half of 1992, similar to the Polish one in the second half of 1989 (the difference between Poland and most of the post-Soviet states IOTL was that Poland switched to an anti-inflationary policy 5 months after price liberalization, and not 3 years later).

The Soviet Union inhabitants ITTL obviously didn't know what kind of catastrophe they had avoided, and they had every right to be dissatisfied with the economic situation in the country. Soviet GDP fell by 8% in 1991 (IOTL by 6%). The deeper decline of the Soviet economy was due to the tightening of financial conditions than OTL and earlier price liberalization. The internal debt of the Union and the republics by the end of the year amounted to 820 billion rubles (IOTL, by the end of 1991, the internal debt amounted to 950 billion, the budget deficit was lower ITTL) with a GDP of 1.9 trillion.

Although the Gosbank (Soviet Central Bank) raised the discount rate to 20% in October and to 30% in December, in fact it was lower than required. The dependence of enterprises on cheap credit, and persistently high budget deficits forced the Gosbank to keep the rate below the inflation rate and slowly print money, which led to the March 1992 financial crisis. Since the absent hyperinflation didn't allow masking the real wages decline to the same extent as IOTL, unemployment began to rise already at the end of 1991.

An important difference from the OTL was a much tougher protectionist policy. If IOTL the newly independent states at the first stage of their existence sought to satisfy the needs of voters and fill the scarce consumer markets, then ITTL the Union Cabinet will listen to the interests of industry. Also, the export and import duties system made it possible to maintain differences in the ratio of external and internal prices, if which were canceled, industrial production would fall by 40%, and to reduce the need for industrial enterprises, which suffered from the transition to world prices IOTL, in cheap loans to maintain their pants.

The Soviet Union was able to avoid default not only on domestic, but also on external debt. IOTL, due to the collapse of Soviet exports, the Union was insolvent by the second half of 1991 and at the end of the year defaulted on its external debt of $104 billion. In the next 15 years, this debt was paid by the Russian Federation, which assumed the USSR obligations on it.

ITTL, without the Soviet state collapse, exports (or foreign exchange receipts from it) were $8 billion more and amounted to $78.1 billion, a quarter down compared to 1990. Imports also declined, but not as much as IOTL, amounting to $82 billion. Problems with payments and attracting additional financing, which had been making them felt since 1990, led to a reduction in the current account deficit from $21 billion in 1990 to $6 billion (it amounted to $2.4 billion ITTL). The situation with loans better than IOTL allowed the Union to tighten its belts less. In mid-1991, negotiations began on the restructuring of the external debt, and Western states, not interested in the USSR collapse, were more willing to give him loans. In December 1991, the USSR joined the IMF, which gave it another source of funds.

Since January 1992, the internal convertibility of the ruble was introduced. The exchange rate at the beginning of the year was 4.41 rubles/$. Despite the Union Government efforts, strong inflationary pressure was exerted on the Soviet currency. Relatively soft lending conditions, a high budget deficit and a 2-fold increase in energy prices in January, undertaken under pressure from the oil-producing republics governments, created the conditions for the March 1992 financial crisis. The ruble collapsed almost 2 times, stabilizing at the level of 8-9 rubles per dollar, where it was until May 1993. The March crisis led to the fall of Pavlov's cabinet and the resignation of the Chairman of the Gosbank, Viktor Gerashchenko. This crisis is analogous to the collapse of the ruble in September 1992 (the first Black Tuesday), caused by the indefatigable printing of money and the Black Tuesday 1994, which led to the fall of Gerashchenko.
 
Disclaimer: The text is based on an edited Google translation, so if you see errors anywhere, please let me know.

The New Union Treaty didn't bring stability to the Soviet Union. In September, Armenia voted to secede from the USSR, which complicated the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, a province of Azerbaijan where there was a movement to join Armenia. In October, the 13th Supreme Soviet of the USSR opened, which was supposed to adopt the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics, the content of which caused conflicts. Valentin Pavlov, who took on most of the hatred because of the monetary reform, remained the Prime Minister in the autumn of 1991 only because the current constitution didn't provide for the resignation of the Cabinet before the new Supreme Soviet. Important elections were to be held in Tajikistan and Ukraine in November-December.

Tajikistan was a weak link among the nomenklatura regimes of Soviet Central Asia IOTL. President Mahkamov also resigned IOTL, after which competitive presidential elections were held in the country. Although they were won by the communist candidate Nabiev, he was unable to suppress the opposition after the elections. This attempt led to an uprising and a civil war that brought the current Tajik dictator, Emomali Rahmon, to power, who defeating the opposition with Russian and Uzbek support.

Nabiev's position ITTL is weaker than IOTL. He, along with the ruling Democratic Party of Communists of Tajikistan, was in the eyes of the voters responsible for monetary reform and price liberalization. The opposition began to organize earlier than IOTL and had experience in elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Makhkamov resignation campaign. The opposition successes showed parts of the elite that it was more profitable to turn away from the DPC and the ruling Leninabad (in honor of the Soviet name Khujand) clan. The presidential elections held on November 24 ended with the victory in the first round of the opposition candidate Davlat Khudonazarov. He won in the central and eastern regions of the country. Nabiev won in the north and among national minorities who feared the nationalist slogans of the democratic opposition.

President Khudonazarov faced a parliament elected in 1990 that was almost entirely communist and could, in theory, block any move by the new president. But the Tajik politics clan nature helped Khudonazarov. Communist deputies were guided not by party interests, but by local interests, and the DPC of Tajikistan was demoralized by defeat in the elections and fell apart. Deputies from the central and southern regions of the republic formed a new majority, when, the DPC retained influence only in the Khujand oblast.

Since July 1990, the former secretary for ideology of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, has been the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada and, therefore, the head of state of Ukraine. Although the CPU collapse led to the dissolution of the parliamentary majority, this didn't hit his positions much. Kravchuk relied on the Ukrainian nomenklaturae pragmatic part and had good relations with some figures in the national democratic opposition. He didn't create his pocket party, relying on the local bureaucracy and nomenklatura class brothers. IOTL, Kravchuk, except for an attempt to seize the Rukh's organization, didn't create a party of power even at the level of Kuchma's People's Democratic Party.

Kravchuk, as the incumbent head of state, was considered the favorite in the presidential elections scheduled for December 1. He stood on the moderate market reforms and the transformation of the Soviet Union into a confederation platform. Although Kravchuk was defeated when Gorbachev was able to push through the federalist Union Treaty draft, he pushed for the draft constitution turning the USSR into a confederation adoption.

The other two main candidates in the elections, Vyacheslav Chornovil and Stanislav Hurenko, occupied different flanks of the Ukrainian political spectrum. The former first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Hurenko, who also headed the new Communist Party, spoke on the AUCP unionist and socialist platform. Former dissident and Lviv governor Chornovil supported Ukraine's secession from the USSR and radical market reforms in his program.

Leonid Kravchuk failed to win in the first round, gaining 34.6% of the vote. His ratings began to fall after the currency reform, along with voters' faith in some form of "renewed Union". Kravchuk won in most of the central and southern regions. Vyacheslav Chornovil, who won in the capital and 7 western regions, received 29.1% (23.3% IOTL). The growth of Chornovil's ratings compared to the OTL is associated with the people's dissatisfaction with the monetary reform and the growth of separatist sentiments after the Pavlov's money exchange and price liberalization. Hurenko, supported by Russian voters, had 22% of the vote. He received an absolute majority in the Crimea and a relative majority in the three eastern regions.

In the second round, where Kravchuk and Chornovil entered, the incumbent Chairman won, gaining 50.4% of the vote against 38.8% for Chornovil. The election results were decided by Hurenko's electorate, for whom Kravchuk was a lesser evil than the dissident Chornovil. The geographical distribution of votes has changed little – Chornovil retained its leadership in all regions in which it won in the first round. The President Kravchuk inauguration took place five days after the election, on December 20.

Ukraine continued to oppose the federalist draft Constitution of the USSR. Ukraine threatened to simply not ratify it if it didn't comply with the Declaration of State Sovereignty. The Ukrainian concept provided for the transformation of the Union authorities into coordinating structures and the transfer to the republican level of most of the union competencies up to the conventional branches of the Armed Forces, with the exclusion of autonomies to such power. In the latter – limiting the powers of autonomies – Ukraine found support from other union republics, burdened with small subjects of the Union in their territory.

The conflict between Ukraine and the Union over the Constitution, which began as soon as the Supreme Soviet formed a commission to develop the Constitution together with the republics, soon left the front newspapers pages. The national democrats victory in Tajikistan caused a domino effect in the Asian republics, primarily in Uzbekistan. The President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov had IOTL in late 1991 - early 1992 dealing with three opposition forces: Vice President Shukrullo Mirsaidov, national democrats and Islamists. IOTL, they were divided, which allowed Karimov to solve problems one at a time, when, they had before their eyes an example of a successful Tajik broad front ITTL.

In January 1992, Karimov tried to get rid of Mirsaidov and, in violation of the Constitution, issued a decree on his resignation. The vice president was supported by the opposition. Massive protests erupted in major cities. The opposition attempted to impeach Karimov, but failed to gain the required number of votes in the Supreme Council. The Interior Ministry, which remained loyal to Karimov, crushed the protests in Tashkent. Mirsaidov fled the capital.

In the Fergana Valley, the situation developed differently. The main force in the region was the Islamist militias "Adolat", which guarded the protests from Karimov's police. The suppression of protests in Tashkent only led to the radicalization of local protesters. The Fergana Valley, suffering from lack of land, was a ready barrel of gunpowder. Power in the field under the banner of the "Legitimate President Mirsaidov" began to take over Mahallahs - traditional self-governing social institutions. The Soviet authorities in the Fergana Valley hastened to swear allegiance to the Government of National Salvation formed in Fergana.

The Union government found itself in the face of civil war in the third most populous republic within the Union. Karimov demanded the intervention of the union forces against the "Islamist rebellion." The Supreme Soviet of the USSR mission, sent in mid-February to organize negotiations between Karimov and Mirsaidov, failed because both sides were not ready to compromise. Armed intervention on the side of Karimov received support from the national patriots, who supported the union intervention in the republics affairs precedent, and republican nomenklatura representatives, who tried on the situation of the people's revolution for themselves. This led to a split in the "Alliance for Sovereignty" between the interventionists and the Ukrainians, who opposed the union intervention. The Democrats were ready to support the peacekeeping mission, but not a campaign to strengthen the local dictator power. Since the decision to intervene could not be carried out without the votes of the Democrats, the Supreme Soviet passed a limited resolution calling for elections and giving the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs a mandate for a peacekeeping mission.

The Uzbek crisis showed the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs inability to respond to crises. The internal troops of the USSR MIA, which were previously used in such situations, were divided between the republics, and now the Union Ministry of Internal Affairs had to beg for troops from the republics. The only republic that both Uzbek presidents trusted and was willing to provide troops was Belarus, but Belarusian internal troops were not enough for a peacekeeping mission.

The Soviet Army was only source of troops for the operation in Uzbekistan. Its possible application has become a stumbling block. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, as soon as the question of the use of the army was raised, banned the service of Ukrainian citizens outside the republic. The Democrats feared that the troops could be used against the Uzbek opposition. They recalled the example of the "Ring" operation, when units of the 4th Army stationed in Azerbaijan participated in the deportations of the Armenians.

The March financial crisis, although unrelated to the confrontation in Uzbekistan, reinforced the sense of impending catastrophe in the people's deputies of the USSR. The collapse of the ruble undermined the credibility of the unpopular government. Pavlov, when he carried out the monetary reform, promised that the confiscation of money would stabilize the ruble, which didn't happen. The Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR was declared a vote of no confidence.

The government crisis and the split of the DPC faction into a democratic and republican-nomenklatura group that joined the Alliance for Sovereignty made Gorbachev look for new allies in parliament. The Democrats made the approval of the operation in Uzbekistan contingent on the election of a new prime minister, the giant of democratic economic thought, Grigory Yavlinsky. Together with the new Chairman of the Gosbank, Tatiana Paramonova, they began to improve the monetary system by raising the discount rate to 60%. Yavlinsky's cabinet was finally able to get rid of the need to finance the deficit through emission. The result of the policy in the form of lower inflation and stabilization of the ruble was not long in coming.

On April 4, the Supreme Soviet finally approved the use of the army to maintain order in Uzbekistan. Both sides agreed to negotiate and hold elections. Karimov hoped, by dragging out negotiations on the rules for holding elections, to win time and win over the peasantry by agreeing to fulfill part of the dehkans' land demands. Having received popular support, Karimov planned to go on the offensive against the rebellious Fergana with the support of the union forces.

This plan buried the May 2 riot in Aktash, Samarkand oblast. Local peasants were dissatisfied with the allotments size that Karimov's officials had give for them, which resulted in the taken the district council building. Karimov's Internal Troops brutally crushed the riot, killing 23 people. This provoked protests and clashes with police throughout Western Uzbekistan. Soviet troops, who, on the orders of the Turkestan military district (TurkVO) commander, General Fuzhenko, patrolled Samarkand, participated in the opposition demonstrations dispersal, as a result of which 3 people died. It thundered throughout the Union. The "Samarkand massacre", as the incident was dubbed by the democratic press, hit the supporters of the intervention. The new commander of the TurkVO, Gennady Kondratiev, practically forbade his troops to interfere. Therefore, Soviet troops watched the desperate attempt by the Karimovites to take the Kamchik Pass and invade the Fergana Valley and the subsequent march of Adolat to Tashkent that followed this defeat.

On May 29, Adolat came to the Chirchik River, on which Tashkent stands, bank. There was a coup in the city. Karimov fled to Kazakhstan and Interior Minister Zakir Almatov was arrested. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Shavkat Yuldashev, who remained in charge in the capital of Uzbekistan, agreed with Mirsaidov. On May 31, he solemnly entered his capital and went to the inauguration in the Supreme Soviet building. The tasks of the new cabinet of national unity were to carry out agrarian reform and elections to the Constituent Assembly of Uzbekistan, which was supposed to adopt a new constitution. The Uzbek crisis was over and everyone hoped that it would not resume in a couple of months.

In February 1992, the 6th Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR was held, which amended the Constitution, introducing the post of an elected president. The Russian Federation was the last union republic that had not yet done this (IOTL, the BSSR, before the August coup, it planned to introduce the presidency with the expectation of the victory of the Communist Party candidate in the elections, but after it the establishment of the presidential system lost its relevance. ITTL, where the Communist Party of Belarus as part of the AUCP will retain its influence, the post of President of the BSSR will be introduced in the autumn of 1991), and even some Russian autonomies have already acquired presidents.

The creation of the post of President was supported by both democrats and national patriots. They saw in the presidential system an opportunity to gain power in the republic and carry out their political program. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Abdulatipov resisted the constitutional reform, as he understood that he could not win the elections because of his nationality. His resistance was enough to delay the 6th Congress and the constitutional reform, but he could not delay further. The elections of the President of the RSFSR were to be held on June 14, 1992.

The Communist Party of the RSFSR (part of the AUCP) claimed the largest political party in the Russian Federation status. The press believed that the undisputed candidate from the RCP would be its first secretary Valentin Kuptsov, but his nomination ran into opposition at a party conference held in early March 1992. The Stalinist wing of the party, headed by the commander of the Volga-Ural Military District, General Albert Makashov (he balloted in the 1991 elections IOTL, and later was known for anti-Semitic speeches) spoke out against the nomination of Kuptsov. Makashov accused Kuptsov of softness and Gorbachev's opportunism (IOTL, Makashov made similar accusations at the 2d Congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and succeeded in electing Zyuganov as party leader instead of Kuptsov). This demarche derailed the conference's original script and led to a fight for the nomination.

In addition to Kuptsov and Makashov, the main candidates for the nomination were the of the RCP Central Committee ideology secretary Gennady Zyuganov, the chairman of the Kemerovo regional council Aman Tuleyev (nominated in the 1991 and 1996 elections) and the former Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Nikolai Ryzhkov (OTL candidate from the RCP in the 1991 elections). Despite the opposition of the Stalinists, Valentin Kuptsov became a candidate from the RCP. Ryzhkov withdrew his candidacy and called on the conference to vote for Kuptsov. Kuptsov announced at the conference that Ryzhkov would be his candidate for Russian prime minister.

Tuleyev and Makashov registered as candidates and took part in the election campaign. Aman Tuleyev withdrew his candidacy before the elections, calling for Kuptsov to vote (which is a repetition of the OTL 1996 campaign, not 1991. Tuleev's participation as an individual candidate was part of the RCP strategy to bring the elections to the second round, which is not necessary ITTL). Makashov, supported by the radical communist Bolshevik platform of the CPSU, participated in the elections and won 4.3% of the vote. In order to outshine Makashov and get the votes of voters who supports of strong power, Kuptsov made General Boris Gromov, the former commander of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, his running mate.

Kuptsov put forward an anti-reform communist program. He appealed to those who opposed radical reforms. Kuptsov advocated a gradual transition to a socialist market economy, rejecting the capitalist transformation of Soviet society. Kuptsov was a firm unionist who advocated strengthening the union center power.

The largest democratic organization in the RSFSR, the Democratic Russia movement, held its congress in early March. At it, after a long discussion, a candidate from the Democratic Russia was elected. They became the people's deputy from St. Petersburg Galina Starovoitova. IOTL, Starovoitova tried to participate in the presidential elections of 1996, but wasn't registered. In 1991, Yeltsin considered her as a vice presidential candidate, but preferred Aleksandr Rutskoi for ticket balance. The assertive Starovoitova, in the opinion of the demorosses, was suitable for an active campaign, which was supposed to ensure the victory of the Democrats in the elections.

Starovoitova was aware that she looked too radical in the voters' eyes, and therefore her choice of a running mate was aimed at the ticket balance. Starovoitova's choice fell on Sergey Stepashin, a representative of the moderately democratic Left Center faction, who worked in the Ministry of Internal Affairs institutions. There were also negotiations on an alliance with Alexander Rutskoi, but he preferred to go to the polls on his own.

Starovoitova spoke on the deepening democratic reforms platform. She demanded the adoption of a new democratic Constitution of Russia, which was supposed to protect civil rights and regulate relations with the regions. Starovoitova paid great attention to the need to law enforcement agencies reform, which were to be transformed from the punishing sword of the communist regime into an effective police force. Starovoitova criticized the current government for failing to protect the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens before the Union. She accused the Union Government of complicity in the genocide in Nagorno-Karabakh and the crimes of the Karimov regime. She saw a way out in the reform of the Union, taking into account the interests of the republics, primarily Russia and Ukraine.

The Nikolai Travkin's star in the political horizon began to roll by the beginning of 1992. Claiming the chair of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR in 1990 and 1991, Travkin had tense relations with the leaders of Democratic Russia. Although the Democratic Party of Russia, headed by him, was for some time the largest democratic organization, this didn't give Travkin an advantage. The party activists supported the Democratic Russia and even forced their leader to join it. Travkin's Unionist views were also losing popularity, especially among Democratic voters. He made the decision to run without support from Democratic Russia after he lost at its congress. Travkin's partner was the famous director Stanislav Govorukhin (No. 2 on the DPR list in the 1993 State Duma elections).

Arkady Volsky and Aleksandr Rutskoi acted on the centrist field. They collected the votes of those who were not ready to vote in the first round for either Kuptsov or Starovoitova. Volsky appealed to moderate reformists and industrial circles, while his partner Ruslan Khasbulatov appealed to national minorities. Rutskoi appealed to the desire for a strong hand and Russian nationalism. Also among the candidates, one should single out the main clown of Russian politics in the 1990s, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, for whom these elections were the first great performance.

The main theme of the campaign was the union government policy, the failures of which brought votes to its most ardent critics. Both Starovoitova and Kuptsov capitalized on the March crisis and the ongoing economic downturn by offering different Russia's economic problems solutions. Starovoitova paid more attention to the Soviet federalism problems. She opposed the use of Russian citizens in the Soviet operation in Uzbekistan. Starovoitova accused Gorbachev that his policy of supporting local dictators led to the emergence of a "second Afghanistan" on Soviet territory, citing the examples of Karabakh and Uzbekistan. Kuptsov was criticized derogatorily for the federalist provisions of his program. Starovoitova accused him of wanting to place all power over Russia in the hands of Gorbachev. Anti-unionist rhetoric fell into a jet of dissatisfaction with Gorbachev's policies. The Russians accused the union center of confiscating money, rising prices, falling economy and sending Russian boys to be slaughtered. Election results:

CandidateRunning mateResult
Valentin KuptsovBoris Gromov28,3%
Albert MakashovAlexey Sergeev4,3%
Aleksandr RutskoiVeniamin Sokolov4,8%
Galina StarovoitovaSergey Stepashin36,4%
Nikolai TravkinStanislav Govorukhin6,4%
Arkady VolskyRuslan Khasbulatov6,9%
Владимир ЖириновскийAndrey Zavidia8,8%










Election results in the regional and federal context are based on the following methodology. The base electorate of Zhirinovsky and Makashov was their electorate in the 1991 elections. Kuptsov's results are determined based on the sum of Ryzhkov's and Tuleyev's results. The Starovoitova's base electorate is opponents of preserving the Union in the March 17 referendum, who almost without exception supported the Democrats. Volsky's results are based on the results of Bakatin in the 1991 elections, RDDR and PRES in the 1993 elections; Rutskoш – KRO in the elections of 1995; Travkina – DPR in the 1993 elections. After that, I introduced a correction factor that takes into account the public sentiment change, and brought the results by region to a base of 100%.

In the second round, held on June 28, 1992, Galina Starovoitova won with 50.1% of the vote. Most of Travkin's electorate and half of the voters of Volsky and Rutskoi flowed to Starovoitova. Starovoitova won in the northern regions of the republic and large cities, while both rural areas and national minorities supported Kuptsov. The only exceptions are the republics of the North Caucasus, whose population counted on a beneficial change in national policy in the event of Starovoitova's victory.

The Kravchuk's election as president of Ukraine did not mean his calm rule. He was elected due to the current head of state status and the fact that voters considered him the lesser evil. As the economic situation worsened, Kravchuk lost the opportunity to maintain this image in the eyes of voters. The President didn't want to throw Prime Minister Vitold Fokin under the bus, whose activities led Ukraine to lag behind in economic reforms and enrich the part of the nomenklatura close to Kravchuk. IOTL, Kravchuk kept Fokin, who was little capable of carrying out the necessary economic reforms, as the Prime Minister until November 1992 and dismissed him only under pressure from parliament.

The two largest political organizations in Ukraine: the Rukh and the Communist Party, despite the sincere hatred they felt for each other, were united in their desire to limit the Kravchuk's power. The president's power base was the bureaucracy and the people's deputies, representing local interest groups, who could be bought with the budgetary funding of their constituencies. Kravchuk's power could be curtailed by moving to a parliamentary system and party-list elections, which were supposed to secure seats for ideological parties rather than local officials and directors. Both the Rukh and the CPU, based on the presidential elections experience, believed that elections based on party lists would bring them victory.

The Rukh and the CPU achieved results in May after collecting 3.5 million signatures for early elections and mass demonstrations. The Rada voted on May 3 to call a referendum on confidence in it and the president. Kravchuk, realizing that in the event of early elections he would lose them, was forced to agree to limit his power. The Constitution was amended to provide for the formation of the Cabinet of Ministers by a coalition of Verkhovna Rada factions and the parallel voting electoral system. Of the 450 people's deputies of Ukraine, 300 were to be elected by party lists, and 150 by single-mandate constituencies in two rounds (in OTL Ukraine had a 50/50 parallel voting system in 1996-2004 and 2011-2020). Elections were scheduled for September 27, 1992.

The Union and Ukraine's participation in it was main topic of the elections. The main options were independence, confederation and federation. If in 1991 the majority of Ukrainians believed that a confederal Union would be the ideal option, now, having seen the government's inability to achieve the aforementioned confederation and the central government actions that hit the citizens' wallets, Ukrainians began to lean towards independence from the USSR.

The Communist Party of Ukraine remained the only party with a strictly unionist position. It was led by communist conservatives led by Stanislav Hurenko. The CPU promised the voters a return to the socialist economy and the preservation of the Union. There was a group in the party that stood on confederalist positions, headed by the head of the parliamentary faction Oleksandr Moroz (IOTL, after the prohibition of the Communist Party, he created the Socialist Party of Ukraine, which didn't unite with the Communist Party after its revival), but its influence was not enough to change the party position.

The Agrarian (IOTL, the Peasant) Party of Ukraine, consisting of kolkhoz CEOs, was close to the Communist Party in economic terms. On the issue of the Union, by virtue of its nature as a corporate organization of the kolkhoz authorities, it took an opportunist position, although confederalist notes were traced in the party platform.

Economically liberal unionists were represented by the Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms, Vice Speaker Volodymyr Hrynyov, who won 4.1% in the presidential election. Targeting the liberal Russian-speaking population of eastern Ukraine, the IBR promised a federal structure for Ukraine and the Russian language official status. Although the IBR was formally in favor of a confederation, its political program meant that it fought for the votes of the Russian minority, seeking the support of those who were not ready to vote for the communists.

Before the elections, Leonid Kravchuk was forced to create an electoral bloc for him. The United Ukraine bloc included various small centrist parties, but its electoral list consisted more of Kravchuk's supporters among the directors and officials. United Ukraine in terms of program inherited Kravchuk's election campaign, promising to continue the current course. In fact, the UU hoped to use the administrative resource to obtain the required number of votes.

The People's Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) went to the polls on the Ukraine's independence and the deepening of democratic and market reforms platform. Rukh's program promised administrative decentralization, law enforcement reform, and protectionist economic policies. National minorities were promised national-cultural autonomy. In the longer term, an administrative-territorial reform was planned with the creation of lands based on historical regions. Although at one time Chornovil used the “F” word in vain (“federalism”, what did you think?), Rukh supported a decentralized unitary state.

The Rukh was the dominant national democratic organization, with various smaller parties and organizations siding with it. This umbrella organization took advantage of size by going to the polls on one ticket. I take as a model the Civil Forum in the 1990 elections in the Czech Republic in and Solidarity in the 1989 elections, and not its fragments in 1991, because the collapse of the nomenлlaturф-communist system in Ukraine has not yet occurred, and the Vyacheslav Chornovil leadership qualities were enough to ensure that Rukh didn't fall apart and remained relevant until his death in 1999 IOTL, unlike Russian democratic organizations. Rukh, as the main opposition force, has drawn dividends from the economic crisis and the union and republican governments actions.

Rukh's main rival on the right flank was the Ukrainian Republican Party, led by Levko Lukianenko. The main contradiction between Rukh and the URP was decentralization. Lukianenko was against decentralization and the introduction of a land system, considering it the first step towards the disintegration of Ukraine. He strove for rigid administrative centralization up to the division of Ukraine into 100 departments according to the French model.

Modeling the election results, I rely on the results of the 1991 elections for most parties (for the CPU - the TTL Hurenko results). For the Greens and the Agrarian Party, I took the results of themselves and the SPU-SelPU bloc in the 1998 elections. The latter correlated well with the pain of the rural population in the 1989 census and the results of the Agrarian Party of Russia in the 1993 elections. Also, the results of the 1998 elections for the CPU correlate well with my model, which is additional confirmation of the correctness. For United Ukraine, additional regional coefficients that reflect the administrative resource have been introduced.

And so, the winner of the parliamentary elections in 1992 is the People's Movement of Ukraine, which received 40% of the vote. Rukh took first place in most regions of the country. The second place was taken by the CPU, for which 19.7% of voters voted. It won first place in the Crimea, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Luhansk and Odesa oblasts. Third place with 10.8% of the vote was taken by United Ukraine. She also won in the Chernihiv oblast. The Agrarian Party, which received 8.6%, performed well in rural areas of Central Ukraine, while the URP, which received 5.5%, performed well in the west of the country. Also, the 4% barrier was overcome by the Green Party and the IBR.

Together with single-member constituencies, the Rukh received 165 mandates, the CPU – 105, United Ukraine – 61, APU – 55, URP – 20, IBR – 16, and the Greens – 14. Another 18 deputies were not included in any of these factions. A coalition of Rukh, United Ukraine and the URP was formed. Vyacheslav Chornovil became the Prime Minister, and economist Volodymyr Lanovyi became his first deputy.

Gorbachev's position as head of state began to deteriorate sharply after the election of Galina Starovoitova as president of the RSFSR. If earlier he could rely on Russia in pursuing a federalist policy, now the Russian Federation has moved into the confederalist camp. The union-forming republic was added to the opposing Ukraine, democratic Tajikistan, revolutionary Uzbekistan, communist Belarus, split Moldova and the one-problem regime in Azerbaijan. Gorbachev could rely on only four Muslim republics, but even their consolidated position was not enough to maintain his political course.

The economic situation in the Union left much to be desired. Although the Yavlinsky cabinet was able to stabilize the ruble and bring down inflation, which stood at 68.9% in 1992, it came at a terrible cost. The economic downturn has intensified. In 1992, the USSR GDP decreased by 16.9%, amounting to 91% of the OTL USSR GDP in 1992 in comparable prices. Tighter credit conditions have caused many businesses to close. Unemployment soared to 14% (roughly the same as in Russia and Ukraine in the late 1990s). By the end of 1992, the state debt reached 2.2 trillion. rubles, which amounted to 81% of GDP in 1992.

Gorbachev tried to find a compromise with the new Russian administration. The new Constitution draft gradually began to take on the confederation features, despite the efforts of the union president to maintain more federalist positions. The Rukh's victory in the parliamentary elections in Ukraine showed the futility of these efforts. In order to prevent Ukraine's exit from the Union, Gorbachev agreed to the confederalist Constitution draft, which was proposed by Kravchuk in 1991. Despite protests from the Soyuz faction, the Supreme Soviet of the Union adopted further amendments to the long-suffering 1977 Constitution, which introduced the provisions of the new Constitution before it was ratified by the republics.

The constitutional reform didn't stop Rukh from wanting to secede from the USSR. A referendum on the independence of Ukraine was scheduled for May 23, 1993. The Ukrainian government was loyal to the provisions of Article 2 of the Union Law on Secession from the USSR, because the most controversial Article 3 (separate referendums in autonomies and places of national minorities’ compact residence) was declared unconstitutional, as it contradicted Article 78 of the Constitution of the USSR of 1977 and Article 3 of the Union Treaty.

On May 23, 1993, Ukrainians came to the polls to decide on Ukraine's membership in the Soviet Union. With a turnout of 86.7%, 87.7% of those who came to the polling stations voted for independence, which amounted to 76% of the citizens of Ukraine eligible to vote. Referendum results are based on 1991 OTL referendum figures. I analyzed the 1991 referendums in Ukraine and Latvia in a regional context results to find patterns. The results, expressed as “yes” votes from the entire electorate, and the turnout depend on the proportion of the titular nation in the population of the corresponding region with a high coefficient of determination. The votes for independence in Ukraine and Latvia follow the same pattern, when a turnout relative to the share of the titular ethnic group in OTL Ukraine is consistently lower.

The turnout is 2.5% higher than IOTL due to the fact that the opponents of independence were not so demoralized as in OTL in the autumn of 1991 and mobilized their supporters better. On the other hand, with the Latvian voters behavior in 1991, the turnout would have been 93.9%. The lower turnout figure is related to the general downward trend in election turnout in Ukraine, which began as early as 1990 and was observed in other post-Soviet countries as well. The most important moment of the referendum in the regional context was that both the Republic of Crimea (so far without the prefix "Autonomous") and Sevastopol supported independence with a result of just over 50%. June 11, 1993, on the anniversary of the accession to the Kiev throne of St. Volodymyr (according to "Memory and Praise" by Yakiv Mnikh), Ukraine declared independence from the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics.

The results of the referendum, although expected, had the effect of an exploding bomb. The inhabitants of Crimea found themselves voting for an independent Ukraine. Russian irredentists from the Russian Movement of Crimea staged protests and tried to get a referendum on the independence of Crimea, but did not find support from the authorities. Mykola Bahrov, who headed Crimea, not only feared the economic and political consequences of secession from Ukraine (problems with water supply and the separation of the northern regions of the peninsula with a significant Ukrainian population from Crimea), but also adapted to the realities of sovereign Ukraine, discovering that he could coexist even with the Rukh government.

The independence of Ukraine and the collapse of the 340-year-old Russian-Ukrainian union, which had existed in one form or another, forced the Russian Federation to react to the situation. The Supreme Soviet discussed the status of Crimea, but President Starovoitova managed to frighten the parliamentarians with the prospect of a war with Ukraine over the peninsula (I recall that the same composition of parliament prevented Yeltsin from crushing the Dudayev rebellion by force in November 1991). Instead, the Russians found themselves without Ukraine alone with Central Asia. Fear of the prospect of a Muslim majority forced Russian politicians to bury the Union. The Russian parliament adopted a resolution that said that the Union Treaty was unacceptable in the current situation and that negotiations on a new treaty were required. The Russians expected, by moving to a freer association, to keep Ukraine in the sphere of influence or, at least, to put certain barriers in front of Central Asia.

The Union Parliament, faced with the prospect of its own uselessness, impeached President Gorbachev and demanded that Yevgeny Primakov, who headed the Soviet Union after him, introduce a state of emergency. Primakov, after consultations with Defense Minister Marshal Shaposhnikov, who stated that the army was unable to enforce this decree, refused. He, having agreed with the leaders of the union republics, demanded that the Supreme Soviet dissolve itself, promising huge benefits to the deputies. Faced with the prospect of violent dispersal, the Supreme Soviet dissolved itself on June 16, transferring constitutive power to ten union republics (the former ASSRs, although they were subjects of the USSR, were not sovereign states in the full sense). The Treaty on the Commonwealth of Independent States concluded in July provided for the dissolution of the USSR and the recognition of the independence of its republics. The Russian Federation was given his seat on the UN Security Council. For a few months, which were required for a civilized divorce, a transitional administration was maintained.

The Primakov-Yavlinsky administration, which led the Soviet Union during the transitional period between Gorbachev's resignation and the end of the USSR, carried out a titanic work of disengagement. The Armed Forces, gold and foreign exchange reserves, internal debt were divided. Agreements have been signed in various fields, covering all issues related to maintaining relations between the newly independent states. It was possible to settle the issue of the external debt of the USSR. By the middle of 1993, the USSR Government reached an agreement with the London and Paris Club on the restructuring of external debt with conversion into Brady bonds. Now, instead of one union bond, several republican bonds were given. Since most of the republics refused to share in the external assets and liabilities of the USSR, they were divided between Russia and Ukraine in a ratio of 4:1.

An important part of Primakov's work was the achievement of dimensional agreements between Azerbaijan and the Karabakh Armenians and Georgia and its rebellious autonomies. Both of these agreements guaranteed the territorial integrity of the aforementioned former Soviet republics and the broad autonomy of the rebellious regions under Russian guarantees. These were important steps to maintain Russian influence in the post-Soviet space. On October 1, 1993, the USSR ceased to exist. The Russian tricolor was raised over the Kremlin. Primakov and Yavlinsky remained in Russian politics. The biggest success of Yevgeny Primakov was the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Aman Tuleyev administration.



For 30 years after the collapse of the USSR, the post-Soviet space has changed a lot. Economic growth in the post-Soviet space resumed in 1995. It never occurred to anyone in Russia to fight inflation by nominal revaluation of the ruble, because there was no need. Therefore, the Russian economy, followed by other post-Soviet economies, began to grow earlier, without the pressure of an overvalued currency, which was removed only by the 1998 default. Over these 30 years, the post-Soviet states have reached the level of developed countries, even if Central Asia still lags behind its northern neighbors. All of them are, to one degree or another, democratic.

The Russian Federation remains the dominant state in the post-Soviet space. The international structures headed by it include most of the post-Soviet states. It is a developed industrial power. In 2015, the Russian flag was raised over the Moon. In the US-China confrontation, it remains neutral so far.

Ukraine maintains close relations with both Russia and the European Union. It derives huge profits from its multi-vector policy. Ukrainians spent a lot of effort in the 1990s and 2000s trying to monetize what other countries owed to the Soviet Union with very mixed success.

Peace and order in Georgia under the shadow of the King of Georgians, Abkhazians and Alans David XIII. In neighboring Azerbaijan, although the recognition of Karabakh's autonomy has caused unrest, it is now a developing oil-exporting country. And no Aliyevs on the throne.

The odious Saparmurat Niyazov regime, who tyrannically ruled Turkmenistan, was overthrown in a revolution in 1999. Evil tongues say that it was with the money of Russian and Ukrainian oil companies that received local oil and gas fields. Neighboring Uzbekistan managed to take part in the restoration of the Afghan monarchy, securing its southern border.

Finally this space can enjoy peace and prosperity.
 
I understand that it might be extremely inappropriate to write a reply to a months-old thread, but I do not have much alternative here (I don't frequent fai.org.ru much and I don't remember whether I did ever register there). In any case, I would like to express my gratitude to you for publishing this excellent TL — it provided me (and quite a few other users, I imagine) some necessary insight into the politics of the late RSFSR and figures that could provide an alternative to Boris Yeltsin. There are some very minor discrepancies, but overall I think it's pretty well-founded.
I was never much of a big 1990s politics buff, though I'm even less of a 2000s politics buff. :<

Election results:
If possible, I'd like to inquire into some specifics — what calculations did you make for your 1992 election methodology? Did you do a table of results region-by-region? (Kind of doubtful — sounds like too much of an undertaking). And how long, precisely, is the presidential term in TTL's Russia, if you do recall thinking of that? I remember seeing one of your responses back on the original stating that Tuleyev was elected in 1998.
 
Did you do a table of results region-by-region? (Kind of doubtful — sounds like too much of an undertaking)
I did

what calculations did you make for your 1992 election methodology?
I used OTL 1991-1998 elections data and identified the core and swing electorates and adjusted it for social sentiment changes social sentiment by multiplying the regional result logarithm by the shift factor. After that, I took the results and added them up.

And how long, precisely, is the presidential term in TTL's Russia
4 years. There was an early election in 1994 due the new constitution adoption
 
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