The Restless Twenties (CP Victory Timeline)

Small quibble, but I have a hard time seeing Henry Cabot Lodge as president of the United States. He'd be 73 in 1920, and his appeal would not be particularly widespread. On the other hand, California senator Hiram Johnson would have won his spurs, so to speak, opposing Wilson; he was already well-known as Theodore Roosevelt's running mate in 1912, and at age 54, would be in the prime of life for a run at the White House.

Johnson would have run a forceful campaign, essentially emphasizing his anti-Wilson policies, which would have struck responsive chords with the American electorate. Teamed with running mate Calvin Coolidge, the isolationist GOP ticket would have swamped the Democrats' offering of William McAdoo and Oscar Underwood.

Coolidge, as was the case with most vice presidents until recent years, would not have been a candidate in 1928. That would have gone to the equally conservative/isolationist Herbert Hoover, as in OTL.
 
don't forget the socialists no Red Scare in 1919, this means Debs can actually run and not be in a jail cell. Additionally, Working class WASPs could become disillusioned because we lost WW1 (I bet they wouldn't vote Democratic) combine that with Republican establishment's closeness to big business and I see a socialist party in the future
 
An important key to Arabia is that control over the Hasa province (the Gulf Coast) and Hijaz makes the Saudis largely impotent (that's where the food, water, and acces to the sea are). The Ottomans only used about 3,000 troops to reconquer the Hasa in 1871, and less even than that to garrison it thereafter. In 1905 only 5,000 troops were sufficient to occupy Riyadh.

It's hard to imagine anyone really bothering much with the interior, although it's not beyond the pale - but if losses are incurred, the attempt would be dropped and a return to the pre-War status quo easily negotiated (the Saudis pay lip-service to Ottoman sovereignty and the Ottomans leave them alone).

I'm not sure why this conflict would be disruptive to the whole of Ottoman Arab lands, since none of them would consider themselves to have anything in common with the Saudis, and would regard them like most Americans viewed David Koresh and the Branch Davidians. I think maybe you're assuming pan-Arab sentiment way ahead of its time.
 
Further Details

USA

Whilst Lodge's OTL death date is 1924, I don't view such things as set in stone as many butterflies had been at work since 1918. Should he die in office during his second term, then his VP would succeed as President. Who this individual is would be interesting, but not necessarily relevant for later events

Why do you have Lodge as the Republican candidate in 1920? I don't think that OTL he was a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination. I was actually thinking that you would have someone like General Wood or perhaps even another shot for Teddy Roosevelt. I think that the Republicans could go towards accusing the Democrats of being Central Power loving softies who allowed the Huns to dominate Europe. Or the United States could retreat further into political isolationism.

Economically though, the United States is going to be able to take advantage of the German victory. The Germans are just as nearly bankrupt as the allies, and they have vast new territory that needs infastructure. I could easily see American investment in railroads, resource exploitation and the like in German Eastern Europe. Also, will the Americans be calling in all that paper they got from the Brits and French, because right there you have the potential for some serious economic trouble.

Last point on the Americans and Post-WWI Europe, is in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans are going to have control of the Arab areas of the Empire, and I don't think that either the British or the Germans are going to be looking like good partners. The British are defeated and the Germans are distracted. The Americans could end up getting heavily involved in the Ottoman oil industry. The Ottomans would view the Americans as neutrals who are willing to invest, but too far away to interfere (too much) and thus are simply awesome people to have around (plus perhaps Ottoman students sent to American universities because of this connection?)

I am thinking of Josephus Daniels as the victorious Democratic candidate in 1928; he has what many Democrats lack, a successful wartime record. Whatever else can be said about the US performance in the Great War, the naval side cannot be so easily criticised, and he escapes the Wilsonian epitaph of having sent Americans to fight Europe's war by being easily able to point to precedents going right back to the early 1800s when US ships served in European waters

Economy will probably be going great guns just like OTL, based on a bunch of things that will soon come crashing down. That said, the Republicans of the 1920's were just the kind of people that the country wanted- they didn't do anything. I can't see the Democrats taking the Presidency back until your alt-Great Depression (perhaps its just the "Panic of '29").

snip interesting stuff about Ottoman Empire.

Addressed above.

The Ottomans in this post-war world will have a moment unique in their history for the last two centuries, no European power is trying to do them in. This free time will allow the Ottoman Empire to get its head right, do some infastructure improvement, and I think, shift towards a imperial set-up where the Turkophone Anatolian center of the Ottoman Empire become the "metropolitan" with outlying colonial areas (the Caucaus', Arabia, Libya). Attempts begin to be made to "turkify" the Empire.
The birth of the Irish Free State was one of confusion and conflicting aims. Whilst many prepared to fight a civil war, the Labour government of MacDonald declared its commitment to a peaceful solution, so a strange situation developed where rebels on both sides fought against both parties negotiating for separation. On the Irish side, extremists denounced co-operation with MacDonald and demanded all of Ulster, whilst on the British side Unionists denounced the abandonment of the South and demanded a fight against the separatists. A strange civil war was thus fought behind the scenes, in the shadows, but bursting into daylight from time to time with explosive clashes and mainland bombings.

MacDonald's crackdown on UVF leaders hardly endeared him to most of the political elite, but solved the problem in the long run. His use of working class units, mainly veterans of Kitchener's New Army, had the effect of over-riding high-browed sentiment but also raised for many the spectre of a Bolshevist people's army. There was much talk about this, but little reality to it, but it helped add to the alarm and suspicion with which the Labour government was viewed in many circles

Ireland became a self-governing dominion of the British Empire with King George V officially head of state, though he refused to have anything to do with Irish political delegations and let it be known unofficially that he viewed the whole course of events with great displeasure. Britain, nevertheless, retained naval bases in Ireland, and used these as much as it did its homeland bases.

Many on the extreme wing of Irish politics resented this, and made a point of opposing it at every opportunity. By 1929 it remains a hot potato, and one which impacts on the UK's own election.

Hmmmm. I think that if Germany were to win WWI, then Sinn Fein and the IRA will take the opportunity to push for an Irish seat at the peace conference. This will of course be rejected, and the Irish will probably end up with the kind of low-level guerilla war that was seen OTL. The difference is that a victorious Germany is probably funneling more arms and ammunition to the Irish. In fact, depending on how events play out on the continent, the Germans may views the Irish as a potentially important rear-area irritant to the British, and actually try to arm the IRA.

In a situation like this, there is the possibility of another Rising, but this time supported and planned by a united IRA and Sinn Fein. The spark to set it off could be a British decision to enforce the draft on Ireland as the war in Europe begins going against them. Enforcing the draft would set off another Rising and would change the whole dynamic of the Anglo-Irish relationship.

If another Rising doesn't happen though, and things proceed as OTL, then there will still be the kind of low-level violence seen in OTL. The difference is that I don't think the British Government would really be willing to deal with it politically. Having just lost the Great War the Government will not want to be seen negotiating with "terrorists". I would foresee a large and well-planned counter-insurgency that will probably wipe the IRA out. If something like that happened then Sinn Fein and the IRA would attempt another rising, to get the whole country involved. This could get very ugly, and descend into ethnic civil war in places (especially Ulster). It would also probably provoke IRA operations in the UK, with targets being ruling party MP's and Cabinent Ministers.


India remains an unresolved problem. In defeat, relations are even worse than they are in OTL, and neither Labour nor Liberal administrations throughout the 1920s has been able to properly deal with this. The feeling in many quarters exists that only a Conservative government can properly deal with India and advance things, because every other government is thwarted by entrenched conservative interests which become even more extreme in opposition

The 1929 election is thus viewed with great interest across the sub-continent, but the growth of radical right wing groups on the fringes of British politics causes a lot of unease, and some rather naiive protests in Indian cities, which are hardly likely either to worry the extreme groups or to make them think better of their Indian fellows.


Best Regards
Grey Wolf

I have no idea how to deal with India. I would say that the British could easily drift into some kind of UnFacist Britain, but that generally I think that British politics will stay on some kind of even keel, as they generally do. The problem that will really stress British domestic politics out is the Irish Question. It is in Ireland that the solution for how to really mess with British politics is to be found. If you have several assassinations of MP's or the murder of a Cabinet Minister, then you will have a very visceral anti-Irish reaction in the UK. Harden attitudes in the UK, and make the Irish conflict bloodier, and the blow-back could be really bad. Think France in Algeria bad for blow-back. Think pissed off troops who are feeling very betrayed and are close enough to the capital to do something about it.
 
On one hand I might agree if things were done purely on the military balance of power, but I simply don't think it would be. Italy is in alliance with Britain, and Britain has to agree the whole treaty, so Italy is going to have to get something from the war, no matter how small it might seem to them. Austria-Hungary is retaining the Southern Tyrol and Trieste itself, so the losses, whilst painful, are endurable.

I simply think that diplomacy would be at work here, rather than pure logic

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

I'm still not getting it. Italy won't have the British and French troops shoring up its frontlines, and if Italy doesn't accept the peace, it would not be hard for Austria and Germany to force the Piave and then have Italy at their mercy. Even if Germany tried to get this through, Austria-Hungary would not accept it. Austria and Germany can dictate this peace and I don't see why they wouldn't with Italy.
 
Theodore Roosevelt died in January 1919, so he won't be a candidate in 1920 (although in OTL, he predicted he would run before his health took a sudden downturn in late 1918). I suggested Hiram Johnson because of the close TR connection and the strong anti-Wilson stance--and he did make a run at the 1920 nomination in OTL, although the deadlocked/brokered convention ultimately went to Harding.

One sidebar: look for H(enry) L(ouis) Mencken, an essayist and editor with the Baltimore Sun to achieve even greater national prominence in a world where the Central Powers won: Mencken, in OTL, was an unabashed apologist for the Central Powers until the Zimmermann telegram; in this timeline, Mencken would have earned the right to say "I told you so", and could even serve as something of a liaison between Washington and Berlin. In fact, a position in the Hiram Johnson cabinet or on the White House staff might not be out of the question.
 
Actually Teddy had an excellant chance of winning the Republican nomination in 1920 and might have won the election too if he hadn't suddenly become ill and died. Part of the problem was the death of his son,a world war one flyier. If he hadn't died I expected that the young Roosevelt might have very well been groomed for the White House by his father and might have beaten his cousin to the job.
 
An important key to Arabia is that control over the Hasa province (the Gulf Coast) and Hijaz makes the Saudis largely impotent (that's where the food, water, and acces to the sea are). The Ottomans only used about 3,000 troops to reconquer the Hasa in 1871, and less even than that to garrison it thereafter. In 1905 only 5,000 troops were sufficient to occupy Riyadh.

It's hard to imagine anyone really bothering much with the interior, although it's not beyond the pale - but if losses are incurred, the attempt would be dropped and a return to the pre-War status quo easily negotiated (the Saudis pay lip-service to Ottoman sovereignty and the Ottomans leave them alone).

I'm not sure why this conflict would be disruptive to the whole of Ottoman Arab lands, since none of them would consider themselves to have anything in common with the Saudis, and would regard them like most Americans viewed David Koresh and the Branch Davidians. I think maybe you're assuming pan-Arab sentiment way ahead of its time.

True, perhaps. I was just trying not to paint an "All is sweetness and light" picture.

I would say/ask, though

-1- Considering that the Sherrif has presumably been kicked out of the Hejaz, what political effect will this have ? Since all his sons are traitors too, I don't see them coming back this time ? Would they be in Egypt, and thus in a position to make potential trouble ? What sort of reprisals would there be against the population of the Hejaz who could be seen to have supported the Rebellion, even if just tacitly ?

-2- Does not the Wahabbi nature of the Saudis mean that the Ottoman state will feel it has an obligation to convert them ? From reading that book I got the opinion that this would be an important focus, especially if the resumption of rule over the Hejaz is supported by renewed focus on the Sultan's role as Caliph

-3- How much have the populations of Palestine and Mesopotamia had their lives disrupted by being invaded, fought over, conquered and then reconquered ? Would this not sow certain resentments of its own ?

-4- I don't know much about Syria ! What does French defeat mean for Lebanon (isn't it recognised as a sort of sphere of interest by agreements?) or would nothing likely change ?

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
I'm still not getting it. Italy won't have the British and French troops shoring up its frontlines, and if Italy doesn't accept the peace, it would not be hard for Austria and Germany to force the Piave and then have Italy at their mercy. Even if Germany tried to get this through, Austria-Hungary would not accept it. Austria and Germany can dictate this peace and I don't see why they wouldn't with Italy.

Well, I can agree to differ, LOL. Its what I think, and whilst I appreciate you taking the time to comment, and can see where you're coming from, you're not going to convince me.

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
Small quibble, but I have a hard time seeing Henry Cabot Lodge as president of the United States. He'd be 73 in 1920, and his appeal would not be particularly widespread. On the other hand, California senator Hiram Johnson would have won his spurs, so to speak, opposing Wilson; he was already well-known as Theodore Roosevelt's running mate in 1912, and at age 54, would be in the prime of life for a run at the White House.

Johnson would have run a forceful campaign, essentially emphasizing his anti-Wilson policies, which would have struck responsive chords with the American electorate. Teamed with running mate Calvin Coolidge, the isolationist GOP ticket would have swamped the Democrats' offering of William McAdoo and Oscar Underwood.

Coolidge, as was the case with most vice presidents until recent years, would not have been a candidate in 1928. That would have gone to the equally conservative/isolationist Herbert Hoover, as in OTL.

OK, I could possibly see my way to Hiram Johnson, tho he's not someone I ever heard of before. I guess thats the problem of writing Alternate History, expecially on a train - you use who you know had certain positions...

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
A few more thoughts for you Grey Wolf

Well, there has to be a POD and I can't see a better one! Anyway, I haven't got them advancing in a Blitzkrieg fashion - they advance to Paris but lay siege to it at first, then they face counterattacks, then they go on the advance again. I'm no military expert, but I would think that if there was a will and the opportunity than a way could be found...

I am no military expert either. Having said that; the only way that I see this coming about would be the Germans having the wit to attack on the junction of the Franco British forces at the same time as there is some sort of major confusion in the Allied high command. Having Foch killed in a car crash isn’t a bad start, may I suggest that Lloyd George’s dislike of Haig causes him to get the sack at some critical juncture in the German attack. Lloyd George was reluctant to send reinforcements from Britain to France, it might be possible that during the German attack of 1918 he again refuses to send reinforcements, perhaps inspiring Haig to make a point too forcefully or even overstep his authority causing his dismissal.

I would then suggest that Lloyd George appoints someone incompetent – i.e. not Plumer, Rawlings, Currie or Monash – who panics and authorises a retreat to the Channel ports enraging and embittering the French. Then we might see a situation like 1940 developing.

Yes, but a new naval race is NOT in the making here, and that was the main impetus for the treaty. A nation can choose to do what it wants with its own shipbuilding, but it was the fear that current plans would soon be outclassed by the oppositions new ones and that a race that would bankrupt them would begin. Maybe SOMEONE makes a move towards a treaty, but I don't see it happening here.

My impression is that the main impetus for the treaty as far as the United States and Britain were concerned was a desire to limit the power of Japan as cheaply as possible. Maintenance of the status quo was a function of the pursuit of this goal. Until 1923 they did not appear to be any cramp on the Japanese desire to expand their fleet.

After all, why tie yourself down when future flexibility could be vital ?

This is a first-rate argument, completely logical, completely rational – in OTL everyone was too clever to pursue it. Why is this timeline different?

I just reckoned that with a somewhat ignominious retreat from Europe, the Navy would get priority. As the US heads into isolationism, it would focus on its best barrier to protect it. The ships under construction are not flawed in themselves (otherwise why did they complete SOME of them). It was the fear that they would be outclassed by new designs of other powers that gave the impetus towards Washington and made them stop their current building

At this time the United States Navy was a deeply flawed arm of defence, its lack of effective modern scouting forces was a tactical liability and would have been an impediment to its ability to fight a war of the most dire sort. The ships of the South Dakota I and Lexington classes were pre-war designs that embodied none of the lessons of the fighting. The Lexingtons at least were an attempt to create a scouting force but what doomed them was the perception that thin armour was the principal cause of the loss of British battlecruisers at Jutland. The tactical doctrine to which they were designed had been revealed by the sea fighting of World War I to be completely wrong, the USN didn’t really want them but no longer had the political clout in the face of an always parsimonious Congress to get them replaced with something better. This again is a strong driver for a treaty, I’m not saying it’s insurmountable, I just think you need to address the issue in detail.

To give up on new construction would be a huge loss of face, but economic imperatives are going to mean that no new ships would be laid down. Several of these completed here are launched/launchable in 1918 anyway, so its work to complete them that is different. In addition, the German Navy isn't going to allow its shipbuilding expertise to vanish by not employing its men

The problem here is that Wilhelm’s warship obsession notwithstanding the German army always had the Kaiser’s ear more than the Navy, in this scenario the army has done its job whereas the Navy has failed. The army will want the Navy very much reduced in size.

On the other hand Germany’s new colonial commitments are a strong impetus to build a large ocean-going fleet though if the HSF is to become a true ‘high seas’ force with worldwide commitments in the same vein as the Royal Navy it will need larger more habitable warships with much better range and accommodation.

Again, not insurmountable but worth addressing.

I basically went with the idea that if its going to build anything (and I think sufficient authority within the Navy would press for SOMETHING) it is going to build what it has authorisation, stockpiled equipment and begun

In my Nach Dem Tag timeline all four of the Hoods are completed, two as aircraft carriers, one as a cut price Colonial battlecruiser using existing guns and mountings (which are the most expensive parts of a warship of this era and the ones that take the longest to build) but I had them continue construction from 1916 (rather than being suspended) the excuse that I used was the need to replace battlecruiser losses at Jutland and the obvious inadequacies of the Renown and Courageous classes.

It would certainly be possible to redesign the last three Hoods with much heavier deck armour in addition to the modifications already planned giving a ship very close to the G3’s capabilities though probably two knots slower, but given the very limited amount of work that had been done on the last three Hoods up to 1918 OTL starting with a clean sheet of paper would be very tempting for the RN.

Money isn't finite (which comes as a surprise sometimes) and can be conjured up to pay for things. Budgets can be shuffled around. The ships are already BEING built, so completing two is not like starting two completely new ships.

Fair comment, but I don’t see Italy being able to manage more than one. The guns and mountings for the first Carraciollo (and I can never remember how to spell it either) were all completed, installed in turrets and formed a couple of coastal batteries. The hull was quite well advanced too. Perhaps money could be found for a second ship if the technically brilliant but very expensive operation to salvage the Leonardo da Vinci were not pursued.

However once Mussolini gets into power (if he gets into power TTL) the Navy will no longer have the ear of the government and will be at a disadvantage in funding squabbles – the Regia Aeronautica was always Il Duce’s pet service.

 
1. The Sharifian family is big - there are always acceptable candidates. There is no chance there will be reprisals against the population of the Hijaz - to the contrary, they will receive magnanimous treatment (Holy Cities and such). The Hijaz was actually a net drain on the Ottoman treasury, a rarity, and state spending there was a major reason why the Hijaz was calmer than you'd think given it's nature.

2. The Ottomans were keen to spread Hanefi Orthodoxy as far as possible, but they were realists, too, and Wahhabis are still Sunnis, so there was no real reason or justification for trying to "convert" them to anything. The chances of this in any case were close to nil - you might sum up the Ottoman philosophy as "if there's no solution, there's no problem". The Hijaz was not Wahhabi, though, if that was your question.

3. The answer to this depends on when the war ended - the British didn't make that much progress until the final months. The people of Syria/Palestine and Mesopotamia had their lives disrupted, in the former more than the latter, but victory tends to have a positive effect on public opinion. How much did the people of N. France and Belgium have their lives disrupted? Yet they weren't characterized by post-war rebellion... I'm sure there are resentments to overcome, but the struggles between the Ottomans and Egypt over Syria and Palestine were far, far more destructive and disruptive in every way, yet everyone got over it. There was some "reverse irridentism" in Syria after the French took over, but then that was because the French took over; there may be some "grass is greener" mentality, and I think the central government is going to have to stop or reverse efforts at centralization at the expense of provincial control over local affairs.

Whether or not the Turkist branch of the CUP can be reconciled with the Ottomanism of the Arab provinces (and the nascent Arabism) is a question, but I think the war having been won is a powerful impetus to trying to deal with local aspirations within the framework of the empire.

4. The Ottomans ended Mt. Lebanon's autonomous status during the war. I think they basically left the system alone, they just ended outside interference in it. Most likely it's not important enough for anyone to bother with so long as it continues to run smoothly.

The abolition of the Capitulations makes a huge difference - it ends the mechanism through which the Powers interefered in internal Ottoman affairs, penetrated the empire's economy, destabilized it politically, exploited sectarian divisions, and made themselves literally above the law, including tens if not hundreds of thousands of proteges that they granted citizenship to. For example, there were only a few hundred British people in Istanbul, but several thousand British subjects, most of whom were Greeks and Armenians in the commercial sector. None of these had to pay taxes, and they had serious legal advantages over their competitors.

True, perhaps. I was just trying not to paint an "All is sweetness and light" picture.

I would say/ask, though

-1- Considering that the Sherrif has presumably been kicked out of the Hejaz, what political effect will this have ? Since all his sons are traitors too, I don't see them coming back this time ? Would they be in Egypt, and thus in a position to make potential trouble ? What sort of reprisals would there be against the population of the Hejaz who could be seen to have supported the Rebellion, even if just tacitly ?

-2- Does not the Wahabbi nature of the Saudis mean that the Ottoman state will feel it has an obligation to convert them ? From reading that book I got the opinion that this would be an important focus, especially if the resumption of rule over the Hejaz is supported by renewed focus on the Sultan's role as Caliph

-3- How much have the populations of Palestine and Mesopotamia had their lives disrupted by being invaded, fought over, conquered and then reconquered ? Would this not sow certain resentments of its own ?

-4- I don't know much about Syria ! What does French defeat mean for Lebanon (isn't it recognised as a sort of sphere of interest by agreements?) or would nothing likely change ?

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
Actually Teddy had an excellant chance of winning the Republican nomination in 1920 and might have won the election too if he hadn't suddenly become ill and died. Part of the problem was the death of his son,a world war one flyier. If he hadn't died I expected that the young Roosevelt might have very well been groomed for the White House by his father and might have beaten his cousin to the job.

True, TR was the nascent front-runner for the 1920 nomination in mid-1918. What took its toll was the lasting effects from the tropical diseases contracted during his Brazilian expedition some years earlier: had he not gone to Brazil, likely he would have lived quite a few years longer and would have occupied the White House at least in the earlier years of the 1920s. I don't recall reading the part about the death of his son contributing but I could certainly see it as a possibility: accordingly it would be interesting to see a different Roosevelt in the White House in the 1930s.

OK, I could possibly see my way to Hiram Johnson, tho he's not someone I ever heard of before. I guess thats the problem of writing Alternate History, expecially on a train - you use who you know had certain positions...

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

I don't blame you for a minute: he's not exactly a well-known figure in the US in the first place. As a start, check out his entry on wikipedia.org: from what I can tell it's reasonably accurate.
 
OK, I could possibly see my way to Hiram Johnson, tho he's not someone I ever heard of before. I guess thats the problem of writing Alternate History, expecially on a train - you use who you know had certain positions...

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

Aye Indeed, Sometimes, You must also make fictitious characters up. Much like Harry Turtledove does at times!
 
Faeelin said:
BTW, I really like the way this China-Japan axis is going.

Thanks, and its good to know you're reading this

The potential for Japan and China to find a working political-economic relationship I based in part on the pre-1904 Russo-Chinese situation, where Russia basically invested in Chinese joint ventures, and worked with these.

Here, Japan has its direct military involvement further North, and securing an internally peaceful and friendly China is important in shoring up its own backyard (if one can say a backyard needs shoring up ?).

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
Matthais Corvinus said:
Why do you have Lodge as the Republican candidate in 1920? I don't think that OTL he was a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination. I was actually thinking that you would have someone like General Wood or perhaps even another shot for Teddy Roosevelt. I think that the Republicans could go towards accusing the Democrats of being Central Power loving softies who allowed the Huns to dominate Europe. Or the United States could retreat further into political isolationism.

The latter, or it completely undermines the whole timeline, and the whole point of the timeline. I did consider Wood, but I couldn't see how the electoral ground would be right for him. TR has the slight complication of being dead, so I overlooked him. I needed someone who had a pedigree in opposing US involvement, so Lodge looked good. I am prepared to accept he may feel he is too old to stand, but can't see why his non-standing in OTL is particuarly relevant since the ATL will have diverged by 2 1/2 years by the time the 1920 election comes around.

As suggested by another poster, I could accept a Lodge protege perhaps, such as Hiram Johnson tho I need to find time to research the guy (remember I am only online intermittently, and then do the rest at home). I am still not convinced that Lodge wouldn't have run himself in 1920, but I don't know how well and fit he was ?

Economically though, the United States is going to be able to take advantage of the German victory. The Germans are just as nearly bankrupt as the allies, and they have vast new territory that needs infastructure. I could easily see American investment in railroads, resource exploitation and the like in German Eastern Europe. Also, will the Americans be calling in all that paper they got from the Brits and French, because right there you have the potential for some serious economic trouble.

I don't really agree with this view of the economic situation. Not only do the Germans have occupation of new territories, they have administration of them - look at Mackensen in Roumania to see how these territories can be exploited to German economic gain. The only actual annexation is OTL Estonia/Latvia as the Baltic Duchy. The rest are vassals/client states, evolving into allies. During the period of evolution, Germany has the pick of their resources (the Ukraine was expected to be able to begin grain shipments in quantity to Germany in 1919 for example). After the withdrawal of German administration and garrisons, the East remains married to the German economy by customs treaties and economic agreements; for example, I cannot but think that the Germans would secure a long-term contract for the bulk of Ottoman oil from Baku on extremely advantageous terms.

With regard to the building of infrastructure, this is only going to be undertaken directly where it supports German economic plans, and thus generates a return, if often in kind. Beyond this, investment by individual German, or for that matter Austrian, companies would be looking for profit - given advantages (I'm no economist but I can imagine the sort of thing that would be given to encourage this, plus the advantages of the customs/tarrif unions) I could see substantial voluntary investment which would generate a return. Expenditure is not a null point - it brings financial rewards of its own.

Last point on the Americans and Post-WWI Europe, is in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans are going to have control of the Arab areas of the Empire, and I don't think that either the British or the Germans are going to be looking like good partners. The British are defeated and the Germans are distracted. The Americans could end up getting heavily involved in the Ottoman oil industry. The Ottomans would view the Americans as neutrals who are willing to invest, but too far away to interfere (too much) and thus are simply awesome people to have around (plus perhaps Ottoman students sent to American universities because of this connection?)

Don't quite see why an isolationist America would get involved with the Ottoman Empire as official policy. Regarding individual companies, I could see some openings, but I would imagine that Germany would corner the market for many, especially since who gets them is going to be largely down to the government in Istanbul, upon whom the Germans can bring a good degree of pressure to bear.

Regarding Germany being distracted, why would they be so distracted as to abandon one of their main pre-war spheres of investment ? The Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway and investment in the oil fields of Mosul and Kirkuk would all be bringing results. I would imagine that any German government would actually see engagement in the Ottoman Empire as a better bet for official money, and for official joint ventures, than the new states of the East, and would be keen for prestige projects to be involved in.

Economy will probably be going great guns just like OTL, based on a bunch of things that will soon come crashing down. That said, the Republicans of the 1920's were just the kind of people that the country wanted- they didn't do anything. I can't see the Democrats taking the Presidency back until your alt-Great Depression (perhaps its just the "Panic of '29").

How much of a cliche is the Great Depression ? Again, I am no economist, but I hardly see it as inevitable. On the one hand it was partly due to US involvement in the whole issue of German reparations, IIRC, a null issue here, not only because it doesn't exist, but also because it doesn't have any direct corollary (France pays reparations in kind from the ironfields, rather than monetary ones). The existence of a German economic sphere in the East I would also posit as another significant divergence, and the economic developments of a cohesive Ottoman Empire even more so.

The stated reason for the Republicans losing the 1928 election is the flaring up of world tensions and the fear of another Great War about to erupt. A party which is based on a policy of doing nothing is hardly going to shine in this scenario. If US disengagement has brought about no substantial benefit to the world situation, I could imagine a return to the naval engagement policies of previous eras, and for this I would imagine Daniels to be an ideal presidential candidate.

The Ottomans in this post-war world will have a moment unique in their history for the last two centuries, no European power is trying to do them in. This free time will allow the Ottoman Empire to get its head right, do some infastructure improvement, and I think, shift towards a imperial set-up where the Turkophone Anatolian center of the Ottoman Empire become the "metropolitan" with outlying colonial areas (the Caucaus', Arabia, Libya). Attempts begin to be made to "turkify" the Empire

Small note on Libya - it has remained Italian. The problem with Turkification is that it has little logical basis among the Arabs - I referred to potential trouble spots in previous posts, though the resident Ottoman expert is not in particular agreement with me. However, if attempts were made to Turkify the Arab regions, I would certainly imagine there would be a violent reaction...?

Hmmmm. I think that if Germany were to win WWI, then Sinn Fein and the IRA will take the opportunity to push for an Irish seat at the peace conference. This will of course be rejected, and the Irish will probably end up with the kind of low-level guerilla war that was seen OTL. The difference is that a victorious Germany is probably funneling more arms and ammunition to the Irish. In fact, depending on how events play out on the continent, the Germans may views the Irish as a potentially important rear-area irritant to the British, and actually try to arm the IRA.

The first part perhaps (Vietnam for example wanted representation at Versailles, so wanting representation and pushing for it could well be in, but rejected). After the signing of the Treaty of The Hague supplying arms or ammunition to the Irish would be an act of war, and since Germany just agreed a peace with Britain after a lot of hard wrangling I can't see why it would want to do that.

In a situation like this, there is the possibility of another Rising, but this time supported and planned by a united IRA and Sinn Fein. The spark to set it off could be a British decision to enforce the draft on Ireland as the war in Europe begins going against them. Enforcing the draft would set off another Rising and would change the whole dynamic of the Anglo-Irish relationship.

If another Rising doesn't happen though, and things proceed as OTL, then there will still be the kind of low-level violence seen in OTL. The difference is that I don't think the British Government would really be willing to deal with it politically. Having just lost the Great War the Government will not want to be seen negotiating with "terrorists". I would foresee a large and well-planned counter-insurgency that will probably wipe the IRA out. If something like that happened then Sinn Fein and the IRA would attempt another rising, to get the whole country involved. This could get very ugly, and descend into ethnic civil war in places (especially Ulster). It would also probably provoke IRA operations in the UK, with targets being ruling party MP's and Cabinent Ministers.

I could imagine Bonar Law considering being tougher on the Irish, but with the unravelling of the European front I don't think he would actually have got round to it.

Why is the Pacifist MacDonald going to fight for Tory interests in Ireland ? Once in power, Labour is going to move towards finding a peaceful solution. Sure, extremists on both sides will object to this and fight it, but I already said that in previous posts. In the end, the will to negotiate if there in London will be met with a similar willingness in Dublin

I have no idea how to deal with India. I would say that the British could easily drift into some kind of UnFacist Britain, but that generally I think that British politics will stay on some kind of even keel, as they generally do. The problem that will really stress British domestic politics out is the Irish Question. It is in Ireland that the solution for how to really mess with British politics is to be found. If you have several assassinations of MP's or the murder of a Cabinet Minister, then you will have a very visceral anti-Irish reaction in the UK. Harden attitudes in the UK, and make the Irish conflict bloodier, and the blow-back could be really bad. Think France in Algeria bad for blow-back. Think pissed off troops who are feeling very betrayed and are close enough to the capital to do something about it.

The OTL 1920s saw the eclipse of the Liberals, the rise of Labour, the General Strike, and the turn of the 1930s saw a second Labour administration turn into a National Government coalition. This isn't particuarly an even keel.

This timeline sees Britain forced to make peace in 1918 elect a Labour government with a majority (their first in OTL was a minority one and came several years later). This government lasts more or less a full term (their OTL equivalent first administration lasted 10 months). The subsequent election sees a return for the Liberals (various pressures will sink the Labour vote, whilst the Liberal vote in OTL at the same YEAR rather than the same relative position, was still strong enough to return something like 150 MPs in OTL circumstances).

I don't agree at all with your statements on Ireland, for reasons I have mentioned above. I think relations would be more cordial, and that the Free State as a dominion under the king would be seen as an evolved state by many, and not a halfway house.

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
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