By the year 1950, the Soviet Union and China both stood as two pillars of the communist world. They would stand together against Western Capitalism. The Soviets would establish a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, while China would fight for the defense of the communist Democratic People’s Republic of Korea against the US, UK, and the capitalist Republic of Korea. Because of opposition from the United States and the United Kingdom, the People’s Republic of China would not be a member of the UN (much to the chagrin of the Soviet Union), but it did not matter. The PRC was a power in its own right. It had one of the world’s largest populations, had defeated India in 1962, and in 1965 had developed their own nuclear weapons. Needless to say, there was no better ally for the Soviet Union to have than China. A powerful ally is usually a good ally.
But it was the fact that China was a powerful country that relations between the Soviet Union and China began to deteriorate. In 1956, the leader of the Soviet Union, Nitika Khruschev, gave a speech entitled “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences”, which harshly criticized Stalin and his cult of personality, along with the way he ruled the Soviet Union. This speech was leaked to the public by the Israeli Mossad, and its revelation was shocking to much of the world. The western left was split on the speech, with some supporting whatever move the USSR may make, and others who were loyal to Stalin and felt that speaking against him was a betrayal. Yet while the western left was split, the left within Eastern Europe did not go through something similar, as they were mainly Soviet proxies (an exception to this was Albania, whose leader, Enver Hoxha, found Khruschev to be revisionist). But the People’s Republic of China, even though they owed much of their success to the USSR, was strong enough to the point where it did not have to follow along with the de-Stalinization efforts of Khruschev. Not just that, but Mao, who saw Stalin as a friend, criticized the speech, further deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations.
Had China been a small country, then perhaps the Soviet Union would find it fit to just reduce aid and support to China and be done with it. China, however, wasn’t. The Soviet Union’s reduction of relations with China triggered a response from Mao. In retaliation for the decrease in aid, Mao began to cultivate ties with Albania, which also began to drift away from the USSR as a result of Khruschev’s speech. Not only that, but China tried to spread their own version of communism in non-communist countries, presenting opposition for Soviet backed communist parties. Now, the Soviet Union was competing with two nations: the United States for dominance of the world, and China for dominance of the communist world. If they fail in the latter, they can forget the former. The Soviet Union’s de-escalation as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis had driven Mao to have China break off ties with the Soviet Union. Mao had criticized the belief that communist and capitalist states should peacefully coexist, and the USSR’s de-escalation was a victory for that belief.
In 1966, in an attempt to take power away from the Soviet-esque bureaucracy which was beginning to form within the educational, economic, and agricultural sectors of China, Mao Zedong launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Students began to organize themselves into “Red Guards” and attacked people viewed as dissidents, and were tasked with destroying elements of China’s pre-communist past. The growing radicalism of the Chinese Communist Party had been a cause for concern amongst the Soviet leadership, as much of the rhetoric coming from proponents of the Cultural Revolution were just as much anti-Soviet as they were anti-capitalist. Not just that, but China was amassing more and more men on their border. By 1969, there were over 1.5 million Chinese soldiers stationed at the border.
Around the late 19th century, the Qing Empire and the Russian Empire signed a series of treaties which, among other things, had the Qing Empire cede much of Outer Manchuria to Russia. With China now being under the control of a communist dictatorship, which feels the need to purge China of its pre-communist past, and said dictatorship also being at odds with the Soviet Union, Mao took a special interest in the areas in which the Qing Empire ceded to the Russian Empire. Mao recalled the success of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, and believed that something similar could be repeated as far as the Soviet Union was concerned. Though he did not believe that all of Outer Manchuria was Chinese territory, he did believe that already contested areas, such as the Zhenbao Island, could be put under Chinese control. Mao would talk about the Zhenbao Island around his military advisors and generals, including General Chen Xilian, who was stationed around the area in which Zhenbao Island was located. This would mainly just be talk. Mao did not make any plans on taking the Zhenbao Island, but nevertheless was curious as to whether or not it was possible for China to take it. This idea also intrigued many members of the Chinese military, but even they realized that taking Zhenbao Island could lead to a chain of events which would hurt China more than it would hurt the Soviet Union.
But, as history shows, those who desire peace don’t always get to remain in peace. One can hardly say that Chamberlain or Daladier wanted war with Germany, but eventually they were forced to declare war. Similarly, one can hardly say anyone in charge of the Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of China wanted war between the two countries. But, at the end of the day, they were forced to fight one.
February 28th, 1969
Three Chinese soldiers and two Soviet soldiers are killed and while two Chinese soldiers and one Soviet soldier is injured during a brief border brawl which escalated into a fight with Soviet soldiers. The brawl started as a mere dispute after a Soviet soldier misheard the remarks of a Chinese soldier to be an insult, and punched him (it is believed that the Soviet soldier was drinking illegally obtained vodka, and was drunk). The brawl would escalate when the Chinese soldier pinned the Soviet soldier to the ground and began to punch him as well, forcing another Soviet soldier to shoot the Chinese soldier, killing him. Four more Chinese soldiers come after hearing the gunshot and begin to fire on the two Soviet soldiers, killing both of them. Three more Soviet soldiers stationed around the island come in and begin to shoot the Chinese soldiers after seeing the dead bodies of their comrades. Three of them are killed, and two of them manage to run away, but not before being shot themselves. One of the Soviet soldiers is also shot.
As news of this incident reaches Moscow and Beijing, Brezhnev and Mao make two different decisions. Brezhnev decides to keep the incident under wraps. The families of the two Soviet soldiers would receive compensation (and a fabricated story as to how they died), but other than that the story would not make it to the public. Mao, however, decides that the news of the incident could make for good propaganda. Alongside this, he orders that over two hundred more soldiers be sent to the Zhenbao Island, in order for their numerical strength to be equal to that of Soviet soldiers on the Zhenbao Island.
March 2nd, 1969
As People’s Daily talks of the “heroic patriotic assault on the social imperialists of the Soviet Union”, over twenty more Soviet soldiers are sent to the Zhenbao Island. Though small in number, the Soviet Union hopes to send a message to China, that any sort of aggression coming from them would not be tolerated. However, it is because of the small number of Soviet soldiers that had the Chinese not receive that message. Tensions remain between Soviet and Chinese troops for much of the day.
Around sunset, the People’s Liberation Army launches an assault on Soviet positions around the Zhenbao Island. Within thirty minutes, over sixty Soviet soldiers and border guards were killed by Chinese soldiers. Some Soviet soldiers begin to desert as it becomes clear that the PLA has no intention of stopping. What their intention actually is, they don’t know (in reality, their intention is just to capture the Zhenbao Island, but many Soviet soldiers fear that China has already declared war on the Soviet Union and planning an all out invasion of the Far East).
By nine o’clock, all of the Soviet Army in the Zhenbao Island had either been killed (202 soldiers), been made a POW (12 soldiers), or had fled (104 soldiers). The Chinese flag was raised over the ground on Zhenbao Island. News of this reaches Beijing, and Mao is overjoyed. He orders that the Zhenbao Island become a part of China. This annexation of Soviet sovereign territory had led to concern among moderates within the Communist Party of China, hardliners proclaim that much as how China had annexed 14,000 square miles of Indian territory in 1962 without much trouble, then they could annex what wasn’t even one half of a square miles of Soviet territory.
In Moscow, Brezhnev orders the Soviet military to prepare for an attempt to retake the island, and to also have Soviet soldiers stationed across the Chinese border to be on guard. He also says that it is ok for state media to report the clashes on the Zhenbao Island, a reversal of his previous position. The Soviet foreign ministry lodges a request, that China return their dead.
March 3rd, 1969
China refuses, angering Brezhnev and much of the Soviet government.
The annexation of the Zhenbao Island is celebrated around China. Street celebrations (some organic, some were orchestrated by Chinese authorities) break out, and the Chinese government gives a statement (purported to be from Mao, but in reality was made by high ranking party leaders) praising the soldiers who participated in the annexation of the Zhenbao Island and mourned those who died. Needless to say, the mood in most of China is jubilant.
News of the annexation of the Zhenbao Island begins to spread across the world. A fear of World War III arises, though much of those fears are allayed when people begin to think that the Soviet Union would not wage war over such a small island.
The US government issues a statement calling for restraint on both sides, a sentiment shared by most nations. Many people within the Soviet and Chinese government would also like to see an exercise of restraint. However, Brezhnev knew that the Soviet Union had to respond, lest the Communist Party lose confidence in him.
Brezhnev is aware that China is expecting a Soviet assault on the Zhenbao Island, and as such chooses to put off a Soviet assault for the next couple of days, in order to give the Chinese a sense of relaxation. If China can let their guard down, then they would be in a state of surprise when the Soviet Union actually does launch an attack. Not only that, but it gives the Soviet Union more time to prepare. If the Soviets were to launch an attack today, then the attack would be met with a prepared Chinese army, which expects this. Brezhnev’s decision to put off an attack is supported by the Soviet military.
March 7th, 1969
By this point, it has been five days since China attacked and annexed the Zhenbao Island. Though it had caught the attention of much of the world when it happened, the Soviet Union’s hitherto lack of response had convinced the US, China, and other countries that the Soviet Union had accepted the annexation of the Zhenbao Island as a fait accompli. However, this implied that China was, up to this point, a friendly nation to the Soviet Union and nobody was harmed in the annexation of the Zhenbao Island. This was not the case. As previously mentioned, the Soviet Union was already at odds with China, and the annexation of the Zhenbao Island had led to the deaths of over 200 Soviet soldiers. Seeing as how the Soviet Union and China were competing for the title of “leader of the communist world”, if the USSR just lets China take over Zhenbao then they are humiliated while China has an increased prestige. The Soviets could not let that slide.
The Chinese army in the Zhenbao Island has been relaxed. They were not informed of the Soviet army’s preparation to retake the island, and felt that the lack of overall response meant that the Soviet Union does not plan to take back the island. This was all according to Brezhnev’s plan.
Around sunrise, the Soviet army (over two thousand soldiers) launches their assault on the Zhenbao Island. The Chinese soldiers stationed there are caught off guard, and were quickly overwhelmed as the Soviet invasion force outnumbered them. With T-62 and PT-76 tanks being used, the Chinese soldiers faced heavy bombardment. After a few hours, they were forced to retreat. Soviet troops moved into the island, placing it under Soviet occupation.
China would keep a lid on stories of what had transpired at the Zhenbao Island from reaching the citizens, because if the Chinese people were to find out they could lose confidence in the Chinese government (similar to Brezhnev’s decision to keep a lid on stories about the February 28th skirmish). The Soviets, unsurprisingly, would broadcast the battle as a great victory for the Soviet Union. A Soviet soldier in the Zhenbao Island would take out a knife and carve Даманский (Damansky, the Russian name for the Zhenbao Island) into the ground. A picture would be taken, and the picture would be put on the front page of Pravda. It was a military and propaganda victory for the Soviet Union.
It could have been a diplomatic victory as well. The fact that the island was placed merely under Soviet occupation, and was not annexed, was giving the Chinese an opportunity to de-escalate and negotiate with the USSR regarding the status of the island. But the Chinese only desired annexation of the island, something which the Soviets did not accept. It was clear that any one of the two sides accepting the annexation of the island by the other side would hurt their image internationally without them gaining anything at all. No negotiations would mean that either China would accept the occupation of the Zhenbao Island (hurting them) or try and attack the island again (hurting the USSR). Both nations were put between a rock and a hard place.
March 9th, 1969
Lin Biao, a man who was simultaneously the First Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China, the Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China, the First Vice Premier of the People’s Republic of China, the Vice Premier of the People’s Republic of China, and the Minister of Defense (to put it simply, he was the second most powerful man in China) was not at all pleased at the turn of events in the Zhenbao/Damansky Island. The capture of the Zhenbao Island on the 2nd was a great propaganda victory for the Chinese government both domestically and internationally, and it being lost would undo all of the prestige they gained as a result of the victory. He decided that he would speak with the man who he felt was responsible for the loss of Zhenbao - General Chen Xilian.
Lin Biao felt that it would be better if he goes to the Ussuri River himself (where the Zhenbao Island was located) to not just confront General Chen but also to look at the state of Chinese soldiers around that area. After stopping midway through his trip to the Ussuri on the 8th to rest in Harbin, he reached there on the 9th. Lin Biao did not stop at the area around the Zhenbao Island, considering how militarized the area was, but rather stopped at an area two miles away from it. He had to endure the stares of hostile Soviet border guards and the looks of fear on the faces of Chinese soldiers. He was looking at them with General Chen, and his look was that of disappointment and disgust. He summoned Chen to a small, uninhabited cabin near the border, as that was the only place where he could talk to him privately.
He confronted General Chen over the state of the soldiers in the Ussuri River. His tone, which at first was calm, soon turned into anger as he began to argue with General Chen. General Chen retorted, and was just as angry at Lin Biao as Lin Biao was angry at him. The argument was overheard by five Soviet soldiers, who were tasked with manning a BM-21 rocket launcher. They did not understand Chinese, nor did they know who Chen Xilian or Lin Biao was, but from how loud and angry Lin and Chen were they thought they were planning an attack against the Soviet Union. As the argument became more intense, they began to get worried, and started to prepare the BM-21. Out of impulse, one of those soldiers accidentally launched a rocket, which hit the cabin.
The other five Soviet soldiers ran to the cabin. They saw the remains of two Chinese soldiers. They had hoped that they had not killed anyone important, and went back to their positions without much thought. They didn’t know it then, but their actions set off an irreversible chain of events.
Chen Xilian and Lin Biao were dead, killed by Soviet soldiers. And when Mao found out about it, de escalation and negotiation were thrown out of the window.
March 10th, 1969
News of the deaths of Chen Xilian and Lin Biao spread like wildfire throughout the world. When the Zhenbao Island was annexed by China, many feared World War III. Such fears returned, but this time these fears are now more reasonable as then China just annexed a small island. This time, however, the Soviet Union just killed the second most powerful man in China, along with another general and politburo member. The US government put out a statement calling for negotiations between the USSR and China, while also saying that the United States will remain neutral in disputes between the Soviet Union and China. Perhaps the word “disputes” underscores the level of hostilities between the Soviet Union and China, as right now they were reports of firefights occurring between Soviet and Chinese troops across the border, and the number of casualties in total on both sides were in the double digits.
But it was not war. The Soviet Union, arguably the country responsible for the crisis, did not want war. In order to appease China, the five Soviet soldiers responsible for the deaths of Chen Xilian and Lin Biao were arrested and sent to prison. It was clear that those five were about to be executed as well. The Soviet Union promised a withdrawal from the Zhenbao Island, if China were to first withdraw from the area as well. Then, negotiations could occur. However, Mao was not in a mood to make peace. He felt that the Soviet demands that China first withdraw from Zhenbao if they want the USSR to meant that Brezhnev was not interested in peace. Anything other than massive concessions (resumption of aid, rehabilitation of Stalin, money sent to the families of Lin Biao and Chen Xilian, and withdrawal from the Ussuri River) to China would not be enough to stave off war.
The fact that this was going on during the Cultural Revolution is not a fact to be neglected. Though much of the Red Guards were sent to the farms by 1969, the radicalism was still there. Hysteria occurred throughout China when the news of the death of Chen Xilian and Lin Biao broke out. In Shanghai, party members and some Red Guards who did not go into the farms stormed the Soviet consulate, dragged out and lynched the Soviet employees working there. Such an act would not have been tolerated at all, no matter which country was in control of the consulate, but Mao, when he was hearing about what was going on in Shanghai, called the Mayor of Shanghai and told him to “let the people show their anger”. The deaths of the Soviet consulate employees prompted the Soviet Union to issue a demand to China that the bodies be brought home and that compensation be paid. Brezhnev hoped that Mao would understand that refusal to accept those demands would mean war, and that he would compare China and the USSR’s nuclear capabilities and conclude that though China has a larger army, the Soviet Union has a superior nuclear program and as such China could not win a war with that in mind.
The Chinese government gave a statement, mourning Chen and Lin, and saying that Mao was expected to make a speech on March 13th to address the situation regarding their deaths. The whole world’s eyes were now on him. Would he de-escalate, or would he go for war? Time will tell.
March 11th, 1969
Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister Andrei Gromyko woke up at four AM, with just four hours of sleep. He was drowsy, but he didn’t have much time to linger over that feeling. There was a lot of work to do today, and if he fails to do so, then the Soviet Union will lose much of their ground in East Asia. He did his morning routine, and 5:30 AM was on a plane which was to land in Ulaanbaatar, the capital of the Mongolian People’s Republic.
Around 1 PM the plane landed. Gromyko and his delegation were welcomed by a Mongolian delegation, and they were all set to go to the Government Palace, to meet with Mongolian President, Jamsrangiin Sambuu, along with Foreign Minister Luvsandorjiyn Toiv and numerous generals of the Mongolian People’s Army.
What Gromyko wanted was Mongolian support in case war breaks out between the Soviet Union and China. Seeing as how Mongolia was a Soviet satellite state, the USSR already had soldiers deployed in Mongolia and the USSR could ask Mongolia for intelligence help. This meant that support could only mean joining the war, which was the only aspect of support that the Soviet Union would have to convince the Mongolian leadership to give.
Gromyko promised the Mongolian delegation that, if Mongolia were to join the USSR in a potential war against China, that the Soviet Union will fund Mongol separatists in Inner Mongolia. Gromyko explained to Sambuu that the Soviet Union’s goals in a potential war with China would not try to annex anything or try to install a friendly government (both goals which are very, very hard to accomplish), but rather, they would give China’s military such a beating that China will be negatively impacted as a whole. The Soviet Union will use the war to give arms to Uyghur, Mongol, and Manchurian separatists in China, and once the war ends they would have given those separatists a base for operations. Gromyko said that, in this case, the PRC would not last to 1980, and that the USSR will support any Mongolian attempt to annex Inner Mongolia. Sambuu, still, was not convinced.
Gromyko tried to convince Sambuu, saying that if Mongolia would join a potential war against China, then the Soviet Union will loosen their leash on Mongolia, so to speak. They would give the Mongol communist government more independence in their affairs. Still, Sambuu was not convinced.
Gromyko was at this point annoyed with Sambuu’s non-compliance, and threatened him with a coup if he continued to defy the Soviet Union. This was not an empty threat, the Soviet Union could very well orchestrate a coup within Mongolia. Mongolia was a satellite state of the Soviet Union, meaning that the USSR had plenty of influence over Mongolian domestic affairs. The threat of a coup scared Sambuu enough to comply with Soviet wishes, that if a war were to break out with China, that Mongolia should join. In fact, now he was beginning to worry that his previous non-compliance will convince the Soviet Union that he would not be a good ally, regardless of anything he will say after he was threatened. The Soviet government got what they wanted in Mongolia, but Gromyko’s work was not done. He would have to convince a much more stubborn, and a much more independent leader, to support the Soviet Union in a potential battle against China. Gromyko would have to go to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
The plane which was carrying Gromyko and the Soviet delegation was to avoid China, as flying straight to Pyongyang would lead to the plane entering Chinese airspace, which could lead to the plane being shot down. Flying straight to Pyongyang wouldn’t take as long, but would be fairly risky.
But the fact that it would take long for the plane to avoid China would lead to problems. The plane was not refueled at any time as Gromyko and the Soviet delegation were in Ulaanbaatar. As such, as the plane was flying over the Soviet-Chinese border near Vladivostok the plane began to lose fuel. As the plane was losing fuel, the pilots began to lose control of the plane, leading to it dipping into Chinese airspace. Chinese anti-aircraft saw a plane coming from the direction of the Soviet Union, and chose to shoot it down, killing Gromyko and the entire Soviet delegation.
March 12th, 1969
Gromyko’s death at the hands of Chinese soldiers had essentially made China and the Soviet Union “tit-for-tat”. There were some optimistic observers who had hoped that the fact that high-ranking Chinese and Soviet leaders were both killed will lead to China and the Soviet Union seeing themselves as even, and they won’t choose to escalate. However, this was mere speculation. Neither the Soviet or Chinese government put out an official statement calling for de-escalation. Brezhnev was put in a much tougher situation. If he chose to de-escalate, then he ran the risk of alienating hardliners. Brezhnev recalled that Khrushchev’s supposed retreat from Cuba had humiliated the Soviet Union, and was one of the reasons Khrushchev was removed, and he did not wish to be removed. Mao was more partial to the idea of de-escalation, but was still hurt by the deaths of Lin Biao and Chen Xilian, and as such felt that the USSR did not deserve any Chinese concessions. When the Soviets wanted the bodies of Gromyko and the rest of the victims of the plane crash back, the Chinese refused.
It was this refusal which made it clear that war was inevitable. Nixon raised the DEFCON level from 5 to 4, along with a stand-by for a possible increase to a 3. The fear of nuclear war once again arose. Old nuclear shelters made in the 1950s began to be restored, making it clear what the mood in the US was. Though more seasoned observers said that China did not have the nuclear capability to destroy the Soviet Union, many people ignored them. People began to demonstrate in front of the Soviet embassy in their country, and if their country had them, the PRC embassy.
But neither the Soviet Union nor China listened to the demonstrators, nor did they listen to the west, nor did they listen to the UN. Firefights continued on the Sino-Soviet border, once again leading to the deaths of more soldiers on both sides, Chinese diplomats in the Soviet Union had left the country (and vice versa), and the militaries of both countries were ready for an eventual war.
Mao was supposed to make a speech tomorrow. All eyes were on him.
March 13th, 1969
At around twelve noon, Chinese time (seven AM Moscow time), Chairman Mao Zedong gave his speech. Though the speech was supposed to give the official Chinese reaction to the events in Zhenbao, the deaths of Chen Xilian and Lin Biao, the speech was not listened to by any of the Soviet military leadership, nor Brezhnev, which should have an interest in what Mao would have to say. Instead, they kept a close eye on Chinese troop movements around the border, believing that troop movements would show what Chinese intention actually was. The speech ended within 45 minutes, and within ten minutes, Chinese soldiers began to make their way over the Ussuri, and reports of Chinese planes shelling Soviet positions within the Kazakh SSR began to emerge. It was war.
Soviet defenses were mainly aimed at defending the Zhenbao Island, not any of the rest of the Ussuri River. Mao, along with PLA leadership, knew this, and as such chose to avoid the Zhenbao Island with the aim of claiming much of the land around the Ussuri River. The Soviet soldiers around the Zhenbao Island will be forced to leave the island, thus giving China the island to them.
Chinese wargoals never amounted to anything more furthering the Chinese border to ten kilometers east of the Ussuri River, thus making the Ussuri River not a Chinese-Soviet demarcation line, but rather a Chinese river altogether. Such a goal was, on the surface, small, but the defeat of the Soviet Union, no matter how small, could serve to bolster Chinese prestige and standing among communist movements.
As Chinese soldiers made their way across the Ussuri River, Soviet soldiers began to leave the Zhenbao Island to defend the area around the Ussuri. This prompted the PLA to launch an offensive on the Zhenbao, leading to the island being captured within 45 minutes. One Chinese soldier tried to carve 珍宝岛 (Zhenbao) into the ground with a knife, but was blown up by a Soviet mortar shell. The Chinese had advanced to two kilometers beyond the Ussuri, but Soviet defenses prevented them from going beyond that.
As the Sino-Soviet border in Manchuria was going through fighting, the Sino-Soviet border in Xinjiang was quieter. Brezhnev knew that China did not expect a Soviet invasion of China on Xinjiang, and as such he told the Soviet Army to prepare for an offensive from the Kazakh and Kyrygz SSRs.
The White House Years, by Henry Kissinger, 1979:
“I was summoned to the situation room at around two AM, to discuss the situation regarding China and the Soviet Union. I had suggested that a Chinese victory would be in the best interests of the United States. My reasoning was this: A Chinese victory would lead to Maoism, the flavor of communism upheld by China (and criticized by the Soviet Union) being given a shot in the arm in popularity, leading to a further divide communist movements around the globe. The Soviet Union was established enough to the point where Maoism would not be the dominant strain of communist thought, but an increased popularity of Maoism would hurt Soviet interests around the third world. Conversely, a Soviet victory would discredit Maoism, leading to a more united communist movement around the world.
I had also argued that a Chinese victory would lead to an eventual collapse of the People’s Republic itself. Note that China was in the middle of the Cultural Revolution, and the impact the Cultural Revolution had on China was a negative one. If China were to win, then the Cultural Revolution would be vindicated, leading to it becoming more extreme, thus hurting China even more, to the point where it will collapse.
I suggested that, in order to bring about a Chinese victory, that the United States should give arms to China. China’s military, though larger than the military of the Soviet Union, had lacked behind when it came to areas other than numerical strength, such as technology. Any sort of support to China should be done in a secretive manner, because if China was receiving open support, then the Soviet Union’s propagandists in communist movements would be able to portray the Soviet Union as a victim of a joint Sino-American conspiracy, which would hurt the popularity of Maoism and not lead to a division within communist movements, thus making my first argument as to why a Chinese victory would be better for the United States null.
To my surprise, Nixon agreed…”
March 14th-15th, 1969
Mao had made his speech at a time when most of America was asleep. Brezhnev, too, had to make a speech a few hours after his, informing the people of the Soviet Union that war has begun against the Chinese. When the American people woke up, they were in a panic as they feared a nuclear war. American families who owned nuclear shelters began to move in those shelters, people began to loot grocery stores, and in general there was a mood of fear encompassing much of America. It had gone to the point that, at five PM Washington time, President Richard Nixon gave an address in which he stated that the United States would do its utmost to prevent the war from becoming nuclear, and to prevent the US from entering. Nixon stated that the US military was ready in case either the USSR or China were to attack. The address eased many Americans, but much of the US government was still uneasy about the whole situation. The DEFCON level was decreased from four to three, with a stand-by for a possible decrease to two.
March 14th and 15th went by with little change in the war’s progress. China and the Soviet Union stalemated around the Ussuri, with China still having control of the Zhenbao and the Soviet Union still preventing the PLA from advancing from two kilometers from Zhenbao. Fighting continued around Manchuria, but no noticeable gains or losses were made on either side. By the night of the 15th, Brezhnev got frustrated at the lack of any Soviet gains, and as such decided to make a phone call, to a man in Ulaanbaatar…
March 16th, 1969
Mongolia’s decision to join the war came in as a surprise. Many did not know what Mongolia had to gain from joining a war which had a real chance of devolving into an apocalyptic one. But Mongolia was a Soviet satellite, and Sambuu was still rattled by the conversation he had with Gromyko and as such found little reason to say ‘no’ to Brezhnev when he called.
One can say that Brezhnev’s phone call to Sambuu was emblematic of how the USSR saw its satellites - not as equals, but rather, puppets, to be at their whim. Had they been seen as equals, then Brezhnev would had given Sambuu some time to prepare for war, but he didn’t. As such, an unprepared Mongolian military was set to fight against a much larger Chinese one. Sambuu was aware of this fact and was a bit disgruntled, but couldn’t complain.
Mainly, Mongolian soldiers were directed to the border they had with China, so as to defend it. Other Mongolian soldiers joined an offensive with the Soviet Union to reach the outskirts of Hulunbuir.
China was not expecting Mongolia to join the war (rather, they expected North Korea, as Gromyko’s plane was heading there), and as such was caught off-guard. The PLAAF launched a series of airstrikes around Mongolian positions, which led to the deaths of around 10 Mongolian soldiers, but were ultimately ineffective. Chinese planning for the war would be revised heavily with the entry of Mongolia, but the question now is whether or not it was too late for that.
March 19th, 1969
After a few days of conflict in Manchuria (which had very little gains on either side) and a few more PLAAF airstrikes on Mongolian targets, the Soviet Union finally launched an attack targeted at Chinese positions around Xinjiang. Soviet troops, along with a small number of Mongolian reinforcements and Uyghur separatists reached the cities of Qoqek, Aksu, Illi, and Altay within a few hours. Capturing those four cities would open the door to the capture of Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. Brezhnev felt that capturing Urumqi would provide the basis for a long-lasting, Soviet backed Uyghur insurgency (which would destabilize and weaken China), and could also force the Chinese to sue for peace.
Reports of a Soviet attack on Xinjiang had startled the Chinese government, much as how the entrance of Mongolia had startled them just a few days prior. Because of how little China expected an attack from that area, Xinjiang became China’s soft underbelly. Brezhnev hoped that Uyghur separatists would adopt the tactics of the Vietcong in Vietnam, in an attempt to wane down China in the years after the war, similar to how the Vietcong is waning America down right now.
Speaking of Vietnam, the United States begins Operation Menu, in an attempt to destroy the COVSN (Central Office for South Vietnam) and kill their leadership. It is believed that a successful Menu will force the end of the war, in an American victory. The Soviet Union and China are still funding the Vietcong, but as the war begins to shake up it is clear that both sides will divert resources from Vietnam and to the war.
March 21st, 1969
Qoqek and Aksu are both captured by the Soviet Union, being the first two cities in all of China to be occupied by the Soviet Union. The loss of those two cities prompts the Chinese government to order Long Shujin, the Chairman of Xinjiang, to create a militia in order to defend Xinjiang from Soviet invasion, until Chinese soldiers can reach the area. Said militia would be formed on a similar basis to the Red Guards (which, by this point, were all under the process of re-education). They would consist of youth from universities in Xinjiang.
The Soviet Union’s luck does not appear to extend outside of Xinjiang, though. A planned Mongolian invasion of Inner Mongolia is stifled by a Chinese preemptive strike, which forces Mongolian soldiers around the border to retreat inward into the country. Alongside this, Chinese soldiers push back a joint USSR-Mongolia force from Hulunbuir in Manchuria. A loss of Hulunbuir will enable the Soviet Union to go into Harbin, one of the largest cities in Manchuria, and a capture of Harbin could force China to sue for peace. The USSR being pushed out of Hulunbuir puts a brake to Soviet advance in Manchuria.
Worse still, for the USSR, the first US weapons begin to reach China. Though the aid is done discreetly, aid is still there, and PLA armed with American weapons will prove to hurt Soviet plans in China a lot more than if China was not being helped.
March 23rd, 1969
PLA soldiers in Hulunbuir begin to move from the city to the Ussuri River. This opens the city up to attack from both the USSR and Mongolia, an opportunity neither country intends to let go of. The Soviets and Mongols attack at 6 PM, around the time many PLA soldiers have already left the city. The assault on Huluinbuir on the 23rd is a successful mission by the joint USSR-Mongolian alliance, and while it does not lead to a capture of the city, it gets them on a path in which a capture of the city is certain.
As this is going on, the first unit of the “National Defence Organization” is formed. The NDO was formed at the behest of the Chinese government, and is composed mainly of students from Urumqi University. Mao hopes that human waves (which he believes delivered the USSR a victory against Germany in the Second World War) comprised of NDO members would be enough to force the USSR out of China.
But Mao’s plan of using human waves against the Soviets is hurt as his generals informed him that it would take weeks for China to recruit and train a sizeable number of students for the tactic of human waves. Giving the Soviet Union a few weeks to continue their offensive on Xinjiang would lead to the Soviet Army reaching Urumqi. China can’t afford it. It was then when Mao proposed another idea, which also originated from the Second World War, and that was the use of suicide attacks. The plan was simple - students armed with bombs would run into Soviet soldiers and blow themselves up, but they would also kill a few Soviet soldiers as well. The plan was shocking to many generals, who believed that Mao was about to throw away an entire generation for the sake of ten kilometers, but Mao’s word was paramount, and the plan was put in place.
March 24th, 1969
A major victory is brought in the Manchuria front for the Soviet Union as Soviet troops push the PLA back to the Ussuri and retake Zhenbao. The reason for such a victory was in large part thanks to the Soviet Air Force. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force had been in a rut due to the Sino-Soviet Split, as they now were deprived of equipment from the Soviet Union. Because the Soviet Air Force had a hand in the development of the PLAAF, the leaders of the Soviet Air Force were aware of the shortcomings of the aircraft the PLAAF was using.
Chinese losses in the war were, as expected, not broadcast on Chinese state media, but the loss of Zhenbao was a big defeat on the propaganda standpoint even if it wasn’t a big military defeat. As such, they tried to block any sort of news detailing their military defeat.
In Xinjiang, Chinese soldiers in Altay and Illi are on their last leg as the Soviet Union continues to push into the outskirts of the city. However, they are told to keep fighting, as the first group of NDO militias from Urumqi are set to arrive within two days.
March 26th, 1969
Over 1000 students were sent to the Xinjiang front, 600 to Altay, and 400 to Illi. Though they were small in number, they were not supposed to engage in any prolonged fighting. They were sent to die. Chinese positions in Altay and Illi were on the verge of collapse, and the time to get sizable reinforcements was too long for the Chinese to stave off a Soviet capture of Altay and Illi. Xinjiang was not as connected to the center of China unlike Manchuria or Inner Mongolia. There were very few railways to Xinjiang, and the area was separated from much of China through large mountain ranges and deserts. These reasons could explain why it was hard to defend Xinjiang. China was not prepared for an invasion from there, and the area was far away enough to the point where it would take months for any defense to take place. The use of suicide bombers by China was to shock and demoralize Soviet soldiers to the point where they could stave off a Chinese collapse around the border areas in Xinjiang.
In a way, Mao’s plan to use suicide bombers worked. NDO members would run to Soviet positions and blow themselves up before they could be shot. Many Soviet soldiers were shocked at the sight of a person armed with a suicide vest killing themselves on purpose just to kill a few Soviet soldiers as well. Throughout the day, the PLA would play a smaller role in the fighting because of the NDO. It was estimated that by the day’s end, over 701 Soviet soldiers were killed by 602 NDO suicide bombers in both Altay and Illi. This was the highest number of casualties the Soviet Union had faced thus far in the Xinjiang campaign. This led to a brief cessation of hostilties as the Soviet Army did not know what to do with the NDO.
When news of this arrived to the higher command of the Soviet Army, they were surprised at the high number of Soviet casualties. However, there was a consensus that there was no need for a drastic change of how the Soviet Army were to operate in Xinjiang, seeing as how they were on the verge of victory in Altay and Illi prior to the arrival of NDO militias. Instead, they gave out an order instructing the Soviet Army to shoot at any Chinese person, even if they look like a civilian, running at a Soviet soldier. Soviet soldiers in Central Asia were instructed to go to Xinjiang to be reinforcements for the thousand killed.
March 27th, 1969
The use of suicide bombers in Xinjiang seemed to work. The Soviets have retreated to the outskirts of Altay and Illi, and Chinese intelligence in the USSR reported to Beijing that Soviet leadership was shaken by the number of casualties caused by the NDO. This was a vindication of Mao’s planning, and gave him further reasoning to ignore his generals when formulating a plan to push back the Soviets. Already, plans were put in place for the creation of NDO groups in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, to help China in fighting the Soviet Union there.
The Soviet retreat had given the Chinese an opportunity to push the Soviets away from those two cities once and for all. Around sunset, the PLA attacked Soviet positions in Altay and Illi. This proved to be a mistake. Though the Soviets were forced to retreat, they were in the dominant position prior to the arrival of suicide bombers, and the weakened PLA engaging in an assault on the Soviet Army led to failure for the PLA. The assault had only lasted a couple of hours, and it did not take long for the Chinese to realize what a mistake said assault had been. By the time of the assault’s end, the PLA in Altay and Illi were further weakened than they had been prior to the assault, and opened up the two cities for further Soviet advancement. The PLA’s position in Xinjiang would be more tenous by tomorrow.
March 29th, 1969
After ten days of conflict, the Soviet Union had finally captured Altay and Illi. The flag of the proposed “People’s Republic of East Turkestan” flew over governmental buildings, the news of which convinced Mao that the Soviet Union was on a mission to destroy the People’s Republic of China (he wasn’t entirely wrong).
The failure of the PLA to defend Xinjiang could not have been blamed on a specific person, as most, if not all of the Chinese military and government thought that the Soviet Union would not attack Xinjiang. As such, no massive purge occurred and neither was Mao’s power reduced, which was what the Soviet Union expected to have happened in the event of a successful Xinjiang offensive. The PLA began to consolidate in Kashgar and Urumqi, and began to build up their defenses in an attempt to weaken the Soviet Union by having it fight a long, arduous battle.
But the Soviet Union did not plan to fight such a battle. The Soviet Union felt that it had achieved their goals, that being retaking the Zhenbao Island and providing a base for Uyghur and Mongolian separatists. Brezhnev felt that the USSR should quit while they were ahead, and offered a peace proposal to China, which was status quo ante bellum. With the Soviet Union offering an olive branch to China, now the question was, would the Chinese government accept it?
March 30th, 1969
The offer of a status quo ante bellum peace was one debated amongst the upper echelons of the Chinese government. Mao himself was split on the decision, and the hardliners and moderates of the Chinese Communist Party sought to influence Mao for their position. The pro-war bloc was led by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, and the pro-peace bloc was led by Chou Enlai, the Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
The pro-peace position was simple: No matter how much China defends its borders from Soviet and Mongolian incursions, it could not score an offensive victory enough to break apart the Soviet Union. Conversely, the USSR can break apart China, judging from the Soviet Union’s open support of Uyghur and Mongol separatists. To the pro-peace bloc, a status quo ante bellum peace was the best peace available.
The pro-war position did not use reason in trying to articulate their opinions, but rather, used emotion and jingoism. The Soviet Union killed Chen Xilian. The Soviet Union killed Lin Biao. The Soviet Union is supporting separatists in Xinjiang. The Soviet Union is supporting separatists in Inner Mongolia. The Sino-Soviet borders in Manchuria are a colonial relic. Why should there be peace?
As the debate was going on, the PLAAF claimed a victory over the Soviet-Mongolian Alliance. An airstrike over the Sino-Mongolian border led to the killing of Mongolian General Jamsrangijn Jondon. General Jondon was in charge of Mongolian forces in Hulunbuir, and his death led to confusion amongst both Soviet and Mongol soldiers. His death had also been a stroke of good luck for the pro-war faction, as they used this to convince Mao that victory for the Soviets was still possible. They succeeded.
The peace offer given by the Soviets was rejected, the official reasoning given by the Chinese government is that China was not in such a weakened position that they would be forced to make peace. Brezhnev was surprised - he really did believe that the Chinese would make peace. None the matter. In spite of any numerical superiority the Chinese had, the Soviet Union could still maintain supremacy in terms of quality of their military. The war would continue.
March 31st - April 1st, 1969
When the month of March began, few believed that the Soviet Union and China would go to war (the Feburary 28th skirmish was not reported on by western media). By the end of March, said belief would become a reality.
Though President Nixon had calmed down Americans, with some success, about the threat of World War III when the war began, the fear still lingered on. In many school districts, “duck and cover” drills were re-instated. People who did not have nuclear bunkers in the 1950s began to build new ones, and the economy would suffer a downturn, primarily due to the fact that investor confidence was not as high due to the threat of the Sino-Soviet War becoming World War III.
That was just in the United States. In China, the effects of the creation of the NDO would lead to a downturn in the number of people joining the PLA. Many feared that they would not be sent to Manchuria or Xinjiang to fight in the trenches, but rather, to blow themselves up. The Chinese people were supportive of the government in their fight against the Soviets, but there weren’t many who were radicalized enough to have someone strap a bomb to their chest so that they can kill themselves. Mao regrets the suppression of the Red Guards, for if they were around in 1969, then there would be a steady supply of young, radicalized youth willing to join the NDO.
The killing of General Jondon would eventually lead to the PLA engaging in an offensive to drive the Soviets and Mongols out of Huluinbuir. Unlike the Altay and Illi failed offensive which occurred after the first NDO raid, this one did not end in total disaster. By April 1st, the Soviets and Mongols were in full retreat, but began to consolidate themselves around the entrance of the city so as to not be run out of it completely. China claimed victory, but neither the Soviet Union nor Mongolia would not be deterred by this setback. It is certain that the Soviet Union and Mongolia will attack Huluinbuir again, in spite of any Chinese gains. In order to break the Chinese in Manchuria, that city has to be captured.
And so, the Sino-Soviet War would proceed. How will it end? Will the Soviet Union exhaust itself to the point where it cannot wage a war anymore? Will the Chinese lose enough land to the point where they have to accept peace? Or will nuclear weapons be used, by either side, to prevent any of the first two scenarios from happening? Nobody can say for certain which one it will be, but so far, these are the three most likely scenarios which will end war. The world is hoping that the third scenario will not happen. But the world also hoped that the Chinese and the Soviets would not go to war. And yet…
Soviet Union: Around 4,500 soldiers killed. 2,613 killed in Xinjiang, 1,887 killed in Manchuria. 3 civilians killed, fishermen from the Jewish Autonomous Oblast.
Mongolia: Around 1,400 soldiers killed. 1,300 from Manchuria, 100 from Xinjiang. Over 9 civilians killed, all of the farmers who were casualties from the PLAAF airstrikes.
Uyghur Separatists: 400 soldiers killed, all in Xinjiang.
Inner Mongolian Separatists: 20 killed, none of them in Inner Mongolia, but in Mongolia itself (they were to be deployed if the Soviet Union and Mongolia would embark on a joint campaign in Inner Mongolia).
People’s Republic of China: 9,760 soldiers killed, 5,553 in Xinjiang, 4,100 in Manchuria, and 107 from various other areas of China as a result of Soviet and Mongolian airstrikes. 1,201 civilians killed, mainly in Xinjiang and Huluinbuir.
But it was the fact that China was a powerful country that relations between the Soviet Union and China began to deteriorate. In 1956, the leader of the Soviet Union, Nitika Khruschev, gave a speech entitled “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences”, which harshly criticized Stalin and his cult of personality, along with the way he ruled the Soviet Union. This speech was leaked to the public by the Israeli Mossad, and its revelation was shocking to much of the world. The western left was split on the speech, with some supporting whatever move the USSR may make, and others who were loyal to Stalin and felt that speaking against him was a betrayal. Yet while the western left was split, the left within Eastern Europe did not go through something similar, as they were mainly Soviet proxies (an exception to this was Albania, whose leader, Enver Hoxha, found Khruschev to be revisionist). But the People’s Republic of China, even though they owed much of their success to the USSR, was strong enough to the point where it did not have to follow along with the de-Stalinization efforts of Khruschev. Not just that, but Mao, who saw Stalin as a friend, criticized the speech, further deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations.
Had China been a small country, then perhaps the Soviet Union would find it fit to just reduce aid and support to China and be done with it. China, however, wasn’t. The Soviet Union’s reduction of relations with China triggered a response from Mao. In retaliation for the decrease in aid, Mao began to cultivate ties with Albania, which also began to drift away from the USSR as a result of Khruschev’s speech. Not only that, but China tried to spread their own version of communism in non-communist countries, presenting opposition for Soviet backed communist parties. Now, the Soviet Union was competing with two nations: the United States for dominance of the world, and China for dominance of the communist world. If they fail in the latter, they can forget the former. The Soviet Union’s de-escalation as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis had driven Mao to have China break off ties with the Soviet Union. Mao had criticized the belief that communist and capitalist states should peacefully coexist, and the USSR’s de-escalation was a victory for that belief.
In 1966, in an attempt to take power away from the Soviet-esque bureaucracy which was beginning to form within the educational, economic, and agricultural sectors of China, Mao Zedong launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Students began to organize themselves into “Red Guards” and attacked people viewed as dissidents, and were tasked with destroying elements of China’s pre-communist past. The growing radicalism of the Chinese Communist Party had been a cause for concern amongst the Soviet leadership, as much of the rhetoric coming from proponents of the Cultural Revolution were just as much anti-Soviet as they were anti-capitalist. Not just that, but China was amassing more and more men on their border. By 1969, there were over 1.5 million Chinese soldiers stationed at the border.
Around the late 19th century, the Qing Empire and the Russian Empire signed a series of treaties which, among other things, had the Qing Empire cede much of Outer Manchuria to Russia. With China now being under the control of a communist dictatorship, which feels the need to purge China of its pre-communist past, and said dictatorship also being at odds with the Soviet Union, Mao took a special interest in the areas in which the Qing Empire ceded to the Russian Empire. Mao recalled the success of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, and believed that something similar could be repeated as far as the Soviet Union was concerned. Though he did not believe that all of Outer Manchuria was Chinese territory, he did believe that already contested areas, such as the Zhenbao Island, could be put under Chinese control. Mao would talk about the Zhenbao Island around his military advisors and generals, including General Chen Xilian, who was stationed around the area in which Zhenbao Island was located. This would mainly just be talk. Mao did not make any plans on taking the Zhenbao Island, but nevertheless was curious as to whether or not it was possible for China to take it. This idea also intrigued many members of the Chinese military, but even they realized that taking Zhenbao Island could lead to a chain of events which would hurt China more than it would hurt the Soviet Union.
But, as history shows, those who desire peace don’t always get to remain in peace. One can hardly say that Chamberlain or Daladier wanted war with Germany, but eventually they were forced to declare war. Similarly, one can hardly say anyone in charge of the Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of China wanted war between the two countries. But, at the end of the day, they were forced to fight one.
February 28th, 1969
Three Chinese soldiers and two Soviet soldiers are killed and while two Chinese soldiers and one Soviet soldier is injured during a brief border brawl which escalated into a fight with Soviet soldiers. The brawl started as a mere dispute after a Soviet soldier misheard the remarks of a Chinese soldier to be an insult, and punched him (it is believed that the Soviet soldier was drinking illegally obtained vodka, and was drunk). The brawl would escalate when the Chinese soldier pinned the Soviet soldier to the ground and began to punch him as well, forcing another Soviet soldier to shoot the Chinese soldier, killing him. Four more Chinese soldiers come after hearing the gunshot and begin to fire on the two Soviet soldiers, killing both of them. Three more Soviet soldiers stationed around the island come in and begin to shoot the Chinese soldiers after seeing the dead bodies of their comrades. Three of them are killed, and two of them manage to run away, but not before being shot themselves. One of the Soviet soldiers is also shot.
As news of this incident reaches Moscow and Beijing, Brezhnev and Mao make two different decisions. Brezhnev decides to keep the incident under wraps. The families of the two Soviet soldiers would receive compensation (and a fabricated story as to how they died), but other than that the story would not make it to the public. Mao, however, decides that the news of the incident could make for good propaganda. Alongside this, he orders that over two hundred more soldiers be sent to the Zhenbao Island, in order for their numerical strength to be equal to that of Soviet soldiers on the Zhenbao Island.
March 2nd, 1969
As People’s Daily talks of the “heroic patriotic assault on the social imperialists of the Soviet Union”, over twenty more Soviet soldiers are sent to the Zhenbao Island. Though small in number, the Soviet Union hopes to send a message to China, that any sort of aggression coming from them would not be tolerated. However, it is because of the small number of Soviet soldiers that had the Chinese not receive that message. Tensions remain between Soviet and Chinese troops for much of the day.
Around sunset, the People’s Liberation Army launches an assault on Soviet positions around the Zhenbao Island. Within thirty minutes, over sixty Soviet soldiers and border guards were killed by Chinese soldiers. Some Soviet soldiers begin to desert as it becomes clear that the PLA has no intention of stopping. What their intention actually is, they don’t know (in reality, their intention is just to capture the Zhenbao Island, but many Soviet soldiers fear that China has already declared war on the Soviet Union and planning an all out invasion of the Far East).
By nine o’clock, all of the Soviet Army in the Zhenbao Island had either been killed (202 soldiers), been made a POW (12 soldiers), or had fled (104 soldiers). The Chinese flag was raised over the ground on Zhenbao Island. News of this reaches Beijing, and Mao is overjoyed. He orders that the Zhenbao Island become a part of China. This annexation of Soviet sovereign territory had led to concern among moderates within the Communist Party of China, hardliners proclaim that much as how China had annexed 14,000 square miles of Indian territory in 1962 without much trouble, then they could annex what wasn’t even one half of a square miles of Soviet territory.
In Moscow, Brezhnev orders the Soviet military to prepare for an attempt to retake the island, and to also have Soviet soldiers stationed across the Chinese border to be on guard. He also says that it is ok for state media to report the clashes on the Zhenbao Island, a reversal of his previous position. The Soviet foreign ministry lodges a request, that China return their dead.
March 3rd, 1969
China refuses, angering Brezhnev and much of the Soviet government.
The annexation of the Zhenbao Island is celebrated around China. Street celebrations (some organic, some were orchestrated by Chinese authorities) break out, and the Chinese government gives a statement (purported to be from Mao, but in reality was made by high ranking party leaders) praising the soldiers who participated in the annexation of the Zhenbao Island and mourned those who died. Needless to say, the mood in most of China is jubilant.
News of the annexation of the Zhenbao Island begins to spread across the world. A fear of World War III arises, though much of those fears are allayed when people begin to think that the Soviet Union would not wage war over such a small island.
The US government issues a statement calling for restraint on both sides, a sentiment shared by most nations. Many people within the Soviet and Chinese government would also like to see an exercise of restraint. However, Brezhnev knew that the Soviet Union had to respond, lest the Communist Party lose confidence in him.
Brezhnev is aware that China is expecting a Soviet assault on the Zhenbao Island, and as such chooses to put off a Soviet assault for the next couple of days, in order to give the Chinese a sense of relaxation. If China can let their guard down, then they would be in a state of surprise when the Soviet Union actually does launch an attack. Not only that, but it gives the Soviet Union more time to prepare. If the Soviets were to launch an attack today, then the attack would be met with a prepared Chinese army, which expects this. Brezhnev’s decision to put off an attack is supported by the Soviet military.
March 7th, 1969
By this point, it has been five days since China attacked and annexed the Zhenbao Island. Though it had caught the attention of much of the world when it happened, the Soviet Union’s hitherto lack of response had convinced the US, China, and other countries that the Soviet Union had accepted the annexation of the Zhenbao Island as a fait accompli. However, this implied that China was, up to this point, a friendly nation to the Soviet Union and nobody was harmed in the annexation of the Zhenbao Island. This was not the case. As previously mentioned, the Soviet Union was already at odds with China, and the annexation of the Zhenbao Island had led to the deaths of over 200 Soviet soldiers. Seeing as how the Soviet Union and China were competing for the title of “leader of the communist world”, if the USSR just lets China take over Zhenbao then they are humiliated while China has an increased prestige. The Soviets could not let that slide.
The Chinese army in the Zhenbao Island has been relaxed. They were not informed of the Soviet army’s preparation to retake the island, and felt that the lack of overall response meant that the Soviet Union does not plan to take back the island. This was all according to Brezhnev’s plan.
Around sunrise, the Soviet army (over two thousand soldiers) launches their assault on the Zhenbao Island. The Chinese soldiers stationed there are caught off guard, and were quickly overwhelmed as the Soviet invasion force outnumbered them. With T-62 and PT-76 tanks being used, the Chinese soldiers faced heavy bombardment. After a few hours, they were forced to retreat. Soviet troops moved into the island, placing it under Soviet occupation.
China would keep a lid on stories of what had transpired at the Zhenbao Island from reaching the citizens, because if the Chinese people were to find out they could lose confidence in the Chinese government (similar to Brezhnev’s decision to keep a lid on stories about the February 28th skirmish). The Soviets, unsurprisingly, would broadcast the battle as a great victory for the Soviet Union. A Soviet soldier in the Zhenbao Island would take out a knife and carve Даманский (Damansky, the Russian name for the Zhenbao Island) into the ground. A picture would be taken, and the picture would be put on the front page of Pravda. It was a military and propaganda victory for the Soviet Union.
It could have been a diplomatic victory as well. The fact that the island was placed merely under Soviet occupation, and was not annexed, was giving the Chinese an opportunity to de-escalate and negotiate with the USSR regarding the status of the island. But the Chinese only desired annexation of the island, something which the Soviets did not accept. It was clear that any one of the two sides accepting the annexation of the island by the other side would hurt their image internationally without them gaining anything at all. No negotiations would mean that either China would accept the occupation of the Zhenbao Island (hurting them) or try and attack the island again (hurting the USSR). Both nations were put between a rock and a hard place.
March 9th, 1969
Lin Biao, a man who was simultaneously the First Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China, the Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China, the First Vice Premier of the People’s Republic of China, the Vice Premier of the People’s Republic of China, and the Minister of Defense (to put it simply, he was the second most powerful man in China) was not at all pleased at the turn of events in the Zhenbao/Damansky Island. The capture of the Zhenbao Island on the 2nd was a great propaganda victory for the Chinese government both domestically and internationally, and it being lost would undo all of the prestige they gained as a result of the victory. He decided that he would speak with the man who he felt was responsible for the loss of Zhenbao - General Chen Xilian.
Lin Biao felt that it would be better if he goes to the Ussuri River himself (where the Zhenbao Island was located) to not just confront General Chen but also to look at the state of Chinese soldiers around that area. After stopping midway through his trip to the Ussuri on the 8th to rest in Harbin, he reached there on the 9th. Lin Biao did not stop at the area around the Zhenbao Island, considering how militarized the area was, but rather stopped at an area two miles away from it. He had to endure the stares of hostile Soviet border guards and the looks of fear on the faces of Chinese soldiers. He was looking at them with General Chen, and his look was that of disappointment and disgust. He summoned Chen to a small, uninhabited cabin near the border, as that was the only place where he could talk to him privately.
He confronted General Chen over the state of the soldiers in the Ussuri River. His tone, which at first was calm, soon turned into anger as he began to argue with General Chen. General Chen retorted, and was just as angry at Lin Biao as Lin Biao was angry at him. The argument was overheard by five Soviet soldiers, who were tasked with manning a BM-21 rocket launcher. They did not understand Chinese, nor did they know who Chen Xilian or Lin Biao was, but from how loud and angry Lin and Chen were they thought they were planning an attack against the Soviet Union. As the argument became more intense, they began to get worried, and started to prepare the BM-21. Out of impulse, one of those soldiers accidentally launched a rocket, which hit the cabin.
The other five Soviet soldiers ran to the cabin. They saw the remains of two Chinese soldiers. They had hoped that they had not killed anyone important, and went back to their positions without much thought. They didn’t know it then, but their actions set off an irreversible chain of events.
Chen Xilian and Lin Biao were dead, killed by Soviet soldiers. And when Mao found out about it, de escalation and negotiation were thrown out of the window.
March 10th, 1969
News of the deaths of Chen Xilian and Lin Biao spread like wildfire throughout the world. When the Zhenbao Island was annexed by China, many feared World War III. Such fears returned, but this time these fears are now more reasonable as then China just annexed a small island. This time, however, the Soviet Union just killed the second most powerful man in China, along with another general and politburo member. The US government put out a statement calling for negotiations between the USSR and China, while also saying that the United States will remain neutral in disputes between the Soviet Union and China. Perhaps the word “disputes” underscores the level of hostilities between the Soviet Union and China, as right now they were reports of firefights occurring between Soviet and Chinese troops across the border, and the number of casualties in total on both sides were in the double digits.
But it was not war. The Soviet Union, arguably the country responsible for the crisis, did not want war. In order to appease China, the five Soviet soldiers responsible for the deaths of Chen Xilian and Lin Biao were arrested and sent to prison. It was clear that those five were about to be executed as well. The Soviet Union promised a withdrawal from the Zhenbao Island, if China were to first withdraw from the area as well. Then, negotiations could occur. However, Mao was not in a mood to make peace. He felt that the Soviet demands that China first withdraw from Zhenbao if they want the USSR to meant that Brezhnev was not interested in peace. Anything other than massive concessions (resumption of aid, rehabilitation of Stalin, money sent to the families of Lin Biao and Chen Xilian, and withdrawal from the Ussuri River) to China would not be enough to stave off war.
The fact that this was going on during the Cultural Revolution is not a fact to be neglected. Though much of the Red Guards were sent to the farms by 1969, the radicalism was still there. Hysteria occurred throughout China when the news of the death of Chen Xilian and Lin Biao broke out. In Shanghai, party members and some Red Guards who did not go into the farms stormed the Soviet consulate, dragged out and lynched the Soviet employees working there. Such an act would not have been tolerated at all, no matter which country was in control of the consulate, but Mao, when he was hearing about what was going on in Shanghai, called the Mayor of Shanghai and told him to “let the people show their anger”. The deaths of the Soviet consulate employees prompted the Soviet Union to issue a demand to China that the bodies be brought home and that compensation be paid. Brezhnev hoped that Mao would understand that refusal to accept those demands would mean war, and that he would compare China and the USSR’s nuclear capabilities and conclude that though China has a larger army, the Soviet Union has a superior nuclear program and as such China could not win a war with that in mind.
The Chinese government gave a statement, mourning Chen and Lin, and saying that Mao was expected to make a speech on March 13th to address the situation regarding their deaths. The whole world’s eyes were now on him. Would he de-escalate, or would he go for war? Time will tell.
March 11th, 1969
Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister Andrei Gromyko woke up at four AM, with just four hours of sleep. He was drowsy, but he didn’t have much time to linger over that feeling. There was a lot of work to do today, and if he fails to do so, then the Soviet Union will lose much of their ground in East Asia. He did his morning routine, and 5:30 AM was on a plane which was to land in Ulaanbaatar, the capital of the Mongolian People’s Republic.
Around 1 PM the plane landed. Gromyko and his delegation were welcomed by a Mongolian delegation, and they were all set to go to the Government Palace, to meet with Mongolian President, Jamsrangiin Sambuu, along with Foreign Minister Luvsandorjiyn Toiv and numerous generals of the Mongolian People’s Army.
What Gromyko wanted was Mongolian support in case war breaks out between the Soviet Union and China. Seeing as how Mongolia was a Soviet satellite state, the USSR already had soldiers deployed in Mongolia and the USSR could ask Mongolia for intelligence help. This meant that support could only mean joining the war, which was the only aspect of support that the Soviet Union would have to convince the Mongolian leadership to give.
Gromyko promised the Mongolian delegation that, if Mongolia were to join the USSR in a potential war against China, that the Soviet Union will fund Mongol separatists in Inner Mongolia. Gromyko explained to Sambuu that the Soviet Union’s goals in a potential war with China would not try to annex anything or try to install a friendly government (both goals which are very, very hard to accomplish), but rather, they would give China’s military such a beating that China will be negatively impacted as a whole. The Soviet Union will use the war to give arms to Uyghur, Mongol, and Manchurian separatists in China, and once the war ends they would have given those separatists a base for operations. Gromyko said that, in this case, the PRC would not last to 1980, and that the USSR will support any Mongolian attempt to annex Inner Mongolia. Sambuu, still, was not convinced.
Gromyko tried to convince Sambuu, saying that if Mongolia would join a potential war against China, then the Soviet Union will loosen their leash on Mongolia, so to speak. They would give the Mongol communist government more independence in their affairs. Still, Sambuu was not convinced.
Gromyko was at this point annoyed with Sambuu’s non-compliance, and threatened him with a coup if he continued to defy the Soviet Union. This was not an empty threat, the Soviet Union could very well orchestrate a coup within Mongolia. Mongolia was a satellite state of the Soviet Union, meaning that the USSR had plenty of influence over Mongolian domestic affairs. The threat of a coup scared Sambuu enough to comply with Soviet wishes, that if a war were to break out with China, that Mongolia should join. In fact, now he was beginning to worry that his previous non-compliance will convince the Soviet Union that he would not be a good ally, regardless of anything he will say after he was threatened. The Soviet government got what they wanted in Mongolia, but Gromyko’s work was not done. He would have to convince a much more stubborn, and a much more independent leader, to support the Soviet Union in a potential battle against China. Gromyko would have to go to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
The plane which was carrying Gromyko and the Soviet delegation was to avoid China, as flying straight to Pyongyang would lead to the plane entering Chinese airspace, which could lead to the plane being shot down. Flying straight to Pyongyang wouldn’t take as long, but would be fairly risky.
But the fact that it would take long for the plane to avoid China would lead to problems. The plane was not refueled at any time as Gromyko and the Soviet delegation were in Ulaanbaatar. As such, as the plane was flying over the Soviet-Chinese border near Vladivostok the plane began to lose fuel. As the plane was losing fuel, the pilots began to lose control of the plane, leading to it dipping into Chinese airspace. Chinese anti-aircraft saw a plane coming from the direction of the Soviet Union, and chose to shoot it down, killing Gromyko and the entire Soviet delegation.
March 12th, 1969
Gromyko’s death at the hands of Chinese soldiers had essentially made China and the Soviet Union “tit-for-tat”. There were some optimistic observers who had hoped that the fact that high-ranking Chinese and Soviet leaders were both killed will lead to China and the Soviet Union seeing themselves as even, and they won’t choose to escalate. However, this was mere speculation. Neither the Soviet or Chinese government put out an official statement calling for de-escalation. Brezhnev was put in a much tougher situation. If he chose to de-escalate, then he ran the risk of alienating hardliners. Brezhnev recalled that Khrushchev’s supposed retreat from Cuba had humiliated the Soviet Union, and was one of the reasons Khrushchev was removed, and he did not wish to be removed. Mao was more partial to the idea of de-escalation, but was still hurt by the deaths of Lin Biao and Chen Xilian, and as such felt that the USSR did not deserve any Chinese concessions. When the Soviets wanted the bodies of Gromyko and the rest of the victims of the plane crash back, the Chinese refused.
It was this refusal which made it clear that war was inevitable. Nixon raised the DEFCON level from 5 to 4, along with a stand-by for a possible increase to a 3. The fear of nuclear war once again arose. Old nuclear shelters made in the 1950s began to be restored, making it clear what the mood in the US was. Though more seasoned observers said that China did not have the nuclear capability to destroy the Soviet Union, many people ignored them. People began to demonstrate in front of the Soviet embassy in their country, and if their country had them, the PRC embassy.
But neither the Soviet Union nor China listened to the demonstrators, nor did they listen to the west, nor did they listen to the UN. Firefights continued on the Sino-Soviet border, once again leading to the deaths of more soldiers on both sides, Chinese diplomats in the Soviet Union had left the country (and vice versa), and the militaries of both countries were ready for an eventual war.
Mao was supposed to make a speech tomorrow. All eyes were on him.
March 13th, 1969
At around twelve noon, Chinese time (seven AM Moscow time), Chairman Mao Zedong gave his speech. Though the speech was supposed to give the official Chinese reaction to the events in Zhenbao, the deaths of Chen Xilian and Lin Biao, the speech was not listened to by any of the Soviet military leadership, nor Brezhnev, which should have an interest in what Mao would have to say. Instead, they kept a close eye on Chinese troop movements around the border, believing that troop movements would show what Chinese intention actually was. The speech ended within 45 minutes, and within ten minutes, Chinese soldiers began to make their way over the Ussuri, and reports of Chinese planes shelling Soviet positions within the Kazakh SSR began to emerge. It was war.
Soviet defenses were mainly aimed at defending the Zhenbao Island, not any of the rest of the Ussuri River. Mao, along with PLA leadership, knew this, and as such chose to avoid the Zhenbao Island with the aim of claiming much of the land around the Ussuri River. The Soviet soldiers around the Zhenbao Island will be forced to leave the island, thus giving China the island to them.
Chinese wargoals never amounted to anything more furthering the Chinese border to ten kilometers east of the Ussuri River, thus making the Ussuri River not a Chinese-Soviet demarcation line, but rather a Chinese river altogether. Such a goal was, on the surface, small, but the defeat of the Soviet Union, no matter how small, could serve to bolster Chinese prestige and standing among communist movements.
As Chinese soldiers made their way across the Ussuri River, Soviet soldiers began to leave the Zhenbao Island to defend the area around the Ussuri. This prompted the PLA to launch an offensive on the Zhenbao, leading to the island being captured within 45 minutes. One Chinese soldier tried to carve 珍宝岛 (Zhenbao) into the ground with a knife, but was blown up by a Soviet mortar shell. The Chinese had advanced to two kilometers beyond the Ussuri, but Soviet defenses prevented them from going beyond that.
As the Sino-Soviet border in Manchuria was going through fighting, the Sino-Soviet border in Xinjiang was quieter. Brezhnev knew that China did not expect a Soviet invasion of China on Xinjiang, and as such he told the Soviet Army to prepare for an offensive from the Kazakh and Kyrygz SSRs.
The White House Years, by Henry Kissinger, 1979:
“I was summoned to the situation room at around two AM, to discuss the situation regarding China and the Soviet Union. I had suggested that a Chinese victory would be in the best interests of the United States. My reasoning was this: A Chinese victory would lead to Maoism, the flavor of communism upheld by China (and criticized by the Soviet Union) being given a shot in the arm in popularity, leading to a further divide communist movements around the globe. The Soviet Union was established enough to the point where Maoism would not be the dominant strain of communist thought, but an increased popularity of Maoism would hurt Soviet interests around the third world. Conversely, a Soviet victory would discredit Maoism, leading to a more united communist movement around the world.
I had also argued that a Chinese victory would lead to an eventual collapse of the People’s Republic itself. Note that China was in the middle of the Cultural Revolution, and the impact the Cultural Revolution had on China was a negative one. If China were to win, then the Cultural Revolution would be vindicated, leading to it becoming more extreme, thus hurting China even more, to the point where it will collapse.
I suggested that, in order to bring about a Chinese victory, that the United States should give arms to China. China’s military, though larger than the military of the Soviet Union, had lacked behind when it came to areas other than numerical strength, such as technology. Any sort of support to China should be done in a secretive manner, because if China was receiving open support, then the Soviet Union’s propagandists in communist movements would be able to portray the Soviet Union as a victim of a joint Sino-American conspiracy, which would hurt the popularity of Maoism and not lead to a division within communist movements, thus making my first argument as to why a Chinese victory would be better for the United States null.
To my surprise, Nixon agreed…”
March 14th-15th, 1969
Mao had made his speech at a time when most of America was asleep. Brezhnev, too, had to make a speech a few hours after his, informing the people of the Soviet Union that war has begun against the Chinese. When the American people woke up, they were in a panic as they feared a nuclear war. American families who owned nuclear shelters began to move in those shelters, people began to loot grocery stores, and in general there was a mood of fear encompassing much of America. It had gone to the point that, at five PM Washington time, President Richard Nixon gave an address in which he stated that the United States would do its utmost to prevent the war from becoming nuclear, and to prevent the US from entering. Nixon stated that the US military was ready in case either the USSR or China were to attack. The address eased many Americans, but much of the US government was still uneasy about the whole situation. The DEFCON level was decreased from four to three, with a stand-by for a possible decrease to two.
March 14th and 15th went by with little change in the war’s progress. China and the Soviet Union stalemated around the Ussuri, with China still having control of the Zhenbao and the Soviet Union still preventing the PLA from advancing from two kilometers from Zhenbao. Fighting continued around Manchuria, but no noticeable gains or losses were made on either side. By the night of the 15th, Brezhnev got frustrated at the lack of any Soviet gains, and as such decided to make a phone call, to a man in Ulaanbaatar…
March 16th, 1969
Mongolia’s decision to join the war came in as a surprise. Many did not know what Mongolia had to gain from joining a war which had a real chance of devolving into an apocalyptic one. But Mongolia was a Soviet satellite, and Sambuu was still rattled by the conversation he had with Gromyko and as such found little reason to say ‘no’ to Brezhnev when he called.
One can say that Brezhnev’s phone call to Sambuu was emblematic of how the USSR saw its satellites - not as equals, but rather, puppets, to be at their whim. Had they been seen as equals, then Brezhnev would had given Sambuu some time to prepare for war, but he didn’t. As such, an unprepared Mongolian military was set to fight against a much larger Chinese one. Sambuu was aware of this fact and was a bit disgruntled, but couldn’t complain.
Mainly, Mongolian soldiers were directed to the border they had with China, so as to defend it. Other Mongolian soldiers joined an offensive with the Soviet Union to reach the outskirts of Hulunbuir.
China was not expecting Mongolia to join the war (rather, they expected North Korea, as Gromyko’s plane was heading there), and as such was caught off-guard. The PLAAF launched a series of airstrikes around Mongolian positions, which led to the deaths of around 10 Mongolian soldiers, but were ultimately ineffective. Chinese planning for the war would be revised heavily with the entry of Mongolia, but the question now is whether or not it was too late for that.
March 19th, 1969
After a few days of conflict in Manchuria (which had very little gains on either side) and a few more PLAAF airstrikes on Mongolian targets, the Soviet Union finally launched an attack targeted at Chinese positions around Xinjiang. Soviet troops, along with a small number of Mongolian reinforcements and Uyghur separatists reached the cities of Qoqek, Aksu, Illi, and Altay within a few hours. Capturing those four cities would open the door to the capture of Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. Brezhnev felt that capturing Urumqi would provide the basis for a long-lasting, Soviet backed Uyghur insurgency (which would destabilize and weaken China), and could also force the Chinese to sue for peace.
Reports of a Soviet attack on Xinjiang had startled the Chinese government, much as how the entrance of Mongolia had startled them just a few days prior. Because of how little China expected an attack from that area, Xinjiang became China’s soft underbelly. Brezhnev hoped that Uyghur separatists would adopt the tactics of the Vietcong in Vietnam, in an attempt to wane down China in the years after the war, similar to how the Vietcong is waning America down right now.
Speaking of Vietnam, the United States begins Operation Menu, in an attempt to destroy the COVSN (Central Office for South Vietnam) and kill their leadership. It is believed that a successful Menu will force the end of the war, in an American victory. The Soviet Union and China are still funding the Vietcong, but as the war begins to shake up it is clear that both sides will divert resources from Vietnam and to the war.
March 21st, 1969
Qoqek and Aksu are both captured by the Soviet Union, being the first two cities in all of China to be occupied by the Soviet Union. The loss of those two cities prompts the Chinese government to order Long Shujin, the Chairman of Xinjiang, to create a militia in order to defend Xinjiang from Soviet invasion, until Chinese soldiers can reach the area. Said militia would be formed on a similar basis to the Red Guards (which, by this point, were all under the process of re-education). They would consist of youth from universities in Xinjiang.
The Soviet Union’s luck does not appear to extend outside of Xinjiang, though. A planned Mongolian invasion of Inner Mongolia is stifled by a Chinese preemptive strike, which forces Mongolian soldiers around the border to retreat inward into the country. Alongside this, Chinese soldiers push back a joint USSR-Mongolia force from Hulunbuir in Manchuria. A loss of Hulunbuir will enable the Soviet Union to go into Harbin, one of the largest cities in Manchuria, and a capture of Harbin could force China to sue for peace. The USSR being pushed out of Hulunbuir puts a brake to Soviet advance in Manchuria.
Worse still, for the USSR, the first US weapons begin to reach China. Though the aid is done discreetly, aid is still there, and PLA armed with American weapons will prove to hurt Soviet plans in China a lot more than if China was not being helped.
March 23rd, 1969
PLA soldiers in Hulunbuir begin to move from the city to the Ussuri River. This opens the city up to attack from both the USSR and Mongolia, an opportunity neither country intends to let go of. The Soviets and Mongols attack at 6 PM, around the time many PLA soldiers have already left the city. The assault on Huluinbuir on the 23rd is a successful mission by the joint USSR-Mongolian alliance, and while it does not lead to a capture of the city, it gets them on a path in which a capture of the city is certain.
As this is going on, the first unit of the “National Defence Organization” is formed. The NDO was formed at the behest of the Chinese government, and is composed mainly of students from Urumqi University. Mao hopes that human waves (which he believes delivered the USSR a victory against Germany in the Second World War) comprised of NDO members would be enough to force the USSR out of China.
But Mao’s plan of using human waves against the Soviets is hurt as his generals informed him that it would take weeks for China to recruit and train a sizeable number of students for the tactic of human waves. Giving the Soviet Union a few weeks to continue their offensive on Xinjiang would lead to the Soviet Army reaching Urumqi. China can’t afford it. It was then when Mao proposed another idea, which also originated from the Second World War, and that was the use of suicide attacks. The plan was simple - students armed with bombs would run into Soviet soldiers and blow themselves up, but they would also kill a few Soviet soldiers as well. The plan was shocking to many generals, who believed that Mao was about to throw away an entire generation for the sake of ten kilometers, but Mao’s word was paramount, and the plan was put in place.
March 24th, 1969
A major victory is brought in the Manchuria front for the Soviet Union as Soviet troops push the PLA back to the Ussuri and retake Zhenbao. The reason for such a victory was in large part thanks to the Soviet Air Force. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force had been in a rut due to the Sino-Soviet Split, as they now were deprived of equipment from the Soviet Union. Because the Soviet Air Force had a hand in the development of the PLAAF, the leaders of the Soviet Air Force were aware of the shortcomings of the aircraft the PLAAF was using.
Chinese losses in the war were, as expected, not broadcast on Chinese state media, but the loss of Zhenbao was a big defeat on the propaganda standpoint even if it wasn’t a big military defeat. As such, they tried to block any sort of news detailing their military defeat.
In Xinjiang, Chinese soldiers in Altay and Illi are on their last leg as the Soviet Union continues to push into the outskirts of the city. However, they are told to keep fighting, as the first group of NDO militias from Urumqi are set to arrive within two days.
March 26th, 1969
Over 1000 students were sent to the Xinjiang front, 600 to Altay, and 400 to Illi. Though they were small in number, they were not supposed to engage in any prolonged fighting. They were sent to die. Chinese positions in Altay and Illi were on the verge of collapse, and the time to get sizable reinforcements was too long for the Chinese to stave off a Soviet capture of Altay and Illi. Xinjiang was not as connected to the center of China unlike Manchuria or Inner Mongolia. There were very few railways to Xinjiang, and the area was separated from much of China through large mountain ranges and deserts. These reasons could explain why it was hard to defend Xinjiang. China was not prepared for an invasion from there, and the area was far away enough to the point where it would take months for any defense to take place. The use of suicide bombers by China was to shock and demoralize Soviet soldiers to the point where they could stave off a Chinese collapse around the border areas in Xinjiang.
In a way, Mao’s plan to use suicide bombers worked. NDO members would run to Soviet positions and blow themselves up before they could be shot. Many Soviet soldiers were shocked at the sight of a person armed with a suicide vest killing themselves on purpose just to kill a few Soviet soldiers as well. Throughout the day, the PLA would play a smaller role in the fighting because of the NDO. It was estimated that by the day’s end, over 701 Soviet soldiers were killed by 602 NDO suicide bombers in both Altay and Illi. This was the highest number of casualties the Soviet Union had faced thus far in the Xinjiang campaign. This led to a brief cessation of hostilties as the Soviet Army did not know what to do with the NDO.
When news of this arrived to the higher command of the Soviet Army, they were surprised at the high number of Soviet casualties. However, there was a consensus that there was no need for a drastic change of how the Soviet Army were to operate in Xinjiang, seeing as how they were on the verge of victory in Altay and Illi prior to the arrival of NDO militias. Instead, they gave out an order instructing the Soviet Army to shoot at any Chinese person, even if they look like a civilian, running at a Soviet soldier. Soviet soldiers in Central Asia were instructed to go to Xinjiang to be reinforcements for the thousand killed.
March 27th, 1969
The use of suicide bombers in Xinjiang seemed to work. The Soviets have retreated to the outskirts of Altay and Illi, and Chinese intelligence in the USSR reported to Beijing that Soviet leadership was shaken by the number of casualties caused by the NDO. This was a vindication of Mao’s planning, and gave him further reasoning to ignore his generals when formulating a plan to push back the Soviets. Already, plans were put in place for the creation of NDO groups in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, to help China in fighting the Soviet Union there.
The Soviet retreat had given the Chinese an opportunity to push the Soviets away from those two cities once and for all. Around sunset, the PLA attacked Soviet positions in Altay and Illi. This proved to be a mistake. Though the Soviets were forced to retreat, they were in the dominant position prior to the arrival of suicide bombers, and the weakened PLA engaging in an assault on the Soviet Army led to failure for the PLA. The assault had only lasted a couple of hours, and it did not take long for the Chinese to realize what a mistake said assault had been. By the time of the assault’s end, the PLA in Altay and Illi were further weakened than they had been prior to the assault, and opened up the two cities for further Soviet advancement. The PLA’s position in Xinjiang would be more tenous by tomorrow.
March 29th, 1969
After ten days of conflict, the Soviet Union had finally captured Altay and Illi. The flag of the proposed “People’s Republic of East Turkestan” flew over governmental buildings, the news of which convinced Mao that the Soviet Union was on a mission to destroy the People’s Republic of China (he wasn’t entirely wrong).
The failure of the PLA to defend Xinjiang could not have been blamed on a specific person, as most, if not all of the Chinese military and government thought that the Soviet Union would not attack Xinjiang. As such, no massive purge occurred and neither was Mao’s power reduced, which was what the Soviet Union expected to have happened in the event of a successful Xinjiang offensive. The PLA began to consolidate in Kashgar and Urumqi, and began to build up their defenses in an attempt to weaken the Soviet Union by having it fight a long, arduous battle.
But the Soviet Union did not plan to fight such a battle. The Soviet Union felt that it had achieved their goals, that being retaking the Zhenbao Island and providing a base for Uyghur and Mongolian separatists. Brezhnev felt that the USSR should quit while they were ahead, and offered a peace proposal to China, which was status quo ante bellum. With the Soviet Union offering an olive branch to China, now the question was, would the Chinese government accept it?
March 30th, 1969
The offer of a status quo ante bellum peace was one debated amongst the upper echelons of the Chinese government. Mao himself was split on the decision, and the hardliners and moderates of the Chinese Communist Party sought to influence Mao for their position. The pro-war bloc was led by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, and the pro-peace bloc was led by Chou Enlai, the Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
The pro-peace position was simple: No matter how much China defends its borders from Soviet and Mongolian incursions, it could not score an offensive victory enough to break apart the Soviet Union. Conversely, the USSR can break apart China, judging from the Soviet Union’s open support of Uyghur and Mongol separatists. To the pro-peace bloc, a status quo ante bellum peace was the best peace available.
The pro-war position did not use reason in trying to articulate their opinions, but rather, used emotion and jingoism. The Soviet Union killed Chen Xilian. The Soviet Union killed Lin Biao. The Soviet Union is supporting separatists in Xinjiang. The Soviet Union is supporting separatists in Inner Mongolia. The Sino-Soviet borders in Manchuria are a colonial relic. Why should there be peace?
As the debate was going on, the PLAAF claimed a victory over the Soviet-Mongolian Alliance. An airstrike over the Sino-Mongolian border led to the killing of Mongolian General Jamsrangijn Jondon. General Jondon was in charge of Mongolian forces in Hulunbuir, and his death led to confusion amongst both Soviet and Mongol soldiers. His death had also been a stroke of good luck for the pro-war faction, as they used this to convince Mao that victory for the Soviets was still possible. They succeeded.
The peace offer given by the Soviets was rejected, the official reasoning given by the Chinese government is that China was not in such a weakened position that they would be forced to make peace. Brezhnev was surprised - he really did believe that the Chinese would make peace. None the matter. In spite of any numerical superiority the Chinese had, the Soviet Union could still maintain supremacy in terms of quality of their military. The war would continue.
March 31st - April 1st, 1969
When the month of March began, few believed that the Soviet Union and China would go to war (the Feburary 28th skirmish was not reported on by western media). By the end of March, said belief would become a reality.
Though President Nixon had calmed down Americans, with some success, about the threat of World War III when the war began, the fear still lingered on. In many school districts, “duck and cover” drills were re-instated. People who did not have nuclear bunkers in the 1950s began to build new ones, and the economy would suffer a downturn, primarily due to the fact that investor confidence was not as high due to the threat of the Sino-Soviet War becoming World War III.
That was just in the United States. In China, the effects of the creation of the NDO would lead to a downturn in the number of people joining the PLA. Many feared that they would not be sent to Manchuria or Xinjiang to fight in the trenches, but rather, to blow themselves up. The Chinese people were supportive of the government in their fight against the Soviets, but there weren’t many who were radicalized enough to have someone strap a bomb to their chest so that they can kill themselves. Mao regrets the suppression of the Red Guards, for if they were around in 1969, then there would be a steady supply of young, radicalized youth willing to join the NDO.
The killing of General Jondon would eventually lead to the PLA engaging in an offensive to drive the Soviets and Mongols out of Huluinbuir. Unlike the Altay and Illi failed offensive which occurred after the first NDO raid, this one did not end in total disaster. By April 1st, the Soviets and Mongols were in full retreat, but began to consolidate themselves around the entrance of the city so as to not be run out of it completely. China claimed victory, but neither the Soviet Union nor Mongolia would not be deterred by this setback. It is certain that the Soviet Union and Mongolia will attack Huluinbuir again, in spite of any Chinese gains. In order to break the Chinese in Manchuria, that city has to be captured.
And so, the Sino-Soviet War would proceed. How will it end? Will the Soviet Union exhaust itself to the point where it cannot wage a war anymore? Will the Chinese lose enough land to the point where they have to accept peace? Or will nuclear weapons be used, by either side, to prevent any of the first two scenarios from happening? Nobody can say for certain which one it will be, but so far, these are the three most likely scenarios which will end war. The world is hoping that the third scenario will not happen. But the world also hoped that the Chinese and the Soviets would not go to war. And yet…
CURRENT SITUATION OF THE SINO-SOVIET WAR
April 1st, 1969
19 days since the start of the war
April 1st, 1969
19 days since the start of the war
Soviet Union: Around 4,500 soldiers killed. 2,613 killed in Xinjiang, 1,887 killed in Manchuria. 3 civilians killed, fishermen from the Jewish Autonomous Oblast.
Mongolia: Around 1,400 soldiers killed. 1,300 from Manchuria, 100 from Xinjiang. Over 9 civilians killed, all of the farmers who were casualties from the PLAAF airstrikes.
Uyghur Separatists: 400 soldiers killed, all in Xinjiang.
Inner Mongolian Separatists: 20 killed, none of them in Inner Mongolia, but in Mongolia itself (they were to be deployed if the Soviet Union and Mongolia would embark on a joint campaign in Inner Mongolia).
People’s Republic of China: 9,760 soldiers killed, 5,553 in Xinjiang, 4,100 in Manchuria, and 107 from various other areas of China as a result of Soviet and Mongolian airstrikes. 1,201 civilians killed, mainly in Xinjiang and Huluinbuir.
