If it's not too late to add fuel to the flamefest, I'd like to point out:
1. Morale would be a huge obstacle for a Soviet offensive. Many Soviets were willing to fight for the Rodina against a Nazi invasion; some (Ukrainians especially) preferred the other side. Consider if, after four of the bloodiest years in human history, the victorious Red Army was ordered to turn on its formidable allies and buy foreign lands for Stalin with their lives. The frontline Russian troops would have surrendered as fast as they could throw down their guns. The most likely consequence of such an insane proposition by Stalin is that Beria would have murdered him in 1945 instead of 1953.
2. It would take more than one or two or three atomic bombs to cripple the Soviet war effort. They'd already suffered much worse than a mere atom bombing. The best chance for such an attack to end the war would be to kill Stalin.
1. Morale would be a huge obstacle for a Soviet offensive. Many Soviets were willing to fight for the Rodina against a Nazi invasion; some (Ukrainians especially) preferred the other side. Consider if, after four of the bloodiest years in human history, the victorious Red Army was ordered to turn on its formidable allies and buy foreign lands for Stalin with their lives. The frontline Russian troops would have surrendered as fast as they could throw down their guns. The most likely consequence of such an insane proposition by Stalin is that Beria would have murdered him in 1945 instead of 1953.
2. It would take more than one or two or three atomic bombs to cripple the Soviet war effort. They'd already suffered much worse than a mere atom bombing. The best chance for such an attack to end the war would be to kill Stalin.