Snake Featherston
Banned
Let us say for the purpose of the thread that the Soviets still wind up with a variant of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939. Let us say that for the purposes of this scenario the greater strength of an ATL Soviet Union lead the British and French to try to exclude it lest the Soviets start flexing their muscles in a way that threatens their interests at Munich, and that ITTL it's Soviet anger over this that serves as the motivation for the ATL Pact. Now let's further say that all this doesn't butterfly away the precursors to an ATL Barbarossa.
Now, realistically if the Red Army develops its doctrine and leadership from 1937-41, it's got the following advantages:
1) Much greater experience at all levels than IOTL. This gives it a leg up over both the Tsarist Army of WWI and the OTL Red Army, as its leaders are actually going to bee people with experience worthy the ranks they hold, not armies hobbled by inexperience and ineptitude resulting from that.
2) Soviet equipment and concepts for offensive war are far superior to OTL, meaning that Soviet equipment may on the whole develop in a much more even process to OTL, but at the same token the Red Army's still going to have a great deal of obsolete equipment and those C3 defects aren't going to be simple to resolve.
3) Soviet military institutions have the advantage of cleanly developing with a great deal of morale and skill, furthered by immunity to the Purges ITTL (for purposes of this thread, Stalin decides on a much more cynical view of letting his army win its war and *then* going after 'Bonapartists' while appealing to Marxism and to Russian history with some greater degree of plausibility. If people object, remember Bellisario's Maxim).
Soviet strengths, however, will be counterbalanced by realistic weaknesses:
1) Soviet thought IOTL never delved too deeply into defensive war. I'm not sure how having the 1937-41 phase to develop Deep Operations further alters this, and my personal feelings based on Stalin's gigantomania and obsession with the offensive is that the Soviets would not necessarily develop such a doctrine. Germany shoots first, which creates major issues.
2) The Soviets will still have problems of having their borders pushed further forward and likely disagreements with the regime over concentration of force, as well as a probable German concentration favoring Army Groups Center and North, not Army Group South.
3) Leningrad in particular is extremely vulnerable as the Soviets IOTL at least made plans to defend it from the Finns but had none to protect it from the Germans. Terrain makes it an area of the Front where small-unit actions and tactics prevail uber alles, which is good for Army Group North, not for the USSR.
What do you guys think would be the result of a realistic scenario where the Soviets develop their concepts more than IOTL but Germany still attacks in June of 1941?
Now, realistically if the Red Army develops its doctrine and leadership from 1937-41, it's got the following advantages:
1) Much greater experience at all levels than IOTL. This gives it a leg up over both the Tsarist Army of WWI and the OTL Red Army, as its leaders are actually going to bee people with experience worthy the ranks they hold, not armies hobbled by inexperience and ineptitude resulting from that.
2) Soviet equipment and concepts for offensive war are far superior to OTL, meaning that Soviet equipment may on the whole develop in a much more even process to OTL, but at the same token the Red Army's still going to have a great deal of obsolete equipment and those C3 defects aren't going to be simple to resolve.
3) Soviet military institutions have the advantage of cleanly developing with a great deal of morale and skill, furthered by immunity to the Purges ITTL (for purposes of this thread, Stalin decides on a much more cynical view of letting his army win its war and *then* going after 'Bonapartists' while appealing to Marxism and to Russian history with some greater degree of plausibility. If people object, remember Bellisario's Maxim).
Soviet strengths, however, will be counterbalanced by realistic weaknesses:
1) Soviet thought IOTL never delved too deeply into defensive war. I'm not sure how having the 1937-41 phase to develop Deep Operations further alters this, and my personal feelings based on Stalin's gigantomania and obsession with the offensive is that the Soviets would not necessarily develop such a doctrine. Germany shoots first, which creates major issues.
2) The Soviets will still have problems of having their borders pushed further forward and likely disagreements with the regime over concentration of force, as well as a probable German concentration favoring Army Groups Center and North, not Army Group South.
3) Leningrad in particular is extremely vulnerable as the Soviets IOTL at least made plans to defend it from the Finns but had none to protect it from the Germans. Terrain makes it an area of the Front where small-unit actions and tactics prevail uber alles, which is good for Army Group North, not for the USSR.
What do you guys think would be the result of a realistic scenario where the Soviets develop their concepts more than IOTL but Germany still attacks in June of 1941?