The RAF doesn't launch the Battle of Berlin in 1943, instead focuses on the Ruhr

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Ruhr
You do know the British were smashing the Ruhr until they shifted to Berlin, right? That's the point; the economic damage was being done, but they cut off the effort based on an erroneous idea that hitting Berlin would end the war; instead it drove Bomber Command to the brink and called off the area bombing effort for months. Tooze demonstrated in Wages of Destruction that the economic damage was so bad that it entirely derailed the planned weapons boom and was on the verge of doing worse when it was stopped.

Ok, I'll detail the point - after repeating that I agree that continuing with what they were doing would have been better than switching to Berlin.

The main issue is weather and seasons, something not even Harris had command upon. Yes, Bomber Command was being effective over the Ruhr - in summer. Winter nights are not only longer (which is what made the offensive against Berlin possible) but also, on average, much cloudier. Bomber Command's navigation and targeting was getting better in 1943, but it was still far from what it achieved in mid and late 1944. A clear, starry night still made much of a difference vs. a cloudy pitch-black night. The Ruhr cities, as mentioned, always were a difficult target. Today they're almost one big conurbation, resembling, well, Berlin as a target in size. At the time, there were worthless areas in between them. Bomber Command regularly bombed one city instead of the other, or missed targets entirely over there.
Another weather-related issue is the possibility of firestorms. What really made Hamburg in was the firestorm. But, even though Bomber Command was striving very hard to achieve these, they never could do so reliably. Low winter temperatures, the likelihood of humidity, and of everything being drenched in rain or covered in snow of course degrade the chances of a city-wide conflagration.
In general, over the winter months Bomber Command flew less sorties, with more aborted flights, less accuracy, less of everything, so expecting the summer results in December is simply not realistic.

Then there are other issues. For instance, the targeting problem if the proposal is that Bomebr Command does hunt for coalmine rail sidings and other such small targets instead of for cities. There is the law of diminishing returns. And in any case, the Germans did take countermeasures and would be doing so in this changed scenario.

And finally, as mentioned, this can only go on until February 1944 at most. After that, there are more pressing concerns anyway.

Now, some less well informed members might wonder why clouds were so important in bombing at night. To clear that doubt, we'll look at one significant month, October 1943. At that time, in central Europe, clouds were the prevailing condition. Bomber Command had not yet begun the Battle of Berlin, so we have several other targets. This is what the RAF diaries have to say:

3/4 October, Kassel: "...The H2S 'blind marker' aircraft overshot the aiming point badly and the 'visual markers' could not correct this because their view of the ground was restricted by thick haze. German decoy markers may also have been present. The main weight of the attack thus fell on the western suburbs and outlying towns and villages."

7/8 October, Stuttgart: "The target area was cloud-covered and the H2S Pathfinder marking developed in 2 areas."

18/19 October, Hannover: "The target area was covered by cloud and the Pathfinders were not successful in marking the position of Hannover. The raid was scattered, with most bombs falling in open country north and north-west of the city."

20/21 October, Leipzig: "Weather conditions were very difficult - Bomber Command records describe them as 'appalling' - and the bombing was very scattered."

So, even with radar-aided targeting, clouds and "thick haze" - a common occurrence in the Ruhr - wasted accuracy. Were all raids in bad weather in October 1943 a failure? No:

1 October, Hagen: "This raid was a complete success achieved on a completely cloud-covered target of small size, with only a moderate bomber effort and at trifling cost. The Oboe skymarking was perfect and severe damage was caused."

And what about raids in good weather?

2/3 October, Munich: "Visibility over the target was clear but the initial marking was scattered. Heavy bombing developed over the southern and south-eastern districts of Munich but later stages of the raid fell up to 15 miles back along the approach route."

4/5 October, Frankfurt: "Clear weather and good Pathfinder marking produced the first serious blow on Frankfurt so far in the war, with extensive destruction being caused in the eastern half of the city and in the inland docks on the River Main."

8/9 October, Hannover: "Conditions over Hannover were clear and the Pathfinders were finally able to mark the centre of the city accurately; a most concentrated attack followed with a creepback of only 2 miles, all within the built-up area. This was probably Hannover's worst attack of the war."

22/23 October, Kassel: "The initial 'blind' H2S marking overshot the target but 8 out of the 9 'visual' markers correctly identified the centre of Kassel and placed their markers accurately. Although German decoy markers may have drawn off part of the bomber force, the main raid was exceptionally accurate and concentrated. The result was the most devastating attack on a German city since the firestorm raid on Hamburg in July and the results at Kassel would not be exceeded again until well into 1944. The fires were so concentrated that there was a firestorm, although not as extensive as the Hamburg one."

These are all the main-force raids of October, even though many more minor missions were also carried out.

So we can see that:

- out of 9 raids, 5 were in bad weather (and things would only get worse in November-February);
- out of 5 raids in bad weather, one succeeded notwithstanding the weather and the other 4 were failures;
- out of 4 raids in good weather, one was inaccurate but the other three were successes, one of them a big success (a firestorm).
 
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That would be a good idea but not as decisive as it might sound. Sure, the Ruhr is closer, but those were always rather difficult targets anyway. Berlin is too large to bomb - yeah, if you are aiming at discrete points within it. But if you are flying in the winter of 1943, in a cloudy night, having a big big target is better than trying to hit a small coal mine rail siding in the foggy Ruhr.

Totally ignoring Berlin and concentrating on the Ruhr would have caused industrial problems, yes, but probably many raids would have been too inaccurate to have a significant effect.

Then up comes the spring of 1944, and even Bomber Command is tasked to hit the railway network, mainly in France, for a very good overlordy reason. Then they also are tasked with the V-Waffen launch sites. So it's not as if an uninterrupted narrowly-focused campaign could be waged from the summer of 1943 to the end of the war against this industrial heartland of Germany.

All in all, considered the limited effect the Berlin offensive had (and its complete failure if we look at the intended effect), the force could have been better used, yes, but I don't think it would have caused the collapse Speer talks about.
I don't wish to cause any offense but I would tend to put more stock in the opinion of Speer than you do.

To dismiss the opinions of the person in charge of the German economy as to the impact of the bombing campaign would seem to be strange IMHO
 
however that was after a false start in 1943 where the 9th Af discovered attacking rail yards, rail maintinance facilities, ect... were not getting the full result they sought. It turned out that bridges were the key target, and bridges could be effectively attacked with a change in tactics and techniques. The US 15th AF found the same techniques and results in Northern Italy, which was the basis for operation STRANGLE in early to mid 1944.

Surely a quick call to the Railway Executive Committee would have shown, early, that bridges ( and tunnels) were the key to crippling a railway network. I get why a marshaling yard looks like a key node and a juicy target but filling in holes in some yard is easier than rebuilding a massive railway viaduct. I always find it hard they took so long to switch but perhaps accuracy ( or lack thereof) meant they couldn't be sure of hitting the bridges.
 
Surely a quick call to the Railway Executive Committee would have shown, early, that bridges ( and tunnels) were the key to crippling a railway network. I get why a marshaling yard looks like a key node and a juicy target but filling in holes in some yard is easier than rebuilding a massive railway viaduct. I always find it hard they took so long to switch but perhaps accuracy ( or lack thereof) meant they couldn't be sure of hitting the bridges.

Reasoning for Wallis' 10 ton bomb

From Paul Brickhill’s ‘The Dambusters’

He worked out theoretical figures, more pages of figures, and decided there was a chance that a 10-ton bomb exploding deep in water by a dam wall would punch out a hole a hundred feet across.

Supposing the bomb did not go as deeply into the earth as the figures predicted? Wallis worked out the effects of a 10-tonner exploding about 40ft deep. In theory it would throw out the staggering amount of 12,000 tons of earth, leaving a crater 70ft deep, with lips 250ft across. He worked out the circumference of the crater and from that the maximum number of men and machines that could gather round the edges. Working day and night they could not fill it in in under 14 days. Supposing one such bomb was dropped accurately in a marshalling yard, or on a vital railway or canal or road where ground contours prohibited a detour.
 
Reasoning for Wallis' 10 ton bomb

From Paul Brickhill’s ‘The Dambusters’

He worked out theoretical figures, more pages of figures, and decided there was a chance that a 10-ton bomb exploding deep in water by a dam wall would punch out a hole a hundred feet across.

Supposing the bomb did not go as deeply into the earth as the figures predicted? Wallis worked out the effects of a 10-tonner exploding about 40ft deep. In theory it would throw out the staggering amount of 12,000 tons of earth, leaving a crater 70ft deep, with lips 250ft across. He worked out the circumference of the crater and from that the maximum number of men and machines that could gather round the edges. Working day and night they could not fill it in in under 14 days. Supposing one such bomb was dropped accurately in a marshalling yard, or on a vital railway or canal or road where ground contours prohibited a detour.

how many of these bombs were dropped?
 
Surely a quick call to the Railway Executive Committee would have shown, early, that bridges ( and tunnels) were the key to crippling a railway network. I get why a marshaling yard looks like a key node and a juicy target but filling in holes in some yard is easier than rebuilding a massive railway viaduct. I always find it hard they took so long to switch but perhaps accuracy ( or lack thereof) meant they couldn't be sure of hitting the bridges.

They weren't sure they could hit small thin targets like bridges with accuracy; and at the beginning of the war they did not have "earthquake" bombs, things so big that even a near miss would shake a bridge's legs.

OTOH, not only a marshalling yard is a large target. If you miss it, you're going to hit what is usually around it: rail workshops, rail stores, then warehouses, workshops, factories, then workers' housings etc. You also get to cut power lines, water mains, gas pipes, and roads.
If you miss a long bridge, you'll probably be hitting a river bed up and downstream.
 
how many of these bombs were dropped?

Some 50; they were the Grand Slams. One order of magnitude more for the Tallboys, 5-ton bombs. They often worked against bridges, but sometimes not. Note they were dropped at the end of the war, when German opposition was weak.
 
Surely a quick call to the Railway Executive Committee would have shown, early, that bridges ( and tunnels) were the key to crippling a railway network. I get why a marshaling yard looks like a key node and a juicy target but filling in holes in some yard is easier than rebuilding a massive railway viaduct. I always find it hard they took so long to switch but perhaps accuracy ( or lack thereof) meant they couldn't be sure of hitting the bridges.

This

They weren't sure they could hit small thin targets like bridges with accuracy; and at the beginning of the war they did not have "earthquake" bombs, things so big that even a near miss would shake a bridge's legs.

OTOH, not only a marshalling yard is a large target. If you miss it, you're going to hit what is usually around it: rail workshops, rail stores, then warehouses, workshops, factories, then workers' housings etc. You also get to cut power lines, water mains, gas pipes, and roads.
If you miss a long bridge, you'll probably be hitting a river bed up and downstream.

When 9th Bomber Division stood up in the UK the experts told them attacking bridges was impractical. My father, a ordnance officer in a B26 squadron had to agree. They arrived over confident, & discovered they could not drop bridges. Following the expert advice from above they attacked marshalling yards & maintenance facilities. That proved unproductive as well. While the destruction looked good in the reconissance photos the next day, they learned they were having to return a month later, and then in another month. Reports from the French underground revealed the Germans had spotted rail cars with repair materials all over France. Rock for ballast, sleepers, rails, telephone & telegraph wire, gas & water pipes & valves... Mobile repair teams were also organized.

They learned that after a marshalling yard was destroyed the trunk line would be swiftly repaired & through service restored in as little as 10-20 hours. The yard would be back to 25% in a few days and 80 or 90% in 2-3 weeks.

In the case of support facilities the Germans had been dispersing all they could, and concealed a few new as well. Sheds were built over any convient siding and maintinace teams made mobile for light & moderate tasks.

During the Autum and winter the 9th Bomber Div found they could be effective at dropping bridges with: A rigorous training program, reducing the attack altitudes from above 20,000 feet to 15,000 or less, much larger attack groups. A aircraft box of 54 became normal, and three such bomber boxes in the attack were not unusual.
 
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They weren't sure they could hit small thin targets like bridges with accuracy; and at the beginning of the war they did not have "earthquake" bombs, things so big that even a near miss would shake a bridge's legs.

OTOH, not only a marshalling yard is a large target. If you miss it, you're going to hit what is usually around it: rail workshops, rail stores, then warehouses, workshops, factories, then workers' housings etc. You also get to cut power lines, water mains, gas pipes, and roads.
If you miss a long bridge, you'll probably be hitting a river bed up and downstream.

Hitting bridges is tough. In Vietnam the US attacked the Paul Doumer bridge with a staggering range of ordinance over the course of the war, but only succeeded in 1972 when they were able to hit it with a number of LGB's.

That is why the only effective way of taking out a bridge was to drop Tallboy or Grand Slams on them and even then a lot fell outside of effective range of the bridges.
 

Deleted member 1487

Hitting bridges is tough. In Vietnam the US attacked the Paul Doumer bridge with a staggering range of ordinance over the course of the war, but only succeeded in 1972 when they were able to hit it with a number of LGB's.

That is why the only effective way of taking out a bridge was to drop Tallboy or Grand Slams on them and even then a lot fell outside of effective range of the bridges.
In part that was due to how insanely well defended it was.
 
To add a bit more about bridge bombing. In a mid 1920s edition of the US Army Field Artillery Journal there is a article summarizing the study of tests demolishing the Pee Dee River bridge in Georgia. This concrete & steel structure was to be demolished due to the flooding of a reservoir. What the Army artillery and air corps ordnance officers found was a fairly large explosive charge had to be detonated precisely within the columns supporting the bridge, preferably in the foundation. Or at the connection of where the spans topped the columns. In simple terms a 250kg aircraft bomb had to detonated less than a meter from these connections. Larger bombs of 500 or 1000kg needed to actually penetrate into the column or foundation. Ordnance from 105mm, 155mm, 240mm, artillery projectiles and 500lb & 2000lb aircraft bombs detonating on non vulnerable points on the bridge shattered concrete but did little to create non repairable damage.

That was on a concrete structure with internal steel components. On truss style steel structures the vulnerable points are more dispersed and more redundant. On any bridge the vulnerability or lack of in the columns & their foundations are about the same.

What I got from my father & the literature he left to me was a precise saturation of the structure with a mix of US model 500 & 1000 lb bombs from 50+ medium bombers had a fair chance of dropping a French or Belgian railway bridge. If the target were high priority, or other circumstances like weather made sorties rare a series of 2-3 54 plane groups would attack in rapid sequence. If the first box dropped the bridge the following box groups diverted to secondary targets. Often the next bridge on the list. The literature also emphasized how the lower the attack altitude the better the results. 15,000 feet seems to have been the maximum considered by the 8th AF in the spring of 1944. A wide variety of lower altitudes are mentioned in the literature. The down side is much below 10,000 the 20mm & 37mm FLAK became dangerous. However I have read where attack altitudes as low as 1,500 feet were used by mission commanders.

This mission photo of a unknown location in France shows the bomb distribution on the target of a typical group attack. Actually two groups. The left hand cluster of smoke & dust seems to have been dropped a minute or two ahead of the right hand cluster. Around the upper bridge you can see a portion of the craters from larger bombs.
Unknown France copy.jpg


This of the railway bridge at Pracht France shows something of the bomb distribution. I am estimating these craters are from 2000lb bombs. A few of what may be craters from 500lb bombs may be visible. This is a fairly solid structure. The columns could be either concrete of masonry, but the spans are likely concrete with significant steel reinforcment. It looks like two columns at the lower end have been destroyed. Bits of the span/s are visible lying across the craters. This one did not scan well & the components on the ground are much clearer in the copy I scanned this from.
Pracht Railway.png


This attack on the Trier railway bridge is later in the winter or 1945 spring. It looks like the attack groups not dropping as a single tight box. The smaller multiple smoke clusters & the four plane formation indicates a much more dispersed attack dropping in small groups, not controlled by a single bombardier.
Trier Ralway copy.jpg
 
They weren't sure they could hit small thin targets like bridges with accuracy; and at the beginning of the war they did not have "earthquake" bombs, things so big that even a near miss would shake a bridge's legs.

thanks - I thought that might be the case.

But surely the USAAF "precision" daylight attacks could easily find, hit and destroy a bridge ;-)

OTOH, not only a marshalling yard is a large target. If you miss it, you're going to hit what is usually around it: rail workshops, rail stores, then warehouses, workshops, factories, then workers' housings etc. You also get to cut power lines, water mains, gas pipes, and roads.
If you miss a long bridge, you'll probably be hitting a river bed up and downstream.

agreed - however I can manage without my workshops as i can do a lot of the work in the field. Ok I cant do a full overhaul but I can keep locomotives in service from almost anywhere doubly so if i can disperse things like tools, spares and skills. That is what i would do. I would be doing running repairs in any branch line shed I could get my hands on.

Some 50; they were the Grand Slams. One order of magnitude more for the Tallboys, 5-ton bombs. They often worked against bridges, but sometimes not. Note they were dropped at the end of the war, when German opposition was weak.

thanks - reading back i think i misread the weight of the bombs.

This

When 9th Bomber Division stood up in the UK the experts told them attacking bridges was impractical. My father, a ordnance officer in a B26 squadron had to agree. They arrived over confident, & discovered they could not drop bridges. Following the expert advice from above they attacked marshalling yards & maintenance facilities. That proved unproductive as well. While the destruction looked good in the reconissance photos the next day, they learned they were having to return a month later, and then in another month. Reports from the French underground revealed the Germans had spotted rail cars with repair materials all over France. Rock for ballast, sleepers, rails, telephone & telegraph wire, gas & water pipes & valves... Mobile repair teams were also organized.

sensible Germanic efficiency - exactly what I would have done.

They learned that after a marshalling yard was destroyed the trunk line would be swiftly repaired & through service restored in as little as 10-20 hours. The yard would be back to 25% in a few days and 80 or 90% in 2-3 weeks.

Personally I would have bombed yards/junctions/repair workshops to cause trouble ( and go back almost immediately to try and catch engineers and equipment in the open) but I think if i couldn't hit bridges I would have gone after the locomotives.

if it were me I would be trying not to use marshaling yards and run block trains from A-B as far as was possible. I wouldn't want the risk of my rolling stock being damaged or relying on the French railway people correctly and efficiently shunting my trains!
 

Deleted member 1487

Sorry I'm responding to this post late, I got side tracked and forgot about it, despite meaning to post a reply.
Ok, I'll detail the point - after repeating that I agree that continuing with what they were doing would have been better than switching to Berlin.
Fair enough.

The main issue is weather and seasons, something not even Harris had command upon. Yes, Bomber Command was being effective over the Ruhr - in summer. Winter nights are not only longer (which is what made the offensive against Berlin possible) but also, on average, much cloudier. Bomber Command's navigation and targeting was getting better in 1943, but it was still far from what it achieved in mid and late 1944. A clear, starry night still made much of a difference vs. a cloudy pitch-black night. The Ruhr cities, as mentioned, always were a difficult target. Today they're almost one big conurbation, resembling, well, Berlin as a target in size. At the time, there were worthless areas in between them. Bomber Command regularly bombed one city instead of the other, or missed targets entirely over there.
Another weather-related issue is the possibility of firestorms. What really made Hamburg in was the firestorm. But, even though Bomber Command was striving very hard to achieve these, they never could do so reliably. Low winter temperatures, the likelihood of humidity, and of everything being drenched in rain or covered in snow of course degrade the chances of a city-wide conflagration.
In general, over the winter months Bomber Command flew less sorties, with more aborted flights, less accuracy, less of everything, so expecting the summer results in December is simply not realistic.
A lot depended on when we are talking due to the navigation aids available. IIRC at the time of the Battle of the Ruhr guidance technology was rather limited, but by the 2nd half of 1943 it had improved in range to cover the Ruhr, which would make accurate bombing (at least in terms of city targets) much more possible provided weather wasn't so dirty as to prevent flying.

Firestorms were mostly a phenomenon of 1945 due to the difficulty of actually stoking one, with Hamburg being somewhat of a fluke due to the exceptionally dry conditions.
The Ruhr was smashed in 1944 without them.

The issue in general with winter months is the bad flying weather, which cut the Luftwaffe sorties during the Blitz too in January-February 1941, that was probably the biggest impact.

Then there are other issues. For instance, the targeting problem if the proposal is that Bomebr Command does hunt for coalmine rail sidings and other such small targets instead of for cities. There is the law of diminishing returns. And in any case, the Germans did take countermeasures and would be doing so in this changed scenario.
That wasn't the proposal, it was to continue what they were already doing in the Ruhr:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Ruhr
25/26 July Essen A force of 600 bombers dropped their bombs on Essen over a period of less than an hour.[23] Goebbels recorded in his diary "last raid....complete stoppage of production in the Krupps works".[23]
That and target rail marshaling yards instead of city centers as they started doing in 1944, which produces the paralysis in transportation that ultimately resulted in collapse of the economy due to the movement of coal being stopped.

And finally, as mentioned, this can only go on until February 1944 at most. After that, there are more pressing concerns anyway.
The Battle of Berlin continued into March 1944...
True, but even a few month break in the lead up to D-day wouldn't be the issue that taking several months off to go after Berlin and other targets was.

Now, some less well informed members might wonder why clouds were so important in bombing at night. To clear that doubt, we'll look at one significant month, October 1943. At that time, in central Europe, clouds were the prevailing condition. Bomber Command had not yet begun the Battle of Berlin, so we have several other targets. This is what the RAF diaries have to say:

3/4 October, Kassel: "...The H2S 'blind marker' aircraft overshot the aiming point badly and the 'visual markers' could not correct this because their view of the ground was restricted by thick haze. German decoy markers may also have been present. The main weight of the attack thus fell on the western suburbs and outlying towns and villages."

7/8 October, Stuttgart: "The target area was cloud-covered and the H2S Pathfinder marking developed in 2 areas."

18/19 October, Hannover: "The target area was covered by cloud and the Pathfinders were not successful in marking the position of Hannover. The raid was scattered, with most bombs falling in open country north and north-west of the city."

20/21 October, Leipzig: "Weather conditions were very difficult - Bomber Command records describe them as 'appalling' - and the bombing was very scattered."

So, even with radar-aided targeting, clouds and "thick haze" - a common occurrence in the Ruhr - wasted accuracy. Were all raids in bad weather in October 1943 a failure? No:

1 October, Hagen: "This raid was a complete success achieved on a completely cloud-covered target of small size, with only a moderate bomber effort and at trifling cost. The Oboe skymarking was perfect and severe damage was caused."

And what about raids in good weather?

2/3 October, Munich: "Visibility over the target was clear but the initial marking was scattered. Heavy bombing developed over the southern and south-eastern districts of Munich but later stages of the raid fell up to 15 miles back along the approach route."

4/5 October, Frankfurt: "Clear weather and good Pathfinder marking produced the first serious blow on Frankfurt so far in the war, with extensive destruction being caused in the eastern half of the city and in the inland docks on the River Main."

8/9 October, Hannover: "Conditions over Hannover were clear and the Pathfinders were finally able to mark the centre of the city accurately; a most concentrated attack followed with a creepback of only 2 miles, all within the built-up area. This was probably Hannover's worst attack of the war."

22/23 October, Kassel: "The initial 'blind' H2S marking overshot the target but 8 out of the 9 'visual' markers correctly identified the centre of Kassel and placed their markers accurately. Although German decoy markers may have drawn off part of the bomber force, the main raid was exceptionally accurate and concentrated. The result was the most devastating attack on a German city since the firestorm raid on Hamburg in July and the results at Kassel would not be exceeded again until well into 1944. The fires were so concentrated that there was a firestorm, although not as extensive as the Hamburg one."

These are all the main-force raids of October, even though many more minor missions were also carried out.

So we can see that:

- out of 9 raids, 5 were in bad weather (and things would only get worse in November-February);
- out of 5 raids in bad weather, one succeeded notwithstanding the weather and the other 4 were failures;
- out of 4 raids in good weather, one was inaccurate but the other three were successes, one of them a big success (a firestorm).

A lot of those were more the fault of pathfinder mistakes plus weather rather than weather specifically.

In the case of Stuttgart on October 7-8 they hit the city, inflicted damage, and pathfinding worked as it was supposed to, so the cloud cover was meaningless given that the mission succeeded.

In the next case of Hannover on the 19th they still hit the city, they just didn't concentrate on the center. Compared to the raid on the 9th it wasn't as severe, but industries were still burned down:
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luftangriffe_auf_Hannover#18._Oktober_1943

Again with the case of Leipzig the bombing still hit the city, it just wasn't concentrated on the city center as they would have liked. They still plastered the city.
So yes, depending on the distance and options available in terms of navigation technology (Berlin and other more distant targets couldn't use certain system like Gee-H, which debuted in October 1943, but was limited to about 350 miles range). Dover-Essen Germany is a bit of 250 miles, so as of October 1943 the Ruhr is entirely within the range of Gee-H, which was effectively unjammable, though limited to about 80 aircraft (so either many pathfinders or some pathfinders and a some heavy bombers to get things started...or even multiple waves of bombers). Kassel was just outside of Gee-H range.

Due to the shorter ranges even though it was the 'happy valley' defensive fighters and early warning aircraft aren't going to get nearly as much time to prepare as they did in Berlin, while ECM was really starting to get effective, as Window was now being used en masse as were other jamming devices.

So shifting back to the Ruhr in October instead of Berlin, even using relatively inaccurate raids, would do quite a bit more economic damage than going after Berlin, while preventing Bomber Command from running into the casualties they did IOTL.
 
Electricity generation and supply, Oil and synthetic oil are targets for 1944, with the accuracy gained through advancing electronic technology. In 1943 the Rhur valley is the only concentration of industry near enough to navigate to and hope to hit something. The trouble with hitting one target is the enemy know where to find you and place their flak and fighters accordingly. Target just industry closer than Berlin and relocation is likely. It is still your best bet for 1943.

Trying to hit a futbol pitch sized target from 5,000 meters altitude at night with 1943 era guidance electronics? Nope. Not even without seducers, disruptive passive measures, night fighters and Kammhuber.

Escorted by long range Spitfires by day for greater accuracy? One time use 90 litre paper/lacquer laminate drop tanks and extra internal fuel (rear tank, under seat tank, leading wing edge tanks) would cover a lot of targets in front of Berlin and offer a reasonable excuse for not targeting Berlin after they targeted London. We paid a lot for the Norden bombsight. May as well use it.
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The Spitfire is an excellently designed but very tightly designed airframe crammed with little mass or CG margin for error. Where are you going to find the room for all the new plumbing and the volume for that fuel again?

By 1944 you can hit energy targets at night and transport targets by day. Days where the US 8th Air Army is also hitting things by day. LW collapse is quicker as they are spread thinner. Stop pushing in Italy at Monte Cassino. Get those Anzio landing craft to England for a spring D-day during that drought. Initially planned for May 1944, the invasion was delayed until June due to a lack of landing craft. You might loom out of the fog in late April. Prague and Vienna before Stalin. Antwerp before "Bulge".

Nope. Landing craft transshipment is a function of AKs and LSTs. Those are not going to be shifted out of the Mediterranean Sea for the simple reason that whether one sits in place or attacks, the 300 AKs and LSTs still need to be in the Med to supply the existing Italian campaign as is. So you might as well attack. For that you need the landing craft, too.


More trucks to the USSR means a faster ops tempo for Uncle Joe's boys as resupply between the Urals and the eastern front is quicker in turnaround. This will help indirectly in France 1944. See what I write about the downside...

I sometimes wonder how the USA would have reacted if we started returning Lend Lease in 1944. Did they really still mind us having "free" assistance? Some of those clauses were becoming weird under the circumstances.

The US sometimes gets it wrong, but with Uncle Joe, it was not wrong to be extremely cautious. The man was a dangerous monster, and not a stupid one. Look at it from Washington's point of view. By May 1944 it was apparent that even if the Wallies did not land in France, it was very likely the Russians would be inside Germany and thereafter the war would be won. By Russia "alone". So... it was "politically" as well as "militarily necessary" to be "globally seen" as grinding the Germans up on the ground in the West for the Wallies, so Russian did not get all the credit for a won war. It might also be noticed that some of the Lend Lease was being "metered" at this time to control the pacing of the war efforts of its participants. And not just to Russia (ramp ups and holdbacks), but to other allies (France, UK, ramp ups and holdbacks as the situation appeared to Washington.), too.
 
I don't wish to cause any offense but I would tend to put more stock in the opinion of Speer than you do.

To dismiss the opinions of the person in charge of the German economy as to the impact of the bombing campaign would seem to be strange IMHO

Speer was a self-server and a liar.

I would not believe his accounts if he said the sky was blue.

USSBS.

One needs to accept that the only truth is ground truth and even that can be tinged with bias and self serving interests (USAAF wanted to drop an A in its name.). Nevertheless, if post-op physical examination of the ruined target sets shows the British and especially the disappointed Americans are more accurate than Speer about the results claimed, then I accept the British/American survey version more than Speer's version.
 

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The Spitfire is an excellently designed but very tightly designed airframe crammed with little mass or CG margin for error. Where are you going to find the room for all the new plumbing and the volume for that fuel again?
Same as the last time. Under seat and leading edge will not impact CoG to any significant extent. Nor, if positioned right, will one use fuel pods. The rear tank is severely limited and should be used before you meet trouble. There is a detailed article on "the long range Spitfire" that goes in to more detail than can recall or work out from basics.

Googled the quoted text and found it: https://www.aerosociety.com/news/escort-spitfire-a-missed-opportunity-for-longer-reach/

escort-spitfire-mk1x-at-wright-field-web.jpg


Landing craft transshipment is a function of AKs and LSTs.
The Channel is narrow. On a clear day you can see the other side. It's a day trip by landing craft. The trucks drive off fully loaded. No port required. Again there is an article/paper for this. I'm not saying that Log is my Jam, but I have a wargamer's respect for the supply. So when I read these things they stick with me. LSTs and LCTs (4,000?) kept working long after the troops landed.

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02681300009414706?journalCode=rwhi20
Paywalls all over these days.
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/BigL/BigL-7.html

While Pluto and Mulberry were supposed to do the heavy lifting, supply over the beach did most of that.
 
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