https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Ruhr
You do know the British were smashing the Ruhr until they shifted to Berlin, right? That's the point; the economic damage was being done, but they cut off the effort based on an erroneous idea that hitting Berlin would end the war; instead it drove Bomber Command to the brink and called off the area bombing effort for months. Tooze demonstrated in Wages of Destruction that the economic damage was so bad that it entirely derailed the planned weapons boom and was on the verge of doing worse when it was stopped.
Ok, I'll detail the point - after repeating that I agree that continuing with what they were doing would have been better than switching to Berlin.
The main issue is weather and seasons, something not even Harris had command upon. Yes, Bomber Command was being effective over the Ruhr - in summer. Winter nights are not only longer (which is what made the offensive against Berlin possible) but also, on average, much cloudier. Bomber Command's navigation and targeting was getting better in 1943, but it was still far from what it achieved in mid and late 1944. A clear, starry night still made much of a difference vs. a cloudy pitch-black night. The Ruhr cities, as mentioned, always were a difficult target. Today they're almost one big conurbation, resembling, well, Berlin as a target in size. At the time, there were worthless areas in between them. Bomber Command regularly bombed one city instead of the other, or missed targets entirely over there.
Another weather-related issue is the possibility of firestorms. What really made Hamburg in was the firestorm. But, even though Bomber Command was striving very hard to achieve these, they never could do so reliably. Low winter temperatures, the likelihood of humidity, and of everything being drenched in rain or covered in snow of course degrade the chances of a city-wide conflagration.
In general, over the winter months Bomber Command flew less sorties, with more aborted flights, less accuracy, less of everything, so expecting the summer results in December is simply not realistic.
Then there are other issues. For instance, the targeting problem if the proposal is that Bomebr Command does hunt for coalmine rail sidings and other such small targets instead of for cities. There is the law of diminishing returns. And in any case, the Germans did take countermeasures and would be doing so in this changed scenario.
And finally, as mentioned, this can only go on until February 1944 at most. After that, there are more pressing concerns anyway.
Now, some less well informed members might wonder why clouds were so important in bombing at night. To clear that doubt, we'll look at one significant month, October 1943. At that time, in central Europe, clouds were the prevailing condition. Bomber Command had not yet begun the Battle of Berlin, so we have several other targets. This is what the RAF diaries have to say:
3/4 October, Kassel: "...The H2S 'blind marker' aircraft overshot the aiming point badly and the 'visual markers' could not correct this because their view of the ground was restricted by thick haze. German decoy markers may also have been present. The main weight of the attack thus fell on the western suburbs and outlying towns and villages."
7/8 October, Stuttgart: "The target area was cloud-covered and the H2S Pathfinder marking developed in 2 areas."
18/19 October, Hannover: "The target area was covered by cloud and the Pathfinders were not successful in marking the position of Hannover. The raid was scattered, with most bombs falling in open country north and north-west of the city."
20/21 October, Leipzig: "Weather conditions were very difficult - Bomber Command records describe them as 'appalling' - and the bombing was very scattered."
So, even with radar-aided targeting, clouds and "thick haze" - a common occurrence in the Ruhr - wasted accuracy. Were all raids in bad weather in October 1943 a failure? No:
1 October, Hagen: "This raid was a complete success achieved on a completely cloud-covered target of small size, with only a moderate bomber effort and at trifling cost. The Oboe skymarking was perfect and severe damage was caused."
And what about raids in good weather?
2/3 October, Munich: "Visibility over the target was clear but the initial marking was scattered. Heavy bombing developed over the southern and south-eastern districts of Munich but later stages of the raid fell up to 15 miles back along the approach route."
4/5 October, Frankfurt: "Clear weather and good Pathfinder marking produced the first serious blow on Frankfurt so far in the war, with extensive destruction being caused in the eastern half of the city and in the inland docks on the River Main."
8/9 October, Hannover: "Conditions over Hannover were clear and the Pathfinders were finally able to mark the centre of the city accurately; a most concentrated attack followed with a creepback of only 2 miles, all within the built-up area. This was probably Hannover's worst attack of the war."
22/23 October, Kassel: "The initial 'blind' H2S marking overshot the target but 8 out of the 9 'visual' markers correctly identified the centre of Kassel and placed their markers accurately. Although German decoy markers may have drawn off part of the bomber force, the main raid was exceptionally accurate and concentrated. The result was the most devastating attack on a German city since the firestorm raid on Hamburg in July and the results at Kassel would not be exceeded again until well into 1944. The fires were so concentrated that there was a firestorm, although not as extensive as the Hamburg one."
These are all the main-force raids of October, even though many more minor missions were also carried out.
So we can see that:
- out of 9 raids, 5 were in bad weather (and things would only get worse in November-February);
- out of 5 raids in bad weather, one succeeded notwithstanding the weather and the other 4 were failures;
- out of 4 raids in good weather, one was inaccurate but the other three were successes, one of them a big success (a firestorm).
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