The RAF doesn't launch the Battle of Berlin in 1943, instead focuses on the Ruhr

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http://ww2history.com/experts/Adam_Tooze/Most_mistaken_decision_of_WW2
And the single most mistaken decision of the war?

ADAM TOOZE: Well, there’s something I’d like to talk about that we haven’t spoken about so far, which is the strategic bombing campaign. I actually think that the RAF had the German war economy by the throat by the summer of 1943. The series of attacks launched by the British from March 1943 through to the cataclysmic attack on Hamburg at the end of July has a devastating impact on the German war effort that’s been very, very largely underestimated so far. But from the inside of the Speer Ministry there’s no question that this is seen as a fundamental turning point in the war and a moment potentially of no return. They expect the German war economy to be crippled in the winter of 1943 and the reason why that doesn’t happen is that the RAF turns its attention from the west of Germany to Berlin, and makes a vain attempt to destroy Berlin. However, Berlin is an inappropriate target. It’s too large, it’s too far away and it’s at the end of the productive chain, whereas the Ruhr stands at the very beginning because it’s the centre of German coal mining, without which the heavy industrial economy of Germany grinds to a halt.

And the Germans are deeply puzzled why the British make this move. And in the autumn of 1944 and into the spring of 1945 when the attacks on the Ruhr are resumed and focused on the shunting yards which are necessary to move the coal around they have an immediate and absolutely dramatic effect on the German war economy. So I think the RAF’s decision to shift its focus from the west of Germany and the Ruhr in particular to Berlin does count as a pretty major strategic miscalculation.

LAURENCE REES: And it also follows from that that you think the strategic bombing campaign was extremely effective?

ADAM TOOZE: Yes. There’s no question that it had an absolutely devastating impact on the functioning of the German war economy from as early as the spring of 1943. The Germans just about begin to believe by the beginning of 1943 that despite the setbacks on the Eastern Front the Russians are a long way away, and they actually began to get a real grip of their armaments production and are beginning to shuffle resources around in a quite strategic, and deliberately calculated way, and had put the organisation in place to do that. That’s the substance behind the Speer 'miracle'. What then happens is that steel output becomes completely unpredictable because of the impact of the British attacks and begins to fall, and immediately you see a plateauing off of armaments production. Instead of continuing to rise it grinds to a halt at a moment when everybody else’s is ramping up and the American war economy in particular is hitting top gear.

And this is a complete disaster for the German war effort and produces a major political crisis. Speer begins to lose his grip on power and has, in the end, to solve this problem with his ill fated alliance with Himmler which emerges in the autumn of 1943 and unlocks a whole new supply of slave labour for the German war economy.

So what if Harris/Bomber Command don't shift bombing to Berlin and instead maintain focus on the Ruhr and start collapsing the German war economy in Autumn 1943?
 
That would be a good idea but not as decisive as it might sound. Sure, the Ruhr is closer, but those were always rather difficult targets anyway. Berlin is too large to bomb - yeah, if you are aiming at discrete points within it. But if you are flying in the winter of 1943, in a cloudy night, having a big big target is better than trying to hit a small coal mine rail siding in the foggy Ruhr.

Totally ignoring Berlin and concentrating on the Ruhr would have caused industrial problems, yes, but probably many raids would have been too inaccurate to have a significant effect.

Then up comes the spring of 1944, and even Bomber Command is tasked to hit the railway network, mainly in France, for a very good overlordy reason. Then they also are tasked with the V-Waffen launch sites. So it's not as if an uninterrupted narrowly-focused campaign could be waged from the summer of 1943 to the end of the war against this industrial heartland of Germany.

All in all, considered the limited effect the Berlin offensive had (and its complete failure if we look at the intended effect), the force could have been better used, yes, but I don't think it would have caused the collapse Speer talks about.
 

Deleted member 1487

That would be a good idea but not as decisive as it might sound. Sure, the Ruhr is closer, but those were always rather difficult targets anyway. Berlin is too large to bomb - yeah, if you are aiming at discrete points within it. But if you are flying in the winter of 1943, in a cloudy night, having a big big target is better than trying to hit a small coal mine rail siding in the foggy Ruhr.

Totally ignoring Berlin and concentrating on the Ruhr would have caused industrial problems, yes, but probably many raids would have been too inaccurate to have a significant effect.

Then up comes the spring of 1944, and even Bomber Command is tasked to hit the railway network, mainly in France, for a very good overlordy reason. Then they also are tasked with the V-Waffen launch sites. So it's not as if an uninterrupted narrowly-focused campaign could be waged from the summer of 1943 to the end of the war against this industrial heartland of Germany.

All in all, considered the limited effect the Berlin offensive had (and its complete failure if we look at the intended effect), the force could have been better used, yes, but I don't think it would have caused the collapse Speer talks about.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Ruhr
You do know the British were smashing the Ruhr until they shifted to Berlin, right? That's the point; the economic damage was being done, but they cut off the effort based on an erroneous idea that hitting Berlin would end the war; instead it drove Bomber Command to the brink and called off the area bombing effort for months. Tooze demonstrated in Wages of Destruction that the economic damage was so bad that it entirely derailed the planned weapons boom and was on the verge of doing worse when it was stopped.
 
As panacea targets go its not a bad one. In France the RAF 2d Tac AF & the US 9th AF succeeded in badly disrupting the rail and automotive transport to the Normandy battle. It only took about 90 days to crate that condition, however that was after a false start in 1943 where the 9th Af discovered attacking rail yards, rail maintinance facilities, ect... were not getting the full result they sought. It turned out that bridges were the key target, and bridges could be effectively attacked with a change in tactics and techniques. The US 15th AF found the same techniques and results in Northern Italy, which was the basis for operation STRANGLE in early to mid 1944.

In latter 1944 the 9th AF sought to reproduce the same pattern on the Ruhr when the advance of 12th Army Group provided airfields in range. However residual logists problems, weather and the Bulge offensive delayed the effort. Clear weather in latter January & February 1945 allowed Op CLARION to kick off, the first in a methodical program of attacks to destroy the bridges and reneral rail transport of the Ruhr and other industrial centers in western Germany. The US 8th AF joined in this effort with its heavy bombers, tho they had the usual accuracy issues attacking from +20,000 feet, vs the 10,000' to 15,000' attack altitudes the 9th AF was using.

How effective the RAF Bomber Command would have been attacking the rail centers, at night in 1943 is a important question. In 1943 the 9th AF & to a lesser extent the 8th AF tried saturation bombing of marshaling yards, loading sites, and the support structure of the French railways. They found that 1. Their normal accuracy was less than desired. 2. The Germans were restoring the damage far faster than anyone anticipated. The campaign in latter 1943 was not reaching the results wanted. What Bomber Command could have done with its area attacks at night deserves a close look.

A little understood factor in the popular history is the effect of the Allied armies closing to the Rhine in February/March 1945. The Ruhr & the other industrial centers were a web that included the Western bank or Rhineland. Closing to the Rhine created holes in the interconnected manufacturing plant. Critical components were cut out. On the transportation side the Allied armies reaching the west bank brought the Rhine river traffic to a halt. The barges had to be diverted to secondary rivers and where possible interconnecting canals. Dropping bridges by the 9th AF and 2d Tac AF clogged the canal system. The high capacity rail corridor paralleling the Rhine ceased operations, similarly diverting the traffic onto the overloading network further east. While recognized in the post war military analysis the professional historians seem to have missed this part of the equation.

The Hollywood version >
< gives you the general idea.
 
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Ruhr
You do know the British were smashing the Ruhr until they shifted to Berlin, right? That's the point; the economic damage was being done, but they cut off the effort based on an erroneous idea that hitting Berlin would end the war; instead it drove Bomber Command to the brink and called off the area bombing effort for months. Tooze demonstrated in Wages of Destruction that the economic damage was so bad that it entirely derailed the planned weapons boom and was on the verge of doing worse when it was stopped.

It certainly would have been better than Berlin. Continuing the general assault on the core industrial plant was the best use from out hindsight. But I cant see a swift paralysis of the transport system by Bomber Commands methods. Its sort of like the ball bearing campaign in latter 1943. Another example of a pancea target that was not going to win the war by its self, but more could have been accomplished had it continued.
 

Deleted member 1487

It certainly would have been better than Berlin. Continuing the general assault on the core industrial plant was the best use from out hindsight. But I cant see a swift paralysis of the transport system by Bomber Commands methods. Its sort of like the ball bearing campaign in latter 1943. Another example of a pancea target that was not going to win the war by its self, but more could have been accomplished had it continued.
Bomber Command's technology was getting much more sophisticated as 1943 went on, which enabled their contributions to the oil campaign of 1944.
In terms of what the RAF could do, this book covers what they were able to do after shifting back to German transportation and industry in west Germany (including strikes on major bridges):
https://www.amazon.com/Collapse-German-War-Economy-1944-1945/dp/0807858501
Ironically it was their shift to targeting marshaling yards rather than city centers as the aiming point that did the most damage.
 
The US 8th AF dismissed the British claims and argued they caused all the damage to the transport system in 1945. At least Bomber Command killed fewer Allied soldiers than 8th AF in its tactical strikes in Normandy, but really I'm skeptical of either. A while back I looked at claims or estimates of decline in German railway traffic, specifically cars loaded/unloaded. It looked like a direct correlation to the amount of ground secured by the Allied ground forces in the same months.
 

Deleted member 1487

The US 8th AF dismissed the British claims and argued they caused all the damage to the transport system in 1945. At least Bomber Command killed fewer Allied soldiers than 8th AF in its tactical strikes in Normandy, but really I'm skeptical of either. A while back I looked at claims or estimates of decline in German railway traffic, specifically cars loaded/unloaded. It looked like a direct correlation to the amount of ground secured by the Allied ground forces in the same months.
According to the book the author operated off of Reichsbahn records to corroborate claims and has written several books about the Reichsbahn in WW2.
 
Interesting. I assume the British didn't persist because they didn't know the extent of the damage they were causing, OR careerism, they though they could beat the Germans single handily through a glorious air campaign against the capital OR both.

I assume likely the Germans have to lighten up what they were trying to do to meet the Allies in France for 1944 (assuming they really can't let the Soviets advance any further than OTL without risking Romanian, Galacian, Estonian oil, Nikopol mines, Turkish neutrality etc.

Likely the Allies break out earlier and roll over the German frontier in September/October 1944?????

Lots of people don't die in German concentration camps.

The biggest long term bonus for the Allies is that they end up in Prague before the Soviets???

Yalta conference wouldn't happen before the end of the war in Europe.

Perhaps the earlier German surrender allows some sanity in Japanese leadership and they surrender earlier??? No A bomb gets dropped.
 

perfectgeneral

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Electricity generation and supply, Oil and synthetic oil are targets for 1944, with the accuracy gained through advancing electronic technology. In 1943 the Rhur valley is the only concentration of industry near enough to navigate to and hope to hit something. The trouble with hitting one target is the enemy know where to find you and place their flak and fighters accordingly. Target just industry closer than Berlin and relocation is likely. It is still your best bet for 1943.

Escorted by long range Spitfires by day for greater accuracy? One time use 90 litre paper/lacquer laminate drop tanks and extra internal fuel (rear tank, under seat tank, leading wing edge tanks) would cover a lot of targets in front of Berlin and offer a reasonable excuse for not targeting Berlin after they targeted London. We paid a lot for the Norden bombsight. May as well use it.

By 1944 you can hit energy targets at night and transport targets by day. Days where the US 8th Air Army is also hitting things by day. LW collapse is quicker as they are spread thinner. Stop pushing in Italy at Monte Cassino. Get those Anzio landing craft to England for a spring D-day during that drought. Initially planned for May 1944, the invasion was delayed until June due to a lack of landing craft. You might loom out of the fog in late April. Prague and Vienna before Stalin. Antwerp before "Bulge".

The Red Army "distraction" during 1944: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/96/Eastern_Front_1943-08_to_1944-12.png

I sometimes wonder how the USA would have reacted if we started returning Lend Lease in 1944. Did they really still mind us having "free" assistance? Some of those clauses were becoming weird under the circumstances.
 
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You might loom out of the fog in late April. Prague and Vienna before Stalin.

I'm dubious. Greater negative impacts upon German industrial production by a more effective 1943 bombing campaign would affect the Eastern Front just as much, if not more, then the western front. I doubt final results of the war probably look much different, only the length and number dead (that is, shorter and fewer).
 

perfectgeneral

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I'm dubious. Greater negative impacts upon German industrial production by a more effective 1943 bombing campaign would affect the Eastern Front just as much, if not more, then the western front. I doubt final results of the war probably look much different, only the length and number dead (that is, shorter and fewer).

The 1943 air campaign didn't help the Russians much. The Heer was still pretty mobile, even in retreat there was a backhand blow in Feb '43 and another planned for the summer (cancelled for Citadel). The 1944 oil targets slowed them down. That doesn't happen any sooner. The lost rail links in France limit the forces that come to bear on Normandy, not the eastern front. Russia gets a month or two more of second front, but the Allies also get that, as a head start.

The logistic bottleneck into France was largely met by Mulberry Harbours and landing craft supplying over the beaches. More landing craft is more logistic support. The storm that hit the US Mulberry won't arrive any sooner and the landing craft can respond to the moving front by using beaches further north. You get longer to open up ports and rail lines to support the front.

Mine clearance barges shunted up the rivers and demolition teams on the downed bridges give those extra landing craft an inland supply route and a job even after the ports are clear.
 
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The 1943 air campaign didn't help the Russians much.

OTL? Sure, if one ignores stuff like the diversion of air resources, as mildly additive to the Soviet summer-fall campaigns as that was. ATL? Perhaps, perhaps not. Depends on how big the impact is on German production. The German army going into the winter of '43/'44 with, say, a thousand fewer AFV's in the Eastern Front then it did OTL could have a massive accelerative affects on the Soviet campaigns in Ukraine, Belarus, and/or around Leningrad.

The Heer was still pretty mobile, even in retreat there was a backhand blow in Feb '43 and another planned for the summer (cancelled for Citadel).

Even leaving aside the points I made above, citing a operation which took place before the beginning of the Anglo-American combined bomber offensive and another which was never carried out (and likely would have failed, given that the assumptions which went into it were horribly flawed) isn't really evidence of how the strategic bombing campaign affected Soviet fortunes.
 

Deleted member 1487

Are you referring to 1943 or 1945?
Since the book covers the 1944-45 it is that period I'm talking about with reference to that book.

In terms of what the actual damage was in 1943-44 by the RAF the Germany and the Second World War series has a volume covering the air war and of course there is the work Adam Tooze did in Wages of Destruction.
 
Concentrating on the Ruhr does not mean ignoring other targets including Berlin. Bombing other targets discourages the movement of guns and night fighters to cover only the Ruhr and by appearing to be be tracking for a different target the Ruhr may be attacked and the bomber stream on the way home before night fighters can be re-directed.
 

Deleted member 1487

Concentrating on the Ruhr does not mean ignoring other targets including Berlin. Bombing other targets discourages the movement of guns and night fighters to cover only the Ruhr and by appearing to be be tracking for a different target the Ruhr may be attacked and the bomber stream on the way home before night fighters can be re-directed.
Sure, I'm just referring to the focus of the campaign, as during the Ruhr fight they did hit other targets including Hamburg.
 

perfectgeneral

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Impact of lost production on the Russian front:

For any loss in production of armaments in Germany this wasn't the main constraint on the campaign in the east. They lacked the infrastructure to get more to the east and were limited for fuel even if they could transport more. The reason that the southern oilfields were even an objective along with the main rail hub at Moscow.

As the logistic difficulties of campaigning in Russia came to an end (May&June 1944) the Heer should have been able to put up a stiffer resistance. South of the Carpathians, Romania was now reliant on Balkan rail routes and fell in eleven days. "Greater Germany under General Government" however was well served by standard rail gauge lines and close to German armament production. That should have been like a boost in production. The loss of Romanian oil. The damage to synthetic oil plants. These negated any gain more than industrial damage. Evidence? Largely testimony of the Germans afterwards, but I'd sooner let the point drop than work for it.

So if hitting industry doesn't do enough to slow the Heer, why does it matter if you hit Berlin?
Losses. We lost more crew and aircraft hitting Berlin than targets closer to home. In truth energy and transport were the limitations on German war fighting ability, but we weren't to know and had difficulty targeting such precise areas in 1943. What we did know was that Berlin was costing us more. It was wasteful. Having built a hammer we made the wrong thing a problem to solve like a nail. It chipped away at our hammer and the hand that wielded it.
 
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