The prospects for anti-Buchanan fusion in 1856

I was recently reading Alexander McClure's http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_McClure *Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania.* He makes an interesting argument that Pennsylvania came very close to guaranteeing a national defeat for Buchanan--and maybe even a national victory for Fremont--in 1856.

The background is as follows: The Republicans, Whigs,and Americans of Pensylvania agreed on a fusion ticket for state officers who were to be elected in October--the so-called "Union Party." This ticket failed to win--but just barely, and (somewhat to my surprise) the Republican on it did almost as well as the Whig and Know Nothing candidates. (This suggests that there were not too many conservative Whigs and Americans who voted for the Whig and American candidates but "cut" the Republican one. Of course some of them may simply have voted Democratic for all three offices or stayed home in protest against the fusion idea.)

According to McClure,

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"The following is the official vote of the State:

Canal Commissioner.
Scott, Democrat 212,886
Cochran, Whig 210,111
Scott's majority 2,775

Auditor General.
Fry, Democrat 212,468
Phelps, Know Nothing 209,261
Fry's majority 3,307

Surveyor General.
Rowe, Democrat 212,623
LaPorte, Republican 208,888
Rowe's majority 3,735"

https://books.google.com/books?id=dqtlavUQNcsC&pg=PA252

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If fusion was possible--and nearly successful--on the state level in Pennsylvania, could it have succeeded on the presidential level, too? Note that the percentages of the vote of all three fusion candidates in October were almost exactly the same as the combined percentages of Fremont and Fillmore in November: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/u/usa/pres/1856.txt

As a matter of fact, a fusion agreement on the presidential level *had* been worked out for Pennsylvania. There would be a ballot distributed by Fremont supporters with Fremont listed as the first elector, and one distributed by Fillmore supporters, with Fillmore listed as the first elector. In other words, one of Pennsylvania's 27 electoral votes was to be thrown away in order to determine the relative strengths of Fremont and Fillmore in the state. The other 26 candidates for elector would be the same on both ballots. If elected, they were to vote *en bloc* for Fremont (or less likely Fillmore) if this would be sufficient to give Fremont (or, less likely, Fillmore) a majority in the Electoral College; otherwise, they were to split their votes according to the relative popularity of Fremont and Fillmore in the state. McClure writes.

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"The union effected on the State ticket between the several organizations opposed to Democracy was finally, after much negotiation, carried to the arrangement of a Union electoral ticket. There was considerable difficulty with some of the Know Nothing leaders, as they were very much averse to the radical views of the Republicans, but it was finally agreed that there should be but one electoral ticket voted by the three organizations that had united on a Union State ticket. One elector was to be sacrificed by printing two electoral tickets for the Union party, one of which had as its first candidate for elector the name of Millard Fillmore and the other had as the first candidate for elector the name of John C. Fremont.

"General Cameron came to the front as a supporter of Fremont, and was placed on the ticket as an elector-at-large, and the electors were divided between Whigs, Know Nothings and Republicans. The agreement was very explicit, and, to avoid all misunderstanding, it was formulated in writing. The electors were each solemnly pledged to give a solid vote for either Fremont or Fillmore if the electoral vote of the State would elect either to the Presidency. If, however, the entire electoral vote of Pennsylvania would not give success to either of the Union candidates, then the Union electors, if chosen by the people, should divide the vote of the State between Fremont and Fillmore in proportion to the vote received by each. As Fillmore's name headed one ticket and Fremont's name headed the other, it was very easy to determine the relative strength of the two candidates at the polls. There is no doubt that if the Union electoral ticket had been successful in the State [in the October state elections--DT] the agreement would have been carried out with hearty fidelity, but, as the ticket was defeated, all dispute on the subject ended."
https://books.google.com/books?id=dqtlavUQNcsC&pg=PA259

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Another October election was that for governor of Indiana. Ashbel P. Willard, the Democrat, won with 51.3 percent to 48.7 percent for Oliver Morton of the fusion "People's Party."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governor_of_Indiana_elections Note that Morton's vote was only slightly less than the combined 49.6 percent for Fremont and Fillmore in Indiana in November--even though Morton had attended the Republican national convention in Pittsburgh and was by now clearly a Republican.

So the idea that fusion on the presidential level was bound to fail because many conservative Whigs and Know Nothings would not vote for a fusion ticket needs some qualification. Evidently plenty of Fillmore voters *did* vote for Republicans running as fusionists in state elections. That Republicans could attract Fillmore votes--even without fusion--for state offices is also shown by William Bissell's victory for governor of Illinois; he won in part because the Americans did much worse in the governor's race than in the presidential race in the state. Compare http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illinois_gubernatorial_election,_1856 with http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/u/usa/pres/1856.txt (15.6 percent for Fillmore in Illinois compared to only 8.04 percent for the American Party candidate for governor)

One can imagine the sighs of relief from Buchanan supporters after the October results from Pennsylvania and Indiana came in: the Union was saved-- at least for now!

Anyway, back to Pennsylvania: McClure argues that had fusion succeeded in Pennsylvania in October it would also have done so in November. This would at least be enough to throw the race into the House, but McClure argues that it could even have led to a national Fremont victory! His argument is that the effect of the Democrats losing Buchanan's own state in October would be so dramatic that it would lead to Fremont carrying Illinois, even without a fusion agreement in that state. Thus, the Pennsylvania electors would be bound to vote as a bloc for Fremont to elect him. (114 electoral votes for Fremont in OTL plus 26 from Pennsylvania plus 11 from Illinois would be 151-- two more than the 149 needed for a majority.) This seems dubious to me, given that Fremont lost Illinois by almost four points.

According to Tyler Anbinder in *Nativism and Slavery* it was John P. Sanderson, the American state chairman, who scuttled the agreement for fusion presidential electors in Pennsylvania. But after the Union Party loss in October probably nothing could have saved the agreement but personal intervention in its favor by Fillmore himself. This he refused to do, believing (mistakenly) that he already had enough southern support to send the election into the House, so why risk it by cooperating with the Republicans in Pennsylvania? (Then, too, Fillmore feared that fusion could lead to an actual Fremont victory which would endanger the Union. And he no doubt remembered that Republicans like Seward and Weed, back in their days as Whigs, had blocked him from getting the Whig presidential nomination in 1852. Finally, there was still the forlorn hope by some Fillmore supporters that a poor showing by Fremont could leave the Americans as the only major opposition party to the Democrats.)

Anyway, my own view is that even if the Union Party had won the state elections in Pennsylvania in October and even if the fusion agreement for electors had not been repudiated, Buchanan would still probably have narrowly carried the state. It was one thing for a Fillmore supporter to back a Republican for Surveyor General of Pennsylvania or even Governor of Indiana. (Or for that matter Governor of Illinois.) One could do that without any risk to the Union. But at least a few of the Fillmore supporters who voted for Republicans for such state offices might have balked at a vote that potentially might help Fremont to win the presidency. (In part of course this was due to fear for the Union, but also in part to the mistaken but widespread rumors that Fremont was a Catholic; see my post at https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/uPBeyf8ypOo/AbhEy6-T7s0J for the importance of the "Catholic issue" in 1856.)

Of course one may ask: if Buchanan came so close to losing his own state in OTL, what if the Democrats had nominated a non-Pennsylvanian--and the Republicans had nominated Justice McLean? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_McLean (McLean could appeal to Old Line Whigs, and as a prominent Methodist could not be accused of Catholicism as Fremont was.) In that case, fusion would have been easier to accomplish and more likely to win the state if accomplished. No wonder that even as radical a Pennsylvania Republican as Thaddeus Stevens favored McLean at the Philadelphia convention.

Besides Pennsylvania, there were moves for fusion in New Jersey and indiana. But New Jersey had only seven electoral votes, and so (unlike Pennsylvania) could not have blocked Buchanan from getting a majority in the Electoral College. In any event, in 1856, according to William Gienapp *The Origins of the Republican Party, 1852-1856* p. 406, "Nativist leaders in New Jersey capitulated to intense outside pressure and rejected an agreement negotiated by the executive committee of the Fremont and Fillmore organizations." Greatly complicating things was the course of Robert F. Stockton http://www.cambriapress.com/cambriapress.cfm?template=4&bid=327 who first endorsed Fillmore only on condition that no union with Republicans be made, then conducted negotiations with the Fremont leaders to arrange a single slate of electors, and then in the final days of the campaign came out for Buchanan. In Indiana, any chance for fusion was lost when Morton was defeated in the state election; embittered Republicans accused the Know Nothings of having deserted Morton: "The Republican cry now was that the day for fusion had passed,--the pandering to the Fillmore element was over. There must be np more affiliation with Fillmoreism. It had retarded--not helped--the growth of Republicanism in the southern half of the State. The 'treacherous' Know Nothings were supposed to be determined to defeat Fremont if they had to elect Buchanan to do so..." https://books.google.com/books?id=dG03AQAAMAAJ&pg=RA2-PA106 In any event, even if Buchanan had lost Indiana's 13 electoral votes *and* New Jersey's seven, he would still have on in the Electoral College. Only in Pennsylvanai did fusion have the potential of blocking him there.
 
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If it does come to that, has anyone a realistic chance of winning in the HoR?

If not, presumably we are looking at a Breckinridge Administration, after the Senate has elected him VP. Would this change a great deal, or would he just be Buchanan with a Southern accent?
 
If it does come to that, has anyone a realistic chance of winning in the HoR?

If not, presumably we are looking at a Breckinridge Administration, after the Senate has elected him VP. Would this change a great deal, or would he just be Buchanan with a Southern accent?

I had an old soc.history.what-if post about the election going into the House (of course, this can happen without any Fillmore/Fremont fusion tickets--just have Fillmore do a little bit better in Kentucky, Louisiana, and Tennessee):

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Giving party labels to the 34th Congress is almost impossible. A good
many northerners who were elected as Whigs or Americans were Republicans,
or at least Fremont-supporting "North Americans", by the time of the 1856
election. Some were violently anti-southern from the beginning; others,
despite their opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Act, still thought
cooperation with southern Whigs or Americans was possible until...and the
"until" varies from case to case. In some cases, the adoption by the
"national" Americans of "section 12" (calling for the maintenance of all
existing laws on slavery, including Kansas-Nebraska) was the turning
point; yet some of the northerners who walked out still hoped for reunion.
For others, it was the election of Banks as Speaker--yet not all of
Banks's supporters considered themselves Republican at the time. For
still others, the "border ruffians'" assault on Lawrence, Kansas and
Brooks's assault on Charles Sumner, following in quick succession, were
the last straw. And some northern Whigs or Americans did not endorse
Fremont until the last moment. (And of course some never did.) To
complicate things further, some anti-Nebraska Democrats still considered
themselves Democrats until the 1856 Democratic convention endorsed the
Kansas Nebraska Act. Furthermore, in states where nativists were an
important part of the anti-Nebraska coalition the term "People's Party"
was preferred to "Republican" for some time. And some southerners elected
as Whigs or Americans were Buchanan rather than Fillmore supporters in
1856, because they thought only Buchanan could stop Fremont...

If that's not complicated enough, in New York there was a split between
"Hard" and "Soft" Democrats" leading to such bizarre results as these from
the New York First Congressional District in 1854:

William W. Valk Soft Democrat and American 28.1%
Allen Hard Democrat 20.8%
Vail Whig 20.1%
Lord Soft Democrat 16.7%
Disosway Temperance 14.3%

Or from the Sixth District that same year:

John Wheeler Hard Democrat and American 46.3%
Murphy Soft Democrat 23.0%
Marshal Whig 20.5%
Mead Independent Hard Democrat 10.2%

As William E. Gienapp writes (*The Origins of the Republican Party
1852-1856*): "A precise party breakdown of the House membership was
impossible. The major imponderable was the strength of the Know Nothings.
When elected, almost two-thirds of the anti-Nebraska members were also
affiliated with the secret order, but, with the elapse of more than a year
since their election, which competing allegiance took precedence was in
many cases unclear. The *Tribune Almanac,* in a heroic effort to sort out
these factions, placed the anti-Nebraska strength at 188 Representatives,
including Republicans, anti-Nebraska Democrats, and anti-Nebraska Know
Nothings. This total represented a small majority of the House."
Eventually, most but not all of them rallied around Banks for Speaker but
it should be remembered that Banks never got more than 107 votes, and was
ultimately elected (103 to 100 over South Carolina Democrat William
Aiken, with eleven scattered) only after the House agreed to allow a
plurality vote to select the Speaker.

Gamaliel Bailey (of the antislavery *National Era*) made the following
interesting estimate of Banks's support: He thought that from thirty to
thirty-five of Banks's supporters had never been Know Nothings and were
"simply" Republicans. "All others have been and with few exceptions are
now Know Nothings." Of this remaining group of about seventy-five
representatives, Bailey estimated that about thirty-five had committed
themselves to the Republican movement, wished to discard their Know
Nothingism, and would go with the Republican party in the presidential
campaign. The remainder were "Know Nothings of all grades." Some were
anxious to promote both the Nebraska and nativist issues, some were
"nearly Republicans," some were leery of Republicanism, and some wished to
dampen all sectional agitation. Combining the first two groups, he
estimated the "true" Republican strength in the House at between
sixty-five and seventy out of a total membership of 224. Bailey believed
that by careful management additional members who voted for Banks could be
brought into the Republican camp, but he clearly did not think that the
Banks election meant that the Republicans had a majority yet.

[On the number of delegations controlled by each party:]


Here is the breakdown by Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections
(third edition):

Democrats--10 states (Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia)

Republicans--7 states (Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Ohio, Vermont,
Wisconsin)

Whig--4 states (Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania)

(It may seem bizarre that Missouri, which had always been one of the
Whigs' weakest states, elected six Whig congressmen out of seven in 1854.
The explanation is the split between pro- and anti-Benton Democrats.
Anyway, by 1855 most Missouri Whigs drifted into the American party. As
for New York, out of 33 seats, it had 16 Whig congressmen, and 11
nominated by both Whigs and Americans.)

Americans (slave states)--3 states (Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland)

Americans (free states)--4 states (Connecticut, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island). All antislavery, all pro-Fremont by 1856.

Democratic-American tie--2 states (Tennessee, Texas)

Democratic-Republican tie--1 state (Iowa)

In short, Republicans or North Americans seem to dominate eleven
delegations, Democrats eleven, pro-Fillmore Americans, four (Delaware,
Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri) I suspect that by 1856 even the relatively
conservative Whigs/Americans of New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania were
largely for Fremont. [1] And Tennessee, Texas, and Iowa are all evenly
split between Democrats and either Americans or Republicans.

My own guess is that if the election goes to the House, there is a
deadlock leading to Breckinridge being chosen acting president by the
Senate. To many Republicans, Fillmore was a "doughface" in no way
preferable to Buchanan; and this is true not only of those Republicans who
had never been Know Nothings, but of some who had been. OTOH, unless the
"South Americans" massively desert Fillmore for Buchanan, I don't see
Buchanan winning, either. (To be sure, South Americans would vote
Democratic to defeat a Republican, as was shown by their overwhelming
support for Aiken in the Speakership fight against Banks. But the
disproportionate power of the South under the "one delegation, one vote"
rule guaranteed that Fremont could not win in the House. So there was no
need for South Americans to support Buchanan--when the worst their
opposition to him could do would be to put their fellow southerner
Breckinridge into the White House.)

[1] FWIW, the following "Whig" or "Whig-American" congressmen from New
York for the 34th Congress are listed by CQ as "Republican" candidates
(successful or not) for the 35th: James S. T. Stranahan (2nd District);
Guy R. Pelton (3rd); Abram Wakeman (8th); Ambrose S. Murray (10th); Edward
Dodd (15th); Orsamus B. Matteson (20th); Henry Bennett (21st); Amos P.
Granger (24th); Edwin B. Morgan (25th); John M. Parker (27th); William H.
Kelsey (28th). Only two--Solomon Haven of the 32nd and Francis G. Edwards
of the 33rd--ran for re-election as Americans (unsuccessfully in both
cases). Haven was Fillmore's former law partner, and as late as 1857 he
assured Fillmore that the American party had a bright future: "I think the
Republican vote was accidental last fall...the causes which produced it
are nearly extinct already. If our boys can hold on two years...one side
or the other will come to our party." (Quoted in Tyler Anbinder,
*Nativism and Slavery*, p. 247.)

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/uPBeyf8ypOo/A-SGlGaoUF4J

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Breckinridge IMO would be marginally better than Buchanan--at least until after the 1860 election. He would still support Lecompton, but he would not try to read anti-Lecompton Democrats out of the party as Buchanan did; in OTL Breckinridge supported Douglas against Lincoln in 1858 despite the Breckinridge/Douglas disagreements over Lecompton and the Freeport Doctrine. It's also possible that a Breckinridge administration would be less corrupt than Buchanan's.

The reason I said "at least until after the 1860 election" is that the Republicans are *still* likely to win, the Deep South is still likely to secede, and Breckinridge is likely to adopt an even softer line toward the secessionists than Buchanan did, abandoning Forts Sumter and Pickens, for example. He might even formally recognize the CSA. This would make it a lot harder for Lincoln or Seward or whatever Republican is elected in this ATL--defending existing forts in the South was one thing, trying to retake them quite another...
 
It does not seem likely that an incumbent Breckinridge would lose in 1860.

Why not? No incumbent president was re-elected between Jackson and Lincoln.

More specifically, the Republicans had already established themselves as the dominant party in most of the North by 1856. All they had to do in 1860 was to win (in addition to the 1856 Fremont states) Pennsylvania and *either* Illinois or Indiana. There are all sorts of reasons to believe that the Republicans would carry at least Illinois and Pennsylvania in 1860:

(1) In Pennsylvania, all the opponents of Lincoln *combined* could get only 43.7 percent in 1860. http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/u/usa/pres/1860.txt The state had already gone Republican in 1858. See Bruce Collins, "The Democrats' Loss of Pennsylvanai in 1858" The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 109, No. 4 (Oct., 1985), pp. 499-536. https://journals.psu.edu/pmhb/article/view/44086/43807 Even if one assumes that Breckinridge would handle the Lecompton question in a way more satisfactory to the North (and there really was no way to satisfy both the North and South on it) Lecompton and the split with Douglas did not alone account for the Democrats' rout in Pennsylvania; there was also the Panic of 1857 (which revived the tariff as an issue) and the decline of the Know Nothings--and remember that even in 1856 Fremont and Fillmore combined got almost as many votes as Buchanan in Pennsylvania. And Breckinridge of course would not have the advantage of being a Pennsylvanian.

(2) In Illinois, even in 1856 Republicans had shown that they could elect a governor; Fremont only lost the start narrowly because he could not get enough of the Whig/Know Nothing vote (in particular because of the rumors he was a Catholic). In 1858, Douglas only won because the legislative apportionment did not take into account the growth of northern Illinois; the republicans won the popular vote. And in 1860 no Democrat other than Douglas would have much chance of carrying Illinois against Lincoln--or probably even against Seward.

Again, things like the decline of the Know Nothings would proceed and would benefit the Republicans regardless of which Demcorat occupied the White House. The Republicans would IMO also be favored in Indiana, where they won eight of the eleven US House seats in 1858. https://books.google.com/books?id=uMMyGtjNOXMC&pg=PA209 But they wouldn't even need Indiana to win.
 
Why not? No incumbent president was re-elected between Jackson and Lincoln.

More specifically, the Republicans had already established themselves as the dominant party in most of the North by 1856. All they had to do in 1860 was to win (in addition to the 1856 Fremont states) Pennsylvania and *either* Illinois or Indiana. There are all sorts of reasons to believe that the Republicans would carry at least Illinois and Pennsylvania in 1860:

(1) In Pennsylvania, all the opponents of Lincoln *combined* could get only 43.7 percent in 1860. http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/u/usa/pres/1860.txt The state had already gone Republican in 1858. See Bruce Collins, "The Democrats' Loss of Pennsylvanai in 1858" The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 109, No. 4 (Oct., 1985), pp. 499-536. https://journals.psu.edu/pmhb/article/view/44086/43807 Even if one assumes that Breckinridge would handle the Lecompton question in a way more satisfactory to the North (and there really was no way to satisfy both the North and South on it) Lecompton and the split with Douglas did not alone account for the Democrats' rout in Pennsylvania; there was also the Panic of 1857 (which revived the tariff as an issue) and the decline of the Know Nothings--and remember that even in 1856 Fremont and Fillmore combined got almost as many votes as Buchanan in Pennsylvania. And Breckinridge of course would not have the advantage of being a Pennsylvanian.

(2) In Illinois, even in 1856 Republicans had shown that they could elect a governor; Fremont only lost the start narrowly because he could not get enough of the Whig/Know Nothing vote (in particular because of the rumors he was a Catholic). In 1858, Douglas only won because the legislative apportionment did not take into account the growth of northern Illinois; the republicans won the popular vote. And in 1860 no Democrat other than Douglas would have much chance of carrying Illinois against Lincoln--or probably even against Seward.

Again, things like the decline of the Know Nothings would proceed and would benefit the Republicans regardless of which Demcorat occupied the White House. The Republicans would IMO also be favored in Indiana, where they won eight of the eleven US House seats in 1858. https://books.google.com/books?id=uMMyGtjNOXMC&pg=PA209 But they wouldn't even need Indiana to win.

All of those things are true, but I'm not seeing the Democrats splitting between separate nominees, and, even so, Lincoln's candidacy is still dead in the border states and the South short of an unlikely second attempt at fusion in as many presidential elections. Likewise, accepting that this would have the effect of exacerbating the decline of the Whigs, I don't know that Bell's voters in the border states would opt for a Republican over a President Breckinridge.
 
All of those things are true, but I'm not seeing the Democrats splitting between separate nominees, and, even so, Lincoln's candidacy is still dead in the border states and the South short of an unlikely second attempt at fusion in as many presidential elections. Likewise, accepting that this would have the effect of exacerbating the decline of the Whigs, I don't know that Bell's voters in the border states would opt for a Republican over a President Breckinridge.

First of all, it is far from clear that there will not be a Democratic split. Especially after John Brown's raid, southerners will demand a platform making clear that they have a right to bring slaves into the territories, that if necessary Congress should pass a slave code to enforce this right, and that "popular sovereignty" only applies when the territories are ready for statehood. The northern Democrats will of course reject this. Furthermore, the two-thirds rule will make it very difficult for Breckinridge to get nominated (I'm not saying "re-nominated" because he was not nominated for *president* in 1856) without northern support. So the party may split anyway.

Second, Lincoln would have won even without a Democratic party spilt in 1860. Apart from his four electoral votes from California, three from Oregon, and four from New Jersey, all the rest of his electoral votes came from states where he got over 50 percent of the total vote--that is, got more votes than Douglas, Breckinridge, and Bell combined. http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/u/usa/pres/1860.txt 169 electoral votes (from states where Lincoln got an absolute majority of the vote) would have been well over the 152 needed for an Electoral College majority. In fact, Lincoln could *also* have lost either Illinois or Indiana (in both f which he got more than 50 percent of the total vote) and still won, as long as he prevailed in one of those two states (and if Douglas couldn't beat him in Illinois, it's hard to see how Breckinridge could).

(Another thing that blaming the Democrats' split for Lincoln's victory overlooks is that in New York, there *was* a fusion slate of anti-Lincoln electors--and Lincoln still won the state fairly decisively, with 53.7 percent of the vote.)

The key to Republican victory is that most 1856 Fillmore supporters in the North had become Republicans by 1858. They would continue to vote Republican in 1860 (especially if the Republicans would nominate an old Whig like Lincoln) regardless of whether the Democrats split or not.
 
First of all, it is far from clear that there will not be a Democratic split. Especially after John Brown's raid, southerners will demand a platform making clear that they have a right to bring slaves into the territories, that if necessary Congress should pass a slave code to enforce this right, and that "popular sovereignty" only applies when the territories are ready for statehood. The northern Democrats will of course reject this. Furthermore, the two-thirds rule will make it very difficult for Breckinridge to get nominated (I'm not saying "re-nominated" because he was not nominated for *president* in 1856) without northern support. So the party may split anyway.

Second, Lincoln would have won even without a Democratic party spilt in 1860. Apart from his four electoral votes from California, three from Oregon, and four from New Jersey, all the rest of his electoral votes came from states where he got over 50 percent of the total vote--that is, got more votes than Douglas, Breckinridge, and Bell combined. http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/u/usa/pres/1860.txt 169 electoral votes (from states where Lincoln got an absolute majority of the vote) would have been well over the 152 needed for an Electoral College majority. In fact, Lincoln could *also* have lost either Illinois or Indiana (in both f which he got more than 50 percent of the total vote) and still won, as long as he prevailed in one of those two states (and if Douglas couldn't beat him in Illinois, it's hard to see how Breckinridge could).

(Another thing that blaming the Democrats' split for Lincoln's victory overlooks is that in New York, there *was* a fusion slate of anti-Lincoln electors--and Lincoln still won the state fairly decisively, with 53.7 percent of the vote.)

The key to Republican victory is that most 1856 Fillmore supporters in the North had become Republicans by 1858. They would continue to vote Republican in 1860 (especially if the Republicans would nominate an old Whig like Lincoln) regardless of whether the Democrats split or not.

All are very valid points.
 
The reason I said "at least until after the 1860 election" is that the Republicans are *still* likely to win, the Deep South is still likely to secede, and Breckinridge is likely to adopt an even softer line toward the secessionists than Buchanan did, abandoning Forts Sumter and Pickens, for example. He might even formally recognize the CSA. This would make it a lot harder for Lincoln or Seward or whatever Republican is elected in this ATL--defending existing forts in the South was one thing, trying to retake them quite another...


Which raises the interesting question of where the Confederacy goes from there.

With Sumter and Pickens abandoned, it has no immediate pretext for war; but absent war, it faces the prospect of continuing as a seven state "mini-Confederacy", containing only half of the slaveholding states, and the less populous half at that - a lot less if only the white population is counted. This would be hardly more than a splinter-state, completely overshadowed by the far bigger US next door. Can it live with that?

No doubt Upper South secessionists will argue for joining the CS, but unless Lincoln provokes them (which I suspect he'll take care not to do) this doesn't seem likely in the short run. How long can this situation hold?
 
Which raises the interesting question of where the Confederacy goes from there.

With Sumter and Pickens abandoned, it has no immediate pretext for war; but absent war, it faces the prospect of continuing as a seven state "mini-Confederacy", containing only half of the slaveholding states, and the less populous half at that - a lot less if only the white population is counted. This would be hardly more than a splinter-state, completely overshadowed by the far bigger US next door. Can it live with that?

No doubt Upper South secessionists will argue for joining the CS, but unless Lincoln provokes them (which I suspect he'll take care not to do) this doesn't seem likely in the short run. How long can this situation hold?

Can Lincoln indefinitely tolerate the existence of a Deep South Confederacy without risking that further states will join them? In states like Tennessee, Arkansas, Virginia, and North Carolina, in any event, unconditional Unionists were definitely a minority, and in at least some of them a smaller one than immediate secessionists. Two of the reasons these states stayed in the Union were (1) residual attachment to an undivided Union, and (2) fear that secession would lead to a bloody civil war. If it seems clear that the undivided Union is gone for good, and that the federal government will not use force against those joining the Confederacy, the argument for joining it will seem more and more persuasive--especially if the Confederacy gets international recognition. One other reason to join: The Morrill Tariff will make it more expensive for Union slave states to trade either with Europe or with the Confederacy.

Lincoln, it seems to me, therefore has to do *something* to show that he is not recognizing, even de facto, the independence of the Confederacy. If retaking the forts will seem too aggressive, the obvious alternative is collecting the revenues offshore. Would this be sufficient "coercion" to provoke more states to join the Confederacy? Note North Carolian's Thomas Clingman:

"I confess, Mr. President, that I do not know whether or not I understand the views of [Buchanan's] message exactly on some points. There is something said in it about collecting the revenue. I fully agree with the President that there is no power or right in this government to attempt to coerce a State back into the Union; but if the State does secede, and thus becomes a foreign State, it seems to me equally clear that you have no right to collect taxes in it. It is not pretended that we can collect taxes at British or other foreign ports from commerce going in there. If a State of the Union secedes, and becomes a foreign State, it cannot be touched. The most offensive form of coercion which could be adopted would be that of levying tribute. I have no doubt that most of the governments of Europe would release their dependencies from the claim on them for protection and for postal facilities, &e., if they would just pay the government all the money it might think proper to exact. I do not know, sir, whether I am given to understand from the message that there is a purpose to continue the collection of duties in any contingency; but if that be the policy, I have no doubt some collision may occur." http://books.google.com/books?id=ymUFAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA519
 
If it does come to that, has anyone a realistic chance of winning in the HoR?

If not, presumably we are looking at a Breckinridge Administration, after the Senate has elected him VP. Would this change a great deal, or would he just be Buchanan with a Southern accent?

It is possible that after multiple ballots indicate that he just can't win (the Republicans are standing firm behind Fremont) Fillmore will announce his withdrawal and say that his supporters are free to vote their consciences. Which presumably means that the South Americans will vote en masse for Buchanan, who will thereby be elected. So not much difference from OTL, apart from butterfly effects (does it somehow change who dies from National Hotel Disease)?
 
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