The professionals fight the ACW

For those who seem to like McClellan, how soon could he have won the war if he had been kept on?
 

67th Tigers

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McClellan failed when it came to field command.

Failed in what sense?

By the time he was correctly relieved of command he had convinced the AoP that Lee would always be ready for them.

Which Centenerist invented that little gem?

He certainly did not defy Lincoln to face Lee at Antietam.

Yes he did. Lincoln wanted Pope to lead his Army of Virginia out against Lee, but Pope kept refusing. Eventually McClellan overrode Lincoln (which he'd later pay for), took command of Pope's forces (using his latent authority as GOC Army of the Potomac, a formation essentially defunct at this point) and a chunk of the Washington defences that was once part of the AoP and marched out in an Advance to Contact WNW.

His handling of his forces has been called into serious question, including the Seven Days Battle(at Glendale and Malvern Hill) as well as Antietam, where despite every advantage a commander could desire, including full knowledge of Lee's operational plan and the detailed breakdown of Lee's army into several smaller forces, he failed to destroy Lee, failed to pursue Lee, and couldn't even manage to overwhelm one of Lee's units before they had pulled together, although he did keep a reserve off the battlefield which would have won day, in his continuing delusion that Lee outnumbered him.

He had a 5 day old movement order. It's a fairly minimal advantage.

As to his reserve (which incidently had only partially arrived and was in the disorder that accompanies a forced march on der tag), he did throw it into a pursuit. He then crossed the Potomac at Berlin and advanced to the Manssass Gap Railroad with his entire force and cut Lee off from Richmond. At the point he was fired he was in the process of actually winning in the East, Lee's shattered army simply couldn't prevent McClellan turning at taking Richmond, or turning west and destroying his isolated force. Of course Lincoln had a few ideas of his own....

The ultimate verdict and damnation for McClellan is that his own AoP voted for Lincoln in 1864 over him and by a margin of nearly three to one.

"His" AoP had prettymuch ceased to exist by that election (most had been discharged), and indeed there was a partisan choice made by the administration in selecting the 200,000 troops furloughed to vote (i.e. only Lincoln supporters in certain swing states were furloughed). More interestingly, about half those furloughed used the chance to take French Leave and cease active service.
 
I believe McClellan would have used the AoP to greater degree of skill if he hadn't had Allen Pinkerton as his Intelligence officer.
 
McClellan

I think the comparison between the WWII Wehrmacht and the armies in the Civil War is a bit off. To elaborate on Grey Wolf's point, the Wehrmacht was a professional force with centuries-old Prussian tradition behind it. The Union and Confederate armies were largely volunteers around a small core of professionals. Further, both Davis and Lincoln (especially the latter as he had to face an election in 1864) had to deal with rival political power centers in the legislatures and the states. Consequently, political hacks such as Benjamin Butler often had to be tolerated because their political support was indispensable to the war effort.

"Needless to say, that was Bragg's idea which Davis went along with."

Actually, I think that strategic concentration was A.J. Johnston's. It also almost worked.

Regarding the apologetics for McClellan--
"Cautious? There is very little "caution" in his movements in the Peninsula and Maryland campaigns. That's not to say he doesn't make reckless movements detached from supply lines (although he was in the middle of the most impressive "flying column" movement of the entire war when relieved)."

The idea that McClellan was overwhelmed by greater numbers is way off. McClellan had a 5-3 advantage going into Seven Pines. Johnston was able to fight on equal terms solely because part of the AoP was on s. side of the Chickahominy. Despite the battle being a tactical draw, McClellan brought his offensive to a half with the usual excuse that he needed reinforcements. It was actually the Confederates who needed to reinforce and McClellan's 3 1/2 week pause allowed Lee to bring his forces up to just slightly less than what McClellan had. Lee only had one clear-cut tactical victory (Gaines Mill) and much of that is owned to 1) McClellan keeping his army divided by the Chickahominy, allowing Lee local superiority in numbers against Porter north of the river and 2) his failure to act on the more pronounced superiority he had on the Confederate forces facing him directly. McClellan was still in a very good position even after that battle and his decision to retreat can only be ascribed to a loss of nerve. The remaining Seven Day's battles were actions against McClellan's rearguard where Lee only had numerical parity because McClellan was running away.

The failure of McClellan to engage all of his forces (most of his army missed all of the Seven Day's battles except for Malvern Hill) was also a problem at Antietam. There, McClellan failed to properly coordinate his attacks, allowing Lee to switch forces from one threatened area to another. Incidentally, he also failed to exercise command control over the Union forces at Fraser's Farm and Malvern Hill. You can engage in whatever semantics you want to see that Lee was defeated but that fact is that he held off a force that almost double his own. Further, his refusal to commit his reserve was inexcusable. Although the VI Corps had just arrived, Porter's V Corps was fresh. Further, the VI Corps could hardly have been more disorganized and tired than the Confederate troops who had been fighting for hours.

Finally, you can hardly call the "lost orders" a minimal advantage because they were five-days old. If McClellan had acted promptly after South Mountain, he could've forestalled Lee's concentration at Antietam. Likewise, the 1 1/2-day delay between him receiving the orders and ordering his army forward also helped Lee.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
The idea that McClellan was overwhelmed by greater numbers is way off. McClellan had a 5-3 advantage going into Seven Pines. Johnston was able to fight on equal terms solely because part of the AoP was on s. side of the Chickahominy. Despite the battle being a tactical draw, McClellan brought his offensive to a half with the usual excuse that he needed reinforcements.

The Surgeon General shows McClellan had about 72,000 men in the Peninsula, which includes his service troops etc. His 32 brigades of infantry averaged slightly less than 1,000 effectives each (actually about 900). McClellan had maybe 30,000 effective infantry in the Peninsula. Little wonder McClellan was requesting the large 1st Corps (11 infantry brigades) as a reinforcement.

Lee had 40 brigades (Johnston had 25, the other 15 were Jackson's), which averaged larger than the Union (about 1,500 ea), or about 60,000 effective infantry out of his 116,000 PFD.

The fact that half the army is on one side of a river, and half on the other during a river crossing is hardly surprising. The Chickahominy needed to be crossed, and Johnston's attack at Seven Pines failed to stop McClellan completing his crossing and concentrating before Richmond, leaving only 5th Corps as a Flank Guard.

The fact that at Mechanicsville and Gaine's Mill 5th Corps did operate independently, and actually as a Corps is a great tribute to McClellan and Porter. In the aftermath of Gaine's Mill rather than being "unnerved" as wikipedia puts it, McClellan was cut off from his Line of Supply and Retreat towards the White House. McClellan had to establish a new supply base, hence the move towards the James.

Again, McClellan screened his movements well, with only one rearguard action (Savage's Station), then concentrated around Malvern Hill and smashed all attempts to dislodge him while securing a new supply base. After several days, McClellan is reinforced by Burnside (9th Corps), but they are quickly recalled to reinforce Pope.

Finally, 6 weeks after Malvern Hill, McClellan's weakened command (ca 45,000) finally withdraws, the last boat departing 16th August, ending the Peninsula Campaign.

The failure of McClellan to engage all of his forces (most of his army missed all of the Seven Day's battles except for Malvern Hill) was also a problem at Antietam. There, McClellan failed to properly coordinate his attacks, allowing Lee to switch forces from one threatened area to another. Incidentally, he also failed to exercise command control over the Union forces at Fraser's Farm and Malvern Hill. You can engage in whatever semantics you want to see that Lee was defeated but that fact is that he held off a force that almost double his own. Further, his refusal to commit his reserve was inexcusable. Although the VI Corps had just arrived, Porter's V Corps was fresh. Further, the VI Corps could hardly have been more disorganized and tired than the Confederate troops who had been fighting for hours.

Well, Lee had about 35,000 infantry on the field, and McClellan about 40,000, including 6th Corps, most of which hadn't been in the Army for 3 weeks and had never even loaded their muskets. They straggled onto the field in immense disorder and were frankly unusable. Deducting 6th Corps, in fact Lee had a slight advantage in infantry (35,000 vs 30,000).

Finally, you can hardly call the "lost orders" a minimal advantage because they were five-days old. If McClellan had acted promptly after South Mountain, he could've forestalled Lee's concentration at Antietam. Likewise, the 1 1/2-day delay between him receiving the orders and ordering his army forward also helped Lee.

Except he did move promptly. What 36hr delay? McClellan delivered verbal orders to his adjacent Corps Commanders 20 minutes after receiving SO191, and written orders were out within the hour.
 
Which army? And Thomas did eventually get command of the Army of the Cumberland after Chickamauga.

Or maybe you mean command of the entire western theater?

I think it's more likely that he would get command of the west before he could get command of the eastern theater. Thomas's tactics were ahead of his time, and I think that he had a right balance of tactical and strategic thinking that he could have done well.

Probably the easiest way is to have Sherman die at Shiloh instead of being wounded. Thomas takes command when Grant goes east.
 
I think it's more likely that he would get command of the west before he could get command of the eastern theater. Thomas's tactics were ahead of his time, and I think that he had a right balance of tactical and strategic thinking that he could have done well.

Probably the easiest way is to have Sherman die at Shiloh instead of being wounded. Thomas takes command when Grant goes east.

The problem however is that General Thomas, though undoubtedly being one of the greatest American Generals in history, had already turned down command of an Army before the battle of Perryville when he was offer command of Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio.

Thomas refusing command because 1) he didn't feel he was ready for it and 2) he didn't think it was a good idea to change commanders in the middle of a campaign put him right at the bottom of the list for potential Army commanders let alone Department commanders.

I think that had he not made his famous stand at Chickamauga and become the idol of the Army of the Cumberland he would have been passed up for that command as well not only becuase Grant didn't particularly like him but because the Union high command were put off by his unwillingness to take command from Buell earlier on.

If Thomas agrees to take command from Buell before Perryville he could very well grow in his standing in American History to be the equal or superior of Grant but because he refused in OTL it took much longer for his particular star to rise than it should have.
 
Is 67th Tigers from some ATL where McClellan was as good at winning battles as he was at organizing logistics?

Based on the numbers he quotes, that's the most reasonable answer. He's been known to subtract every man that was ever sick for even a single day from McClellan's forces using the records for the month after the battle while simultaneously conjuring up 100,000 militia (which would be every last man in Virginia between the ages of 14 and 49) who show just to fight McClellan, but mysteriously vanish when McDowell, Pope, Burnside, Hooker, and Grant invade. :rolleyes:

Then there was the time he tried to use Hattaway and Jones calculations that Lee suffered average casualties while winning more than an average amount of battles to try to prove Lee was a commander of average skill. :rolleyes:

All that being said, Hagerman (who does seem to favor McClellan) says the AotP did suffer an outbreak of hoof-and-mouth after Antietam, though he does not give his source. OTOH, Hagerman also says that by the start of October, the AotP has assembled of 3200 supply wagons and over 10 times that many animals. In spite of this, McClellan did not move.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Based on the numbers he quotes, that's the most reasonable answer. He's been known to subtract every man that was ever sick for even a single day from McClellan's forces using the records for the month after the battle while simultaneously conjuring up 100,000 militia (which would be every last man in Virginia between the ages of 14 and 49) who show just to fight McClellan, but mysteriously vanish when McDowell, Pope, Burnside, Hooker, and Grant invade. :rolleyes:

It's worth reading up about the Virginia Militia. Counties had a set requirement of manpower to supply, and if they failed to get volunteers, the men of the county would be levied for it. In addition at least 3 divisions of militia (notably Carson's in the Valley) fought as separate entities.

The militia were always there, but the Conscription Act prettymuch removed the distinction.

Lee's marching army was prettymuch never below 100,000 (since unlike the Union they had a large number of "civilian" logistics pax which need counting too).

Then there was the time he tried to use Hattaway and Jones calculations that Lee suffered average casualties while winning more than an average amount of battles to try to prove Lee was a commander of average skill. :rolleyes:

"Winning"? What's that?

I do find it odd that you're criticising McClellan for failing to pursue after Antietam (despite the fact that he did), but not Lee after Malvern Hill etc.

All that being said, Hagerman (who does seem to favor McClellan) says the AotP did suffer an outbreak of hoof-and-mouth after Antietam, though he does not give his source. OTOH, Hagerman also says that by the start of October, the AotP has assembled of 3200 supply wagons and over 10 times that many animals. In spite of this, McClellan did not move.

and if you'd read down a few lines you'd find Ingalls noting they couldn't move the army 20 miles at that time....
 
McClellan's probelms in the is Peninsular Campaign are thus:

He has in Washington a commander in chief who is ordering McClellan to do something that is quite difficult logistically speaking and who has no concept of how difficult a logistical task it is.

He has in Washington also at least one man who hates him and is not prepared to give him any discretion to make his own choices in Edwin M. Stanton, who is a man who has the ear of the President and can sway his opinions one way or another.

He has a system in place in his Army that he had not chosen. With the Seven Corps system that his Army employs only three of the commaders are ones he has chosen and believes he can trust to be loyal to him and do their jobs well. The other four commanders were chosen by Lincoln and only one of them will get his trust but that would not happen until after Fair Oaks.

He has no idea what kind of force opposes him. As a man naturally disposed to be more cautious in command than others he is not prepared to be overly-offensive without knowledge of what he is facing, which is fair enough, but his problem here is that all his intelligence is telling him that he is totally outnumbered and, whether or not this was true, the natrually cautious McClellan would cirtainly not be disposed to attack head on when unsure of what the actual strenght opposing him is.

He has then an Army that only half of it he believes he can trust due to the commanders in place, he has a difficult task in front of him both in the strategical/tactical sense and in the logistical sense, he has enemies in high office in Washington who are working against him, his own superior doesn't have that good of an idea of how difficult a task faces the AotP but is demanding action regardless and he has little to no idea of the true strength of the enemy opposing him.

Caution, therefore, is undestandable. McClellan ,though, is inexperianced at Army command and makes a major mistake at Fair Oaks by spliting the strenght of him Army by a swollen river and is only saved by combination of the bad luck and inexperience suffered by the Confederate Army and Joe Johnston, to say nothing of his being bluffed out an attack on Yorktown by the eccentric and dramatic John Bankhead Magruder.

So overall McClellan should rate as one of the best "could have been great" commanders but for his inexperiance, the unwillingness of men in power to give him time to learn and hone his skills and his unwilliness to fight general engagements without beng totally informed of all the stengths and weaknesses of his Army and his Enemies. Had he been a bit willing to take more risks when faced by his enemy on the battlefield he would probably have been one of the best but he was not a risktaking general, he was a methodical one.
 
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