The precision of the Warsaw Pact.

dropbearabroad;7517748Sorry Riain but your question was not clear to me. Since NATO is a voluntary agreement between sovereign states then yes any of them could opt out at any time. You can easily come up with no shortage of hypothetical scenarios where some of the states could say "this isn't what we signed up for said:
While it's easy to come up with scenarios that could politically play havoc with the internal relations within NATO what happens once the shooting starts? Would the forces of an isolated and wavering NATO member be immune from attack, which would continue the wavering from the member? Or once the shooting starts would the waverers be defending themselves from the first hours, which would show all the theatre that caused their doubts to be exposed as bullshit?
 
While it's easy to come up with scenarios that could politically play havoc with the internal relations within NATO what happens once the shooting starts? Would the forces of an isolated and wavering NATO member be immune from attack, which would continue the wavering from the member? Or once the shooting starts would the waverers be defending themselves from the first hours, which would show all the theatre that caused their doubts to be exposed as bullshit?

Depends very much on the Soviet plan which led to the attack, methinks.
 
What era are we talking here? Pre De Gaulle is highly unlikely. Even during his reign I still think France will ultimately join any NATO defensive/offensive actions.

EDIT: I see you basically agree.

With De Gaulle in charge I think NATO would have had to basically Vichy France. I am not sure they would fight willingly.
 
"While it's easy to come up with scenarios that could politically play havoc with the internal relations within NATO what happens once the shooting starts? Would the forces of an isolated and wavering NATO member be immune from attack, which would continue the wavering from the member? Or once the shooting starts would the waverers be defending themselves from the first hours, which would show all the theatre that caused their doubts to be exposed as bullshit?"

I think much would depend on the circumstances. If it's a limited conflict in a 'peripheral' theatre then there is the real possibility that some member states could decide to stay out of the fighting. If it's a large scale war, particularly any attack over the German border, I think it's likely they would all be involved as that would lead directly to the feared global war.

"The book you're referring to Red Storm Rising by Tom Clancy."

Thanks Ivir, though I think I might have been getting some of the details confused with another novel from a less well-known author. Not Harold Coyle or Larry Bond either. But I think I gave that book away years ago so can't check. Still got Red Storm Rising somewhere though.

"Interesting, I came to the opposite conclusion. I thought he was pretty accurate when talking about the force structure and organisation (things which can be verified fairly easily), and while his opinions about tactics and doctrine are debatable he at least makes a decent case for them. It was when he started talking about higher-level political aspects that I thought his agenda started to show through, which called into question a lot of the other things he was saying. His writing style is easy to follow, though; it's a shame there aren't many other similarly easy-access sources available for a comparison of some of his other claims."

I agree he was accurate in his descriptions of Soviet military forces and, for the most part, their strengths and weaknesses. Suvorov's book still has the clearest description, for me, of how and why the WP forces were organised. That made sense where no other text I have come across seemed to have an appreciation of why Soviet divisions, fronts and their support units were organised as they were, or why the WP states had the units they fielded rather than others. For me this was another clear indication of the Kremlin calling all the shots, as even the force structures of Poland, GDR etc were designed as an extension of the Red Army and not as independent forces as in NATO. I was doubting his (limited) appreciation of NATO doctrine and structure, and also policy (re: his analogy to cowboy movies which revealed fundamental differences between the Soviet and Western approaches to war). On reflection I agree he got the economic aspects wrong when he talked about the massive armaments programme of the USSR costing nothing as he neglected the huge opportunity cost of building tanks instead of cars which helped to drive the USSR under as the lack of consumer/civil spending was probably crucial in the crumbling of Soviet communism. I do think his analysis of the Party-Army-KGB troika was very interesting. I am not sure how the collapse of the USSR comments on their accuracy though other than reinforcing his opinion that most people in the USSR knew communism was a hollow shell.
 
Just a little info about polish forces: not all would be used in first wave, but some divisions would be, on Hamburg and Danemark direction of attack. Remember, that Poland during Cold War keeped one airborne, and one naval infantry divisons, exacly for attacking Danish Isles and Jutland in first wave.
 
"While it's easy to come up with scenarios that could politically play havoc with the internal relations within NATO what happens once the shooting starts? Would the forces of an isolated and wavering NATO member be immune from attack, which would continue the wavering from the member? Or once the shooting starts would the waverers be defending themselves from the first hours, which would show all the theatre that caused their doubts to be exposed as bullshit?"

I think much would depend on the circumstances. If it's a limited conflict in a 'peripheral' theatre then there is the real possibility that some member states could decide to stay out of the fighting. If it's a large scale war, particularly any attack over the German border, I think it's likely they would all be involved as that would lead directly to the feared global war.

.

As others have pointed out ACE Mobile Force had units from all NATO members, so peripheral theatres would have most member states in action.

IIRC the Dutch wouldn't allow US forces on their soil in peacetime. Which was a pain in the arse but not something that couldn't be accommodated for the sake of Dutch participation on the assumption that this rule would drop in a crisis. However with a diplomatic offensive the Dutch may keep this restriction up until very late in the game. What I wonder is if the Dutch aren't heavily engaged in the early hours of a war they may even restrict the movement of other NATO combatants who are fighting for their lives.

So are the Soviet/WP forces precise enough to miss Dutch forces (for example) while striking hard enough to rock other back, since if the strikes aren't hard enough the Soviets court defeat in the field.
 
I don't think it's a question of WP precision, more what their plan is as I don't think the Kremlin will dither around with whatever the WP warplan is in order to try to keep small NATO states out of the conflict. If it's a march to the Rhine that's planned as in WW3 then the WP will probably try to roll straight through to the Dutch bridges even if the Dutch tried to stay neutral. I think if the WP comes over the German border then they have to invade the Low Countries and Denmark out of simple operational necessity. If the conflict is smaller scale then Holland probably wouldn't be directly threatened as the German border is secure. After that it would depend a lot on the specific circumstances of the scenario.
 
Weren't all the Soviet War Plans non-conventional?

As far as I know, they were all nuclear until the 70ties, had conventional options until the mid 80ies and went back to all nuclear again, when the Soviet Union felt a technological gap between them and NATO and when they feared the very short response times and decapitating strikes of the i.e. Pershing II.
 

Robert

Banned
The War that Never Was by Michael A. Palmer shows what happens in a conventional Third World War in the year 1990. An excellent book.

We do have to considered a few points regarding a NATO-Warsaw Pact showdown.

1. The Soviet Economy was considerably weaker then it was thought. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union it was widely believed that the Russian economy was half that of the United States. We now know it to have been one tenth that of Americas. The massive Soviet Armed forces were the result of decades of build up, much like Imperial Japans before World War Two.

2. Soviet Military Equipment and Doctrine had weaknesses that US/NATO could exploit. As we learned in the Gulf War, for example, Soviet T-72 tanks were far more vulnerable to Kinetic Enegy Weapons that it was believed (perhaps running the fuel line throught the ammo was a design flaw!).
 
I think it depends alot on who woud be targetted by the Soviets and how many fronts the Soviets would lie to create. I can very well see Bulgarian forces attacking Greece and Romanian forces invading Yigoslavia for example. The Czechs ay also go fr Austria, why not?
 
The War that Never Was by Michael A. Palmer shows what happens in a conventional Third World War in the year 1990. An excellent book.

We do have to considered a few points regarding a NATO-Warsaw Pact showdown.

1. The Soviet Economy was considerably weaker then it was thought. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union it was widely believed that the Russian economy was half that of the United States. We now know it to have been one tenth that of Americas. The massive Soviet Armed forces were the result of decades of build up, much like Imperial Japans before World War Two.

2. Soviet Military Equipment and Doctrine had weaknesses that US/NATO could exploit. As we learned in the Gulf War, for example, Soviet T-72 tanks were far more vulnerable to Kinetic Enegy Weapons that it was believed (perhaps running the fuel line throught the ammo was a design flaw!).
1. Actually, that's not true. The US had accurate estimates of Soviet economic output in the latter half of the Cold War, and they did indeed conclude that the Soviet GDP would have been about half that of the US. But thanks to a lower per capita GDP and other structural inefficiencies, it could not leverage it's wealth as effectively as the United States could.

2. You can't draw conclusions on Soviet equipment based on the monkey model exports they gave to regimes of dubious reliability to Moscow's line. Even then, the T-72 was not mean to be a front-line tank in the Soviet Army: it was a cheaper mass-produced model, because quantity has a quality all its own. The front line Soviet tank was the T-64/T-80, which was a much superior, better engineered (and more expensive) tank.
 
1. Actually, that's not true. The US had accurate estimates of Soviet economic output in the latter half of the Cold War, and they did indeed conclude that the Soviet GDP would have been about half that of the US. But thanks to a lower per capita GDP and other structural inefficiencies, it could not leverage it's wealth as effectively as the United States could.

2. You can't draw conclusions on Soviet equipment based on the monkey model exports they gave to regimes of dubious reliability to Moscow's line. Even then, the T-72 was not mean to be a front-line tank in the Soviet Army: it was a cheaper mass-produced model, because quantity has a quality all its own. The front line Soviet tank was the T-64/T-80, which was a much superior, better engineered (and more expensive) tank.

On point 2 especially I don't see why people continue to draw conclusions on Soviet equipment sold abroad when both the quality of the equipment and the numbers used would not resemble what NATO would have faced in a real shooting war with the USSR (the number of tanks the NATO forces would have faced in Europe would have been far, far more than what Coalition forces faced in Iraq). If I'm not mistaken even the Warsaw Pact states did not get the best quality versions of Soviet equipment like the T-72. They got one of the better export varieties at times as well as the home-use varieties at other times and being able to produce their own versions under licence for some equipment.

It is basically equivalent to drawing conclusions on how the US forces would operate in Iraq in 1991 with the latest models of the F-15 based on how some other countries operated the earliest model of the F-4 and with inferior training to boot.
 
I wonder about the "monkey" versions. Surely there couldn't be that much difference between Soviet and export models. Certainly not enough to make the easily destroyed Iraqi T-72s transform into indestructible Soviet T-72s?

AIR, the difference between the export and Soviet models of the Mig-23, for example, was merely the type of radar. The export model having the same radar as a Mig-21, if memory serves. Certainly not as capable as an F-14 or F-15.

Was it just dis-information to try to obscure the possible fact that Soviet equipment was still of low quality, regardless of who operated it?
 
I wonder about the "monkey" versions. Surely there couldn't be that much difference between Soviet and export models. Certainly not enough to make the easily destroyed Iraqi T-72s transform into indestructible Soviet T-72s?

AIR, the difference between the export and Soviet models of the Mig-23, for example, was merely the type of radar. The export model having the same radar as a Mig-21, if memory serves. Certainly not as capable as an F-14 or F-15.

Was it just dis-information to try to obscure the possible fact that Soviet equipment was still of low quality, regardless of who operated it?

Although Mr. Suvorov has published some......"interesting" books, he actually was in the Soviet army and claims to have "seen two variants of the BMP-1 infantry combat vehicle-one which is issued to the Soviet army and another which is intended for the Soviet Union's Arab friends."

Further description of the differences here:

I counted sixty-three simplifications which made the second `monkey-model' different from the original version. Among the most important of these were: The 73mm gun has no loading or round selection equipment. Whereas in the Soviet version the gunner just presses the appropriate buttons and the round which he requires slides into the barrel, in the simplified model all of this has to be done by hand, and furthermore, the gun is not stabilised. The turret is rotated and the gun is raised mechanically. In the Soviet version this is done electrically-the mechanical system is there only as a back-up. The `export' version is armed with the Malyutka rocket, the Soviet one with the `Malyutka-M', which differs from the other model in having an automatic target guidance system. The `monkey-model' is without the lead internal lining on the walls, which protects the crew against penetrating radiation and against flying fragments of armour in the event of a direct hit. The optical system is greatly simplified, as is the communications equipment, there is no automatic radiation or gas detector, there is neither an automatic hermetic sealing system nor an air filtration system, for use in conditions of very heavy contamination, no automatic topographical fixation system is fitted and many other systems are missing.

When one of these `monkey-models' fell into the hands of Western specialists, they naturally gained a completely false impression of the true combat capabilities of the BMP-1 and of Soviet tanks. For what they were looking at was no more than a casing, or a container, like an empty money box which is of no value without its contents.


And it makes sense. Most countries do not export sensitive military equipment to just any customer willing to pay. Some sort of control is done - the US only exports to reliable countries (almost always firm allies) and usually has an agreement banning the resale of sensitive military equipment. The USSR seems to have adopted a different approach - since a lot of the countries willing to buy it's military equipment could not necessarily be relied upon to not switch allegiance to the USA (think of how Somalia was at first Soviet supported and then became US supported during the war with Ethiopia); putting in place the same measures as the USA is probably a non-starter. So they went ahead and just sold them the inferior quality equipment intended to be mass produced for emergency use anyway. In any case there is the problem that outside of Eastern Europe and Mongolia it would be far easier for Western intelligence to gain access due to more porous security environment as well as the actual usage of the equipment in ongoing conflicts.

For example, to take two vaguely comparable US and Soviet aircraft we had the F-111 being operated by the US and Australia only (the UK ordered some but cancelled the order). Only the US and Australia could thus use them and those countries would use them under conditions that would minimize losses. On the other hand the Mig-23 was being operated by the USSR, North Korea, Vietnam, India, Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Algeria, Angola..... between Iraq, Egypt, Sudan, Libya and Angola alone there would have been numerous chances for western intelligence to exam even downed aircraft because those countries tend to be in conflict pretty often (Iraq with Iran and in the 1991 Gulf War; Libya has actually been in conflict against Chad/France, Egypt AND Sudan at various points in the 1970s and 1980s; and Angola's civil war meant that the loss of a Mig-23 was a very real possibility there).

EDIT: And remember that we have never actually seen Soviet top-of-the-line equipment in use against equivalent forces anywhere. Following the end of WWII, Soviet troops were only openly deployed in conflict situations in 1953 (East Germany), 1956 (Hungary), 1968 (Czechoslovakia) and 1979 (Afghanistan). And in the first 3 cases it was to put down rebellions in the Warsaw Pact camp and in the last case it was to help the local communist government stamp out a rebellion. We have not seen the USSR engage in a Desert Storm type situation where Soviet forces using better equipment squared off against a country using US equipment. The closest we get is in Afghanistan with the rebels using Stinger missiles. Thus one will never really know how much a difference the home model vs the emergency or export model would make in a conflict, since it would be like trying to determine how US equipment would fare against Iraq or Yugoslavia based only a combination of 1965 (the Dominican Republic) and Vietnam (but without the engagements against the North Vietnamese airforce most of the time).
 
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About Suvorov's description of the different models of the BMP-1: it seems to me from a brief description that the model received by the Finnish Defence Forces, BMP-1P, would would have been somewhere in between of the "best" and "simplest" model. So apparently there were even different levels/tiers of "export" versions.

But then again, the BMP-1 seemingly came in many different versions and iterations even within the USSR. The Finnish Wikipedia says that the vehicle was considered pretty advanced and expensive in the Soviet context and thus was originally only considered for the use of the "better units" while most of the rest would have to use the wheeled BTR-60. And given that Suvorov says that the "monkey model" was originally meant for wartime use and that a lot were made also in peacetime, for export, how are we to know in a WWIII scenario how many Warsaw Pact and how many Soviet units are using "better" or "worse" BMP-1s? Suspecting the Soviet military industry to cut corners in many things, it is quite inprobable that even, say, a slight majority of Soviet mechanized units using the BMP-1 would have these "best" models of an expensive APC.

Then we have to also consider the fact that such technically advanced WP countries like East Germany and Czechoslovakia quite possibly improved their APCs, etc, themselves (within their capabilities) if they found the Soviet export models in their hands inadequate. At least neutral Finland constantly seeked to upgrade any and all Soviet hardware it had in its inventory, and even if trade- and technology-wise the Finns would have been in a better position than actual WP nations, those would not be without means for improvement either.

So the actual picture in case of war would not likely be, straight up, "Soviet hardware is better than that of its allies" but more rife with shades of grey.
 
About Suvorov's description of the different models of the BMP-1: it seems to me from a brief description that the model received by the Finnish Defence Forces, BMP-1P, would would have been somewhere in between of the "best" and "simplest" model. So apparently there were even different levels/tiers of "export" versions.

Yes, quite so it would seem.

But then again, the BMP-1 seemingly came in many different versions and iterations even within the USSR. The Finnish Wikipedia says that the vehicle was considered pretty advanced and expensive in the Soviet context and thus was originally only considered for the use of the "better units" while most of the rest would have to use the wheeled BTR-60. And given that Suvorov says that the "monkey model" was originally meant for wartime use and that a lot were made also in peacetime, for export, how are we to know in a WWIII scenario how many Warsaw Pact and how many Soviet units are using "better" or "worse" BMP-1s?

Suvorov gives more context in the same link:

The current Soviet policy concerning equipment is a wise one - to amass first-class but very simple equipment in quantities sufficient for the first few weeks of a war. If the war continues, equipment will be produced on an enormous scale, but in variants which have been simplified to the greatest possible extent. Experience of producing both standard and `monkey' models is being gained in peacetime; the simpler variants are being sold to the `brothers' and `friends' of the USSR as the very latest equipment available.

So in essence it would seem that Category A units would have the best models while Category C units would be expected to operate the low-grade (export version/monkey model) type equipment and presumably Category B units would operate a mix of the two.

As Category A (and maybe some B) units would be expected to be fielded in a war with NATO then it is quite likely that at least in the first few weeks of any conventional war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the majority of Soviet mechanized units would be using the best models, but as the war dragged on (assuming one side or the other did not win within the first few weeks) more of the monkey model equipped units would be fielded.

So while NATO could be expected to perform well against Category C units, it isn't a case that NATO would be facing Cat. C units from the start and just how much of NATO's fighting ability would be degraded in the fight against Cat. A (and B) units would probably be hard to determine. Depending on how badly the fighting went, NATO may well find that the sheer number of Cat. C units is quite possibly too much to deal with even if they are operating inferior equipment.

Even then Jello is quite right in pointing out that evaluating how Soviet forces would perfom based the monkey-model exports is ludicrous. Even in 1991, the most modern monkey model exports were themselves only in use by the more elite units of Iraq's military, while practically ancient equipment was being used by all other units. After all no T-80s were used by Iraq, whereas many T-55s, T-62s, Type-59 and Type-69 (Chinese tanks based off the Soviet T-54A) and domestically produced T-72s (Asad Babil tanks, derived from a Polish T-72 with some modifications done by the Iraqis) and (if I am not mistaken) some Soviet produced T-72 were used. And even within Iraq, only the Republican Guards were equipped with T-72s (both Soviet and Iraqi built) while the regular army's most common tank was the Chinese Type 69.

So in any NATO-Warsaw Pact war we would probably see the fight evolve in terms of equipment and strategy and it would probably no resemble the 1991 Gulf War even remotely, because the Soviets would be expecting to field more T-72s than Iraq probably ever could. It is definitely unlikely to be a case of 4,000-5,000 tanks (of which only some would be T-72s and many would be T-54 derivatives, T-55s and T-62s) versus about 3,000-4,000 modern western tanks. Following the battles between the M1 Abrams and the T-80s the stage might then be set for battles between T-72s and M1s at a ratio of 3:1 or 4:1.
 
So in essence it would seem that Category A units would have the best models while Category C units would be expected to operate the low-grade (export version/monkey model) type equipment and presumably Category B units would operate a mix of the two.

As Category A (and maybe some B) units would be expected to be fielded in a war with NATO then it is quite likely that at least in the first few weeks of any conventional war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the majority of Soviet mechanized units would be using the best models, but as the war dragged on (assuming one side or the other did not win within the first few weeks) more of the monkey model equipped units would be fielded.

So while NATO could be expected to perform well against Category C units, it isn't a case that NATO would be facing Cat. C units from the start and just how much of NATO's fighting ability would be degraded in the fight against Cat. A (and B) units would probably be hard to determine. Depending on how badly the fighting went, NATO may well find that the sheer number of Cat. C units is quite possibly too much to deal with even if they are operating inferior equipment.

That would be it, theoretically, I guess. The question I would like to ask is that how well do we know if units considered "Category A" or "B" in reality would have had the equipment they ostensibly should be using? How consistent and rigorous was the Soviet military leadership and those in charge of the defence industry in making sure what theoretically should have happened really did happen, equipment-wise?

It is known than even in the early 80s there was a lot of BTR-60s in use by various units, even if they were starting to be phased out by BTR-70s and 80s. And in Afghanistan the wheeled APC was used heavily. It can be said that the units sent to Afghanistan were of lower value and that better equipment was sent to other units, sure. But still in Afghanistan the Soviet army was in effect sending men into harm's way with less than optimal hardware in a situation where it wasn't directly fighting other wars near its borders. And still in 1990 there were almost 4200 of these vehicles designed originally in the 60s in use by Soviet troops.

What this all makes me think is that what would have been the actual gear the frontline Soviet units would have been fielding against the NATO at any given time? How much of it was befitting of the high status of these units, and how much of it would have been for some reason of lesser value in battle, be that reason corruption, wrongdoings, inefficiency, misunderstandings, incompetence, etc.?
 
That would be it, theoretically, I guess. The question I would like to ask is that how well do we know if units considered "Category A" or "B" in reality would have had the equipment they ostensibly should be using? How consistent and rigorous was the Soviet military leadership and those in charge of the defence industry in making sure what theoretically should have happened really did happen, equipment-wise?

All excellent questions to which I would love to know the answers to myself.

It is known than even in the early 80s there was a lot of BTR-60s in use by various units,

That would not be surprising given that according to Suvorov, Category A units accounted for a third of the Soviet military and Cat B and C accounted for a third each as well (and within Cat B there were some units kept up to Cat A standards such as any rocket forces). On that premise alone between 50-66% of units could well be using inferior equipment depending on the unit and their role.

even if they were starting to be phased out by BTR-70s and 80s. And in Afghanistan the wheeled APC was used heavily.

In Afghanistan the units came from the Turkestan military district and units in that district and in the Transcaucasus military districts were often kept at Cat. C grade (incidentally those military districts being backwater military districts were probably classified as Type 3 military districts (according to Suvorov military districts were classified as 1, 2 and 3 in a similar manner to A, B and C for units)).


It can be said that the units sent to Afghanistan were of lower value and that better equipment was sent to other units, sure. But still in Afghanistan the Soviet army was in effect sending men into harm's way with less than optimal hardware in a situation where it wasn't directly fighting other wars near its borders.

Just because they weren't directly fighting other wars doesn't mean the Soviets would be pulling Category A units to fight in Afghanistan. Between needing to face NATO, China, ensure compliance by Warsaw Pact allies and the potential for trouble in the middle east, particular in Iran it is rather far-fetched to imagine the Soviets pulling top-quality divisions and equipment to deal with Afghan rebels armed with Lee-Enfield rifles and assorted other weaponry from the First and Second World War eras. In theory you don't need M1 Abrams and T-80s to deal with insurgents (and in fact you really don't need fancy equipment to deal with insurgents, you just need sufficient numbers of troops who are sufficiently equipped for the task at hand and to utilize proper counter-insurgency techniques). I could see arguments being made that the number of Soviet troops were insufficient and that they weren't using optimal counter insurgency techniques (which would be integral to why they failed in Afghanistan), but I can't really see an argument being made that the hardware wasn't sufficient based on the type of mission and it's limited scope.

And still in 1990 there were almost 4200 of these vehicles designed originally in the 60s in use by Soviet troops.

Because you don't need vehicles designed in the 1980s to fight insurgents who don't have any armoured vehicles themselves. It would be a waste of resources really when you consider that the Soviets still had to think about NATO and China.

What this all makes me think is that what would have been the actual gear the frontline Soviet units would have been fielding against the NATO at any given time? How much of it was befitting of the high status of these units, and how much of it would have been for some reason of lesser value in battle, be that reason corruption, wrongdoings, inefficiency, misunderstandings, incompetence, etc.?

Well again, it makes little sense to use what was deployed in Afghanistan to speculate on what would face NATO, initially. The units deployed to Afghanistan were Cat C from a backwater (Cat 3) military district. The units deployed against NATO would be Cat A from priority (Cat 1) military districts
 

James G

Gone Fishin'
IIRC the Dutch wouldn't allow US forces on their soil in peacetime. Which was a pain in the arse but not something that couldn't be accommodated for the sake of Dutch participation on the assumption that this rule would drop in a crisis. However with a diplomatic offensive the Dutch may keep this restriction up until very late in the game. What I wonder is if the Dutch aren't heavily engaged in the early hours of a war they may even restrict the movement of other NATO combatants who are fighting for their lives.

So are the Soviet/WP forces precise enough to miss Dutch forces (for example) while striking hard enough to rock other back, since if the strikes aren't hard enough the Soviets court defeat in the field.

I've never heard that before about the Dutch not wanting US forces in their country.
There was the 32nd Fighter Squadron to start with:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/32nd_Air_Operations_Squadron
And then the POMCUS military bases for the 5th Infantry Division.
 
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