The post-WWII peace settlement if the July 20th Plot succeeds?

Had the July 20th Plot succeeded, what would the post-WWII peace settlement have looked like?

Also, I am aware that the Allies would have almost certainly insisted on unconditional surrender. However, a change of leadership in Germany might mean different military decisions on the battlefield in the last 9 months of the war and thus in a somewhat different situation on the ground after the end of World War II.

Anyway, any thoughts on this?
The West and Soviets had already agreed to unconditional surrender at this point in time. Nothing is going to change this.

What is likely to happen is this. New government in Berlin tries to find a peace deal with the West so it can focus solely on the Soviets. They figure out in a month or two this isn't happening. During this time they stop the death camps and other nasty things the Nazis were doing. But once they figure out that they aren't getting out of this without unconditional surrender they shift the bulk of their forces east to stop the Soviets and evac Eastern Prussia and Germans in the areas that are about to fall. They tell their allies to save themselves. They leave enough forces in the west to give token fighting as they also shift western POWs to the west to keep them out of Soviet hands.

Stalin is likely to get pissed as the Germans are using their brains again in the east instead of holding the line. Further pissed as he thinks the west and Nazis had cut a deal. Only its the Germans trying to get the Western Allies to meet the Soviets as far east as possible. How this plays out post war is where the fun starts IMO.
 
Wehrmacht HQ to Eastern Front
"Commanders in the East! You must lead the men in the heroic last ditch defense! For everyone of ours that falls Ten must fall for them! No retreat! No Surrender!"

Wehrmacht HQ to Western Front
"Operation White Flag is now in full effect. All units are to have their German-English translation guides. If you must engage the enemy try not hit them and try not to let them hit you. Thank God You are Not on the Eastern Front."

I can see the Western allies telling the New German regime to please put up stronger resistance on their front. Its making things awkward with Uncle Joe.

Wallies to Stalin
"No Joey baby we're still allies, yes over 90% of the German forces are fighting you, Well they know your P.O.ed is all Joey, maybe you tell them this not revenge tour 1945?, No we can't request they send more troops to our front, we tried it didn't work. Here's an idea Joey what if we were to land troops on your front to support you? We are allies after all and wouldn't it be wonderful to share experiences and interact with each other? No? Joey you really know how to hurt a friend, Gotta go Joe, don't go all Brest-Litovsk on us, Cya babe!"
 

FBKampfer

Banned
There's no way to avoid unconditional surrender. However as others have noted, Churchill and De Gaulle would take full advantage of an open Western Front (German matériel produced post September 1944 was rather insignificant anyway), and effectively force the United States' hand regardless of their wishes to the contrary.
Notably, many US field commanders would be on board with the scheme as well.

Secondly, crossing well defended and prepared positions on the Vistula and Oder rivers is no mean feat, for any army of any size, especially without adequate airborne units to help secure the rear areas of the river front. And of particular concern for the Soviets is that they lacked any practical means of transporting heavy equipment in a direct assault. Provided adequate supplies and munitions, the Germans could bleed the entirety of the Red Army for months at each river line.

And this is entirely neglecting the swamps in Western Poland that proved difficult for the Germans in 1939, as well as traditional field fortification and secondary and tertiary defensive lines that would be constructed to allow organized withdrawal from the river.

No Hitler is potentially the worst situation the Soviets could find themselves in this late in the war. Especially in any timeline that still ends with them "winning".
 
The SK group had wildly unrealistic ideas about what they could get from the Allies. They expected a negotiated armistice, with Germany keeping not only its pre-Hitler territory, but also Austria and Czechia (or at least the Sudetenland), and pre-1918 German areas in Poland. Germany would not be occupied by the Allies, the German armed forces would not be disbanded, German war criminals would be tried by Germany.

The U.S. and Britain had already stated that only unconditional surrender would be accepted (at the Casablanca Conference in early 1943), joined by by the USSR. At the Tehran Conference in early 1944, the US, Britain, and the USSR confirmed this, and also in principle to the territorial changes in Eastern Europe demanded by Stalin - specifically, annexation of eastern Poland by the USSR, with Poland compensated by German territory. (The details of the actual postwar cessions were agreed to at Yalta in 1945.)

The SK regime imagined that they had substantial bargaining power; as of the beginning of June 1944, Germany still occupied all of Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Albania, most of Italy, and a large area in the USSR. They figured that to get all this freed, without fighting, would be a powerful inducement to the Allies to deal. They did not understand that the Allies thought Germany was dangerous without the Nazis.

Many American and British leaders believed that militarism and aggression were deeply engrained in the German national culture, and in its institutions. Churchill, for instance, spoke of "Prussianism" as the real enemy. They thought there was a secret militarist cabal in Germany, of politicians, soldiers, and industrialists, and that Hitler and the Nazis were "front men" for this cabal as much as actual rulers of the country. Hitler's wars were a renewal of the German aggression in World War I. The Armistice of World War I and the Treaty of Versailles had allowed the cabal to survive, put Hitler into power, re-arm Germany, and launch new wars. Thus the Americans and British believed that it was necessary to defeat Germany completely, and utterly root out this element from Germany; also, to permanently destroy Germany's war-making ability.

This would cost a great deal more in blood and treasure than an armistice on SK terms, but the Allies were prepared to bear the costs and insure there would never be another war of German aggression.

The 20 July coup attempt was viewed by the Allies as a move by the cabal to rid Germany of Hitler because he had become a liability and save their own skins - criminals falling out with each other. There was no thought that the SK were significantly less evil than the Nazis. And even if VALKYRIE succeeded, Germany had lost much of its bargaining power by 20 July. Soviet forces were sweeping across Poland toward Warsaw and pushing the Finns back; US/UK forces were driving north in Italy; and in France, the Normandy landings had succeeded, the COBRA breakout was just days away, and the DRAGOON landings three weeks off. The Allies now expected to defeat Germany completely in a year; by mid-August, they expected victory by January, though those expectations proved optimistic.

In addition to this, Britain and the U.S. were afraid of being accused of double-dealing by the USSR. Stalin, always paranoid, feared that the western Allies would ally with the Germans against the USSR. (Since he knew he was still a long-term enemy of both countries, whatever they might believe at the moment, this sort of plot seemed plausible to him.) He hinted at them, AIUI, in between complaints that the US/UK were deliberately holding back from the fighting. The years of delay before D-Day made Roosevelt and even Churchill somewhat embarrassed by these jibes.

So British and American agents were ordered to have no contact with the SK, and under no circumstance to relay or respond to any "peace feelers". This might change slightly after a successful VALKYRIE, since the new regime would have actual power, but there would be no formal acknowledgement of any German proposal and no proposals from the Allies.

What happens next?

Well - in the immediate wake of VALKYRIE, the SK would start major tweaks to German strategy. I would expect immediate German withdrawal from Italy to the Alps (let Mussolini save himself). Finland was already looking for an exit - Mannerheim replaced Ryti as President on 4 August because Ryti had personally pledged not to seek a separate peace. So the SK would probably withdraw German forces from Finland, and possibly Norway. Also from Estonia and Courland, to shorten the Eastern Front. Withdrawal from Greece, too.

The V-weapon campaign would probably be halted, because of the immense cost and to placate the Allies. All U-boat operations would be cancelled, too. By this time in the war, they were a net loss to the Germans, with a U-boat lost for every Allied freighter sunk.

In France, evacuation from southern and western France once COBRA begins, if not sooner, though there's only five days to act. Instead of the disastrous Mortain counterattack and Falaise pocket, an orderly retreat to the Seine. The Germans may be able to rally there, at least temporarily. Then another "orderly withdrawal" to Belgium and Lorraine - and extended defense of Antwerp, ending with complete demolition of its port.

Another factor affecting the course of the war will be the actions of the Axis ally governments: Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Croatia (Finland was already covered). OTL, at the end of August and in early September, Bulgaria and Romania changed sides, and most of the Slovak army rebelled against the Axis. Hitler's death and VALKYRIE will be a signal that Germany thinks they are losing the war and are getting out, so these moves will come sooner and more decisively. If Germany withdraws from Greece, Bulgaria may try to change sides immediately, and invite British occupiers to pre-empt Soviet occupation.

By mid-September, Soviet forces will have occupied Romania, which will have changed sides sooner. More of the Slovak army will join the end-of August uprising, which may hold out long enough for the Soviets to break through the Carpathians and link up. (The Soviets did attack OTL, and eventually broke through after two months, but by that time the Slovaks had been suppressed.) Hungary may also change sides, especially if the Soviets break into Slovakia. The Germans will probably retreat all the way to Austria and northern Yugoslavia, as there's no good place to make a stand further south or east. But they will make some nasty local counterattacks, along the lines of Manstein's "backhand blow" at Kharkhov.

These retreats will be useful in consolidating German forces and avoiding useless losses. But they will be demoralizing. The handwriting on the wall will be visible. Inside the ruling circle, morale will plummet. Their idea of negotiating a soft exit from the war is DOA. What to do?

One thing that will not happen, not at this time, is abandoning the Western Front. They aren't ready for surrender yet. The US/UK will get some bloody noses in September and October, and have serious supply issues.

In the east... the Germans will put down the Warsaw Rebellion. Unless they get smart, and let the Home Army have Warsaw instead of the Soviets. However, that will almost certainly mean Soviet forces crossing the Vistula at Warsaw. Is preventing that worth a strenuous campaign against the Poles? If the Germans abandon Warsaw to the Home Army, that will change the dynamics of post-war Poland, but I'm not sure how.

The Allies will continue to press in from east and west; the Germans conducting an expert fighting retreat. The diplomatic stonewall will continue. It might be cracked if the SK offers to transfer all concentration camp inmates to Allied care, perhaps via Switzerland. This seems to me an obvious thing to do, but would the SK think of it?

Eventually, though, the time will come when there is no point in fighting on - the Allies won't bend on unconditional surrender, and there is no hope of avoiding defeat. Say in November, with the US and Britain one the Rhine in Alsace, and then along the German frontier to the Netherlands, and the Soviets in Hungary and central Poland. Time to end it before any more losses or destruction. Or maybe February 1945, on the Rhine and Oder. Germany just surrenders. They hate it, but there is literally no point in fighting on.

So what changes?

Germany gets less chewed up; Italy too, and much of the Balkans. Bulgaria may avoid Soviet control, and Albania. Joint occupation of all Germany?
 
Anarchs previous post looks like the only here based on actual research or reading of the subject. It's been four decades since my own reading on this so I'll not touch on many details.

Will note that the original agreement, previous pre 1945, was for joint occupation of the entire German state. No occupation zones. The national zones was the result of post surrender politics among the Allies
 

Deleted member 1487

Anarchs previous post looks like the only here based on actual research or reading of the subject. It's been four decades since my own reading on this so I'll not touch on many details.

Will note that the original agreement, previous pre 1945, was for joint occupation of the entire German state. No occupation zones. The national zones was the result of post surrender politics among the Allies
The occupation zones were the practical implementation of the joint occupation policy; nominally the entire state was jointly occupied, it was just post-war hostilities among the victors that hardened them into borders. The Wallied occupation zones were effectively one state in practice, while the Soviet zone quickly was split from the rest.
Also the zone policy was decided in 1944:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_Protocol_(1944)
In the London Protocol signed on 12 September 1944, the Allies of World War II (then without France) agreed on dividing Germany into three occupation zones after the war.[1]

And the plan to govern occupied Germany as a single state broke down post-war:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied-occupied_Germany#Occupation_zones
The original Allied plan to govern Germany as a single unit through the Allied Control Council broke down in 1946–1947 due to growing tensions between the Allies, with Britain and the US wishing cooperation, France obstructing any collaboration in order to unwind Germany into many independent states, and the Soviet Union unilaterally implementing from early on elements of its political-economic system (mass expropriations of land, nationalisation of businesses).

In the east... the Germans will put down the Warsaw Rebellion. Unless they get smart, and let the Home Army have Warsaw instead of the Soviets. However, that will almost certainly mean Soviet forces crossing the Vistula at Warsaw. Is preventing that worth a strenuous campaign against the Poles? If the Germans abandon Warsaw to the Home Army, that will change the dynamics of post-war Poland, but I'm not sure how.
Probably the smartest thing they could do is make a deal with the Home Army that they'd pull out of areas and let them capture supply dumps with weapons if they don't harass or attack German forces on the way out, so they could set up their own government and resist the Soviets. Historically such deals were made with the Lithuanians in formerly Polish-held Lithuanian territory (Vilnius IIRC).
 
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What happens next?

Well - in the immediate wake of VALKYRIE, the SK would start major tweaks to German strategy. I would expect immediate German withdrawal from Italy to the Alps (let Mussolini save himself). Finland was already looking for an exit - Mannerheim replaced Ryti as President on 4 August because Ryti had personally pledged not to seek a separate peace. So the SK would probably withdraw German forces from Finland, and possibly Norway. Also from Estonia and Courland, to shorten the Eastern Front. Withdrawal from Greece, too.

The V-weapon campaign would probably be halted, because of the immense cost and to placate the Allies. All U-boat operations would be cancelled, too. By this time in the war, they were a net loss to the Germans, with a U-boat lost for every Allied freighter sunk.

In France, evacuation from southern and western France once COBRA begins, if not sooner, though there's only five days to act. Instead of the disastrous Mortain counterattack and Falaise pocket, an orderly retreat to the Seine. The Germans may be able to rally there, at least temporarily. Then another "orderly withdrawal" to Belgium and Lorraine - and extended defense of Antwerp, ending with complete demolition of its port.

Another factor affecting the course of the war will be the actions of the Axis ally governments: Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Croatia (Finland was already covered). OTL, at the end of August and in early September, Bulgaria and Romania changed sides, and most of the Slovak army rebelled against the Axis. Hitler's death and VALKYRIE will be a signal that Germany thinks they are losing the war and are getting out, so these moves will come sooner and more decisively. If Germany withdraws from Greece, Bulgaria may try to change sides immediately, and invite British occupiers to pre-empt Soviet occupation.

By mid-September, Soviet forces will have occupied Romania, which will have changed sides sooner. More of the Slovak army will join the end-of August uprising, which may hold out long enough for the Soviets to break through the Carpathians and link up. (The Soviets did attack OTL, and eventually broke through after two months, but by that time the Slovaks had been suppressed.) Hungary may also change sides, especially if the Soviets break into Slovakia. The Germans will probably retreat all the way to Austria and northern Yugoslavia, as there's no good place to make a stand further south or east. But they will make some nasty local counterattacks, along the lines of Manstein's "backhand blow" at Kharkhov.

These retreats will be useful in consolidating German forces and avoiding useless losses. But they will be demoralizing. The handwriting on the wall will be visible. Inside the ruling circle, morale will plummet. Their idea of negotiating a soft exit from the war is DOA. What to do?

One thing that will not happen, not at this time, is abandoning the Western Front. They aren't ready for surrender yet. The US/UK will get some bloody noses in September and October, and have serious supply issues.

In the east... the Germans will put down the Warsaw Rebellion. Unless they get smart, and let the Home Army have Warsaw instead of the Soviets. However, that will almost certainly mean Soviet forces crossing the Vistula at Warsaw. Is preventing that worth a strenuous campaign against the Poles? If the Germans abandon Warsaw to the Home Army, that will change the dynamics of post-war Poland, but I'm not sure how.

The Allies will continue to press in from east and west; the Germans conducting an expert fighting retreat. The diplomatic stonewall will continue. It might be cracked if the SK offers to transfer all concentration camp inmates to Allied care, perhaps via Switzerland. This seems to me an obvious thing to do, but would the SK think of it?

Eventually, though, the time will come when there is no point in fighting on - the Allies won't bend on unconditional surrender, and there is no hope of avoiding defeat. Say in November, with the US and Britain one the Rhine in Alsace, and then along the German frontier to the Netherlands, and the Soviets in Hungary and central Poland. Time to end it before any more losses or destruction. Or maybe February 1945, on the Rhine and Oder. Germany just surrenders. They hate it, but there is literally no point in fighting on.

So what changes?

Germany gets less chewed up; Italy too, and much of the Balkans. Bulgaria may avoid Soviet control, and Albania. Joint occupation of all Germany?

All of this is probably not far off the mark.

The SK leadership - if successful - will quickly figure out that their conceptions of Allied policy flexibility were sorely mistaken. At that point, their options become far less pleasant. Especially once they learn of the full scale of the Shoah.

1. Re: Allied-Soviet relations and suspicions : One thing to remember as well is that the final occupation zones were not decided until the London Protocol beginning in September 1944. Now those discussions are going to be taking place in the context of an SK-led Germany trying to find a way out of the war, and which has already withdrawn from France and most of Belgium. It's increasingly obvious that the Germans have redirected most of their efforts to the Eastern Front. Churchill, realizing that the Allied armies are now likely to end up farther east, will be pressing to minimize the Soviet occupation zone (along with his pet Adriatic landing operation). Soviet suspicions of the Western leaders will now be pegging the meter. Stalin may even break off the discussions and have his delegation leave in a huff.

2. This raises in turn the interesting question you raise here of how the SK government (however led) would deal with the Home Army uprising. It is hard to play that out. The smart move on the part of the new government would be to cut a deal with the Home Army and leave them in control of most of Warsaw and perhaps even other pockets, on the theory that an intact, armed Polish Home Army controlling some key territory is going to heavily complicate Soviet occupation efforts in Poland, and possibly even its supply lines as it moves west of the Vistula. It will also ratchet up Stalin's paranoia that Berlin has been cutting deals with London and Washington (whose solicitude for Poland's political future is already well flagged and intensely irritating). But would they be smart? Some of the key SK leaders (like Stauffenberg, for example) were hostile in their views toward the Poles, and keen to keep as much Polish territory as possible. Cutting a deal with the Home Army would be a loathsome prospect for them. Still, the failure of their peace feelers and disastrous course of the war over the summer might broaden some minds - or ratchet up their desperation. I could see it going either way.

3. In terms of territory, one suspects that, in broad strokes, the Western armies will indeed end up a little farther east. They would certainly be in a position to take Berlin and Vienna - and even Prague - after rather desultory fighting - though whether they would actually do so is another question. It's plausible that they end up in full occupation of Austria, with no more than a token Soviet occupation zone in Vienna. The Soviets probably lose any territory west of the Elbe for their remaining German occupation zone. This in turn raises the question of the Polish occupation zones, since the Soviet zone will now be rather small, and less sustainable as an independent Soviet allied country (something already percolating in Stalin's mind). The final German-Polish border discussions will be horrifically contentious enough as it is. The existence of the Home Amry (which Stalin might well have attempted to destroy by fire and steel by now) might make him suddenly less willing to give Poland a generous border settlement...

4. It's quite possible now that Allied-Soviet relations essentially dissolve in mutual acrimony. Stalin pushes his armies to drive for as much territory as they can get, and the occupation territories in both Germany other other countries essentially end where the armies meet, hopefully without much in the way of trading shots; Stalin simply draws up the borders in Eastern Europe where he desires, and the Allies refuse to recognize them formally (though perhaps there would be a Helsinki decades down the road where they eventually do so). This might eliminate not only any Allied Control Council, but possibly even cooperation on the war crimes trials. Stalin might respond with imposing even tighter control on his eastern satellite governments, with more accusations of the Allies being coopted with the fascist war criminals who had drowned Europe in blood for six years.

The Balkans could end up in a messier state, too. OTOH, Allied forces might end up making more progress in NW Yugoslavia and the Dalmatian coast, leading Tito to strike out for a more independent line of Moscow more quickly. On the other hand, there might be no "percentages" agreement between Churchill and Stalin restraining the latter from giving active aid to the Greek communists.
 
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The occupation zones were the practical implementation of the joint occupation policy; nominally the entire state was jointly occupied, it was just post-war hostilities among the victors that hardened them into borders. The Wallied occupation zones were effectively one state in practice, while the Soviet zone quickly was split from the rest.
Also the zone policy was decided in 1944:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_Protocol_(1944)

Right. But the interesting thing is that the zones were not agreed to until September, in an initial form (subsequently modified in certain ways over the next several months, esp. to include French and Polish zones). And that is two months AFTER the Valkyrie plot happens. Which means that these zones might be butterflied away, as I note in my post just above.

Otherwise, I don't disagree with the rest of your post.
 
The occupation zones were the practical implementation of the joint occupation policy; nominally the entire state was jointly occupied, it was just post-war hostilities among the victors that hardened them into borders. The Wallied occupation zones were effectively one state in practice, while the Soviet zone quickly was split from the rest.
Also the zone policy was decided in 1944:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_Protocol_(1944)
...

& Kline-Albrandt who specialized in mid 20th Century European studies & worked from original sources, not a two sentence Wiki entry, had a more complete description of the evolution of the occupation zones. The London Protocols were in doubt on all sides, with the idea of preventing either the Soviets or west Allies from gaining complete control of specific areas. The USSR also hoped for wider access to German industry. Joint occupation/governance was preferred. Some Allied leaders saw the London Protocols as a temporary initial occupation expedient. Others wanted them set aside for their preference. Degaulle unilatterally declared the French would be taking control of whatever they stood on which made further arguments for a joint occupation/government 'difficult'.
 

Deleted member 1487

& Kline-Albrandt who specialized in mid 20th Century European studies & worked from original sources, not a two sentence Wiki entry, had a more complete description of the evolution of the occupation zones. The London Protocols were in doubt on all sides, with the idea of preventing either the Soviets or west Allies from gaining complete control of specific areas. The USSR also hoped for wider access to German industry. Joint occupation/governance was preferred. Some Allied leaders saw the London Protocols as a temporary initial occupation expedient. Others wanted them set aside for their preference. Degaulle unilatterally declared the French would be taking control of whatever they stood on which made further arguments for a joint occupation/government 'difficult'.
Nevertheless the Protocols were the start of the zone concept of occupation, which was different than running the country together; both concepts existed at the same time pre-peace deal, you were conflating the two ideas. You claimed that the pre-1945 arrangement was for joint occupation, which was explicitly not the case of as 1944 even if the long term faith in the agreement was in doubt.
Will note that the original agreement, previous pre 1945, was for joint occupation of the entire German state. No occupation zones. The national zones was the result of post surrender politics among the Allies

Clearly everyone planned on altering the deals as the realities of occupation and the final lines of occupation were worked out, but the deal was zones of occupation, joint governance of the 'nation' or whatever you'd call occupied Germany in 1945.

Otherwise, I don't disagree with the rest of your post.
Ok, how so?
 
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Nevertheless the Protocols were the start of the zone concept of occupation, which was different than running the country together; both concepts existed at the same time pre-peace deal, you were conflating the two ideas. You claimed that the pre-1945 arrangement was for mixed occupation, which was explicitly not the case of as 1944 even if the long term faith in the agreement was in doubt. Clearly everyone planned on altering the deals as the realities of occupation and the final lines of occupation were worked out, but the deal was zones of occupation, joint governance of the 'nation' or whatever you'd call occupied Germany in 1945.

It's worth noting the "Map A" agreement, specifying a broad three zone division of Germany, with the Soviets allocated the Ostliche Zone, at the London meeting of the EAC on Sept. 12, 1944.

1024px-EAC_Zonenprotokoll_1.png


Here we see already the precise ultimate western border of the eventual Soviet zone, which of course in time became the western border of the DDR. We also see the embryonic idea of a special occupation for Berlin, with its final outer boundaries and Soviet zone already delineated. What is not spelled out is what areas the Poles would ultimately get, nor the exact division of American, British and French occupation zones.

But this is the first decisive step we see toward the eventual occupation zones.

Now, in THIS timeline, that September meeting, and indeed the preparatory work in the weeks leading up to it, are taking place in the context of an SK-run Germany which has taken power after the July 20 coup.

It's not hard to think that the September meeting might well produce quite different results, or none at all - or that the entire meeting will be cancelled, as recriminations fly between Moscow, London and Washington.
 

Deleted member 1487

Now, in THIS timeline, that September meeting, and indeed the preparatory work in the weeks leading up to it, are taking place in the context of an SK-run Germany which has taken power after the July 20 coup.

It's not hard to think that the September meeting might well produce quite different results, or none at all - or that the entire meeting will be cancelled, as recriminations fly between Moscow, London and Washington.
Without question everything is up in the air with Hitler out of power and the Nazis removed (not sure how this happens without a bloody civil war in 1944 though). I think you're right that it could lead to an earlier fall out between the west and Stalin, but FDR was willing to bend over backwards to accommodate Stalin, so who can really say what he'd agree to. As it was Churchill was being leveraged by FDR on other things, so in the end it might just end up with the Allies still viewing the Prussians as part and parcel of the core problem of German militarism with or without the Nazi mask (as they understood things from the outside at the time).
 
Without question everything is up in the air with Hitler out of power and the Nazis removed (not sure how this happens without a bloody civil war in 1944 though). I think you're right that it could lead to an earlier fall out between the west and Stalin, but FDR was willing to bend over backwards to accommodate Stalin, so who can really say what he'd agree to. As it was Churchill was being leveraged by FDR on other things, so in the end it might just end up with the Allies still viewing the Prussians as part and parcel of the core problem of German militarism with or without the Nazi mask (as they understood things from the outside at the time).

Here's a question. Other than maybe Rommel, who is the savvy PR spokesman for the new regime to persuade the Allies they've reformed?

"Look, we let the Jews out of the camps because we're nice!"

"... Wait, camps?"
 
Without question everything is up in the air with Hitler out of power and the Nazis removed (not sure how this happens without a bloody civil war in 1944 though). I think you're right that it could lead to an earlier fall out between the west and Stalin, but FDR was willing to bend over backwards to accommodate Stalin, so who can really say what he'd agree to. As it was Churchill was being leveraged by FDR on other things, so in the end it might just end up with the Allies still viewing the Prussians as part and parcel of the core problem of German militarism with or without the Nazi mask (as they understood things from the outside at the time).

Roosevelt is indeed in many ways the key to sorting out how the Allied policy will play out in this timeline. We can all pretty well vividly imagine how Churchill will react, after all. But Churchill no longer controls the majority of Allied forces in Europe. American power is now waxing, and its role in Allied councils is appropriately increasing as well.

And Roosevelt was certainly keen to accommodate Stalin at this juncture, as we can see in his personal correspondence with both Churchill and Stalin. His initial instinct will be to go farther out of his way to reassure Stalin.

But Stalin's paranoia will not be so easy to check. There will be repeated SK efforts to reach out to the British and the Americans for a peace deal through the summer. They will be rebuffed; but Moscow will know that these efforts were made, and that there has been some communication, and they'll assume the worst. The rapid withdrawal of German forces from France and Belgium (and likely most of Italy), along with the likely termination of the V weapon Blitz, will only feed Stalin's fears that some under the table deal has been worked out. Angry letters will go to FDR. And we do know that Roosevelt could get his back up when hit hard enough by Stalin. See for example FDR's letter of March 29.

So it is possible that there would come a point where FDR is willing to take a harder line, and where talks just break down. Consider for example Ike's unwillingness (backed up by Roosevelt) to accede to Churchill's project for a landing at the head of the Adriatic in 1944. Well, if the Germans are now withdrawing to the Alps anyway, such a landing might now "hit thin air," so to speak, and an increasingly frustrated FDR might allow a limited landing near Trieste (or perhaps Venice) so long as it appears likely to be unopposed. And then things snowball on each other.
 
Here's a question. Other than maybe Rommel, who is the savvy PR spokesman for the new regime to persuade the Allies they've reformed?

"Look, we let the Jews out of the camps because we're nice!"

"... Wait, camps?"

Rommel is still in a hospital bed in the first weeks after the coup, so he'll not be available to be Mr. Nice German.

As his health recovered, slowly, he might become available in a limited capacity. He was moved to his home on August 8, but his son Manfred described a Rommel in rather bad shape when he arrived; Rommel could hardly walk or stand. His left eye was sealed shut, and Rommel only regained some ability to open it in early September. It is hard to see him playing any useful role until late in August, say, and even then, a very limited one. At most, he would be a figurehead for the SK to use (and hardly at all in public) for the first 6 weeks or so.

The SK would probably make increasing use of its moderate, civilian figures as it learned just how hardline the Allied powers were in their reception. Goerdeler aside, they might make use of Bernhard Letterhaus, the Catholic trade unionist they planned to make Reconstruction Minister. There's also other planned Catholics, like Andreas Hermes, who was active in the resistance, along with Joseph Wirmer... Albert Speer might be too compromised by his perception of close relationship with Hitler.
 
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The problem that I struggle with is that to the West, this is a lot like in 1918, when the bad militarists put up German civilians as window dressing and tried to say they were sorry.
 

Deleted member 1487

Here's a question. Other than maybe Rommel, who is the savvy PR spokesman for the new regime to persuade the Allies they've reformed?

"Look, we let the Jews out of the camps because we're nice!"

"... Wait, camps?"
Not even Rommel. I was thinking they could try and use that as a PR point to differentiate themselves from the Nazis and to discredit them in the eyes of the public, but it would probably backfire. As it was though the Allies knew almost all about the camps.
https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptolog...lications/wwii/assets/files/eavesdropping.pdf
FDR met with Jewish groups in 1942 and confirmed the stories about massacres of Jews in Poland and the East.
http://www.dw.com/en/un-holocaust-files-reveal-allies-knowledge/a-38498671

The problem that I struggle with is that to the West, this is a lot like in 1918, when the bad militarists put up German civilians as window dressing and tried to say they were sorry.
That was certainly the viewpoint the US had of the situation, though I gather the British viewed the Nazis as something different than the Prussian militarists.

Well, if the Germans are now withdrawing to the Alps anyway, such a landing might now "hit thin air," so to speak, and an increasingly frustrated FDR might allow a limited landing near Trieste (or perhaps Venice) so long as it appears likely to be unopposed. And then things snowball on each other.
THAT is a big change for the last part of the war, no thought of a Nazi Alpine retreat. Especially if the Germans lay down their arms early the lack of desire to go after the Alps and perhaps push on Berlin with the Germans aiding the process might well impact the postwar settlement.
 
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What if a butterfly sympathetic to Germany (figuratively speaking) flaps it's wings and a month or so after Valkyrie, there's a major Soviet Spy scandal in the U.S.? FDR might want to keep it quiet, but not everyone in the administration was of like mind. So there's no way it wont leak out.
 
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