Maybe, but he might also capture less territory due to the stiffer and greater German resistance in the East in this TL.
Resistance isn't likely to be stiffer if the WAllies are rolling up the western front.
Maybe, but he might also capture less territory due to the stiffer and greater German resistance in the East in this TL.
I am talking about the East here, though.Resistance isn't likely to be stiffer if the WAllies are rolling up the western front.
The West and Soviets had already agreed to unconditional surrender at this point in time. Nothing is going to change this.Had the July 20th Plot succeeded, what would the post-WWII peace settlement have looked like?
Also, I am aware that the Allies would have almost certainly insisted on unconditional surrender. However, a change of leadership in Germany might mean different military decisions on the battlefield in the last 9 months of the war and thus in a somewhat different situation on the ground after the end of World War II.
Anyway, any thoughts on this?
The occupation zones were the practical implementation of the joint occupation policy; nominally the entire state was jointly occupied, it was just post-war hostilities among the victors that hardened them into borders. The Wallied occupation zones were effectively one state in practice, while the Soviet zone quickly was split from the rest.Anarchs previous post looks like the only here based on actual research or reading of the subject. It's been four decades since my own reading on this so I'll not touch on many details.
Will note that the original agreement, previous pre 1945, was for joint occupation of the entire German state. No occupation zones. The national zones was the result of post surrender politics among the Allies
In the London Protocol signed on 12 September 1944, the Allies of World War II (then without France) agreed on dividing Germany into three occupation zones after the war.[1]
The original Allied plan to govern Germany as a single unit through the Allied Control Council broke down in 1946–1947 due to growing tensions between the Allies, with Britain and the US wishing cooperation, France obstructing any collaboration in order to unwind Germany into many independent states, and the Soviet Union unilaterally implementing from early on elements of its political-economic system (mass expropriations of land, nationalisation of businesses).
Probably the smartest thing they could do is make a deal with the Home Army that they'd pull out of areas and let them capture supply dumps with weapons if they don't harass or attack German forces on the way out, so they could set up their own government and resist the Soviets. Historically such deals were made with the Lithuanians in formerly Polish-held Lithuanian territory (Vilnius IIRC).In the east... the Germans will put down the Warsaw Rebellion. Unless they get smart, and let the Home Army have Warsaw instead of the Soviets. However, that will almost certainly mean Soviet forces crossing the Vistula at Warsaw. Is preventing that worth a strenuous campaign against the Poles? If the Germans abandon Warsaw to the Home Army, that will change the dynamics of post-war Poland, but I'm not sure how.
What happens next?
Well - in the immediate wake of VALKYRIE, the SK would start major tweaks to German strategy. I would expect immediate German withdrawal from Italy to the Alps (let Mussolini save himself). Finland was already looking for an exit - Mannerheim replaced Ryti as President on 4 August because Ryti had personally pledged not to seek a separate peace. So the SK would probably withdraw German forces from Finland, and possibly Norway. Also from Estonia and Courland, to shorten the Eastern Front. Withdrawal from Greece, too.
The V-weapon campaign would probably be halted, because of the immense cost and to placate the Allies. All U-boat operations would be cancelled, too. By this time in the war, they were a net loss to the Germans, with a U-boat lost for every Allied freighter sunk.
In France, evacuation from southern and western France once COBRA begins, if not sooner, though there's only five days to act. Instead of the disastrous Mortain counterattack and Falaise pocket, an orderly retreat to the Seine. The Germans may be able to rally there, at least temporarily. Then another "orderly withdrawal" to Belgium and Lorraine - and extended defense of Antwerp, ending with complete demolition of its port.
Another factor affecting the course of the war will be the actions of the Axis ally governments: Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Croatia (Finland was already covered). OTL, at the end of August and in early September, Bulgaria and Romania changed sides, and most of the Slovak army rebelled against the Axis. Hitler's death and VALKYRIE will be a signal that Germany thinks they are losing the war and are getting out, so these moves will come sooner and more decisively. If Germany withdraws from Greece, Bulgaria may try to change sides immediately, and invite British occupiers to pre-empt Soviet occupation.
By mid-September, Soviet forces will have occupied Romania, which will have changed sides sooner. More of the Slovak army will join the end-of August uprising, which may hold out long enough for the Soviets to break through the Carpathians and link up. (The Soviets did attack OTL, and eventually broke through after two months, but by that time the Slovaks had been suppressed.) Hungary may also change sides, especially if the Soviets break into Slovakia. The Germans will probably retreat all the way to Austria and northern Yugoslavia, as there's no good place to make a stand further south or east. But they will make some nasty local counterattacks, along the lines of Manstein's "backhand blow" at Kharkhov.
These retreats will be useful in consolidating German forces and avoiding useless losses. But they will be demoralizing. The handwriting on the wall will be visible. Inside the ruling circle, morale will plummet. Their idea of negotiating a soft exit from the war is DOA. What to do?
One thing that will not happen, not at this time, is abandoning the Western Front. They aren't ready for surrender yet. The US/UK will get some bloody noses in September and October, and have serious supply issues.
In the east... the Germans will put down the Warsaw Rebellion. Unless they get smart, and let the Home Army have Warsaw instead of the Soviets. However, that will almost certainly mean Soviet forces crossing the Vistula at Warsaw. Is preventing that worth a strenuous campaign against the Poles? If the Germans abandon Warsaw to the Home Army, that will change the dynamics of post-war Poland, but I'm not sure how.
The Allies will continue to press in from east and west; the Germans conducting an expert fighting retreat. The diplomatic stonewall will continue. It might be cracked if the SK offers to transfer all concentration camp inmates to Allied care, perhaps via Switzerland. This seems to me an obvious thing to do, but would the SK think of it?
Eventually, though, the time will come when there is no point in fighting on - the Allies won't bend on unconditional surrender, and there is no hope of avoiding defeat. Say in November, with the US and Britain one the Rhine in Alsace, and then along the German frontier to the Netherlands, and the Soviets in Hungary and central Poland. Time to end it before any more losses or destruction. Or maybe February 1945, on the Rhine and Oder. Germany just surrenders. They hate it, but there is literally no point in fighting on.
So what changes?
Germany gets less chewed up; Italy too, and much of the Balkans. Bulgaria may avoid Soviet control, and Albania. Joint occupation of all Germany?
The occupation zones were the practical implementation of the joint occupation policy; nominally the entire state was jointly occupied, it was just post-war hostilities among the victors that hardened them into borders. The Wallied occupation zones were effectively one state in practice, while the Soviet zone quickly was split from the rest.
Also the zone policy was decided in 1944:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_Protocol_(1944)
The occupation zones were the practical implementation of the joint occupation policy; nominally the entire state was jointly occupied, it was just post-war hostilities among the victors that hardened them into borders. The Wallied occupation zones were effectively one state in practice, while the Soviet zone quickly was split from the rest.
Also the zone policy was decided in 1944:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_Protocol_(1944)
...
Nevertheless the Protocols were the start of the zone concept of occupation, which was different than running the country together; both concepts existed at the same time pre-peace deal, you were conflating the two ideas. You claimed that the pre-1945 arrangement was for joint occupation, which was explicitly not the case of as 1944 even if the long term faith in the agreement was in doubt.& Kline-Albrandt who specialized in mid 20th Century European studies & worked from original sources, not a two sentence Wiki entry, had a more complete description of the evolution of the occupation zones. The London Protocols were in doubt on all sides, with the idea of preventing either the Soviets or west Allies from gaining complete control of specific areas. The USSR also hoped for wider access to German industry. Joint occupation/governance was preferred. Some Allied leaders saw the London Protocols as a temporary initial occupation expedient. Others wanted them set aside for their preference. Degaulle unilatterally declared the French would be taking control of whatever they stood on which made further arguments for a joint occupation/government 'difficult'.
Will note that the original agreement, previous pre 1945, was for joint occupation of the entire German state. No occupation zones. The national zones was the result of post surrender politics among the Allies
Ok, how so?Otherwise, I don't disagree with the rest of your post.
Nevertheless the Protocols were the start of the zone concept of occupation, which was different than running the country together; both concepts existed at the same time pre-peace deal, you were conflating the two ideas. You claimed that the pre-1945 arrangement was for mixed occupation, which was explicitly not the case of as 1944 even if the long term faith in the agreement was in doubt. Clearly everyone planned on altering the deals as the realities of occupation and the final lines of occupation were worked out, but the deal was zones of occupation, joint governance of the 'nation' or whatever you'd call occupied Germany in 1945.
Without question everything is up in the air with Hitler out of power and the Nazis removed (not sure how this happens without a bloody civil war in 1944 though). I think you're right that it could lead to an earlier fall out between the west and Stalin, but FDR was willing to bend over backwards to accommodate Stalin, so who can really say what he'd agree to. As it was Churchill was being leveraged by FDR on other things, so in the end it might just end up with the Allies still viewing the Prussians as part and parcel of the core problem of German militarism with or without the Nazi mask (as they understood things from the outside at the time).Now, in THIS timeline, that September meeting, and indeed the preparatory work in the weeks leading up to it, are taking place in the context of an SK-run Germany which has taken power after the July 20 coup.
It's not hard to think that the September meeting might well produce quite different results, or none at all - or that the entire meeting will be cancelled, as recriminations fly between Moscow, London and Washington.
Without question everything is up in the air with Hitler out of power and the Nazis removed (not sure how this happens without a bloody civil war in 1944 though). I think you're right that it could lead to an earlier fall out between the west and Stalin, but FDR was willing to bend over backwards to accommodate Stalin, so who can really say what he'd agree to. As it was Churchill was being leveraged by FDR on other things, so in the end it might just end up with the Allies still viewing the Prussians as part and parcel of the core problem of German militarism with or without the Nazi mask (as they understood things from the outside at the time).
Without question everything is up in the air with Hitler out of power and the Nazis removed (not sure how this happens without a bloody civil war in 1944 though). I think you're right that it could lead to an earlier fall out between the west and Stalin, but FDR was willing to bend over backwards to accommodate Stalin, so who can really say what he'd agree to. As it was Churchill was being leveraged by FDR on other things, so in the end it might just end up with the Allies still viewing the Prussians as part and parcel of the core problem of German militarism with or without the Nazi mask (as they understood things from the outside at the time).
Here's a question. Other than maybe Rommel, who is the savvy PR spokesman for the new regime to persuade the Allies they've reformed?
"Look, we let the Jews out of the camps because we're nice!"
"... Wait, camps?"
Not even Rommel. I was thinking they could try and use that as a PR point to differentiate themselves from the Nazis and to discredit them in the eyes of the public, but it would probably backfire. As it was though the Allies knew almost all about the camps.Here's a question. Other than maybe Rommel, who is the savvy PR spokesman for the new regime to persuade the Allies they've reformed?
"Look, we let the Jews out of the camps because we're nice!"
"... Wait, camps?"
That was certainly the viewpoint the US had of the situation, though I gather the British viewed the Nazis as something different than the Prussian militarists.The problem that I struggle with is that to the West, this is a lot like in 1918, when the bad militarists put up German civilians as window dressing and tried to say they were sorry.
THAT is a big change for the last part of the war, no thought of a Nazi Alpine retreat. Especially if the Germans lay down their arms early the lack of desire to go after the Alps and perhaps push on Berlin with the Germans aiding the process might well impact the postwar settlement.Well, if the Germans are now withdrawing to the Alps anyway, such a landing might now "hit thin air," so to speak, and an increasingly frustrated FDR might allow a limited landing near Trieste (or perhaps Venice) so long as it appears likely to be unopposed. And then things snowball on each other.