The Polish-Soviet border is set at the Curzon Line in 1920-1921

CaliGuy

Banned
What if the Soviet Union would have performed better in the Polish-Soviet War and thus gotten the Polish-Soviet border set at the Curzon Line in 1920-1921?

What would the consequences of this have been over the next several decades?
 

CaliGuy

Banned
I had a post about the Red Army stopping at the Curzon Line: https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/red-army-stops-at-the-curzon-line-1920.390402/ Although the *reason* the border is set at the Curzon Line is somewhat different from that in your post, most of the results would be similar.
Thanks for that link, David! :)

That said, though, I decided to create a new thread since that link was so old. However, I might nevertheless take a look at that link for inspiration for this specific thread. :)
 
What if the Soviet Union would have performed better in the Polish-Soviet War and thus gotten the Polish-Soviet border set at the Curzon Line in 1920-1921?

What would the consequences of this have been over the next several decades?

Pretty momentous.
In 1938, the Czechoslovakians and the Soviets are allied all the same, but the Soviet Union does not need to ask permission from Poland or Romania to send troops into Czechoslovakia. They've got a common border, if the Czechs ask for help, they can receive it directly. That entirely changes the outlook of the Munich situation.
 
Considering how underdeveloped Kresey was related to the area west of the Bug in the Interwar Era, and how significant the Ukrainian and Belorussian populations were, this is probably a net gain for Poland in the long run.
 
Pretty momentous.
In 1938, the Czechoslovakians and the Soviets are allied all the same, but the Soviet Union does not need to ask permission from Poland or Romania to send troops into Czechoslovakia. They've got a common border, if the Czechs ask for help, they can receive it directly. That entirely changes the outlook of the Munich situation.

Prague inviting the Red Army into the heart of Central Europe at the height of Appeasement... that's a cracking setup for a TL. Question is how do the players react? Hitler might find the Poles are his strongest allies.
 
Pretty momentous.
In 1938, the Czechoslovakians and the Soviets are allied all the same, but the Soviet Union does not need to ask permission from Poland or Romania to send troops into Czechoslovakia. They've got a common border, if the Czechs ask for help, they can receive it directly. That entirely changes the outlook of the Munich situation.

OTOH, if you see fear of Bolshevism as a driving force behind appeasement, the western powers may be even more anxious to appease Hitler than in OTL. And I doubt whether the Soviets will, even with a common border, come to the aid of Czechoslovakia without any chance of western support.

It is arguable that in OTL if France and Britain had been willing to fight for Czechoslovakia, so would the Soviet Union--going through Poland *even without Polish consent.* Hugh Ragsdale has so argued in *The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of World War II* (Cambridge UP 2004). He admits that the evidence on this is not conclusive and cannot be at least until "the furtive Neanderthals who are the keepers of the secrets of the Russian archives" (p. 192) allow greater access; but he does cite as evidence the fact that "In the spring of 1936, both the Soviet military attaché in Paris and Minister Alexandrovskii in Prague, in response to the question how the Red Army would come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia, stated plainly that it would come through Poland, [1] where we have seen that the rail network was considerably more advantageous than that of Romania." (p. 183) He also notes the "simultaneity of the Soviet mobilization of 21-3 September and the warning to Poland that its intervention in Czechoslovakia would abrogate the Polish-Soviet treaty of nonaggression, 23 September..." (p. 183)

[1] "In the spring of 1936, the French General Staff had asked the Soviet military attaché in Paris how the Soviet Union would render military aid to France if Germany attacked France. His reply was blunt and infinitely intriguing: '*en attaquant la Pologne.* Ragsdale, p. 167.
 
Domestically Poland would be more insular, nationalistic and right-wing. Leaving aside the resentment, revanchism and red-scare that would likely arise from the Soviets taking everything beyond the Curzon Line; Piłsudski would have been heavily discredited and along with him the left-wing multicultural vision of Polish nationalism which he championed, he certainly wouldn't be in a position to pull off a coup ITTL, whilst the loss of the Eastern provinces is likely to skew Polish politics far more in favour of the right-wing anti-minority anti-Semitic Popular National Union whose main power bases were in the West.
 
It is not clear to me whether the "Curzon line" had practical significance that would cause the Reds to simply stop advancing at that point, for any reason.

Reading about it again at Wikipedia I see that it technically existed, in that Curzon surveyed and proposed it, and that OTL he even telegraphed the Bolsheviks asking them to consider honoring it as the permanent border. So I can see that it does not require that any pragmatic features, geographic or cultural, to independently define it--Curzon already surveyed it to determine which land border best divides mainly Polish settlement from other peoples.

So I know now it would be a meaningful thing to talk about anyway.

It could be set two ways--one, the Soviets (as apparently Trotsky was willing to do) stop there and go no further west, leaving Pilsudski's government as a buffer state and foregoing all opportunity to trigger the desired first world Revolution in return for consolidating firm borders. I can see why Lenin, though clearly wrong in retrospect, ordered the Red Army on to attempt to take all of Poland and thus get access to Germany as well.

Second, if the Reds retreat after a Polish victory driving them east again, they might sue for terms that get them the Curzon line as their new fixed border with Poland. But at that point, why should the Poles or their French backers agree, instead of pushing as far east as possible, just as the Bolsheviks before them had done.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
OTOH, if you see fear of Bolshevism as a driving force behind appeasement, the western powers may be even more anxious to appease Hitler than in OTL. And I doubt whether the Soviets will, even with a common border, come to the aid of Czechoslovakia without any chance of western support.

It is arguable that in OTL if France and Britain had been willing to fight for Czechoslovakia, so would the Soviet Union--going through Poland *even without Polish consent.* Hugh Ragsdale has so argued in *The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of World War II* (Cambridge UP 2004). He admits that the evidence on this is not conclusive and cannot be at least until "the furtive Neanderthals who are the keepers of the secrets of the Russian archives" (p. 192) allow greater access; but he does cite as evidence the fact that "In the spring of 1936, both the Soviet military attaché in Paris and Minister Alexandrovskii in Prague, in response to the question how the Red Army would come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia, stated plainly that it would come through Poland, [1] where we have seen that the rail network was considerably more advantageous than that of Romania." (p. 183) He also notes the "simultaneity of the Soviet mobilization of 21-3 September and the warning to Poland that its intervention in Czechoslovakia would abrogate the Polish-Soviet treaty of nonaggression, 23 September..." (p. 183)

[1] "In the spring of 1936, the French General Staff had asked the Soviet military attaché in Paris how the Soviet Union would render military aid to France if Germany attacked France. His reply was blunt and infinitely intriguing: '*en attaquant la Pologne.* Ragsdale, p. 167.
Very interesting points, David!

However, I have a question--would the Soviet Union have been willing to withdraw from Poland after the war if the Soviet Union needed to cross Poland to get to Czechoslovakia? Or would they have permanently kept the parts of Poland that they occupied for themselves?

Pretty momentous.
In 1938, the Czechoslovakians and the Soviets are allied all the same, but the Soviet Union does not need to ask permission from Poland or Romania to send troops into Czechoslovakia. They've got a common border, if the Czechs ask for help, they can receive it directly. That entirely changes the outlook of the Munich situation.

Do Britain and France agree to fight on Czechoslovakia's behalf in such a situation, though? After all, as David T mentioned above, the Soviet Union might very well be unwilling to take on the full burden of fighting Germany.

Considering how underdeveloped Kresey was related to the area west of the Bug in the Interwar Era, and how significant the Ukrainian and Belorussian populations were, this is probably a net gain for Poland in the long run.
Didn't Galicia have some oil fields, though?

Prague inviting the Red Army into the heart of Central Europe at the height of Appeasement... that's a cracking setup for a TL. Question is how do the players react? Hitler might find the Poles are his strongest allies.
If the Soviets don't invade Poland, then I am unsure that Poland would have cared that much about this unless the Soviet Union would have refused to withdraw from Czechoslovakia after the end of the war.
 

BigBlueBox

Banned
I don't think this scenario is likely unless the Soviets stop at the Curzon line and offer peace like they did in David T's thread. If the Battle of Warsaw is lost by the Poles, the Soviets are getting all of Poland. If the Battle of Warsaw is won, there's no way the Poles will allow Lvov to be left in Soviet hands.
 
Do Britain and France agree to fight on Czechoslovakia's behalf in such a situation, though? After all, as David T mentioned above, the Soviet Union might very well be unwilling to take on the full burden of fighting Germany.

The British aren't interested, have no commitment, and won't get involved. The French OTOH had signed the treaty with Czechoslovakia in the first place not to "fight on its behalf", but to replace the Czarist Russian counterweight to Germany. The same reason why they signed with Poland. Now, in actual history, the French did not want to fight because they feared it would be them and the Czechs (some doubts as to the Slovakians) against the Germans. The British could not be counted upon, and the Soviets were shunned by everybody and couldn't intervene without having to shoot at the Romanians or the Poles or both.
In this scenario, it's not the French and the Czechs alone against the Germans. The Slovakians can't part ways (they would fear Soviet meddling, of course), and the Soviets are in, without moving across neutral territory. The equation is very different, seen from Paris.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
The British aren't interested, have no commitment, and won't get involved. The French OTOH had signed the treaty with Czechoslovakia in the first place not to "fight on its behalf", but to replace the Czarist Russian counterweight to Germany. The same reason why they signed with Poland. Now, in actual history, the French did not want to fight because they feared it would be them and the Czechs (some doubts as to the Slovakians) against the Germans. The British could not be counted upon, and the Soviets were shunned by everybody and couldn't intervene without having to shoot at the Romanians or the Poles or both.
In this scenario, it's not the French and the Czechs alone against the Germans. The Slovakians can't part ways (they would fear Soviet meddling, of course), and the Soviets are in, without moving across neutral territory. The equation is very different, seen from Paris.
Would Soviet assistance alone be sufficient for France, though? After all, in World War I, France and Russia couldn't defeat Germany without British and American help!
 
Would Soviet assistance alone be sufficient for France, though? After all, in World War I, France and Russia couldn't defeat Germany without British and American help!
The USSR of 1938 is very different from the Romanov dynasty ruled Russia of 1914 to start with. It isn't nearly as formidable as the Red Army of 1942 despite massive Soviet losses of men, material and territory, true. That's mainly down to inexperience and a failure to weed out the politically favored deadwood-OTOH in 1938 the Army Purge has not happened yet either. Meanwhile the Wehrmacht of 1938 is a very dubious comparison to the Second Reich armies of 1918 too, again despite the devastation and privation of basic supplies the Germans faced by that late date in the Great War. There is speculation that the Czechoslovak forces of OTL, before surrendering so many assets to Hitler and deposing their government in favor of a leader handpicked by Hitler, could, if they had resolved to fight instead of submit to Munich, have made a pretty brave showing against the German forces of 1938. If all the Soviets send are token forces, they won't make much difference, and I suppose the case might be argued that man for man, even the Werhmacht of '38 might have had a superior loss ratio and higher effectiveness--man for man. But it was not yet nearly as expanded as it would be just a year later when Poland was attacked OTL, whereas the Red Army had behind a tremendous current enlistment, a generation--at least half a generation anyway--of former conscripts suitable as reserves, all of whom had been through peacetime service. If Stalin were resolved to stop Hitler from taking Czechoslovakia I think the only way it would go badly for him would be if the Germans could break through so quickly that the major strategic assets of Bohemia are lost before substantial Soviet forces could get to the field.

The political equation is something else. I think maybe if Czechoslovakia had shared a border with the USSR for a long time, it is possible this would considerably chill political support in Czechoslovakia for a Soviet alliance. If this were not the case, realistically, whatever the prevailing feeling is in Czechoslovakia, admitting enough Soviet troops and other forces to assure defeat of the German invasion would put the country at severe risk of a Communist takeover with even less pretense than OTL of political legitimacy; the presence of the Soviet forces could shield a simple Communist coup.

Would Stalin wish to rush to Czechoslovakia's defense if the way were open, geographically and politically? It is my general belief that he was the Great Procrastinator, motivated by both Bolshevik ideology and personal dictatorial reasons to form a vast, mighty army reasonably well modernized and on paper able to take on any power, great or small. But generally he would never be the first to initiate a war in part because of his fear of empowering some successful marshal to take him down in a coup--he had other reasons to hesitate to strike the first blow too, boiling down to the political value of being seen as the victim versus as an aggressor. That did not stop him from doing things that outraged the morals of the Western liberal powers when it suited him, when he was well covered from the immediate consequences of their outrage anyway.

But Hitler attacking a defiant Czechoslovakia is a different case. Were he to honor his own offers to help, and the Czechoslovak government to take the offer, no Western power would see him as an aggressor. A cold blooded opportunist perhaps, especially if the Western powers do nothing effectual which leaves Stalin effective master in Czechoslovakia. I think he would calculate that the Red Army could probably get to the front soon enough for numbers, combined with Czechoslovak arms, defensive geography, and resolve to defend themselves, to prevail and move the fight, if the Germans do not capitulate first, onto German soil. Meanwhile the Germans do not threaten the Soviet Union directly anywhere; they would have to persuade some allies to strike on their behalf, and those in a position to do so--Poland primarily, and Romania, and to a much lesser degree Turkey, and of course Britain via Indian territory--would hardly be motivated to, unless they feared the Red Beast was unleashed and would inevitably attack everywhere. But by coming in as Czechoslovakia's ally, once the basic business of holding or regaining prewar borders was accomplished, it is at Stalin's discretion, with the permission of the Czechs of course, whether to double down and start conquering the Reich, or seek a cease fire with terms for Germany. Terms that the consensus of the liberal powers would probably find reasonable under the circumstances would probably include removing the Nazis from power, outlawing Hitler, and breaking the Reich back up into a separated Austria and Germany. Indeed he might seek even harsher terms, such as disbanding Germany into smaller states. A new Versailles Treaty again placing Germany, including Austria, broken up or not, under indemnity and limitations might also seem entirely in order. Or he could either refuse to hear terms, arguing before Western public opinion that no German treaty could be trusted, that removing the Nazis might be accomplished on paper but only occupation and forced reforms could free Germany of her barbaric dictatorship in practice, or put out terms so harsh the Germans do not surrender. Eventually Germany would be cut in two, with westward Czecho-Soviet salients out of Bohemia reaching the French border and severing Austria; Austria herself overrun and probably turned into some sort of People's Republic; the slog northward would be harder but inexorable I think and when the dust settles, both Germany and Czechoslovakia are either Soviet puppets or incorporated as SSRs outright, perhaps five or six of them--Slovakian, Czech, Austrian, Bavarian, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Saxony, Hesse, and a few others--maybe Hannover comes back on the map, probably Prussia is forthrightly dismembered much as OTL. This would leave Poland and the Baltic states in horrible isolation of course, only the Baltic their lifeline.

All this if the USSR and Czechoslovakia fight alone. It could be some other powers get drawn in even if the Entente powers sit it out--perhaps early on Hungary and maybe even Poland can be brought in on the German side which would surely distract Soviet strategy based on liberating and moving out of Czechoslovakia, but in the longer run would merely engage and commit the USSR for an all in fight and result in Red rule east of the Rhine. The best case for Czechoslovakia is that seeing the Russians move for real, the Entente powers tear up the Munich accords, or we are in an ATL where they never signed them in the first place, and France and Britain attack Hitler for breaking both the Accord and the Versailles treaty. Probably they get a resolution through the League of Nations calling for common action to move into Germany and remove its current regime. If this happens, Stalin loses the opportunity for eastern European empire, but I don't think he was counting on that; instead, the bloodletting of the Red Army will be shared by Entente powers. The best thing for the Czechs, who could still come under Soviet dictatorship anyway, would be if the French and/or British offered to move in significant forces of their own via Romania--Romania signing on to the anti-Hitler crusade would be the best thing for deterring Soviet designs on Romanian territory and independence too. If Red Army boots on the ground in Czechoslovakia are balanced by British and French ones, the liberal government can hope to stay in power. I think Stalin would be prepared to live with this, provided the Third Reich is dismantled and the Soviet Union gets a fair say in the fate of Germany. Aside from any expeditionary forces taking a roundabout path through the Black sea to get into Czechoslovakia, obviously France could attack on the German western border, while Britain interdicts all trade. League of Nation mandate can guarantee Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark close their borders, and Sweden persuaded, if not right away than as the pendulum swings against Hitler, to terminate their trade with Germany too.

The main reason I am confident that Soviet aid to Czechoslovakia is sufficient to crush the Reich in time is that Hitler has not had time to develop the forces he intended to contend with the Great powers over Europe with yet. Soviet forces will probably prove somewhat inefficient but they have the numbers to bleed out a lot and still get steeled by painful trial and error. It may take time for the Red Army to learn how to make its numbers tell, but that only buys time for the Germans, and perhaps other nations Hitler might persuade to jump into the abyss with him, to kid themselves into thinking they will come out ahead. Eventually the Soviet steamroller will get up some momentum and once it does, the Reich and anyone allied to it is through.

Unless perhaps the Entente powers, seeing that the Red Army need not be defeated and Czechoslovakia with Soviet help can hold, would get on the bandwagon; they might thus win a position to share setting terms with Stalin, and thus have leverage to persuade Stalin to stop when they say so. That just means the pile on to break the Reich is all the heavier of course, and the wrting on the wall all the clearer and brighter.

The Reich alone, given time to arm, might indeed be able to check all other powers without Soviet help, and perhaps able to fight the Red Army to a draw instead of certain defeat if able to keep the fights purely bilateral.

Without time to arm, I believe even say France could do it with help from Czechoslovakia, and an expeditionary force could make its way to Czech frontiers via Romania. The British would be hard pressed to win if fighting alone--but with a roundabout path for expeditionary forces through Romania, even British forces might suffice to tip the balance.
 
The political equation is something else. I think maybe if Czechoslovakia had shared a border with the USSR for a long time, it is possible this would considerably chill political support in Czechoslovakia for a Soviet alliance. If this were not the case, realistically, whatever the prevailing feeling is in Czechoslovakia, admitting enough Soviet troops and other forces to assure defeat of the German invasion would put the country at severe risk of a Communist takeover with even less pretense than OTL of political legitimacy; the presence of the Soviet forces could shield a simple Communist coup.

1. The Czechoslovakians would fear that, of course. But if Germany issues an ultimatum? "We're entering to take the Sudeten"? And both France and the USSR pledge to go to war if the Germans move? ...I doubt anybody in Prague says, we'd rather lose the Sudeten than risk a Communist coup.

2. It's also entirely possible that it doesn't come to any foreign troops in Czechoslovakia. The German army of 1938 isn't that of 1939, it simply wasn't able to invade Czechoslovakia, fight the Soviets in there, and at the same time keep the French at bay. It's possible the other side calls the bluff and the generals tell Hitler, we can't. It fizzles. That has internal repercussions in Germany, but Cechoslovakia is safe both from the Germans and the Soviets.

3. As a final scenario, suppose the Czechoslovakian government outright refuses assistance and caves in to the Germans. Fine. The French will breathe a sigh, the Soviets will stand-to. But do the Germans stop in the Sudeten? Maybe, temporarily. What will happen when time comes for the final dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, though? Won't the Czechs be in the same position as the Poles, who stubbornly refused any sort of Soviet help, but when push came to shove, ordered their soldiers to withdraw in front of the Soviet troops and not to fire at them, in hopes they were coming to fight the Germans?
 
If I were a Czech, I'd take my chances on the risks Soviet forces in country pose because I regard Hitler as the greatest evil. Knowing his views on racial hierarchy which rank Slavic peoples low, I would think anyone who read Mein Kampf or had it accurately summarized would know that for a Slavic nation facing conquest by the Reich, they have nothing to lose by asking anyone's help, no matter how bad that anyone might be themselves.

But part of that is hindsight. Hitler did declare openly to the world what he planned to do and how, and everyone who was amazed (as opposed to appalled) that he did it is a testimony to how often people talk trash they don't mean, and how eager people are to rationalize their situation to grasp for the illusion of safety.

If I were a Communist Czech, I would probably look forward to the coming Red invasion and be in on the plans to have the coup and rule at last, without having to kowtow to bourgeois ideology any more. But I would probably have to have had my head in the sand to not worry just a bit that Stalin might not play fair even with fellow Communists. The Army purge has not yet happened, but the great Party purge has. And for that reason if I am a loyal Communist and not dead yet nor driven to abandon the party (at risk of my life of course, even if the Revolution never comes) I probably have rationalized around it somehow and look forward to the Red Army's arrival, the sooner the better.

A liberal Czech on the other hand would have some agonizing to do, and would place their major hope on the idea that if the Soviets alone respond to their calls for help, that in the wake of their positive response, France and Britain might be motivated not just by guilt but by Great Power realpolitik as well to belatedly, and despite anything they said at Munich, rally to the cause as well, which the French could aid immediately by attacking German western frontiers. I would dream of expeditionary Franco-British forces coming in via Romania to check the Soviets and keep them on track, but perhaps the western powers would be able to simply talk Stalin out of a Communist coup even without boots on Czechoslovak ground.

But I think I would have some reluctance to call forth the Red Bear. Only a bleakly realistic assessment of my people's likely fate under Hitler would steel me for that.
 
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