The Phoney War

September 1939 to May 1940 on the European Western front always puzzled me. Why did Britain and France just sit tight? Wouldn't it have made more sense to take advantage of their local numerical superiority whole the majority of the Reich's troops were busy in Poland?
 
1 -I'm not too sure they knew how much stronger they were. Didn't they really overestimate the strength of the Luftwaffe before the war?

2 - Politically, could the French launch an invasion; and would they have got British support? There was a big fear of a repeat of WW1, even though they expected it, so prevarication ruled.

3 - The French had the Maginot Line. Maybe adopt a wait-and-see approach instead -for the Germans to see sense?

I realise these are more questions than answers...
 
The French strategy was still overall an offensive one, the Maginot Line would hold off the Germans until the French achieved numerical superiority, probably in 1941. Time was on the Allies side, so why take the risk?
 
The Allies were aware that they would get stronger as the mobilised their economies and societies while already mobilised Germany wouldn't. Therefore the balance of power would move in their favour.
Also the Allies seriously over-estimated the Westwalle/Siegfried Line, Hitler said it was better than the Maginot line, the Maginot line was "impenetrable" therefore no one wanted to put their finger in that particular grinder.
 
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The Allies were aware that they would get stronger as the mobilised their economies and societies while already Germany wouldn't. Therefore the balance of power would move in their favour.
Also the Allies seriously over-estimated the Westwalle/Siegfried Line, Hitler said it was better than the Maginot line, the Maginot line was "impenetrable" therefore no one wanted to put their finger in that particular grinder.

Fair enough. And I suppose no one in their wildest dreams thought that Hitler would blitz France so quickly and effectively.
 

burmafrd

Banned
And once again one must remember just how weak the leadership of Both England and France was at that time. Chamberlin was absolutley the worst possible PM for War.
 
And once again one must remember just how weak the leadership of Both England and France was at that time. Chamberlin was absolutley the worst possible PM for War.

Halifax would like to talk to you. Chamberlain was bad but at least he accepted the necessity of re-armament.
 
Basically its simple; time was on the allied side. And the blockade would have been pretty effective (weakening Germany even more) if it hadn't been for Stalin. So the decision to wait was the correct one.
 
September 1939 to May 1940 on the European Western front always puzzled me. Why did Britain and France just sit tight? Wouldn't it have made more sense to take advantage of their local numerical superiority whole the majority of the Reich's troops were busy in Poland?

Look at the map of colonies in 1945. The UK and France had a huge superiority in resources over Germany.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Colonization_1945.png

The cheapest way for them to win the war was to simply strangle Germany, as they had done with the naval blockade in World War I that killed more than 700,000 civilians during the war, and an additional 100,000 civilians killed after the war while the blockade was continued until 1919.
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/spotlights/blockade.htm

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockade_of_Germany

But the Allies were not completely passive during the Phoney war.
Since Germany was using Norway to get the Swedish Iron they needed, the UK almost invaded Norway.

British invasion boats with troops were already on their way to invade neutral Norway when the Germans beat them to it by one day. The Germans did not know that the Brittish were about to invade, but they knew the Brittish had the serious intention to do it, which led the Germans to launch their own pre-emptive invasion of Norway during the Phoney war.
http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_02.htm
 

BlondieBC

Banned
September 1939 to May 1940 on the European Western front always puzzled me. Why did Britain and France just sit tight? Wouldn't it have made more sense to take advantage of their local numerical superiority whole the majority of the Reich's troops were busy in Poland?

In war, the prewar doctrine, training, and war plans are huge. The French had built up a defensive mindset based on the Maginot Line. Switching the mindset and abilities of a million plus man organization is difficult and takes time. The French had a promotion system designed to train and promote Generals who best fought defensive war. The regiments were trained/exercise in the war plan. The NCO mindset is a defensive war plan. As Allied leader, you have a 36 day window to act, before Germany starts to move troops west. For a modern parallel, imagine that you told the US army you would need to fight a light infantry war in Mexico, that the USA could not use any air power (complete doctrine change), and that the war has to be started with at least 500,000 soldiers on the ground, and all this has to be done in 36 days.

Now to the Post fall of Poland window. Germany only had to rail units across Germany/Poland. The UK had to form new units from scratch. So if it did not make sense to attack in September/October 1939, it would not make sense to attack an even stronger German Army in the winter. And after the winter was over, the Germans attacked. Also, due to WW1 legacy issues, the allies could not have attack through Belgium so they have to start the attack crossing the Rhine with green units versus experienced German units.

Now if you are asking why France/UK thought Poland could hold off the Germans indefinitely, I don't fully understand that belief. It is partially wishful thinking, partially overestimation of the quality of Poland's military, and partially the belief the USSR would not attack Poland.

Fair enough. And I suppose no one in their wildest dreams thought that Hitler would blitz France so quickly and effectively.

The plan worked better than even German optimist expected. If the Germans had seriously though France would fall that quickly, there would have been serious Sea Lion planning in November 1939. Likewise, Stalin would likely have taken different actions if he thought France would fall so quickly.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
The cheapest way for them to win the war was to simply strangle Germany, as they had done with the naval blockade in World War I that killed more than 700,000 civilians during the war, and an additional 100,000 civilians killed after the war while the blockade was continued until 1919.
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/spotlights/blockade.htm

Depends on what you mean by "cheapest". Winning quick will always cost less financially than a multi-year war. Normally, the longer the war, the higher the losses. Even in the "quite time", soldiers normally are dying at a decent rate. Internal issues with the population arise, and it was know that WW1 had cause major issues with India, and a long WW2 would likely do the same. All those Indian division come with a political costs.

The more rational answer to waiting is the French/UK believing they were too weak to launch a successful attack, and that the attack would fail.

Do you have any sources that the UK/French leadership believed that a shorter victorious war would be "cheaper" in KIA or financial resources than a long war?
 
You also have to remember the fresh memories of WW1 trench warfare.

They did not adjust thinking to the new rapid warfare concepts
 

Thande

Donor
I'm sure the WW2 anoraks have more detailed reasons, but I've always understood it as being a continuation of the attitudes behind appeasement, viz., a conviction on the part of the British and French governments (and most of the people) that:

1) We are not ready to fight, whereas Germany is a terrifying modern war machine;
2) This war will surely be just like the last one where defenders had an advantage over attackers and any attack results in a messy and largely pointless bloodbath;
3) And we cannot politically or morally countenance an attack because (see above) we don't want another Somme on our hands.

It represents indecision over the fact that they had finally committed to war, having faced the inevitable, yet still had no more stomach for it (for perfectly understandable reasons, mind) than they had back in 1938.
 
Depends on what you mean by "cheapest". Winning quick will always cost less financially than a multi-year war. Normally, the longer the war, the higher the losses. Even in the "quite time", soldiers normally are dying at a decent rate. Internal issues with the population arise, and it was know that WW1 had cause major issues with India, and a long WW2 would likely do the same. All those Indian division come with a political costs.

The more rational answer to waiting is the French/UK believing they were too weak to launch a successful attack, and that the attack would fail.

Do you have any sources that the UK/French leadership believed that a shorter victorious war would be "cheaper" in KIA or financial resources than a long war?

Well, no, no sources on the economic calculations.

I have a related source from the battle for France though, relating to the air war. It seems the UK felt it was economically better to lure the Germans into a strategic city-bombing war rather than to fight them head-on in the battlefield frontlines.

May 16, 1940, letter from Churchill to the French:
"I have examined today with the War Cabinet and all the experts the request which you made to me last night and this morning for further fighter squadrons. We are all agreed that it is better to draw the enemy on to this Island by striking at his vitals, and thus to aid the common cause."
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documentsonline/details-result.asp?queryType=1&resultcount=1&Edoc_Id=7965861
It takes a few steps to get the document download, but it does not cost anything.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Well, no, no sources on the economic calculations.

I have a related source from the battle for France though, relating to the air war. It seems the UK felt it was economically better to lure the Germans into a strategic city-bombing war rather than to fight them head-on in the battlefield frontlines.

May 16, 1940, letter from Churchill to the French:
"I have examined today with the War Cabinet and all the experts the request which you made to me last night and this morning for further fighter squadrons. We are all agreed that it is better to draw the enemy on to this Island by striking at his vitals, and thus to aid the common cause."
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documentsonline/details-result.asp?queryType=1&resultcount=1&Edoc_Id=7965861
It takes a few steps to get the document download, but it does not cost anything.

That quote is from as the Germans were breaking the French lines, and represents an unwillingness to commit additional air units to what is seen as a losing battle. On either the 13th or 14th, there was a max allied air effort to stop the Germans. The allied lost 60% of the planes sent into the battle that day. Churchill is writing the this letter a couple of days after worst single day the RAF had against the Luftwaffe, and perhaps the worse day any air force has every had in a land battle.

I don't see this quote showing economics being the reason for the phony war, largely because of the date. If it was date May 9th, 1940 or earlier, it would powerful evidence. In this quote, I think Churchill is telling France that he is abandoning them, at least as far as the air war in France.
 
The French geared their army and its mobilization to in effect re-fight WW1. Where they would need lots of firepower and lots of manpower.

Their system was designed to produce a very large body of people but not as a ready to use field army. Their divisions, etc were cadre formations with no experience at operating together. The fortifications were to shield France and allow them time to train up that huge mass of manpower into an effective fighting army. Once several months or longer of training was done THEN France could do something. In effect Paris lied to Warsaw when they said they would launch a major offensive into Germany so many days after mobilization began.

If France really tried to do an all out offensive into Germany at M+14 or something it would have been a fiasco. It might have worked even so because the Germans were very weak but it would have been a huge risk. They would have had no real coordination and all sorts of other problems.

Michael
 
The plan worked better than even German optimist expected. If the Germans had seriously though France would fall that quickly, there would have been serious Sea Lion planning in November 1939. Likewise, Stalin would likely have taken different actions if he thought France would fall so quickly.

This is very true, everyone was surprised when France fell, most espcially the Germans. Their invasion plan worked beyond their wildest dreams. In hindsight, one can say that France was doomed due it's very stubborn warfare doctrines, but at the time, nodoby thought the under-equip German military would dare challenge the Juggernuaght that was the French Empire and if they did, they would be slapped around and sent back to Berlin with their tails bewteen their legs.

The Allies in Europe didn't really want to fight Germany, they were happy to block German trade and starve Hitler back to the negotiating table. They didn't count on Stalin invading, then fucking up in Poland and nobody counted on Paris falling in only a few weeks.

Inaction, at the time, was the best action.
 
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