What if the 1802 Peace of Amiens *had held?
Yes--basically, Napoleon is perfectly content to sit on his butt and to make the most of his current territory.What's causing the peace to hold? Is Napoleon less ambitious about reordering Europe? Are the British and/or Russians more willing to stand by and watch it happen?
Yes--basically, Napoleon is perfectly content to sit on his butt and to make the most of his current territory.
Britain was the one who broke the treaty over some excuse over Malta, not France.
Anyways, assuming Britain doesn't break the treaty, long story short, Napoleon wins. Honestly, Napoleon really should have won, and he merely suffered from bad luck that led to defeat. Suffice to say, any small change to France's fortunes will result in victory.
First Malta was a tricky issue, the French constantly broke the treaty of Lunéville and kept insulting both GB and Russia. You can hardly say that Napoleon was blameless here.
And only small changes? I'm actually curious about what "small changes" you are talking about because I can only see that happening with some decent sized changes.
France could have tried harder to keep the peace, no?Britain was the one who broke the treaty over some excuse over Malta, not France.
Britain was not a signatory of Luneville. Also, Luneville not breaking down is not a guarantee that Amiens will hold.the French constantly broke the treaty of Lunéville
France could have tried harder to keep the peace, no?
Britain also felt rightly that Napoleon was intent on cutting them off from all avenues on the continent. Markets being closed, trade dropping and loss of face mean that Britain would try and pitch in whenever a chance showed up.It's hard to keep the peace once a country has declared war on you.
Essentially, what happened was that Pitt lost power, a conciliatory Tory government under Addington signed a peace treaty widely celebrated by the British poor, and then Pitt came to power again and declared war on France again.
That wasn't an issue during the negotiations at Amiens, either in public or private correspondence. I know; I did my undergraduate dissertation on Amiens (more precisely, negotiations for peace between the 1796 preliminaries of Paris through to Amiens). Peace had been conceded after the Second Coalition had been shattered; the sticking point up to then was the status of the Austria Netherlands, which the British by 1802 knew they could no longer keep from France. The role of trade considerations in early modern Europe is overrated; nations concerned themselves with the balance of power as an end of itself. Britain broke the treaty by not evacuating Malta, but a good argument could be made that they were provoked by Bonaparte's actions in Switzerland and Italy.Britain also felt rightly that Napoleon was intent on cutting them off from all avenues on the continent. Markets being closed, trade dropping and loss of face mean that Britain would try and pitch in whenever a chance showed up.
Cutting them off the continent in amny spheres is what I meant.The role of trade considerations in early modern Europe is overrated; nations concerned themselves with the balance of power as an end of itself. Britain broke the treaty by not evacuating Malta, but a good argument could be made that they were provoked by Bonaparte's actions in Switzerland and Italy.
(Paul W. Schroeder, "Napoleon's Foreign Policy: A Criminal Enterprise", Journal of Military History vol. 54 no. 2 (Apr. 1990), pp.147-162.)"I find it inexplicable that good historians can simply assert what is technically true, that Prussia started the war of 1806 or Austria that of 1809, and not ask themselves what could have induced so timorous a king as Frederick William III, eager only to enjoy further peace and neutrality, to gamble everything on war against the French? Or what could make so narrow-minded and fearful a sovereign as Emperor Francis, whose highest ambition was to hang onto his hereditary estates in peace and who had been so thoroughly beaten by France in three great wars throw the iron dice again alone and unsupported in 1809?"
"Between 1800 and 1812 almost every government in Europe, and most statesmen in Europe, went much further in trying to appease Napoleon than Chamberlain did with Hitler... The experience of Napoleon's power was enough to make every European power try some form or other of accommodation- joining him if possible to get a share of the imperial spoils, buying him off, or making an arrangement to stay out of his way. Some states like Bavaria did this fairly eagerly and trustingly, others like Austria only with reservations or in desperation. Only Britain, which Napoleon could not destroy, continued to fight doggedly, and this only because it concluded in 1803 that an actual peace with Napoleon was humiliating and intolerable and in 1806-7 that any peace was impossible.
What demands explanation is not Europe's repeated recourse to appeasement, but its consistent failure. The only satisfactory answer is the simple and obvious one: Napoleon could not be appeased. Each war was the outcome of the uniform experience of one European state after another that it was impossible to do business with Napoleon, that peace with him on his terms was more dangerous and humiliating than war. It is most striking of all that the appeasers themselves, the very men who had advocated accommodation and coexistence with France, regularly abandon their own policies, admitting, even though they still dread war and fear defeat, that accommodation will not restrain Napoleon. This was true of Austria's Count Coblenzl and Archduke Carl in 1805, of Emperor Francis and Carl again by 1809, of Prussia's Counts Lombard and Hauwitz, the Duke of Brunswick, and King Frederick William III by 1806, of Prussia's Baron vom Stein in 1807, of Prince Hardenberg in 1808-12, of Count Rumiantsev and Tsar Alexander by 1812, of Count Metternicht in 1813..."
My point is rather that there were these repeated cases of the European powers making deals with Napoleon and then breaking them again. Why? Why did so many of the Kings and Emperors of Europe risk another defeat at Napoleon's hands, again and again?The other European powers didn't 'appease' Bonaparte; they would have viewed the Franco-British attitude to Hitler as lunacy. They were consistently beaten in the field and forced to yield to his increasing demands.
Oh, that perfidious Albion, making Napoleon crown himself king of Italy and kidnap the Duc d'Enghien!Don't forget, Bonaparte didn't want to fight the War of the Third Coalition, it was forced on him by Britain.
I'm not sure what your point is, in ascribing the blame to the British instead of Napoleon. Certainly it takes two to tango, but (to take one example) post-1812 campaign into Russia - after Napoleon had lost the Grande Armee - he was offered a peace which confirmed him as the ruler of France and with expanded French borders; he refused it and continued to fight.It was the British who perpetuated the cycle of wars. From their own perspective, they were absolutely right to do so, and subsequent history bears this out. But that shouldn't absolve them of their guilt.
...I'm not sure what you intended to prove by that. That Britain deserves some kind of guilt for the second half of the Napoleonic Wars for impudently not being obliterated?He imposes a draconian treaty with near Carthaginian levels of punishment, the British never to rise again. Do the subsequent wars post 1804 get fought? Absolutely not
If I can drop into a slightly silly form of analysis for a moment, Napoleon basically saw himself as the player - the one who doesn't have to care about the normal rules of diplomacy except for how they constrain the actions of others. Again and again we see him doing this kind of ridiculous stuff - invading a sovereign state to kidnap and execute a refugee, demanding Prussia cede him land during a peace and then bribe the British using more of Prussia - and it produced the result that a well-coded video game should produce. To whit, everyone teamed up on him because his Reputation hit the bottom of the needle.
Of course, other powers did other things. But the reaction of the time to Napoleon was much greater - he broke the norms of diplomacy far more at the time than other powers did, which is why they reacted to him as they did.Never mind how he came quite close to winning, and never mind the crazy schemes of other European states, like Britain's ridiculous attempt to conquer Spanish Argentina while allied to Spain!