The Pacific War begins without the Pearl Harbour raid. USN actions?

[Draconis]

The Japanese have initiated the Pacific War exactly as in OTL with the same attacks against the British and Commonwealth forces in Malaya and Hong Kong, the Dutch in the East Indies and the American forces in the Philippines. So yes, the U.S. is at war with Japan same as OTL. But the IJN have rejected the Pearl Harbour raid as too risky.

With the US Pacific fleet largely intact but also considering the USNs' rejection of War Plan Orange how would the U.S. Navy conduct operations in the first few months of the Pacific War? What more could the USN do that they couldn't have in OTL? If political pressure don't compel the USN to attempt an unwise relief operation for the Philippines then what other operations could be mounted that might achieve success?

The question is would the USN had been able to prevent Imperial Japan from achieving some of their early war successes if they hadn't suffered the Pearl Harbour losses? For example, preventing the loss of Wake Island? Or being able to support a bigger ABDA fleet? What else?

 

[jsb]

preventing the loss of Wake Island?

Without the KB would Wake fall to the second attack assuming it happens at all if more forces are not sent seperatly from OTL that would presumably have been sent to more useful areas if not coming back from PH?

Medium term USN is constrained by it fleet train and range from doing much more than OTL but could potentially be more threatening to IJN simply by its existence ie IJN might not be willing to send CVs to IO if USN pretended (even if could not actually do it) it might advance from Wake at short notice?

 

[CV(N)-6]

I could see a large detachment being sent to SE Asia since the USN isn't in a desperate situation, whether it gets there on time is another question. If Wake holds on the first time, I could see a relief force being sent, the success depends on what the IJN has there ITTL. The sheer amount of fuel required to move the BB line and its supporting elements would mean that it stays in the Eastern Pacific, at least at first.

 

[Admiral Spaun]

Wake could be the first major American fleet engagement of the war if the Pacific Fleet is more aggressive. Also, Kimmel would be in command in the Pacific. Maybe America makes MacArthur into a scapegoat instead.

 

[EWHM]

Japan beginning the Pacific War with the US without Pearl Harbor and a perceived stab in the back during negotiations sets up the possibility that Japan could actually win---in the sense of getting a favorable treaty negotiation settlement after winning a few major battles, Russo-Japanese war style.
Without Pearl, there's no bottomless reserve of will like there was OTL for the US vs Japan (the US did NOT have a bottomless reserve of will against Germany, which is a big reason why its strategy against Germany was so conservative),. In that environment, a few serious drubbings and the US may well tap out, irrespective of the fact that it would obviously win a long war. To win a long war, you have to keep the will to prosecute it through a short war.

 

[Driftless]

Wake could be the first major American fleet engagement of the war if the Pacific Fleet is more aggressive. Also, Kimmel would be in command in the Pacific. Maybe America makes MacArthur into a scapegoat instead.

Interesting question....

Historically, Mac made several big tactical mistakes, even though he had some warning. However, he was much better politically connected, so there was more of a buffer of protection. But without Short and Kimmel being the proverbial "fall guys", maybe Mac inherits the title. For him to be sacked, it probably happens within the first few days. The longer he's in charge, the less likely he is to be sacked, IMO

A wild card in that calculation is where does the Japanese fleet go, if it's not being used against Hawaii?

 

[Driftless]

Japan beginning the Pacific War with the US without Pearl Harbor and a perceived stab in the back during negotiations sets up the possibility that Japan could actually win---in the sense of getting a favorable treaty negotiation settlement after winning a few major battles, Russo-Japanese war style.
Without Pearl, there's no bottomless reserve of will like there was OTL for the US vs Japan (the US did NOT have a bottomless reserve of will against Germany, which is a big reason why its strategy against Germany was so conservative),. In that environment, a few serious drubbings and the US may well tap out, irrespective of the fact that it would obviously win a long war. To win a long war, you have to keep the will to prosecute it through a short war.

I wonder if the Bataan Death March stokes that persistent fire in place of Pearl Harbor. Think of how fired up the average American was by the defense of Wake Island. "The Alamo of the Pacific"

 

[Sanderford]

I wonder if the Bataan Death March stokes that persistent fire in place of Pearl Harbor. Think of how fired up the average American was by the defense of Wake Island. "The Alamo of the Pacific"

This assumes the Death March even still happens. The falling back of U.S. and Filipino forces to Bataan and Corregidor was part of War Plan Orange, which called for the Army in the Philippines to withdraw to those locations in a fighting retreat and hold out until the U.S. Pacific Fleet arrived with heavy reinforcements. If the Japanese do not strike the Fleet in port as IOTL, then WP Orange is enacted as written.

General MacArthur and his men leave Manila and declare it an open city, withdrawing south to the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor, as IOTL. If the Pacific Fleet can break through in time with the convoys bearing more troops and materials, there is no American surrender, and therefore no Death March happens.

If they don't? Then it probably happens.

 

[Admiral Spaun]

But without Short and Kimmel being the proverbial "fall guys", maybe Mac inherits the title.

Well someone has to take the ax for the bungled response to Japan's attack. Seeing as the Philippines would replace Pearl harbor in the American mindset, Mac's errors would be in greater prominence.

 

[jsb]

WP Orange is enacted as written.

If the Pacific Fleet can break through in time with the convoys bearing more troops and materials, there is no American surrender,

Had that not already been written off by the Navy as impossible and they had already agreed on along war with the army its just Mac didn't get the meno (or rather his ego didn't)...?

..
Without Pearl, there's no bottomless reserve of will like there was OTL for the US vs Japan (the US did NOT have a bottomless reserve of will against Germany, which is a big reason why its strategy against Germany was so conservative),. In that environment, a few serious drubbings and the US may well tap out, irrespective of the fact that it would obviously win a long war. To win a long war, you have to keep the will to prosecute it through a short war.

I just dont see that any negotiated peace will work as Japan will think its winning until the Essex's have sunk the fleet and at that point US knows its won and will demand everything.....look at how hard it was to negotiate a WWI white peace.....I also dont think the Germany part is right its more just Eisenhower/British being careful about dealing with the most powerful of the Axis?

 

[Sanderford]

Had that not already been written off by the Navy as impossible and they had already agreed on along war with the army its just Mac didn't get the meno (or rather his ego didn't)...?

I have never seen anything saying the Navy had written it off as impossible to break through, or that the Army agreed with such an assessment were it made. Do you have sources?

 

[CV(N)-6]

I have never seen anything saying the Navy had written it off as impossible to break through, or that the Army agreed with such an assessment were it made. Do you have sources?

WPO was defunct by 1941, the US was using the new Rainbow plans, the plan was pretty much what happened OTL+the BB line, the Through Ticket was abandoned in 1932ish

 

[Sanderford]

WPO was defunct by 1941, the US was using the new Rainbow plans, the plan was pretty much what happened OTL+the BB line, the Through Ticket was abandoned in 1932ish

Rainbow utterly slipped my mind. Apologies.

Rainbow 3, which looks to be the one we would use here, was basically Orange with modifications, including provisions to secure the Western Hemisphere north of a set latitude, basically the existing plan with expansions. That doesn't sound like the Navy deciding breaking through to reinforce the Philippines isn't possible to me.

 

[Driftless]

I have never seen anything saying the Navy had written it off as impossible to break through, or that the Army agreed with such an assessment were it made. Do you have sources?

From the Hyperwar site
The short version: In 1922 the Navy was of the opinion that the Japanese could take both the Philippines and Guam before the Navy could sail to the rescue. The Army objected to the Philippine garrison being written off

 

[Sanderford]

From the Hyperwar site
The short version: In 1922 the Navy was of the opinion that the Japanese could take both the Philippines and Guam before the Navy could sail to the rescue. The Army objected to the Philippine garrison being written off

So the Navy thought so, at least in 1922, and the Army disagreed. Got it. It would seem, however, the authors of the overall war plans were of the Army's opinion.

 

[Johnrankins]

So the Navy thought so, at least in 1922, and the Army disagreed. Got it. It would seem, however, the authors of the overall war plans were of the Army's opinion.

Who wouldn't get there without the USN's ships, also FDR was a former Secretary of the Navy and could read maps. In the end the USN was going to shape the Pacific War, that was the nature of that front.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

NOTE: Macarthur's failure lay in failing to respond effectively to the news of the Pearl Harbor attack. If Japan does not attack Pearl Harbor, the first notice the US gets of Japanese hostility is when Japanese forces strike without warning in the Philippines. Since the USAFFE don't have the fleet of patrol aircraft it would take to detect the incoming Japanese, nor any radar sets, it will be very hard to blame Macarthur for the surprise.

 

[ExScientiaTridens]

IMO it doesn't change much.

Wake Island could certainly be reinforced, but it might become costly. Not ideal for a base due to small size and poor/non-existent harbor.

Expanded ABDA? I believe the answer is no. Same reason as the inability to hold, reinforce or evacuate the Philippines - DISTANCE.

It is really a matter of logistics, not a battle fleet. While Jesse Oldendorf's ladies did fine service, they are not the issue.

Beans, bullets, black oil and the means to transport them.

BEFORE the Japanese control Rabaul, Ambon and the Celebes and no ground-based air at Davao the Navy does not have the shipping to resupply the PI or conduct significant operations in WESTPAC. A quick "back of the napkin" estimate is that one would need to dedicate a minimum force of 50 cargo ships stretched both ways across the Pacific to supply 40K tons/month to Manila. Add in tankers, troop transports, ships to carry aircraft... and their screening units. Battle and carrier fleet along with their screening units at sea constantly (not possible) to keep the SLOC open.

The shipping simply isn't available in 1942 to supply a fleet (or ground force) much beyond its cruising radius from a secure port/supply line.

 

[Tonrich]

This is a really interesting discussion. My thought about the BIG positive that came out of Pearl Harbor was that it changed the strategy and tactics of the USN immediately. They didn't have the ability to just bull rush Japan so they played defense, learned about their opponents and learned about themselves. Good or bad the US only permanently lost a few ships and about 300 planes in the PH raid. The rest of the capital ships were raised, fixed and sent back into the battle. (albeit after a few years)

Imagine the task forces sent out from PH to 'kick the Japs butt' have Pearl not been attacked. Chances are they would have continued to have been ruled by battleship men; using tactics that were obsolete and quite possibly lost all those same BB's in deep water. Would the carriers had to provide air cover for these slow moving TF's? The carriers themselves then could have ended up being sunk in these open ocean battles as they were tied to the slow moving BB's.

Draconis, very interesting question. I'll be watching the reply's.

 

[ivanotter]

It is an interesting question.

Do we assume that Japan was strides ahead in carrier tactics? Japan also had its battleship cheerleaders, looking for the decisive battle.