The nicest Versailles to Germany in 1919

What would be the nicest possible Versailles Treaty to Germany ? Let's say Clemenceau is extremely sick during the Conferency and is not able to defend France's point of view, so there is not GERMANY MUST DIE point of view in the Conferency, since France was the country that was quarter destroyed and lost the most people in the winner camp.
 
What would be the nicest possible Versailles Treaty to Germany ? Let's say Clemenceau is extremely sick during the Conferency and is not able to defend France's point of view, so there is not GERMANY MUST DIE point of view in the Conferency, since France was the country that was quarter destroyed and lost the most people in the winner camp.
It is an unfair myth propagated by Keynes and several decades of post-war German myth making and faulty scholarship that followed. In reality on most of the significant points of Versailles, France either marched in lock step with her allies, or was more lenient. Territoriality all of the Allied powers were in agreement on the French regaining Alsace-Lorraine, America was favorable towards Poles (admittedly the border might have been less favorable, but Germany was bound to lose important territory and the 14 points themselves required access to the sea, which could only reasonably be secured by territorial linkages) and from my recollection the Danes, and France abandoned her Rhineland ambitions at the treaty itself. Militarily it was the British who were most intent on destroying the German fleet, and the Anglo-American proposals for the German army were substantially harsher than the French ones - a reduction to 100,000 volunteers, as opposed to the French 200,000 conscript proposal (the Anglo-Americans got their way). The French themselves opposed a more thorough disarmament of Germany than what happened at Versailles. Economically all of the powers were in favor of German reparations, and British claims were even higher than the French at many times throughout negotiations - in face the initial French goal wasn't even for reparations, they wanted continued inter-allied economic cooperation, and large reparation demands were principally a bargaining tool. And the British were of course, the ones to introduce pensions as reparations, while French The "War Guilt Clause" or Article 231, was instituted by the Americans as it was drawn up purely by American lawyers, and the only French involvement was that Clemenceau made a stern response to German questioning on it which steered the Germans towards interpreting it as the war guilt clause. Colonial-wise the British took more colonial territory than the French. The only area where the French were notably more aggressive than the British and Americans was in the Rhineland, but they sacrificed that historically of course.

More likely without Clemenceau you get a French leader who is more interested in exactly what you propose, firm and concrete cuts into German power. Clemenceau proved willing to sacrifice quite a number of things in order to get the Anglo-American security guarantee for France (which both Britain and America proceeded quite shameful to not ratify...), and a replacement conservative leader would presumably be less anxious for - still aware of the need for foreign allies, but less willing to sacrifice terms upon the altar for it. I'd expect that whoever he is (Tardieu from my recollection) would probably neglect the attempt at the Anglo-American alliance and settle instead for the 1814 borders and a firmer occupation in the Rhineland. That is, if it changed at all, since much of the French leadership was of the same opinion. The only things that would be more "mild" is potentially Article 231 not being interpreted as a war guilt clause - the German government explicitly ordered their representative to the peace conference to not bring up Article 231 as a war guilt clause, which he disobeyed, so it wouldn't take much to budge it - and a smaller Polish territorial gain. The treaty would still continue to be viewed as excessively harsh by the Germans - even if the French weren't present at all in the negotiations.
 
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Okay ... I was guessing that a treaty that would be too nice to Germany would piss off France, so ... yeah, okay, I didn't know that, thanks
 
Pretty much the only thing which wasn't lenient considering the standards set by peace treaties of the time was the "sole war guilt" aspect, which really struck a nerve with the German people. But it's impossible to not give Germany war guilt, so at best you could also dump it on Austria and Hungary...

Otherwise, yeah, the Treaty of Versailles seemed unfair to the German people because World War One didn't feel like a loss to them, which is of course largely the blame of the German military, who actively tried to suppress information which could be seen as Germany being unable to win the war at any stage of it. So virtually any treaty which would affirm Germany as the loser of the war would be seen as unjust given those circumstances.

But comparing Versailles to other contemporary treaties like Trianon, Sèvres, Bucharest, or Brest-Litovsk, it's a downright gentle treaty.
 
Simple. Germany breaks through to surround Paris in 1914, partially or in full, forcing eventual French surrender as they bleed their manpower white in assault after assault on the dug in German forces. Eventually, they're simply unable to continue the war. Likewise, German forces win the race to the sea, capturing several ports on the Channel, playing merry hell with supply efforts for the BEF. Eventually the Allies seek peace, and offer to trade back German colonies in return for minimal German gains in Western Europe. Peace conference takes place at Versailles.
 
That's ... not what I asked, I guess I should have been more precise, but ... I meant, the Entente+US beat Central Empires and are going very soft on Germany, but meh, you can consider this thread dead
 
The lightest treaty you can get is essentially a return to the status quo, with the exception that German colonies overseas go to the Entente. But in real life that wouldn't have happened unless the war ended in a stalemate, with neither side clearly winning or losing. Perhaps going easy on war reparations and military restrictions is doable if a German defeat was less comprehensive.
 
One should remember that even paying the Versailles indeminities to their full would have cost the Germans ~2,5% of their GDP yearly. Considering they spent a bit over 3,5% of their GDP on military spending 1913, the payment was entirely possible, as military spending went way, way down with Versailles.

If the Germans had actually complied with Versailles instead of forming the Schwarzer Reichswehr, cheating on tonnage, destroying their own economy rather than pay the reparations and so on, they could very well pay.

The problem is as @Iserlohn says, the German people did not feel like they actually lost the war, and that the treaty was unfair, and thus politicians that fucked with it - even to the extent that it devastated Germany - were popular post-war.
 

Anchises

Banned
One should remember that even paying the Versailles indeminities to their full would have cost the Germans ~2,5% of their GDP yearly. Considering they spent a bit over 3,5% of their GDP on military spending 1913, the payment was entirely possible, as military spending went way, way down with Versailles.

If the Germans had actually complied with Versailles instead of forming the Schwarzer Reichswehr, cheating on tonnage, destroying their own economy rather than pay the reparations and so on, they could very well pay.

The problem is as @Iserlohn says, the German people did not feel like they actually lost the war, and that the treaty was unfair, and thus politicians that fucked with it - even to the extent that it devastated Germany - were popular post-war.

That is simply not true. The Reich was broken by 1918-1919, what where fully acceptable costs by 1913 simply weren't after WW1.

Sure, Germany might have been able to pay the reparations but it wouldn't have been easy. Stuff like putting a deliberately inflated number in the treaty, the war guilt clause and tearing away majority German areas made popular support for simply paying exceedingly unlikely.
 
One should remember that even paying the Versailles indeminities to their full would have cost the Germans ~2,5% of their GDP yearly. Considering they spent a bit over 3,5% of their GDP on military spending 1913, the payment was entirely possible, as military spending went way, way down with Versailles.

If the Germans had actually complied with Versailles instead of forming the Schwarzer Reichswehr, cheating on tonnage, destroying their own economy rather than pay the reparations and so on, they could very well pay.

The problem is as @Iserlohn says, the German people did not feel like they actually lost the war, and that the treaty was unfair, and thus politicians that fucked with it - even to the extent that it devastated Germany - were popular post-war.

Well, there's a slight caviat here: the method of spending created by pushing it into the military rather than shipping that same money off to Paris did work to create domestic throughput/employment and kept capital inside the German economy rather than creating a leakage of their limited monetary supply to France. Assuming the government has to take a harder money policy as part of playing the reparations straight (IE no abuse of the printing press), a combination of 2.5% of the production getting shipped out of the country, decreasing velocity of money as nominal GDP growth is much slower, credit tighter, and employment lower, ect. with no counter-cyclical efforts runs the very real risk of triggering a deflationary treadmill... and considering that the Weimer governments already had the average shelf life of red-band bananas such could destroy what little stability there was until somebody took a more populist financial policy.
 
Well, there's a slight caviat here: the method of spending created by pushing it into the military rather than shipping that same money off to Paris did work to create domestic throughput/employment and kept capital inside the German economy rather than creating a leakage of their limited monetary supply to France. Assuming the government has to take a harder money policy as part of playing the reparations straight (IE no abuse of the printing press), a combination of 2.5% of the production getting shipped out of the country, decreasing velocity of money as nominal GDP growth is much slower, credit tighter, and employment lower, ect. with no counter-cyclical efforts runs the very real risk of triggering a deflationary treadmill... and considering that the Weimer governments already had the average shelf life of red-band bananas such could destroy what little stability there was until somebody took a more populist financial policy.

Would the Germans have to just export a lot of goods to allow reparations, things the Germans were traditionally good at, manufactured products, dyes etc. (essentially the Allies would have to allow imports of those things, the Germans get money, and give it back in reparations. So domestic employment could still be created. The risk for the Allies is the German exports undermine their own economy.
 

Anchises

Banned
Would the Germans have to just export a lot of goods to allow reparations, things the Germans were traditionally good at, manufactured products, dyes etc. (essentially the Allies would have to allow imports of those things, the Germans get money, and give it back in reparations. So domestic employment could still be created. The risk for the Allies is the German exports undermine their own economy.

Kind of hard when most of your merchant marine is taken away, when international property of German companies is given to the Entente and when certain export markets are closed to Germany.

So rhe traditionally strong German export sector was also crippled.
 

Ramontxo

Donor
Well not as crippled as the northern more productive part of France was left by the Germans in the second of three invasions in seventy years. Not to speak of Belgium of course. And Brest Litovsk is not a fair comparison beacouse treatys imposed by Germany are not a fair comparison to these imposed on them.
 

Anchises

Banned
Well not as crippled as the northern more productive part of France was left by the Germans in the second of three invasions in seventy years. Not to speak of Belgium of course. And Brest Litovsk is not a fair comparison beacouse treatys imposed by Germany are not a fair comparison to these imposed on them.

Trying to moralize really isn't the point of the thread. However it is quite silly to compare 1871 or 1914 with 1940. In 1871 France declared war and in 1914 they were willing escalators. Belgium certainly was against international law but so was the blockade, trying to point fingers isn't really useful tbh.

From a Realpolitik angle France and Great Britain simply failed to create and uphold a stable post-war order. A "nicer" Versailles would have been a Versailles that only demanded things that Great Britain and France were actually able and willing to enforce.
 
Pretty much the only thing which wasn't lenient considering the standards set by peace treaties of the time was the "sole war guilt" aspect, which really struck a nerve with the German people. But it's impossible to not give Germany war guilt, so at best you could also dump it on Austria and Hungary...
They did.

Seriously, go READ the treaties in question.

The idea that Germany was held solely responsible is a lie.
 
Would the Germans have to just export a lot of goods to allow reparations, things the Germans were traditionally good at, manufactured products, dyes etc. (essentially the Allies would have to allow imports of those things, the Germans get money, and give it back in reparations. So domestic employment could still be created. The risk for the Allies is the German exports undermine their own economy.

A) Thats an iniative that can only be pursued by the private sector, not the government. Berlin can generate demand by increasing spending or, if you're willing to go commie, even moderately generate supply with state-owned industry/national workshops (though making those industires compedative for export...),but that requires an inflationary/loose monetary policy. An austerity/hard money policy basically prevents Germany from taking active iniatives to bolster the broader economy.

B) France and Britain have no incentive to do this. It hamstrings their own struggling, recovering industries, which are not only strategically important and who's health is key for any domestic government's popularity and stability (especially since having a large, under or unemployed urban-worker population isent good when the main rival ideology is communism), but they need exports of their own to get the currency to serve their debts to the Americans.
 
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