The Need for Speed: Technology Thread

Delta Force

Banned
What exactly is the POD for this timeline? I wonder if it stems mainly from somewhat better or faster early (well, medium-early, say late 1940s/early '50s) jet engine development. As I alluded to above, reading up on the development history of various jets (and for that matter, earlier piston planes too) a design was often hobbled in its early development and testing because the engine anticipated by the designers turned out not to be ready yet, or in some cases never did get finished at all, and they'd substitute in something else that wasn't as good but had the virtue of actually being available; then the plane would fail to meet its targets but often it seemed no one would say "well, let's see how it does with the right engines before we scrap it!" Sometimes I guess because it showed other flaws that a new engine would not fix. Maybe other times because by then it was well known the desired engine would never be ready and something else equivalent might be too hard to redesign the plane around?

So, if for some reason the general state of the art of engine development is several years ahead of the progress OTL, more often the right engine is available from the get-go; more often experimental planes get into flight envelopes that shed some light on problems and solutions that OTL designers had to grope after for longer, meaning more knowledge about how to get new designs right the first time, hence more success. Also, more confidence from financiers and political advocates that this or that project is a good bet to back, hence earlier starts and more time to work the bugs out before the changing military, political or economic situation moves the goalposts and makes designs obsolete or irrelevant.

Is that it, or what?

FWIW based on the two posts so far, it seems the Soviets are clearly ahead of the game OTL, at least in the field of engines and perhaps across the board. Is the POD then strictly in Russia, and do alternative developments in the West stem mainly from feeling more pressure to keep ahead (often perceived as a need to catch up?) If Western military project budgets are increased and standards for accepting designs somewhat laxer due to feeling the pressure, then on one hand I suppose the costs are higher and so is the accident rate in the air forces, but on the other this hothouse might make somewhat better tech available sooner for civil purposes, bought with more gold and blood to be sure.

So that's two guesses--better engines all round; better progress in the USSR driving more of it in the other bloc. Which comes closest, may I ask, or is it some third thing?

I do not really have a particular date for the PoD as much as butterflies starting in 1952 leading to different outcomes as time goes on. In this timeline, the development of strategic bombers and high speed interceptors continues for a few years after they were abandoned in favor of ballistic missiles.

The reason for such advanced aircraft being seen is that both sides are pursuing parallel development of strategic bombers, interceptors, ballistic missiles, and SAMs. Early ballistic missiles were unreliable and inaccurate. Skybolt and other airborne cruise missiles offer a way to circumvent SAMs to deliver more accurate and reliable nuclear strikes. Another advantage is that they are based on strategic bombers, so there are always bombers airborne ready to respond to an attack, and more on the ground able to do a scramble to get airborne and on the way to their bombing target within minutes. It is still an advantage enjoyed by strategic bombers nowadays (which is why to my knowledge all nuclear bombers have airborne weapons) and one that would be even more pronounced in the age of liquid fueled rockets, which can take up to a day to prepare for launch, after which they must be fired or returned to the factory for overhaul (their fuel being corrosive and/or cryogenic).
 
From what we've been told so far, the Western planes are sort of shuffled around a bit, but the only clear cases we've been told of yet of new types or notably superior results to OTL relate to planes developed directly in response to Russian stuff.

But the Soviet planes, on the other hand, sometimes as in the case of the M-50 are remarkably and clearly better than OTL. The M-50 works as advertised (well, well enough to be put into service anyway) and that's a big improvement over OTL. And it drives the American determination to come up with a nuclear-powered airplane, silly as that might look in retrospect. (OK, it might not look so silly if it leads to reasonably economical nuke planes that never have a spectacularly terrible nuclear accident, since it's unrealistic to assume any plane type will never ever crash that implies it has a heck of a containment system!)

I'm leaning toward, whatever "butterflies" may be transmitting changes as early as 1952, what stimulates them is indeed something going right in Russia, leading to their planes more often meeting or coming much closer to specs. Early on it would indeed take butterflies, later there is the alarming evidence coming in from spying and scouting out the USSR.
 
Here is an OTL airliner that got cancelled (political interference). And even then the project almost got resurrected. Maybe ITTL it does?

Jetliner.jpg
 
The thing about the Avro Jetliner--not only was it an apparently perfectly good plane, it was developed years earlier than any other jet seriously intended for regular passenger service!

Aside from "politics," which seems not too implausible but about which I don't really know, other reasons for the plane not to be accepted involved its range. It couldn't fly far enough for transAtlantic operations. Its fuel consumption suffered because of its engines--I've read that actually quite suitable engines that would lower fuel consumption were actually available, indeed IIRC made by Avro Canada itself! But alas, they had double the thrust of the engines chosen--it just seemed too risky in the 1940s to trust a passenger plane to just two engines, so they went with the best engine that delivered just 1/4 the thrust needed, which wasn't nearly as good.

Having derived the wacky notion of developing airship hook-on flight to a really grand scale during my years of airship obsession, when I learned of the sad fate of this jet I thought, "Hey, you needed to be developed in the alt-timeline where big airships routinely ply the traderoutes and certain passengers go faster via airplanes that fly partway across the Atlantic, hook on to an airship, take in more fuel (over land, it might exchange some passengers to, debarking those who plan to land in the regions this airship is going to pass over soon, embarking others who came up to the airship from this region and plan to go farther in the direction the jet is going), then launch again to continue on its way.

This might have been just what the AJ needed; it could greatly speed up transport along such routes, while avoiding the need to develop new service capabilities at airports.

But aside from such far fetched solutions, I honestly don't know what prevented anyone in North America or Europe from adopting it. Early jets were already very popular with passengers. You'd think US transcontinental markets would snap it up.

So I'm guessing the "politics" was, US aero manufacturers, unready as they were to come up with something competitive, were jealous and behind the scenes worked to throw up as many regulatory barriers and bad rumors to poison its reputation and make the airlines hesitate as they could manage, thus closing off the US market. The Canadian market may have been insufficient on its own to justify the cost of production (but if that wasn't true, the advocates of the "Politics" explanation have some 'splainin' to do--why wasn't this first-ever jetliner, made in Canada, first accepted at least in Canada?) so then the question remains what of the European market--which sort of answers itself--it would suffer from the same jealous "not invented here" syndrome compounded by being fragmented into many separate nations, making the whole business of jet travel just a bit more problematic.

So aside from the airship-cluttered alt timeline I dream of, the trick of the Avro Jetliner would seem to be, get some American customer to look at it, realize it's perfect for their needs and will wow the socks off their customers, and tell the naysaying American designers to take a hike, or come back when they have something as good or better.

The thing is, for this timeline, the American designer scene is somewhat subtly changed, with some planes being made earlier and others made better and a few being made that weren't made at all. But for some American airline to accept the AJ and start beating the pants off their customers before 1950 would be to take the gameboard and give it a good shaking! The American scene would be totally, not subtly, different.

One can suppose that in addition to the limitations the AJ wore on its sleeve (not dishonorably; it was after all the earliest jetliner by years, and the earliest one that got accepted turned out to have flaws too) mainly hinging on limitations of its engine and associated limited range, in service it too like the Comet might have turned out to have some unanticipated drawback, perhaps not a fatal one like the Comet, but it could be that given a trial in the actual marketplace it wouldn't turn out to be quite as good as it looked.

That would be sad, I think. Not too unrealistic though!

Or politics trumps early vision and scrappy little guys coming up with the winning first with most solution as OTL--also sad, but the one thing this timeline can't have, given what's already established in the first post about the pace of development of Comet and Boeing's offer, is that the AJ makes it.:(
 
I would love to see the Avro Jetliner flying. Damn political interference.

Convoluted political interference. It would be acceptable if it were powered by two engines which were not yet working and wouldn't be available if they were. They could have just said "forget it" in the first place, but Avro Canada couldn't see the sarcasm.
 
And it drives the American determination to come up with a nuclear-powered airplane, silly as that might look in retrospect. (OK, it might not look so silly if it leads to reasonably economical nuke planes that never have a spectacularly terrible nuclear accident, since it's unrealistic to assume any plane type will never ever crash that implies it has a heck of a containment system!)
:confused:
Can you build a nuke plane? Yes, there are a couple of possibilities. Can you build one that is "reasonably economical" and not a disaster waiting to happen? No.

How do you build a nuke plane. 2 options, basically, you can either do a nuclear jet (e.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Pluto) where you use a VERY, VERY hot reactor to heat air and push it out the back. Doing that without spilling radioactivity into the air being pushed through means shields between the radioactive fuel and the air, which slows heat transfer, which...

Or you can go with a prop plane with electric engines and a nuclear generating station on board. There you have even more fun. Work out the mass/power ratio of even the lightest reactors, calculate how much power e.g. a Boeing Pelican would need and figure out the weight of the reactor. My back-of-the envelop calculations done a while back suggested the plane wouldn't even get off the ground (by about an order of magnitude if my memory is correct, which it may not be). You MIGHT get around this by using really highly enriched fuel, but then you'd better hope the plane never crashes...
 
:confused:
Can you build a nuke plane?
I can't build anything. Also I think they are generally a stupid idea.

Yes, there are a couple of possibilities. Can you build one that is "reasonably economical" and not a disaster waiting to happen? No.

How do you build a nuke plane. 2 options, basically, you can either do a nuclear jet (e.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Pluto) where you use a VERY, VERY hot reactor to heat air and push it out the back. Doing that without spilling radioactivity into the air being pushed through means shields between the radioactive fuel and the air, which slows heat transfer, which...

Or you can go with a prop plane with electric engines and a nuclear generating station on board. There you have even more fun. Work out the mass/power ratio of even the lightest reactors, calculate how much power e.g. a Boeing Pelican would need and figure out the weight of the reactor. My back-of-the envelop calculations done a while back suggested the plane wouldn't even get off the ground (by about an order of magnitude if my memory is correct, which it may not be). You MIGHT get around this by using really highly enriched fuel, but then you'd better hope the plane never crashes...


There was this 1970s RAND study book, on possible alternative fuel approaches to really big airplanes, that doted on a third nuclear power scheme you haven't acknowledged as possible--using a relatively compact liquid-metal cooled reactor to transfer heat, through a secondary coolant loop, directly to radiators corresponding to the combustion chamber of turbofan engines. For purposes of keeping the arrangement compact, he had the reactor occupying the region of the fuselage right at the joint of the wings to the main body, and the engines all clustered on top right there, to minimize the distance the liquid metal (some sodium/potassium mix) had to travel).

So I suspect that might work; another approach would be to have an advanced gas-cooled reactor that does not use air but say helium as the working gas, which is run directly through sealed power turbines and then cooled and recycled (one might compactly cool it by using the still-hot turbine exhaust to boil water and run a secondary steam engine for auxiliary power, for instance), then take the power from the main turbines, via mechanical shafts or electricity, to drive fans that perform aerodynamically more like turbofans than turboprops. Or for that matter, props can be very effective, as per say the Soviet/Russian Tupolev "Bear" bomber for instance!

Would it be smart? I doubt it. The sheer mass breakdown of the system becomes more competitive with conventionally combusting systems at larger sizes, especially when one factors in minimum necessary shielding mass--this becomes proportionately smaller at bigger sizes. Go somewhat bigger and it breaks even economically even with cheap fuel rivalling it, somewhat sooner if avgas and other combustible alternates are very expensive. But it's a big cost upfront; it takes a lot of financing and a lot of government bureaucracy giving it a thumbs-up to be done, no easy starts with small scale versions to prove the concept.

Then too safety is a huge and uncertain cost. What does it take to guarantee a crashing plane won't shatter or splash its reactor core all over the landscape and inject it as fine poisonous dust into the air, or leak all over the seafloor? (Not to mention the risks of rouge nations and money-grubbing opportunists catering to them, or various non-governmental fringe groups, scavenging the stuff for their own fell purposes!) The RAND guy made all sorts of promises of the safe integrity of his conceptual liquid-metal cooled reactor, asserting that it could be sealed off and hardened to survive a crash intact. Should we believe him?

And as I think I sketched out already here, it isn't clear to me what mission the dang things should have. The RAND study wound up mostly favoring simply synthesizing conventional hydrocarbon fuel as least risk and competitive overall cost, with the prospect of a hydrogen-fueled version (bigger fuselage than any other for the target, but smaller take-off weight and hence smaller wings) but just couldn't let the nuke go. Certainly for a narrow niche of missions where the plane would ideally be kept aloft for many days or more, ie very long loiter time, he made a case. To be sure we hardly see the need for that OTL! For long range I personally like hydrogen; for wacky stuff like supersonic airborne rocket launch I think Nukes would be a profoundly stupid approach.

I actually think airborne nukes have their best niche in really big airships, but since those are relegated to ASB by the establishment as it is, I don't think it's any loss we haven't developed airborne nukes to speak of.

OTL that is. ITTL, the Air Force snookered itself into splurging on one* and now they are stuck with a military white elephant. They'd do well to make some lemonade out of this lemon, so surely studies are well underway for applications where the damn thing makes at least marginal sense. Like, airborne command posts much bigger than the 747 based ones of OTL, or perhaps subsonic airborne ballistic missile launchers suitable for something like the MX, or a whole quiver of Minutemen. The thing about such admittedly marginal missions is that they'd benefit from staying airborne for a good long time without refueling, so the nuke comes in handy there.

And for some of these missions they can promise to orbit around far from inhabited land, so if something goes wrong and it crashes, at least it isn't crashing on Sheboygan!
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*A lot of the OTL inflation of Soviet capabilities and subsequent 'Gap' panics was the Air Force cherry-picking the evidence for a worst-case scenario that would get them maximum funding, I suppose the same thing happened here--building on more objectively alarming real Soviet evidence, they made an even bigger scarecrow for Congress and Presidential candidates to gibber about, and hand their favorite contractors yet another big blank check.

In general I guess ITTL, especially if it turns out that the POD is basically the Russians doing better, Eisenhower still gives his warnings about the overweening Military Industrial Complex and all that, but his personal tipping point is on a greater scale, given objective evidence of clearly better Soviet capability than OTL. And the tax burden on the USA is somewhat higher, which might not necessarily translate into a worse standard of living as a certain amount of Keynesian recycling worked well in the '50s and early '60s. The big taxpayers, the big corporations and their stockholders, were also likely to benefit directly from the pork. Perhaps the Devil's due bill comes in the form of a sooner or sharper slowdown into "stagflation" in the late '60s; perhaps it never comes due at all and there is just a proportionately bigger downturn from a proportionately bigger maximum economic performance.

So in that latter optimistic case, the money for extra frilly high-tech wankery a la Gerry Anderson's Thunderbirds comes from simply "making the pie higher" as George W Bush so masterfully put it. Or if one believes a price must be paid somewhere--I leave it up to the timeline author to tell us where the axe falls in his view. I'm willing to believe that there was a certain margin to be expanded in that generation and dynamics go much as OTL.

If someone wants to suggest that this timeline actually works out better economically, in the sense of totally avoiding stagflation eventually happening or something like that, I'll tsk at them. Just arguing that we could probably have inflated the 50s-60s booms some more without changing the basic dynamic strikes me as Santa Clausish enough for the season!
 
By the way, Dathi, what's up with CanadaWank being left to languish? Have you looked at my latest post there? Also one in Lands of Ice and Mice, where I sketch out why I think the Catholic convert erstwhile Prince of Wales was a sensible move of yours.

Or, you know, the Turtledove nomination thread where I beg you for an excuse to add it?

Have you formally declared it dead somewhere I haven't seen (and why not in the thread itself?) or what?

I just recently discovered it you see and I think it's very good. So what happened?
 
look at post #23 by RCAF Brat

And mine. I don't have my references handy; I believed that the plane was actually flying and ready to sell long before Comet reached that stage.

It could be that had it been developed and flown as much as Comet was, flaws would have shown up in its design too. But I'm willing to believe otherwise obviously!
 
And mine. I don't have my references handy; I believed that the plane was actually flying and ready to sell long before Comet reached that stage.

It could be that had it been developed and flown as much as Comet was, flaws would have shown up in its design too. But I'm willing to believe otherwise obviously!

From the article, one design flaw did show up during what testing was done on the prototype: Noticeable cracks in the wing spar. Noticeable in that the pilots heard cracking while the plane was on a flight from Toronto to New York and refused to fly it back. The plane was taken a apart and shipped back by rail where it got a redesigned, stronger wing spar. (It was later discovered that the cause was not in the wing spar but in that the engines were attached too closely/tightly to it, which would have been cheaper to fix...) So there were issues with the design, and I'd bet that the metal fatigue issue could well have shown up in this plane too.

It's still too bad that the thing didn't go into production. Imagine jet airliners ten years early.
 
Wasn't the metal fatigue issue on the Comet one centered on the windows; not being perfectly round they concentrated stress on the corners as the plane flexed in varying air pressure, so eventually the fuselage snapped? Or was that an additional issue of metal fatigue, that would have been a problem if other parts didn't break down first?

Douglas and Boeing had more experience with high-altitude pressurized cabins; but metal-fatigue issues might have plagued anyone who pushed ahead to higher-altitude, stratospheric high-speed (hence high and varying stress) fast jetliners; whoever went first got to be the canary in the coal mine. Boeing of course "went first" in that they were picked for the US Air Force long-range strategic jet bombers, the B-47 and -52.

The prototype B-52 had an extended fighter-type bubble canopy on top, similar to the layout of the B-47; in the latter operational version there was some cabin room for auxiliary crew to rattle around in but it was very cramped. The '-52 evolved into having more of a passenger/cargo plane/traditional bomber type flight deck.

Just saying, on the early designs they largely sidestepped the issue of how to provide good pressurized shirt-sleeved cabins by treating the crew largely like fighter crew, in a bubble stuck on top hence fewer windows and less of a pressurized interior cabin, so really they were rolling the dice along with everyone else designing the 707, as far as that went. But they did have Stratoliner experience to draw on. And the B-29 and -36.
 
The failure of the Comet became a milestone in the development of studies, procedures, and testing aircraft structures and materials, and in the genesis of the fail-safe design methodology and damage-tolerance philosophy. But pressurized fuselage tubes were not the only items subject to failure. B-47 wings and Lockheed Electra engine mounts also suffered multiple catastrophic failures. While 2 and 7 series aluminum alloys are pretty well understood now, the gradual change to the various composites and nanu-nanu-tubular materials is a whole new ballgame.
 

Delta Force

Banned
I was unaware of the efforts to revive the Avro Jetliner, so was going to discount it. Thanks for bringing it up though, as there were indeed efforts to revive it, with production by Convair no less. I wanted to see Convair as a player in the SST market in this timeline, so a more successful 1950s and early 1960s with the Convair Jetliner and Convair 880 and 990 will put them in a much better position. Having Boeing get off to a less impressive start will also help Convair. You will see what I mean in the next update.

How is retroconning looked on? I will have to do a slight bit of retrocon to account for the Jetliner (the Convair Jetliner is the second jetliner, the Tu-104 becomes the third, Boeing 707 forth), but things will generally be the same.
 
Hoping this bit of advice is not too late...

...don't have Convair base its first SST too directly on the B-58. I know OTL there were some suggestions they should have done just that.

But it turned out the Hustler had an atrocious safety record, and one reason for that (maybe the big reason) was trouble with engine aerodynamics. The engines themselves were subject to sudden "unstarts," which is disastrous enough for a passenger plane. Placed as they were, shock waves from engine suddenly failing could trigger a failure in another one.

So either Convair does it better the first time around, with either the engines being better so they don't shut down so unpredictably in the first place, or Convair noticing the cascade danger in design or early testing and they somehow rejigger the engine placement to hold that problem in check--or the plane is accepted by the Air Force as it was OTL, the poor safety record (and quite a few dead flight crew and totaled ultra-expensive bombers) racks up as OTL--but Convair has the time and wisdom to go back to the drawing board for their first passenger SST.

I wonder if something as simple as having a tri-jet arrangement (still with 4 engines, one each on each wingtip, the other two buried in the fuselage and exhausting through the tail like their F-102/106 interceptor design) would at least solve the unstart chain reaction problem. The Soviet M-50 has a somewhat different arrangement of its engines, sort of halfway between the Hustler's straightforward evenly spaced pods and my radical tip-and-fuselage suggestion; perhaps fortuitiously (or even because the Russians anticipated that possible problem in design?) it exempted it. OTL of course the M-50 was a failure so it could be it never encountered it just because a) very few flights were made and b) the plane was underpowered, never reaching its intended flight envelope.

The B-58 was also very expensive to make and operate. Its crew was crammed into fighter-like seats, its fuselage was just about entirely filled with fuel; to carry out bomber missions it required a pod strapped on below that was largely a fuel tank for the outward leg of the mission and also contained the bombs; there was no bomb bay integral to the airplane itself. (One SST proposal of sorts was to make it a very very expensive executive jet by cramming a few passengers into the space the bomb would have gone in, in a pod permanently attached).

Mind, unlike the OTL M-50 (and apparently like the one ITTL) it did reach its design flight envelope. And it racked up records along with Air Force obituaries.

My Dad was a career USAF interceptor pilot; he recently told me he did meet some former B-58 pilots (during training for bombing missions over North Vietnam--not in B-58s; these SAC guys were overseeing the training and development of F-105 pilots). They didn't say a whole lot about it.

Dad himself mainly flew F-106s as long as they flew, then F-16s for the rest of his career.

How much did he like the '106? Well, he put vanity plates on my Mom's car, F-16. He put F-105 on his truck. And he reserves F-106 for his beloved Cadillac!

Convair in his view got that one right. A fairly modest supersonic jetliner operating in the range of say up to Mach 1.6 might well wind up having a family resemblance to both the '102/'106 and the Hustler.

Just don't make it too close to the latter or damn things will never pass regulatory muster!

Also, one reason the B-58 was such a budget-buster even before having to start writing off crashed planes was, it was meant to go very fast very far. I'm going to repeat a suggestion I made in the SST WI thread that got started recently, bowing to the authority of Barnes Wallis, that an early SST should concentrate on achieving the Mach speeds where the thermal shock heating raises the temperature of stratospheric air not much above surface air temperatures, to get the most use out of standard aeronautical alloys and to minimize air conditioning needs and the like. Those speeds are down around Mach 1.4, I believe. Not all that impressive, but if the plane can be made in some combination early and economical, it might carve itself a solid niche and make some respectable sales.
 

Delta Force

Banned
Shevek, thank you for your advice. I plan on having Convair do some basic experimentation with the B-58, but not using it as an SST. Something that is dangerous and a maintenance nightmare for USAF aircrew and maintenance personnel is obviously not something that will ever be useful for someone who has to convince airlines to buy the aircraft. The flying public is also unlikely to want to get into a cramped airliner with a dubious safety record. Better to get there slower than not at all.

As for the Avro Jetliner, it is going to be retconned into the timeline now (likely license produced by Convair). The Arrow will also survive in this timeline, making Canada a larger player in aerospace than in OTL (at least in the military sphere). I could use a bit of advice on how this makes Canada's aerospace industry play out in the 1960s. Perhaps Avro Canada is sold to Convair and becomes a major propeller aircraft brand (as Canadian aerospace companies were and have been in OTL). Another possibility is an equitable merger (Convair and Avro Canada being very strong partners) creating Convair-Avro. Any thoughts on what direction Canadian aerospace will take?
 
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Shevek, thank you for your advice. I plan on having Convair do some basic experimentation with the B-58, but not using it as an SST. Something that is dangerous and a maintenance nightmare for USAF aircrew and maintenance personnel is obviously not something that will ever be useful for someone who has to convince airlines to buy the aircraft. The flying public is also unlikely to want to get into a cramped airliner with a dubious safety record. Better to get there slower than not at all.

As for the Avro Jetliner, it is going to be retconned into the timeline now (likely license produced by Convair). The Arrow will also survive in this timeline, making Canada a larger player in aerospace than in OTL (at least in the military sphere). I could use a bit of advice on how this makes Canada's aerospace industry play out in the 1960s. Perhaps Avro Canada is sold to Convair and becomes a major propeller aircraft brand (as Canadian aerospace companies were and have been in OTL). Another possibility is an equitable merger (Convair and Avro Canada being very strong partners) creating Convair-Avro. Any thoughts on what direction Canadian aerospace will take?

It would be interesting to see the Jetliner manufactured in the Canadair facility, managed by Convair with government support. The convoluted alterations to OTL required, keeping in mind the egos, political bias, and business machinations inherent in the era, will require incredible agility and finesse to avoid potential accusations of silliness and naivete. The Jetliner died because TCA didn't want it. The Arrow died because the air force specification was too ambitious, with at least some goals being beyond reach. Compromise was never considered. Keeping GD's nose out of the picture is just the icing. Sorry I can't help, but I do await the fairy tale. Please keep in mind that aviation firms and airlines not located in Quebec, historically, were, if not suppressed, not encouraged.
 
...Please keep in mind that aviation firms and airlines not located in Quebec, historically, were, if not suppressed, not encouraged.

Why was that? Was it some influence of Great Britain, operating informally through corporate channels and perhaps formally through the remaining channels of imperial authority, having traction in the Anglophone-dominated provinces, but not in Quebec? Was it some stubborn mindset in the Anglophone provinces that airplanes were not something loyal Canadians aspired to, that the Quebecois did not share? Was it a matter of the Imperial system having long ago set up Quebec to be the center of aeronautics in British North America and that role persisting by inertia?

Or what?

It's obviously hard for me to imagine a rational reason for this sort of localization of Canadian aeronautical enterprise, so I'm reaching with some pretty silly suppositions. (The last one would be sort of rational, but weak, one would think--if someone in BC or Alberta wanted to develop some kind of aircraft they might suffer a bit from a lack of infrastructure devoted to aviation around them, but clearly the USA did not have a single geographic center of aviation that attracted all enterprise to base itself there, neither did Britain for that matter, so clearly that's a weak force at best.)

So say on--why would Canadian society work that way, to channel all Canadian aeronautical enterprise to Quebec or discourage it?
 
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