So I we writing that kickass story, or what?
Look, sorry, but I can't consider a story which must logically result in millions of helpless Soviets being slaughtered without mercy in the most savage ways "kickass". Sorry, I know it's something of a personal hang-up with me, and please don't take this as an attack on anybody's motives, but I'm not really comfortable with the whole idea of this thread.
That idea seems to be pretty flagrant pro-Nazi handwaves ("old globes" and Stalin taking actions which cross from paranoia to outright suicide) to create otherwise implausible outcomes, and I have to ask:
why would any reasonable person want to fly in the face of plausibility and, using what amounts to magic, extricate the Nazis from the inescapable diplomatic dilemma that their absurdly aggressive foreign and economic policy led them into? Why would anybody invoke the impossible
to let the Nazis win, if they were really aware what Nazi victory entailed?
Nazis aren't cool.
How about the Soviets invade Poland first, and Germany (opportunistically betrays the Soviets and) moves in to "defend" Poland from the "Red Menace"?
To clarify, the Soviets didn't just enter Poland
second, they entered after the Polish campaign was for all practical purposes over. Warsaw's situation was hopeless, Poland's field units had been cut to pieces, and the Germans had pushed right into areas of the designated Soviet sphere which they then evacuated - including a siege of Lwow, which reduced any potential escapes via the "Romanian bridgehead" to a trickle. And the Soviets were still moving
forward on their planned dates for the invasion, because the Germans had beaten Poland faster than they'd expected.
The only reason there was any fighting worth mentioning was because the Red Army was pretty crap, and local Polish home-guard who were in no sense mobile units capable of opposing the Germans in the field were able to hold them up.
Drafting Barbarossa was launched only in July 1940. Untill that time there was no plan of invasion to the USSR.
That's an excellent point, and it rather goes to show how little the German command even considered the idea of going to Russia before France.
Quite. What has to be remembered is that not even British Prime Ministers can transform there every whim into government policy, not if their convictions are as quixotic as Chamberlain's had gotten after Prague. In spite of how actually doing something for Poland was a military impossibility (something not true of CZS),
not declaring war over Poland was a
political impossibility.
The Allies could also secure Norway if they are not keen in invading Germany from the West.
That could mean trouble for Germany in the long run.
I'm not so sure, actually. What the Allies got from the Norwegian campaign was the merchant fleet, which was theirs either way. All the Germans got was some bases to pursue the strategically futile air and sea campaigns against Britain, and a big liability that they had to garrison with troops who could have been in Russia.