The Nazi Invasion of the Soviet Union, 1941...

MacCaulay

Banned
...so as most folks know, I'm really not that adept at Second World War history. Sure, I know a fair amount about the T-34/76 and /85, the Aleutian Campaign, and the Canadian Army, but apart from that I've got a fair number of blanks. After reading Red Inferno: 1945 by Robert Conroy, I've kind of gotten into the whole WWII thing, which is quite interesting. So obviously I'm thinking up a lot of obvious questions, and I figured I'd throw this one out there.

The concept (which I'm sure has been done to death) is simple: The German government decides that it's main foe is not in the West, but in the East. Consequently, Hitler doesn't launch an invasion of the Low Countries or France, and instead goes ahead with Operation Barbarossa in 1941 against the USSR.

So, I ask you o Second World War buffs...what is the general thought on the board of what would've happened in a war that only involved Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union?
 

Typo

Banned
That would be interesting. But keep in mind Germany and the west were already at War in 1939.

But the west might very well be tempted to let the phony war continue indefinitely.
 

Cook

Banned
My immediate thought would be that Hitler would lack the resources to launch something on the scale of Barbarossa without conquering the west, or at least pressuring France into another bloodless Munich style back down that gives him access to more resourses.

By the way, did you mean Barbarossa on schedule in 1941 or was that a typo and you meant 1940?
 
They still need to leave important forces in the west to prevent an Anglo-French offensive. They are willingly entering Germany's military nightmare, aka, war on two fronts.
 

Cook

Banned
A few months back this same subject came up.

I put forth the scenario that the invasion of Norway and Denmark would go ahead but Hitler would postpone the Invasion of France until the Norway campaign was decided.

Staggered at the efficiency of the Germans in Scandinavia, the French and British accept a peace conference hosted by Mussolini as a way of avoiding defeat.

Hitler gets substantial concessions, not territory in the west but major disarmament by France as guarantee of the new status quo, and of course both Britain and France demobilise.
 
As other have said, do we mean "Germany attacks Russia instead of France" or "Germany does not attack France but attacks Russia on schedule"? Very differant scenarios, but the basic problem with both is the same.

Now, in 1940... I can't claim any extensive knowledge of the military situation. Germany would miss all the lorries they plundered from France, but it seems to me that Russia is in a drastically worse position: the buffer consists of troops who've just moved into eastern Poland and sweet fanny adams in the Baltic states to stand between the panzers and Leningrad; the Red Army is considerably smaller and no more prepared. Romania stays out, there's one mercy. Finland... hmm. This is presumably summer, 1940 (it took the Germans time to replenish stocks of ammunition from the Polish campaign, IIRC). Has the Scandinavian campaign happened or not? That's a major factor in Finnish involvement.

If it was Germany and the USSR, mano-a-mano, I'd foresee a farely rapid fall of Leningrad (especially with Finnish involvement) and the Soviets in general being pushed back and mauled even more severely than OTL. The eventual result would be German victory.

Thing is, the Entente were already at war, and their failure to do anything much was a matter of command and government uncertainty, dawdling, and miscalculation, not some sort of appeasing sentiment (not that the pro-German and rabidly anti-Soviet elements had ceased to exist, of course). We thought the war would be like WW1, and there we needed to build up our forces until we could strike Germany with the certainty of victory. And of course the Germans did manage an overwhelming military success using innovative methods before the Entente's vastly superior potential could be mobilised.

So as others have said, if the Germans chose to send the biggest part of their army to Russia, they'd be leaving themselves completely open to attack - and the French did attack them, a small abortive offensive across the Saarland - in their crucial industrial zone and thus practically immediate defeat.

The consequences of a likely anti-Hitler putsch with Entente troops on the Rhine and Germans in Leningrad are interesting enough, but the thing is no sane German government would invite defeat in such a way.

As for waiting until 1941 but not attacking France, well, Britain and France now have plenty of time to mobilise those resources. Same basic problem.

As for a peace after Norway: the mood in Britain was not a peacemaking mood. It was a mood that celebrated defeat and narrow escape in France by affirming a crazily stubborn diehard's assumption of the premiership. Any government that tried to make peace would see the backbenches explode.
 
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MacCaulay

Banned
Thanks for the replies!

I'll refine my question... Suppose that for whatever reason, Poland is not backed by the Franco-British alliance. I don't know why...they've got old globes in Paris and London and they don't have Poland on them. Hitler invades Poland, which stands alone.
A week later, the USSR invades as well to get it's share of the pie and the borders are moved until they meet. The Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht wait six months to recoup and after that, Hitler gives the order to initiate the invasion of the Soviet Union.

How's that?
 

Cook

Banned
I read David Faber’s “Munich” recently. In it he mentions that at one stage Chamberlain wanted to publicly declare that British foreign policy interests extended only as far as the Rhine. (ie. France and the Low Countries)

This was prior to the guarantee to Poland obviously, and if it had been made official policy would pretty much have ruled out reassuring Poland.
 
Thanks for the replies!

I'll refine my question... Suppose that for whatever reason, Poland is not backed by the Franco-British alliance. I don't know why...they've got old globes in Paris and London and they don't have Poland on them. Hitler invades Poland, which stands alone.
A week later, the USSR invades as well to get it's share of the pie and the borders are moved until they meet. The Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht wait six months to recoup and after that, Hitler gives the order to initiate the invasion of the Soviet Union.

How's that?

How about the Soviets invade Poland first, and Germany (opportunistically betrays the Soviets and) moves in to "defend" Poland from the "Red Menace"?
 
As other have said, do we mean "Germany attacks Russia instead of France" or "Germany does not attack Russia but attacks France on schedule"? Very differant scenarios.

Now, in 1940... I can't claim any extensive knowledge of the military situation. Germany would miss all the lorries they plundered from France, but it seems to me that Russia is in a drastically worse position: the buffer consists of troops who've just moved into Poland and sweet fanny adams in the Baltic states to stand between the panzers and Leningrad, the army is considerably smaller and no more prepared. Romania stays out, there's one mercy. Finland... hmm. This is presumably summer, 1940 (it took the Germans time to replenish stocks of ammunition from the Polish campaign, IIRC). Has the Scandinavian campaign happened or not? That's a major factor in Finnish involvement.

If it was Germany and the USSR, mano-a-mano, I'd foresee a farely rapid fall of Leningrad (especially with Finnish involvement) and the Soviets in general being pushed back and mauled even more severely than OTL. The eventual result would be German victory.

Thing is, the Entente were already at war, and their failure to do anything much was a matter of command and government uncertainty, dawdling, and miscalculation, not some sort of appeasing sentiment (not that the pro-German and rabidly anti-Soviet elements had ceased to exist, of course). We thought the war would be like WW1, and there we needed to build up our forces until we could strike Germany with the certainty of victory. And of course the Germans did manage an overwhelming military success using innovative methods before the Entente's vastly superior potential could be mobilised.

So as others have said, if the Germans chose to send the biggest part of their army to Russia, they'd be leaving themselves completely open to attack - and the French did attack them, a small abortive offensive across the Saarland - in their crucial industrial zone and practically immediate defeat.

The consequences of a likely anti-Hitler putsch with Entente troops on the Rhine and Germans in Leningrad are interesting enough, but the thing is no sane German government would invite defeat in such a way.

As for waiting until 1941 but not attacking France, well, Britain and France now have plenty of time to mobilise those resources. Same basic problem.

As for a peace after Norway: the mood in Britain was not a peacemaking mood. it was a mood that celebrated defeat and narrow escape by affirming a crazily stubborn diehard's assumption of the premiership. Any government that tried to make peace would see the backbenches explode.

I Blame Communism

Brilliant exposition. A lot of the posters here are ignoring the fact that after Hitler swallowed up the rest of Czechoslovakia (as Churchill predicted in Parliament) no one EXCEPT Chamberlain still trusted that man. Politically, in Europe, it had become impossible to believe that Hitler would make any agreement that he wouldn't betray as soon as it suited him to do so. By taking Czechoslovakia, Hitler destroyed any semblance of the balance of power in Europe. He had gained Czechoslovakia's industries, aircraft, and gold supplies without firing a shot. This made the guarantee to Poland an imperative in every sense of the word (politically, economically, and militarily). Once the Soviet/German Non-Aggression Pact was signed, war was inevitable.

Churchill had been completely vindicated. If Chamberlain had tried to wriggle out from under a German invasion of Poland, Churchill would have broken Chamberlain in the House of Commons and taken his place as PM. Winston simply wouldn't have had the universal support (in this scenario) in Sep '39 that he enjoyed in May '40. Churchill knew this. That's why when Chamberlain told him (On the day of Poland's invasion) of his wish to have Churchill join his "war cabinet" he agreed. He knew full well that Chamberlain wasn't going to have Winston Churchill in his cabinet UNLESS he was indeed issuing a DoW.

As far as a "Russia First" strategy? AFAIK, NO ONE, anywhere, advocated going after Russia before France. For the reasons stated by you and others. The Entente was only going to get stronger. Time was not on Germany's side. Russia's current 5 Year Plan would finish in 1942. That was Stalin's schedule for a target year for war with Hitler. The Entente planned for 1941. Germany had to act fast and first. The margin for Germany in the East is not great, but it's near zero in the West. Some of the most important strategic targets in Germany are right on or near the French border. For this reason above all, Russia first is a non-starter.
 
Russia tricked into attacking first

How about the Soviets invade Poland first, and Germany (opportunistically betrays the Soviets and) moves in to "defend" Poland from the "Red Menace"?

IF Hitler could pull it off :confused: this would swing the anti-communist's in France and Britain behind Germany and effectively end any chance of a two front war.

The trick would be getting Stalin to go into Poland first instead of second, which is how they did it OTL. Presumably leaking 'secret plans' for a Nazi attack with the west's backing - don't try to tell me that the man was not paranoid enough to believe such a story, its just if he would ATTACK based on it - and then one of the Austrian paperhanger's patented screaming rants on the 'the crusade to stop the Bolshevik Hordes' to rally the rest of Europe behind him.

A Soviet attack would change the entire moral/political dynamic of the war. When the Nazi's attacked the USSR one US politician apparently stated '...it's a shame they can't both lose'. The Soviets coming west again - the Poles stopped them in the early 20's - would make selling it as a war of self-preservation easy. Attacking Germany while they fought the Red's would be a non-starter, even Churchill wouldn't go for that, and assuming Hitler wins he comes out as a hero, 'saviour of civilisation' and ruler of most of what he wanted without the risk of fighting France and Britain.

Note the size of the 'if' I started this posting with, however
 
The Allies could also secure Norway if they are not keen in invading Germany from the West.
That could mean trouble for Germany in the long run.
 

Stalker

Banned
My immediate thought would be that Hitler would lack the resources to launch something on the scale of Barbarossa without conquering the west, or at least pressuring France into another bloodless Munich style back down that gives him access to more resourses.

By the way, did you mean Barbarossa on schedule in 1941 or was that a typo and you meant 1940?
Drafting Barbarossa was launched only in July 1940. Untill that time there was no plan of invasion to the USSR.
 
So I we writing that kickass story, or what? :D

Look, sorry, but I can't consider a story which must logically result in millions of helpless Soviets being slaughtered without mercy in the most savage ways "kickass". Sorry, I know it's something of a personal hang-up with me, and please don't take this as an attack on anybody's motives, but I'm not really comfortable with the whole idea of this thread.

That idea seems to be pretty flagrant pro-Nazi handwaves ("old globes" and Stalin taking actions which cross from paranoia to outright suicide) to create otherwise implausible outcomes, and I have to ask: why would any reasonable person want to fly in the face of plausibility and, using what amounts to magic, extricate the Nazis from the inescapable diplomatic dilemma that their absurdly aggressive foreign and economic policy led them into? Why would anybody invoke the impossible to let the Nazis win, if they were really aware what Nazi victory entailed?

Nazis aren't cool.

How about the Soviets invade Poland first, and Germany (opportunistically betrays the Soviets and) moves in to "defend" Poland from the "Red Menace"?

To clarify, the Soviets didn't just enter Poland second, they entered after the Polish campaign was for all practical purposes over. Warsaw's situation was hopeless, Poland's field units had been cut to pieces, and the Germans had pushed right into areas of the designated Soviet sphere which they then evacuated - including a siege of Lwow, which reduced any potential escapes via the "Romanian bridgehead" to a trickle. And the Soviets were still moving forward on their planned dates for the invasion, because the Germans had beaten Poland faster than they'd expected.

The only reason there was any fighting worth mentioning was because the Red Army was pretty crap, and local Polish home-guard who were in no sense mobile units capable of opposing the Germans in the field were able to hold them up.

Drafting Barbarossa was launched only in July 1940. Untill that time there was no plan of invasion to the USSR.

That's an excellent point, and it rather goes to show how little the German command even considered the idea of going to Russia before France.

-insightful analysis-

Quite. What has to be remembered is that not even British Prime Ministers can transform there every whim into government policy, not if their convictions are as quixotic as Chamberlain's had gotten after Prague. In spite of how actually doing something for Poland was a military impossibility (something not true of CZS), not declaring war over Poland was a political impossibility.

The Allies could also secure Norway if they are not keen in invading Germany from the West.
That could mean trouble for Germany in the long run.

I'm not so sure, actually. What the Allies got from the Norwegian campaign was the merchant fleet, which was theirs either way. All the Germans got was some bases to pursue the strategically futile air and sea campaigns against Britain, and a big liability that they had to garrison with troops who could have been in Russia.
 
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Stalker

Banned
The only reason there was any fighting worth mentioning was because the Red Army was pretty crap, and local Polish home-guard who were in no sense mobile units capable of opposing the Germans in the field were able to hold them up.
I'd say the Red Army was a crap in doctrinal and tactical aspects but was very good in logistics, numbers and equipment.
The reasons why Wehrmacht had so terrifying beating on the Soviets in 1941 besides the advantage sudden strike gave it, are: obsolete doctrine, inflexible tactics both on land and in the air, and thus German total superiority in the air, and probably, the main reason - RKKA's being extremely short of means of mobile communication. That lead to absence of information on the enemy, its movements and thus Red Army commanders not havin clear idea of what was happening acted in complete isolation from one another.

That's an excellent point, and it rather goes to show how little the German command even considered the idea of going to Russia before France.

I'd say it was possible only with the Pact. But when Hitler thought Stalin had moved too far with his ultimatum to Romania he realised all of the sudden that such an 'ally' as the USSR one good day may stab him in the back. Especially with strategic overhaniging of RKKA over oil deposits in Ploieşti.
 
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