The Most Effective Soviet Military

"From the Soviet perspective, keeping everything Category A (T-90's, BTR-70's, with full combined-arms support) was way too expensive. You do that with offensive units acting as the Schwerpunkt."

That's only part of it. As the Russian defector who wrote under the pseudonym Victor Suvorov explained in his "Inside the Soviet Army", category B and C divisions were fleshed out with reactivated reservists and it made no sense to equip these units with hardware that the reservists didn't know. It was not only cheaper but also more practical to have them equipped with the weapon systems they trained with when they were conscripts than try to give them a crash course in how to use a more sophisticated but unfamilar weapon. The cat B and C reservists wouldn't be able to use new systems effectively so equipping them with modern kit would not only be expensive but inefficient.
 
The first part of your statement is indeed a superfluous platitude, but my statement (which I reproduce here again: "the Soviets buit exactly the kind of of military they wanted for the kind of war they expected to fight.") pertains to the second part of your statement. It assumes I have taken a position on the issue: i.e. the Soviet military was effective by Soviet standards. This is a statement that can be challenged. It could be wrong. If you want to challenge this statement, go on, challenge it. But don't start to claim that I write platitudes and then deride me for this.

Semantics. If you want to argue about whether your statement was a platitude or not, it depends on whether the Soviet military's failings were because it expected to fight the wrong type of war. Which does seem the case, by this point in discussion.
 
"Anecdotal commentary aside, what would you do to change the Soviet military?"

Pre WWII, stop the purges (that's an easy one to suggest). Red Army strategy was more advanced than that of its rivals so there's no need to play around with that. Tactical and operational doctrines were in development, I think, but that was the same situation for everyone else so no great need to change those at the time. The main problems for the Red Army were in training (standards were low, in large part due to the purges), lack of transport, poor communications and lack of supplying all soldiers with basics. So my first directives as Marshall of the Soviet Union would be;

i) Improve training in modern soldiering skills. For a start this will help prevent fiascos such as the first months of the Winter War with Finland as the initial troops were from nonforested parts of the country. It wasn't the only problem but these troops weren't familiar with how to live and fight in forests.

ii) Ensure all frontline troops are fully equipped, particular with fundamental kit (boots, rifle, and unit support weapons).

iii) Build trucks, halftracks and jeeps (licensing issues with the US permitting). Mobility is key and the Red Army would be far more potent particularly in attack with more transport.

iv) More radios. That runs into a problem in the security obsessed USSR but that's another story.

v) Boost a traditional strength, build more artillery. Try to push heavy mortars and Katyushas into faster production.

vi) If I could fast forward one weapon from OTL, it would be an automatic rifle like the AK47. That was famously designed due to the lessons learnt by the Soviets from WWII. If it could be produced earlier in history that would give each Soviet squad much greater firepower, and the repercussions would be large.

Plenty of other weapon systems could possibly be pushed through earlier if we use the benefit of hindsight, but that gets ASBish and isn't really necessary to have a potent Red Army in 1939. A similar argument holds for the Red air force, but I don't think it's really necessary so long as it doesn't get caught on the ground like IOTL. As for the Soviet Navy, changing that in a meaningful way, other than in submarines, would require a major change in Soviet thinking so is unlikely to happen in the short term.
 
it depends on whether the Soviet military's failings were because it expected to fight the wrong type of war. Which does seem the case, by this point in discussion.
the statement "the soviet union correctly anticipated what kind of war they would fight in the future" is one possible item of discussion. It can be argued for and against.

The statement "the soviet union successfully prepared for the war they expected to fight" is a completely independent item of discussion. It can allso be argued for and against. There are no foregone conclusions here.
 
the statement "the soviet union correctly anticipated what kind of war they would fight in the future" is one possible item of discussion. It can be argued for and against.

The statement "the soviet union successfully prepared for the war they expected to fight" is a completely independent item of discussion. It can allso be argued for and against. There are no foregone conclusions here.

Given that I nor you said neither, I'm not sure what you're saying. The foregone conclusion, as I stated before, was that "The Soviet Union prepared the way it wanted for the war it expected to fight." You'll notice that neither success or correctness are mentioned.
 
Besides military officers and statesmen, a number of engineers were also purged. Andrei Tupolev himself was arrested on trumped up charges and might have been executed like many of his colleagues if the State did not have other plans for him.

If more engineers like Tupolev had escaped the purges, would the Soviet Unions forces be more advanced than they were OTL?

What might be the most plausible changes?



 
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