The Most Deadly Moment

Paul MacQ

Donor
I have been reading "Carrier Observer" by Gordon Wallace
And one of the chapters stick out as a interesting point as a What If
From the title chapter " The Most Dangerous moment"

In Early April The Japanese has sent a raid into the Indian ocean
Balance of Forces
Japanese Force under ViceAdmiral Chuichi Nagumo, and it consisted of the
carriers Akagi, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku,
the battleships Kongo, Haruna, Kirishima, and Hiei, the
heavy cruisers Chikuma and Tone, a light cruiser, and
eight destroyers.
318 Carrier Aircraft

The Royal Navy Force under Admiral Sir James Somerville
Modern fleet carriers Indomitable
and Formidable, the small carrier Hermes, the battleships
Warspite, Resolution, Ramillies, Royal Sovereign, and
Revenge, the heavy cruisers Dorsetshire and Cornwall,
five light cruisers, and 14 destroyers
Total 90 Aircraft
Mixed bag of Fighters
Marlet’s( British name for wildcat) 2 Setter Fulmars and a few Sea Hurricanes
Offensive aircraft mostly Albacore and some Swordfish bi-plane Torpedo Bombers ( read sitting ducks for Zero’s )


On the 4th of April 1400 hours The main Forces got within about 200 Miles from each other. Well within striking Distance of the Japanese Carrier aircraft.
1355 The Heavy Cruisers Dorsetshire and Cornwall had been caught doing 27.5 Knots head back to the main Force under Somerville is the Japanese had though to send Cruiser Recon Aircraft ahead to see what these to warships where headed towards . I am thinking Somerville force of 5 Old Battle ships and Carriers Indomitable and Formidable would have been spotted.

What would the repercussions of The British Eastern Fleet being completely Destroyed.

I am sure this would not have been a war winner. But would it have lead to a more concentrated effort in the Indian Ocean as now possibly seen as easy pickings, By the Japanese.
 

burmafrd

Banned
It did surprise me that Nagumo did not do better in OTL then he did. The Brits were so outclassed in the air it was ridiculous. This was before the attrition on the IJN squadrons had really begun so they were only slightly less capable then they were at Pearl. The IJN torpedo bombers would be especially dangerous.
 
I believe, stupidly I suppose, that with the resources the British committed to the Far East between the Dec '41 and Apr '42 they could have achieved something rather than nothing.

In a head to head carrier battle Sommerville could only expect the total destruction of his force. However I do wonder if significantly lower aims could be successful. What were Nagumo's tactical dispositions? Did he have any ships exposed like the Hermes and the cruisers that Sommerville could slip in a night strike against and then make a run for it?
 
In a head to head carrier battle Sommerville could only expect the total destruction of his force. However I do wonder if significantly lower aims could be successful.

He hoped to launch a night attack using his radar equipped torpedo bombers. However, he retreated after seeing how effective the IJN aircraft were against ships at sea.

Because of the Doolittle Raid the Kido Butai was always going to withdraw from the Indian Ocean as OTL (possibly they should have stayed longer). However, if all the British carriers had been sunk and the battleships at least crippled, perhaps Ozawa's force would have been allowed to sail around the Arabian Sea as well as the Bay of Bengal. That could have stopped supplies to India (and thus China), Egypt and Persia (delaying development of the major Lend Lease route to Russia). Also some oil for Australia came from the Middle East.
 
I don't think Nagumo would have stayed in the IO much longer if he has sunk Sommervilles force, but the raid would have been seen as worth it despite the Dolittle raid.

On the other hand if Sommerville had been able to attack any IJN target of opportunity before escaping then he too could have been judged successful, doing similar damage to the IJN as was done to him. But it must be a target of opportunity, there is no way he can attack the main body and escape. Were there any IJN ships conveniently located for such an attack, ie somewhat detached and closer to Sommerville than the main body? Or was Nagumo operating his ships as a compact unit?
 
Somerville did not want a battle by day but he intended to attack the main IJN force if he could at night. He believed that radar gave him a significant advantage at night using either aircraft or gunfire. He knew that the IJN had no radar and he assumed that they had not trained for a night battle.

We know it was risky but he had to follow the traditions of the RN. Remember Taranto and Matapan.
 
Not just a night attack, but it would need to be against the closest significant ship/s because of the power of Nagumo's counterstrike. If Sommerville launched a successful strike against the main body he would not be beyond 300 miles from Nagumos carriers by dawn and would be sunk. However if there were some significant ships a few tens of miles closer to Sommerville then he could strike at these and have a good chance of being beyond 300 miles by dawn.

The reason I harp on this and the naval battles in the DEI is because the IJN is a wasting asset. For example Japan built 5 cruisers during the war but lost 41. However if the loss of Force Z, ABDA, Hermes and the 2 CAs was accompanied by the sinking of 4 or 5 IJN cruisers then the IJN would have lost 10-15% of its entire cruiser strength. And the USN would have to face a significantly reduced IJN at Midway and the Solomons in later months.
 
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