This board's software is unpredictable at times. I had a bunch of speculation about Rome I started writing some days ago but I thought it could use some editing, and then the author posted stuff that seemed to determine which way they'd go, and now refreshing to see what else is going on, it finally went away. I don't know what determines how long a reply is retained before the software decides it is dead and drops it.
I approve Ptolemy's priorities. Egyptian expansion into Africa is a common wish-list item in ATLs and it might happen yet, but in terms of the main competition, invading Cush is a luxury and can wait--dealing with the Seleucids is a priority. As long as the Seleucids have a salient onto the Mediterranean, they are in the game of profiting from Eastern trade with the Med and competing with Egypt. To be sure, having to haul their goods overland while Egypt can bring them in mainly over water means the Egyptians are still in an excellent position, and if it were possible for the two successor realms of Alexander to come to amicable terms, the Ptolemies could back off and let the Seleucids keep Antioch, live and let live. But since the two apparently are in a death struggle with each other, Egypt should surely move to deny the eastern kingdom any access to the Med. Doing so removes the threat that the deep pockets of the big Eastern kingdom can finance a navy to threaten their hegemony in the eastern Med. It cuts them off from direct contact with the core of the Hellenic world, eclipsing their claims to be heirs of Alexander. So I've always expected the Ptolemies to move against Antioch sooner or later, and wonder why it has waited this long. Well, of course, earlier other ones tried, and failed. By the same tokens Egypt wishes to deny the eastern kingdom access, the Seleucids are desperate to keep it.
It might be that the previous Ptolemy would get the last laugh from beyond the grave; against the benefits of cutting the Seleucids off from the Med, there is the knowledge that they will fight hard to prevent that; it will be an expensive war and perhaps the Ptolemaic kingdom is vulnerable in places that a live-and-let-live detente would protect. It would not be so nice if the Ptolemaic forces lose and in the aftermath, Seleucid armies advance to take Palestine and perhaps Sinai and front right on the heart of Egyptian power, now would it be. Perhaps the Seleucids will be motivated and able to push back against Ptolemaic expansion in the Indian Ocean, building and launching fleets to sortie out of the Persian Gulf to attack Egyptian shipping along the India route, who knows maybe even sending an armada to invade the Red Sea and again come up on the very flanks of the Nile itself. Risks like that strike me as good reasons for earlier kings to let Seleucia alone.
The question is, has the new Ptolemy done his math right? A theme of the TL is that the Massaliotes have applied some scientific effort toward enhancing the fighting power of their tagmates, and that other Hellenic powers in alliance with them have profited from observing and imitating the Massaliote innovations. And I gather it runs other ways; with Epirus at least better off than OTL by this time, and Egypt seeming to be stronger too, they too have had their own innovations some of which Massalia is learning from. And some are their own tricks. If the Ptolemaic realm is vulnerable on the Indian Ocean, it is because they are present there and profiting from it; it is the Seleucids who have more to lose if the Hellenic kingdoms start fighting each other on that ocean. Which may already be happening anyway. Last time I looked I think I wondered who the Arabic region of Maskat favors; if they are organized they tend to be able to control the mouth of the Persian Gulf, the Arabian side of it anyway though not the Persian side.
I asked about Maskat over a month ago, suggesting the Seleucids might co-opt them to raid Ptolemaic shipping, but perhaps, in addition to the possibility they defeat Maskati piracy on the sea, the Alexandrian diplomats get there first and cut them in somehow, and then Maskat might serve to keep Seleucid naval adventures corked up in the Persian Gulf. Looking at it cold-bloodedly--assuming Ptolemaic traders are unwelcome in Seleucid ports, the Egyptian-Arab ships have no business anywhere near Maskat, and bribing these people with a share of the Indian trade would mean a loss of revenues. The only fashion in which the Ptolemaic traders and Maskati have perhaps a shared interest is that perhaps the Egyptians hope to trade in Seleucid markets indirectly. By landing cargoes of goods the Ptolemaics know the Seleucid markets will want in Maskat, they might induce Maskati traders to appear in those ports at the north end of the gulf to sell Egyptian goods and purchase Seleucid ones, to then sell to the Ptolemaic traders in their homeland. This would give Maskat a profitable middle-man role to be sure.
But it seems peripheral; there would be some goods profitable to channel to the enemy in return for others they might offer even knowing they wind up in Egyptian hands. But it might merely whet Maskati appetites for more exotic goods from India--anything coming from the other direction that might tempt them, the Seleucid markets can probably supply! Maskatis might wind up becoming piratical pests on their own hook, without any encouragement from the Seleucid monarch whatsoever--though if he does become aware they are a plague on his rival he might subsidize and otherwise back them. I don't see Seleucia gaining a powerful Indian Ocean navy in this way though; they'd probably be satisfied to let Maskat accomplish what it can and trade with them.
A look at maps 13 pages back reminds me that in principle Seleucia might develop another sea route to strike at Alexandria, but it is a long shot and no economic substitute for Antioch as an outlet of eastern trade goods. The Seleucid lands actually include eastern Anatolia (unless some more recent development has changed this) and includes some Black Sea shores in the southeast. If the monarch can somehow or other develop a naval port there, he can threaten to interfere in and maybe take over the Bosporian Kingdom's grain trade with Greece. Pergammon controls northeast Anatolia and the southeast side of the Dardanelles, while Epirus controls the European side. The Seleucids would have to fight their way to the Med outlet, but if they can do that they are again a presence on the Med, and in the course of getting there would get control of assets very important in the region.
In terms of an emporium for eastern goods it makes no sense though; it is similar to the problem Massalia has regarding the Po Valley--the terrain of eastern Anatolia does not encourage development of an overland route north to even the Seleucid shores. Only if the monarch regarded getting control of Crimean region grain, at the cost of first defeating the incumbent kingdom which has strong allies, and then defending those conquests against Eurasian nomad peoples while also battering through the straits.
I don't think the Seleucids are going to go that way.
The major front line is up by Antioch of course. That's the focus. Does Egypt have forces to spare from other fronts to concentrate there, that can beat what the Seleucids can put there, and if so how far back can they be pushed? Noting that the Seleucids hold eastern Anatolia, if all Egypt does is push them off the shore they can counterattack two ways, from the northern bastion or from the east.
It is important to know how strongly the Seleucids hold Anatolia; the terrain is inherently tough, but if the grip is weak and its rule resented perhaps they can be driven out of there easily--vice versa if the people there are content enough then they would be very hard to dislodge and so Seleucia would always be threatening to restore its outlet on to the Med with a short but hard drive south from there.
Another factor to consider is the interests of the desert peoples living in OTL modern Jordan; the arm of the Arabian desert reaching up to pinch the Fertile Crescent in the middle. It is this desert, and the people in it, stopping the two powers from having a huge frontier in effect. It is hard to cross with big forces, and if the people living there want to stop such crossings, almost hopeless. Vice versa if the people living there are desperate enough to actually favor one side or the other they can open the way; perhaps even so only small forces can strike, but they might strike with great effect if no one on the other side expects an attack.
I figure that the prime interests of these people range from simply being left alone to a keen interest in world affairs based on their spice trading monopolies. Since the Ptolemies have been bypassing Arab inland routes with their development of sea based trade (favoring other Arabs--which means the inland people tend to know about it, but aren't going to be pleased or mollified in the least) they seem likely to most strongly favor neutrality and status quo, but when push comes to shove to favor the Seleucid cause. But they will be very very reluctant to show the eastern kingdom's officers the routes across the desert they know--even if guerrilla action by them later could effectively close the routes much of the power and profit of these desert traders came from keeping the passable routes secret.
So--not only do the Ptolemy forces need to dislodge the Seleucids from Antioch, they need to hold them back from returning downslope from Anatolia (or drive them out of Anatolia--a tall order if the regime has any legitimacy there) while holding a strong line to the east in Assyria, and keep a frustratingly difficult and apparently pointless yet probably necessary watch on the frontier south from there all the way down to the Dead Sea's eastern hinterland and on down to the eastern gulf flanking the Sinai peninsula, while being on a lookout also for naval harassment coming out of Maskat as well. Is a net force capable of such a hard strike followed by such a wide curtain of vigilance really in hand, and if it is, how far short of what it would take to simply conquer the entire Seleucid realm from border to border?
I suppose enough force to just prune off Antioch and then hold the frontiers against retaliation would be more modest than needed to destroy Seleucia. But how sure is the current Ptolemy to reckon correctly not just what he needs for the quick coup of taking out Antioch but the long game of then defending the entire northern and eastern border? It would be a hell of a thing if he can deny Antioch, only to have a huge Seleucid army appear in the Sinai and wind up taking Alexandria in exchange!
I approve Ptolemy's priorities. Egyptian expansion into Africa is a common wish-list item in ATLs and it might happen yet, but in terms of the main competition, invading Cush is a luxury and can wait--dealing with the Seleucids is a priority. As long as the Seleucids have a salient onto the Mediterranean, they are in the game of profiting from Eastern trade with the Med and competing with Egypt. To be sure, having to haul their goods overland while Egypt can bring them in mainly over water means the Egyptians are still in an excellent position, and if it were possible for the two successor realms of Alexander to come to amicable terms, the Ptolemies could back off and let the Seleucids keep Antioch, live and let live. But since the two apparently are in a death struggle with each other, Egypt should surely move to deny the eastern kingdom any access to the Med. Doing so removes the threat that the deep pockets of the big Eastern kingdom can finance a navy to threaten their hegemony in the eastern Med. It cuts them off from direct contact with the core of the Hellenic world, eclipsing their claims to be heirs of Alexander. So I've always expected the Ptolemies to move against Antioch sooner or later, and wonder why it has waited this long. Well, of course, earlier other ones tried, and failed. By the same tokens Egypt wishes to deny the eastern kingdom access, the Seleucids are desperate to keep it.
It might be that the previous Ptolemy would get the last laugh from beyond the grave; against the benefits of cutting the Seleucids off from the Med, there is the knowledge that they will fight hard to prevent that; it will be an expensive war and perhaps the Ptolemaic kingdom is vulnerable in places that a live-and-let-live detente would protect. It would not be so nice if the Ptolemaic forces lose and in the aftermath, Seleucid armies advance to take Palestine and perhaps Sinai and front right on the heart of Egyptian power, now would it be. Perhaps the Seleucids will be motivated and able to push back against Ptolemaic expansion in the Indian Ocean, building and launching fleets to sortie out of the Persian Gulf to attack Egyptian shipping along the India route, who knows maybe even sending an armada to invade the Red Sea and again come up on the very flanks of the Nile itself. Risks like that strike me as good reasons for earlier kings to let Seleucia alone.
The question is, has the new Ptolemy done his math right? A theme of the TL is that the Massaliotes have applied some scientific effort toward enhancing the fighting power of their tagmates, and that other Hellenic powers in alliance with them have profited from observing and imitating the Massaliote innovations. And I gather it runs other ways; with Epirus at least better off than OTL by this time, and Egypt seeming to be stronger too, they too have had their own innovations some of which Massalia is learning from. And some are their own tricks. If the Ptolemaic realm is vulnerable on the Indian Ocean, it is because they are present there and profiting from it; it is the Seleucids who have more to lose if the Hellenic kingdoms start fighting each other on that ocean. Which may already be happening anyway. Last time I looked I think I wondered who the Arabic region of Maskat favors; if they are organized they tend to be able to control the mouth of the Persian Gulf, the Arabian side of it anyway though not the Persian side.
I asked about Maskat over a month ago, suggesting the Seleucids might co-opt them to raid Ptolemaic shipping, but perhaps, in addition to the possibility they defeat Maskati piracy on the sea, the Alexandrian diplomats get there first and cut them in somehow, and then Maskat might serve to keep Seleucid naval adventures corked up in the Persian Gulf. Looking at it cold-bloodedly--assuming Ptolemaic traders are unwelcome in Seleucid ports, the Egyptian-Arab ships have no business anywhere near Maskat, and bribing these people with a share of the Indian trade would mean a loss of revenues. The only fashion in which the Ptolemaic traders and Maskati have perhaps a shared interest is that perhaps the Egyptians hope to trade in Seleucid markets indirectly. By landing cargoes of goods the Ptolemaics know the Seleucid markets will want in Maskat, they might induce Maskati traders to appear in those ports at the north end of the gulf to sell Egyptian goods and purchase Seleucid ones, to then sell to the Ptolemaic traders in their homeland. This would give Maskat a profitable middle-man role to be sure.
But it seems peripheral; there would be some goods profitable to channel to the enemy in return for others they might offer even knowing they wind up in Egyptian hands. But it might merely whet Maskati appetites for more exotic goods from India--anything coming from the other direction that might tempt them, the Seleucid markets can probably supply! Maskatis might wind up becoming piratical pests on their own hook, without any encouragement from the Seleucid monarch whatsoever--though if he does become aware they are a plague on his rival he might subsidize and otherwise back them. I don't see Seleucia gaining a powerful Indian Ocean navy in this way though; they'd probably be satisfied to let Maskat accomplish what it can and trade with them.
A look at maps 13 pages back reminds me that in principle Seleucia might develop another sea route to strike at Alexandria, but it is a long shot and no economic substitute for Antioch as an outlet of eastern trade goods. The Seleucid lands actually include eastern Anatolia (unless some more recent development has changed this) and includes some Black Sea shores in the southeast. If the monarch can somehow or other develop a naval port there, he can threaten to interfere in and maybe take over the Bosporian Kingdom's grain trade with Greece. Pergammon controls northeast Anatolia and the southeast side of the Dardanelles, while Epirus controls the European side. The Seleucids would have to fight their way to the Med outlet, but if they can do that they are again a presence on the Med, and in the course of getting there would get control of assets very important in the region.
In terms of an emporium for eastern goods it makes no sense though; it is similar to the problem Massalia has regarding the Po Valley--the terrain of eastern Anatolia does not encourage development of an overland route north to even the Seleucid shores. Only if the monarch regarded getting control of Crimean region grain, at the cost of first defeating the incumbent kingdom which has strong allies, and then defending those conquests against Eurasian nomad peoples while also battering through the straits.
I don't think the Seleucids are going to go that way.
The major front line is up by Antioch of course. That's the focus. Does Egypt have forces to spare from other fronts to concentrate there, that can beat what the Seleucids can put there, and if so how far back can they be pushed? Noting that the Seleucids hold eastern Anatolia, if all Egypt does is push them off the shore they can counterattack two ways, from the northern bastion or from the east.
It is important to know how strongly the Seleucids hold Anatolia; the terrain is inherently tough, but if the grip is weak and its rule resented perhaps they can be driven out of there easily--vice versa if the people there are content enough then they would be very hard to dislodge and so Seleucia would always be threatening to restore its outlet on to the Med with a short but hard drive south from there.
Another factor to consider is the interests of the desert peoples living in OTL modern Jordan; the arm of the Arabian desert reaching up to pinch the Fertile Crescent in the middle. It is this desert, and the people in it, stopping the two powers from having a huge frontier in effect. It is hard to cross with big forces, and if the people living there want to stop such crossings, almost hopeless. Vice versa if the people living there are desperate enough to actually favor one side or the other they can open the way; perhaps even so only small forces can strike, but they might strike with great effect if no one on the other side expects an attack.
I figure that the prime interests of these people range from simply being left alone to a keen interest in world affairs based on their spice trading monopolies. Since the Ptolemies have been bypassing Arab inland routes with their development of sea based trade (favoring other Arabs--which means the inland people tend to know about it, but aren't going to be pleased or mollified in the least) they seem likely to most strongly favor neutrality and status quo, but when push comes to shove to favor the Seleucid cause. But they will be very very reluctant to show the eastern kingdom's officers the routes across the desert they know--even if guerrilla action by them later could effectively close the routes much of the power and profit of these desert traders came from keeping the passable routes secret.
So--not only do the Ptolemy forces need to dislodge the Seleucids from Antioch, they need to hold them back from returning downslope from Anatolia (or drive them out of Anatolia--a tall order if the regime has any legitimacy there) while holding a strong line to the east in Assyria, and keep a frustratingly difficult and apparently pointless yet probably necessary watch on the frontier south from there all the way down to the Dead Sea's eastern hinterland and on down to the eastern gulf flanking the Sinai peninsula, while being on a lookout also for naval harassment coming out of Maskat as well. Is a net force capable of such a hard strike followed by such a wide curtain of vigilance really in hand, and if it is, how far short of what it would take to simply conquer the entire Seleucid realm from border to border?
I suppose enough force to just prune off Antioch and then hold the frontiers against retaliation would be more modest than needed to destroy Seleucia. But how sure is the current Ptolemy to reckon correctly not just what he needs for the quick coup of taking out Antioch but the long game of then defending the entire northern and eastern border? It would be a hell of a thing if he can deny Antioch, only to have a huge Seleucid army appear in the Sinai and wind up taking Alexandria in exchange!
