I'm afraid I'm too well-versed on this particular section of history. Could someone give me a short overview of what happened ITTL and how it's different from OTL?
 
Here are all the updates. I've marked the PODs with numerals at the end of each update, but this habit becomes the norm only after the eight update. The key differences before that are:

-Chinese forces repel the first attempt to seize the Taku Forts, leading to a much more difficult siege of Tientsin.

-Empress Dowager dies during the siege of foreign legations in Peking, and the Manchu court is thrown into disarray

-the first battle of Tientsin is also inconclusive due changes in the internal situation of China

As for the rest, go ahead and read it yourself - I hope each update provides enough background info to get you on track.

China:
Rise of the Boxer movement -
what was happening in China in 1900 in OTL: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=7384188&postcount=1

Battle of Taku Forts: the POD - Foreign forces fail to capture the forts. https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=7395197&postcount=3

Russia and Boxer Revolution -
the terrible hangover of count Muraviev, and why Japan chose to stay out instead of joining in to the 8-Nation Alliance as in OTL: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=7410175&postcount=4

Beitang Massacre - Dowager Empress dies to a random bullet fired from besieged Catholic cathedral, and enraged Chinese forces storm the Foreign Legations with full force and fury: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=7470531&postcount=7

Foreign intervention takes shape: - European powers and US start to ship in enough forces to wage war in Chinese mainland https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=7476130&postcount=18

Battle of Tientsin: Foreign powers underestimate the European-trained formations that Chinese employ at Tientsin, and fail to take the city with their first assault: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=7517852&postcount=22

Qin Wang - Confucian reformers exiled abroad start a peasant uprising in southern China, where local viceroys have so far kept things quiet: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=7727991&postcount=32

Foreign reinforcements arrive and the drive towards Peking begins - German contigent arrives, and the Chinese forces start to retreat towards their capitol. The campaign towards Peking is commanded by a Russian instead of a German as in OTL: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=7836631&postcount=38

Confucian reformism - ideological situation in China by 1900 -
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=8007609&postcount=48

Japan and her options - why the Japanese opted to stay out from the Western intervention to China, and what were they up to in 1900:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=8098280&postcount=58

Battle of Peking - The Western armies capture Peking, but the war continues
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=8186361&postcount=71

A way out of this mess - Negotiations to end the Boxer War begin in winter 1900-1901 https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=8265736&postcount=88

The Fèng Era begins - Chinese factions in southern unoccupied parts of the realm join forces and establish a new Chinese dynasty to replace the discredited and defeated Qing. Britain and Germany do limited cooperation due mutual suspicion of Russian and French actions in China.
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=8302802&postcount=93

What the Chinese wanted - status of Chinese society in 1900 : https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=8349006&postcount=105

Boxer War peace settlement - China remains nominally intact, but pays a heavy cost for the Boxer War. Russian leaders discuss their options regarding occupied Manchuria: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=8374163&postcount=112

Russia and Japan - the two powers are able to find a common ground and make an agreement about Korean Peninsula and Manchuria, defusing tensions in the Far East.
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=8636361&postcount=123

Ottoman Empire and the Balkans:
Albanians were tribal and violent in 1900: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=9265228&postcount=134

Britain didin't like the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II one bit: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=9300289&postcount=137

Other major powers had their own plans for the Ottoman Empire:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=9304258&postcount=138

Especially Russia:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=9304986&postcount=139

Macedonian Question was a key flashpoint in the early 20th century Balkans:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=9665845&postcount=153

Anatolia was troubled as well:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=9703266&postcount=156

Sultan Abdülhamid II was assassinated by an international terrorist plot:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=9862576&postcount=158
 
Thanks, that's quite helpful. It's the last seven updates that I've gotten lost on.

Considering how important the fate and fortunes of Ottoman Empire were to the Great Power diplomacy of early 20th century Europe, the actual history of this period and region is indeed remarkably little known.

So far the key butterfly in this part of the world and in the last seven updates is a different outcome of the internal power struggles of Macedonian separatist movements. They lead to a decision to postpone the armed revolt that in OTL became the Ilinden Uprising of 1903. It sapped the strength of domestic Macedonian armed groups, and created a power vacuum that other neighbouring Balkan states that had territorial claims to the area filled up with their own armed gangs.
Here SMARO retains a different leadership and as a consequence distances itself from Bulgarian control that was firmly established in the beginning of the century in OTL. Without a bloody revolt it also retains its role among the local population, and is the strongest and most popular armed group of Macedonia in 1905.
 

Dementor

Banned
Considering how important the fate and fortunes of Ottoman Empire were to the Great Power diplomacy of early 20th century Europe, the actual history of this period and region is indeed remarkably little known.

So far the key butterfly in this part of the world and in the last seven updates is a different outcome of the internal power struggles of Macedonian separatist movements. They lead to a decision to postpone the armed revolt that in OTL became the Ilinden Uprising of 1903. It sapped the strength of domestic Macedonian armed groups, and created a power vacuum that other neighbouring Balkan states that had territorial claims to the area filled up with their own armed gangs.
Here SMARO retains a different leadership and as a consequence distances itself from Bulgarian control that was firmly established in the beginning of the century in OTL. Without a bloody revolt it also retains its role among the local population, and is the strongest and most popular armed group of Macedonia in 1905.
SMARO could hardly be called domestic in the sense of not relying on help from other Balkan states, in fact its base was consistently in Bulgaria, not only due to the support it received from there, but also due to the deep involvement of many exile Macedonians in Bulgarian politics. In fact even the Supremists who you mentioned in a previous post where mostly composed of officers from Macedonia. And even the slogan "Macedonia for the Macedonians" did not preclude unification with Bulgaria, as after all Bulgaria's position up to the First Balkan War was the same: autonomy for Macedonia and no division (of course with later unification with Bulgaria).
 
SMARO could hardly be called domestic in the sense of not relying on help from other Balkan states, in fact its base was consistently in Bulgaria, not only due to the support it received from there, but also due to the deep involvement of many exile Macedonians in Bulgarian politics. In fact even the Supremists who you mentioned in a previous post where mostly composed of officers from Macedonia. And even the slogan "Macedonia for the Macedonians" did not preclude unification with Bulgaria, as after all Bulgaria's position up to the First Balkan War was the same: autonomy for Macedonia and no division (of course with later unification with Bulgaria).

And the fact that one could itentify as ethnic Bulgarian and still call oneself Macedonian. The Bulgarian views about the Macedonian Question and the political situation within SMARO will be dealth with closer detail in future updates.
 
Chapter 25: The Macedonian Crisis, part IV: Byzantine Politics
The Macedonian Crisis, part IV: Byzantine Politics

The assassination of Abdülhamid II presented the growing cadres of middle-ranking government officials committed to the Ottoman cause with a unique opportunity - but it was also a situation where they were once again the group that had the most to lose. They had already grown accustomed to the significant differences among the salaries of the different ranks of the administration, and to the fact that bribery was often a compulsory way to upkeep a lifestyle expected from their social status. They had been forced to put up with the nepotism of their examination and education system, and by 1905 the new priviledges enjoyed by the sons of most influential court members had already alienated and embittered the younger generations of technocrats in the armed forces and Ottoman administration. These young graduates from technical schools and military academies had entered to the odd and fascinating world of latest Western knowledge and cultural trends, but after receiving modern education in the cosmopolitan atmosphere of major cities of the empire these men were then shipped away to their first posts, virtually exiled to govern foreign barbarians to earn their spurs at the remote and backward tribal borderlands of the vast realm.

If they had proven themselves capable and they had had the right connections and/or enough luck, they could have eventually gained the necessary promotions to return to the heartlands of the Empire and rise to the coveted rank of a pasha. Each high-ranking pasha was at once an administrative expert and a political figure. Petitioning, persuading, sharing profits and outright bribing were common ways to influence their decisions at the provincial level, and foreigners had long ago learned how to take advantage of this system. The very nature of the Ottoman government pitted the officials against one another on determining how the limited tax funds should be used, and to function at all the administration depended on the existence of a supreme arbitrator, whether it was the Sultan or an influential Grand Vezir. By distributing the power powerful positions in the government among ambitious and competitive pashas, Abdülhamid II had managed to divide and rule by keeping the conflicting interests of his powerful advisors and bureaucrats in check. Upon his death the complex Byzantine web of court factions and bureaucracy the crafty Sultan had spun during his decades-long reign begun to unravel immediately. Several major figures had shared the reins of power by advising the Sultan on the problems that came to his attention, and controlling his access to individuals and information. Having schemed and waited for years on the shadows beneath the dominating dominating presence of the sultan, they were shocked to find themselves free to act, and take measures to strengthen their control of the Porte against the encroachments of competing political factions in the Ottoman society and the Palace itself. In the new situation some previously powerful figures were almost instantly sidelined, while others decided to take their chances and rose to challenge the prevailing status quo.

One of the previously highly esteemed positions that lost its significance upon the death of the Sultan was Sultan’s scribe (baş katip), who had presented all communications to the sultan and proposed laws and degrees. Over the centuries the scribes had expanded their official roles to a point where they had taken up the tasks of presenting to the sultan all communications and proposed laws and degrees, so that they had held the power to convey the sultan's will to to the various departments and government officials, and then communicate to him their own versions of the actual results. Therefore the scribe had held a strong influence to the way Abdülhamid II had viewed the surrounding world. As the Red Sultan was now dead, his long-standing scribe and trusted advisor Tahsin Pasha had lost his earlier influence virtually overnight.

This benefitted the position of the Ottoman Chief of Staff, Ahmed Izzed Pasa. He had gradually elevated the importance of the traditionally ceremonial role of the secondary assistant scribe (kâtib-i-sani) by taking over the dull day-to-day affairs of the main scribe. By now he was firmly connected central figure in the Ottoman government with years of experience from the regular meetings with the Grand Vezir and ministers. There he had conveyed the wishes of the Sultan to them, received their reports, and then summarized their content to the main scribe and directly to the Sultan. By his dutiful service he had gained the trust of Abdülhamid II, and now chaired many important royal commissions, most importantly the financial reform commission and the commission established to deal with the problem presented by the British control of Egypt and Persian Gulf sheikdoms.

He also had a powerful ally in the current Grand Vezier, Mehmed Ferid Pasha. Both men were Tosk Albanians, and quickly found common ground in the upcoming power struggles against their Ottoman Turkish competitors. Like Ahmed Izzed Pasha, Mehmed Ferid Pasha had also been elevated through the ranks after he had gained the Sultan’s favour by his performance as the Governor of Konya. He was also the head of the Rumeli Reform Commission that had been established to deal with the deteriorating situation of Ottoman Macedonia in 1902. Aside from his native Albanian and Turkish the current Grand Vezier spoke French, Italian, Arabic and Greek. The Albanian Pashas combined the prestigious position of Grand Vezir to the influence of the Army, but they also had powerful competitors who had good contacts among the court and ruling elites.

Most prominent among them was Mehmed Said Pasha, who had exiled himself to a self-imposed house arrest and withdrawn from public life in 1903, fearing for reprisals of Abdülhamid II. Mehmed Said had been a Grand Vezir six times, and had shown unquestioned talent in matters of imperial administration. He had improved tax collection, balanced the budgets, led the negotiations about the settlement of Ottoman foreign debts, and modernized the examinations for civil service. Politically Mehmed Said was a dedicated Anglophile who opposed all foreign interference to Ottoman affairs, and a firm believer in centralized government and ample administration. To the other members of the Ottoman elite he was a dangerous, vainglorious, corrupt and extremely ambitious plotter who was loyal only to his own position.

The most serious challenger to Mehmed Ferid Pasha among the Ottoman Turkish elites was thus another former Grand Vezir, “The Cypriot” - Mehmed Kâmil Pasha. Mehmed Kâmil was also an anglophile and spoke fluent English. The foreign representatives in the capitol considered him to be a dignified person of integrity with an excellent grasp on world affairs, and among the Ottoman elites he had a reputation of an impartial elder statesman who preferred to focus on his duties instead of court bickering. Because of this he had been sidelined from the upper ranks of power. Personally Mehmed Kâmil was firmly dedicated to the Islamist policy pursued by the late Sultan. Known for his preference to adopt practical means to to preserve the state and secure its interests, Mehmed Kâmil had earlier written a controversial memorandum suggesting a redefinition of ministerial responsibilities and a new approach to the Armenian question.

As these men started to assess the chaotic situation during the first days after thea ssassination, they all sought to secure their positions against the alarmed and paralyzed security apparatus that Abdülhamid II had devised to protect his power. The key focus of their interest was the Privy Council (Yaveran-i-Ekrem) responsible for inspecting the army and civil service in order to ferret out "all dishonesty, disloyalty and inefficiency."In addition everyone was afraid of the Hafiye, secret police, that had been organized under the sultan’s personal control directed by one of his old protégés, Fehim Pasha. Army of spies and informants (jurnalcis) were present in every department of the government, and reported the actions and throughts of individual bureaucrats in memorandums (jurnals). Another key powerbroker was Sefik Pasha - head of the Zaptiye Nezareti, the Ministry of Police that was based on the French model. Commissioners (komisers) under the direct control of the minister directed police at each province and in the districts of Constantinye and other larger cities. These two police forces spied on one another and everyone else.

As the foreign representatives in the Ottoman capital were busily sending and receiving telegrams from the European capitals and the news of the assassination spread through the shocked Empire and the surrounding world, it was still too early to find a definitive answer to the fundamental question at hand: "Who would take charge after the death of Abdülhamid II?"
 
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Thanks. Considering the fact that I consider the situations of China and Ottoman Empire as the primary starting points of the event chains that ultimately led to the outbreak of World War, I find it necessary to deal with them in sufficient detail. Especially since they're often utterly negletted in most otherwise really good TLs.
 
Chapter 26: The Macedonian Crisis, part V: Britain at the Crossroads
The Macedonian Crisis, part V: Britain at the Crossroads

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When Queen Victoria died on 20th January 1901, the powerful elites and commoners alike in Britain felt that the era that died along Her had been a happier and less troubled than their current world. The time of mourning had been marked by the harsh and internationally criticized repression of the Boer insurgency in southern Africa, and the end of the Boxer War that had marked the downfall of Qing dynasty. While the international settlement had ultimately ensured that China had remained nominally territorially intact, it was in a sense an illusory return to status quo. The Russian incursions to Manchuria had been followed by their de facto continuing occupation of northern parts of the province in the disguise of “railroad guards”, while French military was also still present in Yunnan. Together these actions had so severely challenged the traditional British positions in the Chinese markets that striking a bargain with Germany for spheres of influence in China and signing an official alliance with Japan were privately often viewed as signs of imperial decline among Foreign Office officials. They and the commoner masses alike felt that the grand coronation ceremony of King Edward VII and Queen Alexandra symbolized the current status of the Empire. The new King was fashionable and extremely popular in Britain, but seldom seen in public and unable (and unwilling) to travel abroad due his ailing health.


15885227669_ae510b19dc_o.jpg

The would-be assassin boy: Jean-Babtiste Sipido gained widespread fame and publicity in the European anarchist circles after the Belgian jury had acquitted him due their view that because of his young age he could not yet be considered legally responsible for his actions. After the trial Sipido fled to France, and his actions put further strain to the already troubled relations between Belgium and Britain.[1]

The second bullet randomly fired by Jean-Babtiste Sipido had struck its intended target, the heir of the British Empire. Luckily the wound was non-fatal, but the bullet had still severely damaged the femoral neck and other hip bones. Despite several operations, the injury had permanently severely limited the mobility of the British heir, who had been formerly known as an avid huntsman and smooth and fashionable socialite. During his reign Edward VII was a rare sight in public situations, where he was always instantly recognizable with his iconic walking stick and limping gait. Privately his family and closest friends knew that the King suffered from constant pains that had to be occasionally medicated with opiates. Combined with his habit of smoking cigarettes and cigars most of the time he was awake, the health of the 60-year old monarch was deteriorating fast, and that he was unable to partake to actual decision-making as much as he would have liked to.[2]


Yet foreign and domestic policy decisions that played a large role in defining the diplomatic future of the British Empire in the 20th Century were made during his reign. With the King incapable of playing as a prominent role in the decisionmaking as HM himself would have liked to, the postz of the Foreign Secretary and Colonial Secretary gained new prominence. In the immediate aftermath of the Boxer War and the resignation of Lord Salisbury, the growth of Russian power across Asian mainland was viewed as the most pressing concern of British foreign policy. The following establishment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was a thinly veiled attempt to curb Russian expansionism in the Pacific, but British elites had conflicting views on whether Britain herself could still afford to defend the North-Western Frontier by force of arms in a case of war against Russia. As the Liberals were using military spending as one of their key campaign themes while Army budgets were already being squeezed thin compared to the funding available to the Royal Navy, the situation was troubled. This was the primary cause of the growing differences of opinion about the future course of British foreign policy, and the question of future security of the Empire divided the diplomats of the Foreign Office into factions, whose influence waxed and waned depending on the events and crises of the early 20th Century that forced Britain to react and make far-reaching choices about her friends and foes.


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The Lame King: For the rest of his life, Edward VII suffered from constant pain, and was able to walk alone only with a stick and a great difficulty. He was openly bitter towards continental Europe, and aside from occasional hunting trips to India he very seldom travelled abroad. Due his health difficulties he was unable to influence the course of British foreign policy as much as he would have liked to, and he soon turned into a bitter and reclusive character.

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The Imperialist: A Liberal Unionist leading a Conservative majority government, Joseph Chamberlain was a former Colonial Secretary with stern views on the needs to defend British interests across the world. The experiences from the Boer War in South Africa and the Boxer War in China convinced him to challenge the decision of aging Lord Salisbury to place his nephew, Arthur Balfour, to the Downing Street, and due his popularity and strong allies he was able to take the helm of the British Empire when Lord Salisbury resigned on July 11th 1902.[3]

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The Diplomat: Lord Lansdowne took over at the Foreign Office in September 1900, just when the 8-Nation Alliance was finally starting to gain the upper hand in the fighting against the Chinese forces in Tientsin. Together with PM Chamberlain they started to realign British foreign policy away from the old policy of steering clear of entangling alliances with foreign powers. The Yangtze Agreement and Anglo-Japanese Alliance were first steps to this direction, but by 1905 the fundamental questions of British security in central Asia and balance of power in Europe were still unresolved.

1: Sipido was acquitted in OTL as well, to the outrage of British officials and public opinion alike.
2. In OTL Sipido missed.
3. There are two reasons for the ascendancy of Chamberlain - first of all, he is gravely concerned about the British position in China, and secondly he misses his OTL traffic accident (that sounds just like ALT-history plot twist in itself)
 
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The second bullet randomly fired by Jean-Babtiste Sipido had struck its intended target, the heir of the British Empire. Luckily the wound was non-fatal, but the bullet had still severely damaged the femoral neck and other hip bones. Despite several operations, the injury had permanently severely limited the mobility of the British heir, who had been formerly known as an avid huntsman and smooth and fashionable socialite. During his reign Edward VII was a rare sight in public situations, where he was always instantly recognizable with his iconic walking stick and limping gait. Privately his family and closest friends knew that the King suffered from constant pains that had to be occasionally medicated with opiates. Combined with his habit of smoking cigarettes and cigars most of the time he was awake, the health of the 60-year old monarch was deteriorating fast, and that he was unable to partake to actual decision-making as much as he would have liked to.

There seems to be missing a short part of the paragraph here. Especially since it includes a minor divergence from OTL. Interesting update nonetheless.

edit: minor as in a bullet traveling some inches in the wrong direction. not minor because of its effect.

also, much clearer now.
 
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Belgian Independence

That shot was perhaps the final blow to the Entente Cordiale, which is sure to Great Britain do not will defend by force of arms the Belgian independence.
 
That shot was perhaps the final blow to the Entente Cordiale, which is sure to Great Britain do not will defend by force of arms the Belgian independence.

The Anglo-Belgian relations were really bad in OTL as well due the horrors of Kongo, and the assassination attempt made them even worse in OTL as well.

Oh dear, the poor Third Republic.

Luckily for them Britain feels she can no longer afford to stand on the sidelines. France and Britain share both conflicting and mutual interests at the beginning of 20th Century, and both sides have interests to solve these issues. Yet different leaders and different political situation around the world will certainly affect the essense of these deals.

Stay tuned for further updates about European diplomacy.
 
Chapter 27: The Macedonian Crisis, part VI: To Defend The Empire
The Macedonian Crisis, part VI: To Defend The Empire

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The Grand Chessboard: Greater Middle East and Central Asia were the forefronts of imperial rivalries and British security policy in the first years of 1900s.

After the end of the Boxer War and the signatory ceremony of the Yamagata-Muraviev Agreement in September 1901, Hamilton, the India Secretary, commented the foreign policy prospects of Britain vis-a-vis Russia with a sombre mood on January 1903: "Time is on the side of Russia; the longer we delay coming to an arrangement, the worse the settlement for us will be.” The grim mood of the Colonial Office was also widespread in Foreign Office as well.Almost all of the senior official of the Foreign Office shared a common view of the diplomatic position of Britain.

Few of them believed in the fixity or security of the stance Britain had in the world. For them, the future safety of Britain rested on a powerful fleet and on agreements with potential rivals and threats to their current position. They differed on specific solutions, but in the aftermath of the Boxer War there was a general agreement that Russia was the power most likely to upset the status quo and that such a change could only be to the detriment of Britain. Content with the status quo of world affairs in 1900, all the British leaders wanted was a quiet life. They would have gladly settled for being treated with ‘ordinary diplomatic civility’ as a Great Power. Unfortunately they also felt that their position as a Great Power depended on the existence of the Indian Empire.

Lansdowne, a former Viceroy of India, summarized the situation: “
As long as we rule India, we are the greatest power in the world. Were we to lose it, we would drop straight away to a third-rate power.” To him and other key members of the Foreign Office the idea of sacrificing or compromising British positions anywhere in Central and East-Central Asia was an anathema. Even though most contemporary collections of statistics revealed even Raj to be of little true economic value except in psychological terms in the present and still only “a claim pegged out for the future”, the existing financial arrangements between London and the Raj did serve an important role concealing basic weaknesses in the British economy at home.

Regardless of the perceived importance of the Raj, the ruling elites of Britain did not dare to risk the political consequences of asking the British people to assume the financial burdens and military anxieties of maintaining an Indian Army deemed strong enough to defend the borders of a Empire’s continental territories in Central Asia, despite the fact that recent reports of the War Office Intelligence Departments had concluded that at the present state the Indian Army would be unable to defend itself against a Russian attack. Yet the rulers of British Empire were unconvinced that the public at home shared their opinion of the Empire’s present value and future potential, considering the scale of the dissent caused by the Boer War.

And because of this basic difficulty of erecting and operating strong diplomatic and military barriers to the borders of the Subcontinent against their fear of a slowly creeping Russian tide southwards, the Foreign Office powerbrokers were fixated “
to find some definite ground of understanding at once so clear in itself, and of such obvious importance to our Imperial interests, that the British people would consent to make its attempted infraction at once regarded as a sufficient ground for putting forth their whole strength in its defence”, as Earl Balfour put it.

The purpose of this British foreign policy was to ensure the security of the British Isles as well as to maintain Britain’s global position. Though Britain watched the growth of German economic, military and imperial power with growing concern, the government perceived the military threat to Britain’s security or her status in the world from Germany in 1905 as minimal. The enemy to fear was Russia, because she alone could threaten the Indian Empire, and consequently seriously challenge Britain's position as a Great Power. To British leaders, there seemed to be plenty of evidence of the Russian threat. Both In China and the Balkans, it was the growth of Russian power at the expense of the retreating and waning influence of an ancient empire that challenged British security and global aspirations.

China, with her tremendous trade potential and vast borders with Russia, seemed vulnerable to further Russian expansionism in Mongolia and Sinkiang, even though the Anglo-Japanese alliance had seemingly managed to contain further expansion towards Korea and Southern Manchuria and the Yangtze Agreement with Germany now shielded Zhili region and the nominal territorial integrity of whole China.

While the British governments had initially adopted an attitude of waiting and seeing due a lack of politically acceptable alternatives, after the Boxer War it was no longer practical to clung on the uncertain hope that during the time bought by further concessions and compromises with would-be future rivals, the overall geopolitical situation would somehow once again change to the benefit of Britain. And thus Britain had to react to the changing situation, initially by abandoning the traditional 'splendid isolation' and signing an alliance with Japan, and then signing a local accord with Germany regarding spheres of interest in China. Each of these actions was more or less directly aimed at containing the Russian ambitions in China.

And since these measures alone were deemed as insufficient to secure the frontiers of Indian Empire, the prospect of continuing Asiatic antagonism with Russia required concomitant strengthening of British position in Asia. This debate was muddled by a power struggle between the Government of India and the newly established Committee of Imperial Defence - as the defense of India became a key issue in the argument over the size of the army, the army emphasized its importance in this role to prevent its size from being slashed, since naval power would clearly unable to defend India from an invasion through Afghanistan. By 1905 the new Liberal government sought to solve this problem with the scheduled renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

It was only natural to consider using the alliance to solve this persistent weak spot in Imperial security when the renewal came up. A meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence was held on 12th of April 1095, and a proposal for an appropriate amendment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was presented. In exchange of British protection of their global position, Japan would be required to provide aid for the defence of British India. Provision for troops from Japan would reinforce the Indian Army ‘in as many weeks as a numerically equal army from home would take months.”G.S. Clarke argued that “in return for the great weight of naval protection accorded to Japan, she should undertake to supply (say) 150 000 troops for the defence of our Indian frontier…the fact that a large Japanese contingent would be supplied in the event of our Indian frontier being threatened would amply suffice to put an end to Russian projects in that direction.

The revised draft worked out by the British Cabinet provided for two major changes. One was that the treaty was now to operate in case of attack by a single power. This was a clear concession to Japan, since it would guarantee that the country would now receive British help against Russian aggression. In exchange Japan was demanded to extend the geographical scope of the alliance to Indian Empire. Chamberlain government undertook strenuous efforts to make Japan commit itself to sending a large force to India by delaying the renewal of the treaty until the Japanese agreed to extend the scope of the alliance to cover the adjacent regions of the Northwestern Frontier as well.

These were defined as “Afghanistan, the strip of Persian territory adjoining Afghanistan and Baluchistan, and possibly Tibet.” Initially the Japanese resisted, and pointed out that if the new terms were to be adopted, Japan would be henceforth be obliged to organize its military forces in times of peace so as to provide a suitable force for service in India in times of war. Ultimately the British bravado paid off - the importance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was a keystone of new Japanese foreign policy, and she was willing to comply with the terms after the fixed number of forces was dropped, and both parties agreed that a special council would be established to negotiate the actual details of troop transfers in a threat of war.[1]

With renewed promises of support from the sole ally of British Empire secured, the Foreign Office diplomats also sought to reduce tensions and sources of conflict between Britain and the Franco-Russian alliance. Many ministers in London had begun to favour an understanding with France, hoping to use Paris as a proxy road to St. Petersburg. The initial prospect for negotiations was bleak. The French press was still vitriolic towards Britain due the Boer War and the tensions in China, and when French governments were weak and short-lived while the influential colonial lobby held considerable influence in their ministry of foreign affairs, it was politically easy to gain support by taking an anti-British position. To the influential Frenchmen of the colonial lobby, the years 1898 and 1899 were remembered as bitter diplomatic defeats.

The key figure among these men was Théophile Delcassé, the Colonial under-secretary who had authorized the French forces to back down in Fashoda, hoping in vain to gain concessions in southern Sudan. Enraged by what he had perceived as British betrayal of an informal agreement, he had for a time sought cooperation with Germany against the "Perfidious Albion." But after Germans had made the status quo of their European possessions as a preliminary condition for further negotiations on the formation of an anti-British continental coalition, Delcassé had had to abandon his earlier hopes of Franco-German collaboration on the question of Egypt.

Yet the British presence Egypt still remained central part of his key foreign policy objective, French control of Morocco. By refusing to acknowledge British control of Egypt, Delcassé and his allies in the French ministry of foreign affairs hoped to pressure Britain to an agreement regarding the future of Morocco, while other other interested powers would be bought off with concessions elsewhere: Germany with territories from French Equatorial Africa, Italy with an agreement regarding the future of remaining Ottoman holdings in North Africa, and Spain with a strip of territory in northern Morocco.[2]

In January 1905 Delcassé had grown impatient to the lagging of negotiations between London and Paris. In the previous autumn he had recalled his former key ally, Paul Cambon, from London and replaced him with the amiable Camille Barrère, who was in many ways an exact opposite of the aloof and self-righteous Cambon.[3] Barrère had already earned the trust of Delcassé by his work as the French ambassador in Italy, and now Delcassé had entrusted him with improving the Franco-British relations, and securing an arrangement with Britain without challenging his personal policies.

After the recall of Cambon Delcassé saw it fit to begin his grand geopolitical gamble, when France sent a deputation to Morocco to negotiate with the Sultan about the control of Moroccan army and police in an open defiance of the existing international agreements regarding Morocco. Germans were quick to react to this challenge. In March Wilhemstrasse orchestrated a German countermove by arranging a surprise naval visit by Kaiser Wilhelm II to Tangier, a Moroccan port on the Atlantic. The Kaiser landed, and held a speech in a German legation where he asserted the German commercial and economic interests in Morocco and publicly proclaimed his belief in the total independence of the Sultan to cheering crowds, and sailed away.

After testing the waters, the French government now expressed willingness to start initiated bilateral negotiations with Berlin about the current “colonial questions”. Despite his personal distrust of all things German (“they’re swindlers, as Delcassé privately remarked to Paul Revoil, his closest collaborator), the French foreign minister was willing to do business with Berlin in this matter. The negotiations were firmly underway in July 1905, when the events in Constantinople suddenly turned the attention of the Major Power to Balkans.


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The divided Maghreb: The Kingdom of Morocco was already experiencing increasing forms of Western incursions by 1905, and all of her major ports were occupied by European powers.

[1] In OTL such a plan was presented, but rejected due a wording that included a fixed amount of forces Japan would be expected to provide for India. Here C.B. is willing to press on the issue, and Japan is more willing to compromise to retain her important alliance with London. In OTL Japan never objected in principle to sending troops to India per se, only to a numerical commitment within the treaty. Without such a clause, the finer details of the subject are covered in the military talks after the actual treaty is signed. Before this could happen in OTL, the British themselves decided not to ask for Japanese help in OTL due a more realistic assesment of the available supply routes in Afghanistan and the North-Western Frontier. Here the assessment is still made by 1905, but Elgin and his former colleaques from the Colonial Office are more influential than OTL and include the secret aid clause to the treaty in order to deter future Russian expansion in Persia and Afghanistan.

[2] Without the 1903 royal visit to Paris, the French press and public opinion remain more critical towards Britain, limiting the options of French politicians. Internationally the only difference to OTL is the increased tension in Anglo-French relations caused by the French occupation of Yunnan. This makes Delcassé consider changes in London Embassy.

[3] In retrospect it seems bizarre that Paul Cambon was able to negotiate the Anglo-French Entente and retain his post until 1920. He literally burned the official instructions from Paris if he happened to dislike them, didin't speak a word of English after spending 22 years in the country, and opposed the foundation of French schools in Britain on the grounds that French people raised in Britain tented to end up mentally retarded! He also saw that the Delcassé was not getting any results with his fixation to Egypt and criticized him for it. Here Delcassé loses his patience with Cambon, and replaces him with more cooperational Barrère.
 
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