Thanks, I was trying to work out how he fitted into Othello. And now I know a European proverb!
The March of Time - 20th Century History
- Thread starter Karelian
- Start date
Chapter 161: The Abdication Crisis, Part XVIII: The Navy is expanding to meet the needs of the expanding Navy.
The leaders of 1908 all agreed that the world they lived in was a competitive place. Struggle for colonies, spheres of influence and markets were things that kept them awake at night. The rise of two powerful industrial competitors to Britain - US and Germany - and the expansive British colonial and naval policy of the previous 40 years bore a degree of responsibility for creating this more menacing international climate.
The new technology that had promised such endless progress and prosperity had failed to deliver. The same steamships, railroads and telegraphs had once been heralded and celebrated as inventions that would bring about a more peaceful and secure world were now creating new tension and flashpoints all over the globe.
Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz was no stranger to this merciless reality. For him, the promotion of German economic influence and its worldwide expansion was the guiding principle of everything he did. For him it was all too obvious that in a modern world, true economic power and sea-power were naturally the same thing. The more the German overseas trade grew, the better it was for the German battlefleet that would have to safeguard the expanding German merchant marine.
This made Tirpitz accept the prospect of economic transformation of Germany from an agricultural society to an industrial one as something of a natural law. This view seated him in the camp of the modernizing industrialists who were increasingly at odds with the reactionary agrarian conservatives. He knew that the landowners and agrarians had deep-rooted objections to what they called “the terrible fleet”, which they rightly regarded as an agent of further industrialization. But while the old Junker families had their estates and a lot of prestige, von Tirpitz had Krupp and the other steel barons, bankers and shipyard magnates. As long as Wilhelm II had reigned, the Admiral had managed to control the German naval policy.
This political position on the right side of modernity had suited Tirpitz just fine. He had always thought that the arch-conservative Eulenburg was weak, unable to stem the threat from the left and unwilling and reluctant to pursue a consistent foreign policy that would be determined and imperialistic enough. Convinced that Germany was on the wrong track, Tirpitz seriously contemplated his position in November 1908. He was becoming desperate, frustrated and angry. Lately Wilhelm II had made his life a perfect hell with his constant meddling.
Worse still, the now-disgraced Kaiser and Chancellor had both failed to deliver the desperately needed cooperation between government, army and navy. And the constitution contained no future safeguards against men like Wilhelm II. This state of affairs would have to be remedied. For Germany to prevail, the young Crown Prince would have to rule with the support of Chiefs of the Admiral Staff and the General Staff. Already when the Eulenburg scandal had been starting to seriously threaten the crown, Tirpitz had privately urged Gustav von Niedner, the personal physician of Wilhelm II, to declare him unable to govern.[1]
Tirpitz felt that the time to act was now. He had managed to make a lasting and positive first impression to the young monarch by talking business instead of focusing on court etiquette. The old Empress also liked him, as well as several other German royals. The Grand Duke of Baden openly supported him. Prince Johann Albrecht of Mecklenburg helped his navalist cause as the honorary leader of the Colonial Society, ADV, the Navy League and several smaller nationalist organizations that also held the Admiral in high regard. Prince Regent Luitpold of Bavaria wanted his support over the question of military justice reform. [2]
There was but just one flaw. Tirpitz hated speech making and public oratory. He preferred the small technocratic expert circles of the Naval Office and the Reichstag budgetary committee where he could focus on his sole ambition, naval matters. He knew that by most standards he was an uncharismatic, untalented public speaker. Lacking options, he thus had to rely on the Navy League - for now.
Tirpitz was ambivalent about the role of lobby groups and regretted the excesses of the most noisy German navalists of the League. At the same time he lacked other means to change German domestic politics. Privately he was attending meetings with his financial backers and doing his best to gather funding to support his political efforts, but publicly he felt uneasy about the idea of breaking a social taboo and getting directly involved to politics himself. For now, it was easier to wait for the coronation of the new Kaiser and muster his troops.
1-2: Both OTL - Tirpitz had friends in high places, and he became politically active and increasingly critical towards Wilhelm II during WW1. Here he is more reluctant, but still sees the status quo as a recipe for a disaster just like in OTL. In OTL he kept quiet until 1914 since the naval expansion seemed less threatened than in TTL.
Chapter 162: The Abdication Crisis, Part XIX: Patrisian Politics
As the dust began to settle around the Abdication Crisis, Posadowsky-Wehner was once again busily at work. As the new acting Chancellor he was performing his constitutional duties, and urgently sought an acceptable option for the post of acting Vice-Chancellor. Since the Conservative Junkers hated his guts and the National Liberals were too small to provide the necessary votes in the Reichstag, he had few other options than to turn towards the Zentrum.
This option made good political sense. After all, the more or less open anti-Catholic agitation of Chancellor Eulenburg in the election 1907 had not been lost to the many Catholic voters, and the internal relations between Prussia and the southern German states were now extremely strained as a result. This state of affairs had to be addressed, since the Catholics formed an influential group that had only grown in influence lately. Zentrum had gained 85 percent more votes in 1907 than it had done in 1874 (1,45 million to 2,18 million), enjoying an upward trend that exceeded both the growth in population (37%) and the number of potential voters (47%) of the same period. The end of the Kulturkampf era of Bismarck meant that Zentrum was now seeking to retain its current status instead of expanding its ranks further. It was also no longer the only option for German Catholics ( - in 1912 only 54,6% of all Catholics voted for Zentrum). The old clerical party was now increasingly seen as a middle class movement, a fact reflected in the new cooperation with the Prussian Conservatives, the former arch-enemies of South German Catholic culture.[1]
Zentrum was an odd party. It had never built up an actual party organization, opting to use the Church and clerics as the local networks of voter organization. The Catholic community did have their own mass movement, the Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland. Established in 1890 the Volsverein had grown to one of the largest voluntary organizations of Wilhelmine Germany, with over 700 000 members by 1908. Offering social, social reformist and democratic left-wing Catholicism an institutional home, the Volksverein was accompanied by the growing Christian Catholic unions. Together with these groups and the 90 and 110 seats that the Zentrum party consistently secured in the Reichstag, the Catholics were a group that any aspiring imperial government could ill ignore.
The man whom Posadowsky approached with an offer of Vice-Chancellorship was a former professor of philosophy from the university of Bonn, with a previous record of honorable and faithful service as a member of the Bavarian Government. A devoted monarchist by birth and conviction, Georg Friedrich Karl Freiherr von Hertling seemed like a curious choice for a vice-chancellorship at a time when public dissent for the House of Hohenzollern and the person of the previous Kaiser seemed to be increasing by the day.
Hertling was sixty-five when he became the party chairman of Zentrum in 1908 after his second tenure as a Reichstag representative. His decision of pleading patience and conciliation towards the government had just recently trumped the confrontational and uncompromising stance supported the populist left wing of the party, led by Mathias Erzberger and Hermann Roeren. Hertling was a veteran of the Kulturkampf, and feared that brash polemics of Erzberger would put an end to a decade of efforts aimed at allaying passions and overcoming the confessional division by emphasizing national unity. It was this desire to normalize the position of the Catholics in German politics after recent return from political exile that led to the desire to find the Zentrum a reliable Protestant political partner from the Reichstag.
Here too the Wilhelmine-era feature of German politics, relying on extra-parliamentary forces to govern the country, was clearly visible. For Stegerwald and other Catholic labour union leaders the Black-and-Blue Block had been a bad alternative to the solution they lobbied: a deal with the Christian Socials. Such a move would have brought the smaller Protestant grouping into obliged loyalty towards its mentors at Zentrum, pushing the party towards more urban-oriented social policy and unifying the Christian unions and their political influence behind the two allied parties. Stegerwald correctly predicted the drawbacks of the chosen course of action: As the Conservatives and Zentrum had joined forces, the Christian trade unions had suffered, and their rate of growth dropped. After this decision had marked the end of the Eulenburg Block, Hertling had been in bad terms with Erzberger, his radical colleague and main competitor inside the party.
After he had been personally tasked to take up the post of the Vice-Chancellor by Prince Regent Luitpold, he promptly resigned from his position in the party, so as to be able to act as a representative of the will of the sovereign in a constitutional monarchy and not as the agent of a parliamentary majority.[2]
He declared that he was fully cognizant of the strength and justice of the demand for an increased share of participation by the people in the government, and he pledged himself to use his best efforts to see that this demand would be met. But for an aged conservative like him, the idea of a change of the system meant quite different things than to the average voter.
While he was acceptable to the young Kaiser, the limits of his political views considering the general mood in German politics quickly became apparent. When the Herrenhaus Junkers and industry barons seemed dead-set to hold their old privileges and ancient rights in the face of the suffrage reform bill, Hertling stated in a speech that the new law should be seen "as a necessary step to avoid the future necessity of making still more far-reaching concessions." The speech made the Junkers-linked press call him “the gravedigger of the Prussian monarchy” while the Liberal and Socialist newspapers assaulted him as a “man who sought to block honest democratic reforms of Prussia’s iniquitous franchise system.”[3]
Personally Hertling truly believed that imposing franchise reform on the states would be an unwarrantable violation of their rights, just like the introduction of a parliamentary government. In this he and Posandowsky were in complete agreement. Their reformism was ultimately firmly conservative in nature and limited in scope. And as both of them were early on firmly focused to the disastrous domestic situation, this left the stage open for politicians more interested in international politics to step ahead to promote their own agendas.
1: OTL figures
2: He did this in OTL during his post as the Ministerpräsident of Bavaria, and I see little reason he would chance course in a higher office.
3. OTL quotes from WW1 era.
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Chapter 163: The Abdication Crisis, Part XX: Thesean Diplomacy
When Chancellor Eulenburg took office in the beginning of the century, he placed great confidence and trust in Richthofen, the new Foreign Minister of German Empire. He had chosen von Richthofen among the potential senior diplomats because Baron Richthofen was a clever, capable, completely reliable and amiable personality. He also knew that von Richthofen was a man who could be trusted not conduct German foreign policy according to his own precepts.
Eulenburg was always most courteous to Baron von Richthofen: “Not only will I always allow you to speak freely, but I expressly ask you always to tell me your view without reserve. Rest assured that I not only never misunderstand sincerity [Aufrichtigkeit], but I place this above all other qualities”, he told to von Richthofen when he took office. Richthofen gradually became one of the closest advisers of Eulenburg, since the Chancellor left the brunt of the routine paperwork to Richthofen. Richthofen dealt with his lot without qualms. His traditional Prussian bureaucratic mindset made him so “colourless and uninspiring” that he was barely tolerable for Wilhelm II, who had to be persuaded hard by Eulenburg to accept von Richthofen to the office in 1900.
For his part, von Richthofen had to accept that his new role had great responsibilities, but little practical power. Eulenburg, an old fox in the German diplomatic circles, had made it clear from the outset that von Richthofen would have to play a second fiddle to the Chancellor, who was also now automatically the Foreign Minister of Prussia. Richthofen soon found out that he was in fact not only one, but two steps down in the pecking order of Wilhelmine court: He had to confirm his every move from Eulenburg, who in turn had to abide by the whims of the erratic Kaiser.
And then there was Holstein. Since Holstein and Richthofen were not on speaking terms, Eulenburg had to placate the old Geheimrat to accept the new Foreign Secretary by offering Holstein the post of State Secretary: both of them new that the recluse Holstein would never accept the position, but the offer appeared to his vanity.
After the former Director of the Foreign Office Trade Department and a protégé of Holstein, Otto von Mühlberg, was assigned as the new Under State Secretary, Holstein was pleased and a sort of peace returned to Wilhelmstrasse. But the cost was ineffectiveness of the entire Auswärtiges Amt, as the Political Division turned into a stage of petty jealousies, disputes and endless intrigue, with Holstein himself playing a central role.
He and the other ambitious diplomats never accepted the control of Chancellor Eulenburg with his subtle, suave personality, sweet-talking manners and scintillating mind. In his correspondence with the other top diplomats of German Foreign Office, Holstein resented both the Kaiser and his Chancellor, but he and the other diplomats could do little to change the way the German foreign policy was led. After all, the All-Highest held the power to do unto them the same he had done to Bismarck, and Wilhelm II expected “his diplomats” to align their views to his own in every detail.
And so things muddled along until the Abdication Crisis. Eulenburg did what he could to affect the little things, but the major lines of German politics set by Wilhelm II remained firmly in place: the naval arms race with Britain, adventurism in China, Ottoman Empire, Africa, the Pacific region and Central America. The increased unease felt towards the growing strength of the Franco-Russian alliance and the vague desire to conduct Weltpolitik - whatever that meant - led to constant stream of incidents where only the diplomatic skill of Eulenburg and the cooperation between him, Richthofen and Holstein had managed to avert and limit the worst disasters. Together with Count Posadowsky-Wehner, von Richthofen remained a close confidant of Chancellor Eulenburg through his term[1], as the Dissolution War in Scandinavia and the turmoil in the Balkans focused German foreign policy back to Europe after 1905.
The stress of the job was considerable, but von Richthofen was still around to see Holstein go. That was a short-lived joy, for the expanding scandal and the fact that the German yellow press unfairly linked him to the Liebenberg Circle proved to be too much for his failing health. A day after hearing the news of the abdication of Wilhelm II, Baron von Richthofen fainted to his desk, clasping his chest in pain. [2]
1. in OTL Bülow used von Richthofen in a similar way, and Eulenburg also prefers to keep the nominal leader of German diplomacy close at hand.
2. Unlike Bülow, von Eulenburg does not burden von Richthofen with as much extra work and complete disregard of scheduled appointment times. In addition von Richthofen sees a different doctor than in OTL after assuming office, and upon his instructions he picks up a habit of longer daily walks, cuts back on beer and tobacco and goes to regular vacation trips to Marienbad. Thus he does not unexpectedly die to a cardiac arrest in January 1906 as described here, but lingers on for two extra years.
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Two more years of Richthofen - and who might Wilhelm III (or Posadowsky-Wehner) choose as his successor? iOTL all foreign Secretaries were horrible failures, but that was often mostly Willy2's blame. Here is a Window wide open with opportunities for very different German policies...
Chapter 164: The Reign of Wilhelm III, Part I: Keeping Up With The von Eulenburgs
The coronation ceremony of Wilhelm III felt more like a funeral, and was a stark contrast to the sunny wedding of the royal couple just three years earlier.
When he returned from his political exile to extinguish the flames of the Abdication Crisis and to serve the young man who had been dazed to realize that he really was the new Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia, Chancellor Posadowsky-Wehner held true to the political maxim that one should never let a good crisis to go to waste. He knew that speed was essential, and utilized the fact that the Conservatives were in complete disarray because of the abdication. Securing a new majority in the Reichstag with one stroke by getting the conservative wing of Zentrum on board with von Hertling as his new Vice-Chancellor, he made himself indispensable for both to the young Kaiser and to the Conservative Junkers, who were afraid that the radical wing of Zentrum might join forces with the dreaded SPD if left unchecked. This step to mend fences with the slighted South Germans was quickly followed with the new revised libel law (Lex Eulenburg).
As the Eulenburg Scandal faded away from the headlines and the new Kaiser went to a charm tour accross Germany, the Conservatives regained their footing. They organized a bitter opposition to the suffrage law revision and especially the tax reforms plans, which required Posadowsky to use every last favour and backroom horse-trading deal to wiggle out the minimum working majority to pass it. By then the worst of the storm had passed, and while the criticism from socialist and liberal press still kept coming in, it was already muted by the new legislation and no longer attracted large crowds to public demonstrations.
By then the Chancellor and the new Kaiser had also found some common ground. Spirited in from the middle of his studies and without any real experience from the affairs of state (much to his own dismay, the Crown Prince had been allowed to get the first brief tours at bureaus of the Lord Lieutenant at Potsdam, the Home Office, Admiralty and the Exchequer only in October 1907), the young Emperor had been initially besieged by angry older German monarchs who had taken advantage of his confusion and the sense of urgency to promote their own causes. Getting Wilhelm III to personally attend to the sessions of the Bundesrat regularly was enough to get them back in line, whereas the re-establishment of Landesverteidigunsgkomission had a lot to do with von Tirpitz, who wanted to have another seat on the table near the young Kaiser.[1]
Some other changes emanated from the person of the new Kaiser himself.
Oberhof- und Hausmarschall Count August Eulenburg had dodged many bullets in his life, and even during the crisis that rocked the court and empire the core he never became a target of public criticism, proving that he had not been called “the most intelligent man in Berlin” by von Bismarck himself for nothing.
He had experience and tact, and despite his conservative views he was flexible enough to pick his battles carefully. For decades he had focused solely on promoting the agrarian Conservative Junker policies discreetly and subtly from the background. He had abstained from using his influential position to shut Wilhelm II off from outside influences or to topple personal enemies, opting to remain neutral in petty politics and court intrigue.
Now his disgraced cousin had made his family name an anathema, but he could take solace from the fact that he had (in vain) tried to warn the former Kaiser about the looming threat well in advance, but failing that, he had reluctantly embraced the candidature of Philip von Eulenburg. August had used his own influence to promote the careers of two men, and them alone: he and his brother Botho. For everyone else he had always formulated a backup plane. At the same time he had accepted the idea that his cousin would become the new Chancellor instead of his brother, he had stored documents proving his far-sighted warnings to the Emperor. He leaked them to the conservative press to limit the damage caused to the House of Eulenburg at the height of the crisis, turning his part in the story to a role of a wise but, tragically ignored loyal advisor.[2]
After he had met the future Kaiser and gone to great lengths to stop all plans of a Prussian electoral reform, he had found Wilhelm III unaffected by his reasoning. From this he drew his own conclusions. While he had avoided the fate of his cousin, his central role in the court made him part of the world of his father - a place the new Emperor found dusty and dull. His departure from the court was more or less a willing self-exile of a loyal servant of Wilhelm II.
Letting him go was also a convenient way for the young Wilhelm to re-arrange the court a bit more. The three "Hallelujah-Aunts", Gräfin von Brockdorff, Gräfin von Keller and von Gersdorff were all devoted servants of the Kaiser's mother, Augusta Viktoria, and permanent fixtures in court. His father had found them tiresome and annoying, but had been powerless to get rid of them because the Empress had insisted to keep them around. They had enforced their narrow conservatism to the royal entourage during the whole childhood of Wilhelm, and the young Kaiser hated their guts. Thus only his mother was shocked when the new Emperor almost immediately expressed his loyal wish that his beloved mother would have to take some familiar faces along with her and make sure that her husband, Wilhelm II, would feel at home in his new residence, Achilleion, at Corfu.
After all, the young emperor reasoned, they both knew how much their poor father liked familiarity and repetition. Deep down both of them knew how Achilleion had been like. Every trip had been the same. Same guests, same activities. To relieve the shock and stress caused by the recent events as much as possible, Corfu simply required the constant presence of Auguste Victoria, Princess Viktoria-Luise, Prince August Wilhelm, the two most trusted adjutants and Wilhelm’s doctor.[3] It was for the best of Germany and dear Papa, after all.
1. The Daily Telegraph affair saw the other German monarchs to express hopes for such an arrangement, while von Tirpitz wanted closer cooperation between the various branches of the German military and government in OTL.
2. As per OTL.
3. This was the core of the OTL list of people who accompanied Wilhelm II to Achilleion. He loved endless repetition, while the other guests stuck to the island with him found the Groundhog Day life in the palace "tedious and horrible."
The family had a history of setting people with mental health troubles aside, and there are still people alive who recall the last sad days of King Friedrich Wilhelm IV.
"Focusing on archaeology and sailing" in the healthy Mediterranean climate together with few trusted friends and family is a much more pleasant way to move out of the limelight than being held in a mansion half-paralyzed and depressed.
Chapter 164: The Reign of Wilhelm III, Part II; Excerpts from Memoirs - The Early Years
I knew King Edward from my earliest youth and had ample opportunity to talk with him on past and present affairs almost up to his death. This Serene, world-experienced man was, as long as I can remember, extremely friendly to me, and as I have said before, he took a most active interest in my development. My great-uncle always seemed to feel a sort of responsibility for my welfare. Often we sat talking for hours in the most unconstrained fashion while he lay back in a great easy chair and smoked an enormous cigar. At such times, he narrated many interesting things, often out of his own life...
He was a brilliant upholder of his country’s interest, and a one who, I am convinced, would rather have secured these interests in cooperation with Germany than in opposition to her, but who, finding the former way barred, turned with all his energies to the one thing possible and needful, namely, the assurance of that security per se...
Undoubtedly a remarkable personality endowed with vast experience, great wisdom and practicality, Edward VII repeatedly expressed his anxiety lest the economic competition of Germany would some day lead to collision with Britain. Remembering that England’s forces had always been employed against that Continental Power which at any given moment happened to be the strongest, it seemed inevitable that sooner or later the German Empire would become involved in a war unless the opposition would be removed...
Personally, I considered it desirable to strive for an understanding with England on economic, economic-political and colonial questions. I did not entertain any illusions as to the difficulty of such an undertaking. I was quite aware that any such effort presupposed a thorough discussion both on the naval programme and of economic matters. The object appeared to me well worth the sacrifice, for the relaxation of the political tension would have secured peace and provided us with advantages amply compensating for the concessions indicated. When I pointed this out to Chancellor Eulenburg, he replied to me, smiling sadly, that just like Bismarck he was quite willing to love the English, but they refused to be loved...[1]
Many an hour’s talk on this fascinating subject my great-uncle, King Edward, had lovingly instructed me concerning Britain’s political structure, in which I recognized many a feature of value to our younger development. That the ideas which had governed the first two decades of my father’s reign had been leading further and further from the lines along which the monarchy of Germany ought to develop, if that monarchy were to remain the firmly-established and organic consummation of the State’s structure. It was as though he clearly and consciously meant to call my attention to this danger point, in order to warn me and to win me to a different path at the threshold of my political career...[2]
In the early months, during the collective regency of all the federal princes, I was deeply moved by their oath-sworn loyalty to our House, when they offered me their advice and guidance in the interest of the Reich and in the name of their peoples, under clearly stated conditions. Prince Ludwig of Bavaria was their spokesman in the name of his father and of the grand dukes of Saxony and Württemberg. It was with him that we discussed the matter for the second time...
I made the incautious remark that in my opinion and with the view to a certainty of peace, it would be far and away the wisest thing for Germany and England, the two greatest Teutonic nations - the strongest land Power and the strongest sea Power - to co-operate; they could then, moreover (if it must be so), divide the world between them. “Yes, true, but England does not wish to divide with anybody -- not even with Germany.” I still recall the surprise and confusion I felt in that moment. The world of youth with its simple and clear solutions met the complex and harsh reality...[3]
Everyone told me again and again: Understanding was impossible, England would not have it, or if a basis were found, we should lose the whole affair... For me, a glance across the black-white-and-red frontier lines showed that all around us political feats quite different from our had been performed; but they had been performed by men who understood their profession and the signs of the times. The British Empire grew to great heights when it was guided by a dozen strong, clear-headed men who, misled by no sentiment, worked along the lines of a firmly-established tradition to accomplish the programme mapped out for England and England’s weal...
I persistently advocated, in view of the menacing situation, an augmentation of our military resources. Our own preparations were limited to the minimum of what was essential. In the face of all this and in sure and certain anticipation of this final settlement, it became the bounden duty of the German Empire to arm itself as thoroughly as possible and to demand a similar fighting-power from Austria, which country, under the influence of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the men selected by him, had become politically very active. The Archduke was putting out feelers and developing ideas which should enable him to see what he might except of me. This dangerously ambitious Archduke, who was prepared to act as anything but modest part and who was as clever as he was ruthless...
The feverish and unconcealed warlike preparations of the Russo-Frankish Entente were clearly directed against us and showed that they meant to be ready and then await the right watchword for a rupture. France exhausted her manpower and her finances in order to maintain a disproportionately large army. Russia, in return for French money, placed hundreds of thousands of peasants in somber earth-hued uniforms. Italy turned greedy eyes on Turkish Tripoli and built fortress after fortress along the frontiers of her deeply-hated Austrian ally. England watched this activity and launched ship after ship.
We had missed the opportunity of coming to a complete understanding with the well-intentioned Combes Cabinet in the early summer of 1905. In the meantime, the bitterness towards England caused by the Fashoda affront had begun to dissipate. The conditio sine qua non for any major agreement would be a sacrifice of at least a part of the Reichsland, a thing which we could not even discuss in times of peace. So, assuming it to be impossible to alter the antagonism with the French or to bridge the rift started during the Boer War with England, the only possible and profitable ally left for us in Europe was Russia...I received the impression that the Tsar was as friendly to Germany as ever, but that he was less able to put his friendliness into action. He was completely enmeshed by the Pan-Slav and Anti-German party of the Grand Duke Nicholai Nicholaievitch and powerless to oppose that prince, who quite openly displayed his hatred for Germany...
But how to loosen the Franco-Russian alliance to draw Russia into cooperation with ourselves? There seemed to be a prospect of succeeding, if we supported Russian wishes in regard to the Dardanelles and the Persian Gulf. Free passage was anything but an unapproachable idea to the Ottoman politicians, and opposition to such a solution was not found from Austria-Hungary either...
I was dismayed to discover that no energetic action or a well-defined Government programme existed to bring about to link our policy with Russia, or to bring about an understanding with England or France.[4] This short-term hand-to-mouth policy from the days of old that wished to offend nobody had nothing in common with the Bismarck tradition of clever and wide-spun conceptions...
1. replaced Bülow with Eulenburg, otherwise OTL quote.
2. Written in 1919, this is almost certainly a calculated remark rather than genuine feeling.
But aside of this the amount of praise he heaps upon the man who was in OTL viewed as the main architect of "encirlement of Germany" and whom his father hated like poison until the day he died is rather remarkable.
3. In OTL the Crown Prince states that Edward Grey made this remark to him during his visit to London. Part with regency is naturally added-up, but the remark and reply are from OTL memoirs.
4. France is added to the mix, rest of the quote is OTL.
He was a brilliant upholder of his country’s interest, and a one who, I am convinced, would rather have secured these interests in cooperation with Germany than in opposition to her, but who, finding the former way barred, turned with all his energies to the one thing possible and needful, namely, the assurance of that security per se...
Undoubtedly a remarkable personality endowed with vast experience, great wisdom and practicality, Edward VII repeatedly expressed his anxiety lest the economic competition of Germany would some day lead to collision with Britain. Remembering that England’s forces had always been employed against that Continental Power which at any given moment happened to be the strongest, it seemed inevitable that sooner or later the German Empire would become involved in a war unless the opposition would be removed...
Personally, I considered it desirable to strive for an understanding with England on economic, economic-political and colonial questions. I did not entertain any illusions as to the difficulty of such an undertaking. I was quite aware that any such effort presupposed a thorough discussion both on the naval programme and of economic matters. The object appeared to me well worth the sacrifice, for the relaxation of the political tension would have secured peace and provided us with advantages amply compensating for the concessions indicated. When I pointed this out to Chancellor Eulenburg, he replied to me, smiling sadly, that just like Bismarck he was quite willing to love the English, but they refused to be loved...[1]
Many an hour’s talk on this fascinating subject my great-uncle, King Edward, had lovingly instructed me concerning Britain’s political structure, in which I recognized many a feature of value to our younger development. That the ideas which had governed the first two decades of my father’s reign had been leading further and further from the lines along which the monarchy of Germany ought to develop, if that monarchy were to remain the firmly-established and organic consummation of the State’s structure. It was as though he clearly and consciously meant to call my attention to this danger point, in order to warn me and to win me to a different path at the threshold of my political career...[2]
In the early months, during the collective regency of all the federal princes, I was deeply moved by their oath-sworn loyalty to our House, when they offered me their advice and guidance in the interest of the Reich and in the name of their peoples, under clearly stated conditions. Prince Ludwig of Bavaria was their spokesman in the name of his father and of the grand dukes of Saxony and Württemberg. It was with him that we discussed the matter for the second time...
I made the incautious remark that in my opinion and with the view to a certainty of peace, it would be far and away the wisest thing for Germany and England, the two greatest Teutonic nations - the strongest land Power and the strongest sea Power - to co-operate; they could then, moreover (if it must be so), divide the world between them. “Yes, true, but England does not wish to divide with anybody -- not even with Germany.” I still recall the surprise and confusion I felt in that moment. The world of youth with its simple and clear solutions met the complex and harsh reality...[3]
Everyone told me again and again: Understanding was impossible, England would not have it, or if a basis were found, we should lose the whole affair... For me, a glance across the black-white-and-red frontier lines showed that all around us political feats quite different from our had been performed; but they had been performed by men who understood their profession and the signs of the times. The British Empire grew to great heights when it was guided by a dozen strong, clear-headed men who, misled by no sentiment, worked along the lines of a firmly-established tradition to accomplish the programme mapped out for England and England’s weal...
I persistently advocated, in view of the menacing situation, an augmentation of our military resources. Our own preparations were limited to the minimum of what was essential. In the face of all this and in sure and certain anticipation of this final settlement, it became the bounden duty of the German Empire to arm itself as thoroughly as possible and to demand a similar fighting-power from Austria, which country, under the influence of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the men selected by him, had become politically very active. The Archduke was putting out feelers and developing ideas which should enable him to see what he might except of me. This dangerously ambitious Archduke, who was prepared to act as anything but modest part and who was as clever as he was ruthless...
The feverish and unconcealed warlike preparations of the Russo-Frankish Entente were clearly directed against us and showed that they meant to be ready and then await the right watchword for a rupture. France exhausted her manpower and her finances in order to maintain a disproportionately large army. Russia, in return for French money, placed hundreds of thousands of peasants in somber earth-hued uniforms. Italy turned greedy eyes on Turkish Tripoli and built fortress after fortress along the frontiers of her deeply-hated Austrian ally. England watched this activity and launched ship after ship.
We had missed the opportunity of coming to a complete understanding with the well-intentioned Combes Cabinet in the early summer of 1905. In the meantime, the bitterness towards England caused by the Fashoda affront had begun to dissipate. The conditio sine qua non for any major agreement would be a sacrifice of at least a part of the Reichsland, a thing which we could not even discuss in times of peace. So, assuming it to be impossible to alter the antagonism with the French or to bridge the rift started during the Boer War with England, the only possible and profitable ally left for us in Europe was Russia...I received the impression that the Tsar was as friendly to Germany as ever, but that he was less able to put his friendliness into action. He was completely enmeshed by the Pan-Slav and Anti-German party of the Grand Duke Nicholai Nicholaievitch and powerless to oppose that prince, who quite openly displayed his hatred for Germany...
But how to loosen the Franco-Russian alliance to draw Russia into cooperation with ourselves? There seemed to be a prospect of succeeding, if we supported Russian wishes in regard to the Dardanelles and the Persian Gulf. Free passage was anything but an unapproachable idea to the Ottoman politicians, and opposition to such a solution was not found from Austria-Hungary either...
I was dismayed to discover that no energetic action or a well-defined Government programme existed to bring about to link our policy with Russia, or to bring about an understanding with England or France.[4] This short-term hand-to-mouth policy from the days of old that wished to offend nobody had nothing in common with the Bismarck tradition of clever and wide-spun conceptions...
1. replaced Bülow with Eulenburg, otherwise OTL quote.
2. Written in 1919, this is almost certainly a calculated remark rather than genuine feeling.
But aside of this the amount of praise he heaps upon the man who was in OTL viewed as the main architect of "encirlement of Germany" and whom his father hated like poison until the day he died is rather remarkable.
3. In OTL the Crown Prince states that Edward Grey made this remark to him during his visit to London. Part with regency is naturally added-up, but the remark and reply are from OTL memoirs.
4. France is added to the mix, rest of the quote is OTL.
Chapter 165: The Reign of Wilhelm III, Part III: "In theory, this is a a most brilliant plan..."
The Nordic Secession War of 1905 affected German domestic politics more than her foreign relations. The Björkö debacle, where Wilhelm II sought to utilize the conflict for his own grand foreign policy schemes instead of seeking to defuse the situation, was in many ways the watershed of erratic royal diplomacy of the Wilhelmine era.
Once a truce was called at the insistence of the joint demand of the Concert of Europe and Britain, Germany and Russia had started occupying ports in Norway, international tensions were running high. The weakness of Hochseeflotte in comparison to the Royal Navy was also now made obvious to all. Although Richthofen and Eulenburg were ultimately rather successful in pouring oil to the waves in the final negotiations for the North Sea Convention, the crisis left the German military elites concerned with the overall military situation of the Empire, as a major war in the continent now seemed more likely than ever.
The first session of the re-instituted Landesverteidigunsgkomission dealt with the current status and future of Germany from the perspective of military strategy. The young Kaiser was accompanied by Chancellor Posadowsky and War Minister Josias von Heeringen.
The military top brass present included Chief of Staff Hans Hartwig von Beseler, Chief of the Military Cabinet Colmar von der Goltz, Chief of the Naval Cabinet Georg Alexander von Müller, Head of the Reichsmarineamt Admiral von Tirpitz, and Chief of Staff of the Naval High Command, August von Heeringen - brother of the War Minister.
The first meeting was intended to act as a general briefing of the Emperor, and a presentation of the current status and strategic plans of the Army and Navy. This was also a useful pretext for the Chancellor to be present. Posadowsky was naturally curious: As it was, he had next to no idea what the German armed forces actually planned to do in a case of war!
The Army opened the meeting. As the bemused young Kaiser, his Chancellor and the top Navy brass listened, von Beseler started his representation by stating that the Großer Generalstab had two main war plans, one for each member of the most likely foe, the Franco-Russian Entente. The plan focusing against France had to deal with the narrow geography of the Franco-German border. As France had fortified her eastern border with Germany extensively, it was obvious that a purely frontal assault would lead to a laborious and costly struggle, trench warfare of indeterminate length, and yet to an uncertain conclusion. Hence the plans of venerable old von Moltke had called for a strong right wing conducting a deep sweep through Luxemburg and Belgium - a course of action von Beseler had found militarily sound approach in his own operational study as the Oberquartiermeister III, from January 1900.[1]
The enveloping wing would have to be as strong as possible from the very beginning. Since Meuse fortresses of Liège and Namur limited the operational deployment area to 80 to 90 kilometers, there was only room for maneuver for 10-11 corps. After testing variations of the plan in the staff ride of 1904[2], Beseler was unsatisfied with the results. The right wing advanced towards Trier and Aachen, and the left advanced between Metz and Strasbourg. The key battles were fought in the center, and the task of the right wing was to swing south - not west- to support the center and left by entering the battle on the frontiers from the French rear.
The conclusions of the war game were grim: The French fixed the left wing down by pushing forward from their own fortress line, while the right wing lacked strength to avoid getting stuck down to inconclusive frontal battles, since it was eight army corps short of requisite forces! Worse yet, these hypothetical missing troops would hardly have room to maneuver and supply themselves effectively even if they were available.
Von Beseler continued with the grim remark that it would be next to impossible to assemble majority of the German army to the Belgian-Luxembourg border in secrecy. The French high command could at once rearrange their posture to secure their northern flank. This was supported by a fresh study from his old III Department: it concluded that military intelligence and French military publications both pointed out that French had enough reserves to recover from “a Belgian hook” early enough to avoid a quick defeat.[3]
The operational draft of von Moltke had rested on several assumptions. Russian mobilization would have to be slow enough to give the German armies enough time to decisively defeat the French armies in a single short campaign. The German armies would have to be strong enough to do so in a single lightning-fast campaign. Now, von Beseler grimly pointed out, the plan was becoming more and more unfeasible by the day. The Russian railroad infrastructure had been expanding with an alarming rate, and most importantly the divisions needed for the Western offensive plan did not even exist to begin with.
Moreover, as Posadowsky felt compelled to point out, the plan was expressly hostile to Great Britain: it threatened a vital British interest and carried the risk of finally driving Britain from her aloof isolation into a definitive alliance with France. Both von Beseler and von der Goltz countered by stating that it was clearly obvious that in any war with France, Germany would almost certainly have to fight Britain as well, and thus any considerations for Belgian neutrality were moot to begin with. Posadowsky was not convinced, and pointed out that Britain had sat out the last time because von Bismarck and his diplomatic success. Here von der Goltz referred to his earlier work: Wars of the kings were over, as the fresh example from Scandinavia so aptly showed. There would no longer be short and victorious wars, period. Ultimately the general consensus of all generals present in the meeting was that a war with France could no longer be brought to a swift conclusion in a single campaign, no matter how desirable that was.
All such an all-out offensive could offer was a chance to seize areas vital for the French war effort, and offer Germany a better negotiation position. Now, assuming they still had to go to war, an offensive to enemy terrain was a classic approach straight from von Clausewitz. But if they invaded and the British Empire declared war as a result, and a quick victory was out of the question, what then? Everyone turned towards von Tirpitz and rest of the German naval delegation.
1. He did this work in OTL as well as a part of the preparations of his expected promotion.
2. Similar of the OTL war game of 1908 - von Beseler was fond of testing existing plans with war games beforehand.
3. OTL report from 1911, advanced by three years after the disappointing result of the 1904 wargame.
Driftless
Donor
I'm very interested to see where you take this storyline. It has the feel of more diplomatic wiggle room. A very dangerous convergence of destructive national policies, but perhaps with some German leaders seeing alternate paths. Some crash may be inevitable, but maybe not the modern "Thirty Years War" of the historic Twentieth Century
Chapter 165: The Reign of Wilhelm III, Part IV: "Your Imperial Majesty, we cannot allow a dreadnought gap!"
The meeting turned from cordial discussion into a heated debate. Tirpitz had to admit that right now he could not promise decisive success in a decisive battle against the Royal Navy. In a case of war the German foreign trade would be blockaded, August von Heeringen stated, and there was little the Navy could do to change this considering the overall geography. The British had the luxury to either choose a distant blockade or go for an aggressive close blockade, whereas the German Navy lacked strength to challenge either posture.[1]
Von Beseler did not miss the chance for a sardonic remark. Since now was obviously a bad time, when exactly would the Navy be ready then? Just like Field Marshall von Waldersee had said already in 1898, the navy kept cultivating the notion that future wars would be decided at sea. But what exactly did the navy propose to do if the army suffered a defeat, be it in the West or in the East?
Here the two factions of German military found little room for compromise: Beseler wanted more divisions and revision of available funding, while Tirpitz would not give up with his idea that the Hochseeflotte would ultimately become an important deterrent against the threat of a British blockade - but when pressed on the exact timetable, the irritated old sea lion was unable to provide anything concrete.
Posadowsky was appalled.
Two days later the Chancellor invited von Beseler, von der Goltz, War Minister von Heeringen and the State Secretary of Finance Adolf Wehrmuth to meet him in private. Chancellor Posadowsky stated outright that the current war plans were a road to ruin and totally out of touch with the basic facts of Realpolitik.
The old agrarian made von Beseler an offer he could ill refuse: Firstly, he wanted an ally to wean the young Kaiser away from Tirpitz and the navalists, and promised more funding for the army in return. Secondly, since it was clear that Tirpitz could never deliver what he kept promising, antagonizing the British by invading Belgium would turn a war against France into a struggle against the very kind of nightmare coalition Bismarck had warned about.
There had to be an alternative course of action, and Posadowsky said that the Emperor wanted to see a concrete plan for it as soon as possible. Von der Goltz, an old warhorse and anglophobe Pan-German as he was, supported this notion - knowing fully well that the young Kaiser had no idea that this meeting was taking place. The old general was not against naval expansion per se, on the contrary, but he had for long advocated for expanded funding for the Army.[2]
War Minister von Heeringen was a loyal mandarin and supported the Clausewitzian idea of the primacy of the civilian government, while State Secretary of Finance Wehrmuth just wanted to get the rampart spending spree in check, merely remarking: “As the strength of the army is for us a matter of life and death, so is the fleet for England.”[3]
And thus the civilians and soldiers formed a temporary marriage of convenience. The preliminary drafts from von Beseler were ready after a month of work. It had two variants, for French aggression and Russian aggression each, with either one of the hostile powers initially in an undetermined political position. Both plans showed that they were devised by a military engineer and the former Inspector of Fortresses: they called for strong fortress lines at the western and eastern border of Germany, and von Beseler openly stated that it would require a lot of new standing army formations and funding to turn the drafts into a viable strategic options.
Posadowsky realized that this was finally it: Germany was facing a strategic choice she had postponed for far too long.
For the previous decade Tirpitz had bypassed the tangled mess of conflicting Reichstag interests by using extra-parliamentary lobby groups of his own to influence the parties from the outside. Zentrum deputies had helped him to pass the first two Navy Laws, but already before his downfall Chancellor Eulenburg had found it harder and harder to sustain the alliance of moderate agrarians and industrialists who had so far allowed Wilhelm II and Tirpitz to continue the grandiose naval plans.
His predecessors had merely kept kicking the can down the road. Posadowsky no longer had neither the necessary tax funds or Reichstag votes for such luxury. Germany could no longer afford to maintain a strong standing army, invest in the unprofitable colonies, and constantly expand the naval budget, especially since the populist wing of Zentrum led by Matthias Erzberger was now openly critical to the naval policy of Tirpitz. Something had to change, since there simply wasn’t enough funding to keep all grandiose plans of Wilhelm II up and running anymore.
Posadowsky presented this state of affairs to Wilhelm III in a most courteous manner. He was friendly, but firm, and had a simple message: Further naval laws were no longer a realistic possibility. He requested from the new All-Highest that in order to save what might still be saved from the noble legacy of His Majesty Wilhelm II, the Foreign Office should be given a chance to at least try to negotiate some sort of a face-saving naval détente with Britain.
For his part, Wilhelm III never found it odd that the Chief of Staff, Chief of the Military Cabinet, Finance Minister, Foreign Minister and Chancellor all advocated roughly similar courses of action when he asked for their opinion during the following days. Had he not always loved the Army more than the Navy after all, and wanted to try to find at least some common ground with Britain, if possible?
Tirpitz, for his part, was not so easily fooled. He knew that the son was unlike his father, and realized that the way the Navy received almost half of the total defense expenditures of Germany was not a state of affairs that could be justified easily with the new monarch.
Even though he never admitted it frankly and openly, his blueprint for Weltpolitik had failed the moment HMS Dreadnought had been launched. Existing locks and docks in the major German naval bases required extensive rework to handle the increases in displacement, the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Kanal had to be both widened and deepened: in total the changes in technology increased the costs of up-to-date battleships by 96% and battlecruisers by 107%!
His staff had made calculations that kept Tirpitz awake at night. Naval estimates of 347 million for 1908 would have to rise to at least 434 million GM by 1910 to maintain the planned expansion rate (that would most likely not be enough to keep up with the Royal Navy), and the Reich Treasury would have to raise 1 000 million GM in new indirect taxation for Germany to continue the dreadnought race.
And no matter how Tirpitz tried to spin these numbers, he remarked to his staff in private that the cost of individual ships “had reached impossible heights for Reich finances and will continue to do so.”[4] To make matters even worse, the German shipyards were simply not up to the task of challenging their British counterparts. Competition schedules were constantly delayed, and the major shipyards were hard-pressed to keep up in the international competition for civilian vessels.
The humiliating experience of 1905 when the British naval forces descended to the Baltic and North Sea coast in an open display of prowess of the Royal Navy had driven the point home for most of the German elite. The old fear - “Der Fischer kommt” had turned to reality. It was one thing to read about the British naval power and look at statistics, and quite another to actually see their battleships at sea all along the coasts of Germany.
With the prospect of a new naval law being particularly nil considering the views of the new Chancellor, mood in the Reichstag and the country at large and the ambivalence of the young Emperor, Tirpitz surprised Wilhelm III when he was summoned to discuss "vital questions of naval strategy." He started by stating that he, too, supported a greatly expanded army bill. This did little to warm Wilhelm III to the still adamant view of the Admiral regarding the vital necessity of continued naval construction, but further improved his personal view of Tirpitz in the eyes of the young Emperor.
But it was not enough. Vultures had already began to descent. Chief of the Naval Cabinet, von Müller, now advocated the view that the delay of the 1908 naval funding had already given the Royal Navy too much of a head-start, and ruined German prospects of a prolonged naval arms race. Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff wrote a widely-discussed article to Die Flotte, the Navy League monthly, publicly hoping that the Navy would focus on readiness issues - for what good were new ships without trained crews? Tirpitz had made sure that he held all the reins during the time of Wilhelm II, and had used his elbows to make sure he remained the top dog in German naval strategy. Now he found himself surrounded by greedy competitors who showed scant mercy.
The Treasury was desperate to cut expenses, Posadowsky wanted to placate his Agrarian supporters by focusing on the Army, and hoped against hope that he could turn necessity into virtue by still seeking some kind of a deal with Britain. When met with an alliance of dissident admirals, vengeful generals and thrifty politicians surrounding the inexperienced and ambivalent young Emperor, Tirpitz offered his resignation.
But Wilhelm III would not have it. He greatly valued Tirpitz as an individual, as he explained to the downtrodden navalist, and added that he was certain that He and Germany would yet need the good services of Admiral in the future. He insisted that Tirpitz remained in office, as the Emperor wanted him to remain in the Landesverteidigunsgkomission.[5]
1. OTL assessment, which was historically kept a secret from the Army and politicians.
2. Colmar von der Goltz met the Crown Prince in Eastern Prussia during his tenure as commander of the I Corps both in TTL and OTL, and was posted to Berlin the same time when the Crown Prince started his studies there in 1907. His hardliner Pan-German views closely match those of the Crown Prince, who adores people who dare to say what they think. Hence he became the new Chief of the Military Cabinet after the death of Hülsen-Haeseler. The OTL replacement, Moritz von Lyncker was the officer in charge of the education of the Crown Prince, and his memoirs make it clear that he would have never assigned his former tutor to such a post.
3. OTL quote.
4. All figures are from OTL, and Tirpitz really said this to his staff.
5. Crown Prince Wilhelm greatly liked Tirpitz because of his middle-class background and professional mindset, even though he was never the navalist his father was.
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Lines of defensive Fortresses instead of OTL's offensive madness - looks like you've found the key to spare Germany the horrible four decades they inflicted upon themselves and the rest of the World IOTL!
That would have a wise Policy and a valuable Signal to other powers. Maybe we're looking at a long continental Peace?
That would have a wise Policy and a valuable Signal to other powers. Maybe we're looking at a long continental Peace?
Plans and realities are two different things, but this was the policy advocated by both von Beseler and von der Goltz. Neither of whom are by any means dovish, on the contrary. Wilhelmine Germany was also a major part of the instability of the fin de siècle Europe - but far from the only one.
But before we'll deal about their views and plans in greater detail, it is necessary to talk about the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.
I don't think that alone is going to suffice, but it certainly can't hurt, especially if coupled with a naval detente. Now of course this does not rule out local or general European conflagrations either, it simply butterflies away the specific circumstances of OTL. But for Germany, that might still be enough. It's certainly hard for them to do worse pre WW1 compared to OTL, and it seems like they're on the way to significant improvement ITTL. Most fundamentally, with such a defensive strategy, they're playing right into the strength of WW1 military technology. Western border fortresses augmenting the existing ring of fortresses in A-L will be next to impossible to break through, and if the French try attaque a la outrace they will bleed themselves white to minimal German losses; and in the east, the geography of the border will mean that a combination of fortresses and counteroffensives would inflict very painful losses on any Russian attacker. Of course now we must needs see what happens to Austria-Hungary and its succession, but I dare say, compared to OTL, Germany is sitting pretty.
Indeed, vdG was a major architect of the thinking that led to German war crimes as early as 1914. I also don't see their half-committed effort at reaching some understanding with Britain as having a true chance of success, although ensuring neutrality might be enough. Rather than through a master plan, it seems to me like this congerie of men is *stumbling* into the right answer while looking for something else - which is good enough for me, tbh.
Excited to see the UK and Ireland make an appearance!
The divergences have already advanced quite far from the POD of 1900, so that much is guaranteed.
Generally speaking the pre-war German elites felt certain that everyone was out to get them - but in reality the OTL coalitions were gradually formed when other major powers pursued their own foreign policy goals that often had next to nothing to do with Germany.
I'll get to their strategic thinking in future updates. It is still based on many flawed ideas on how a modern war will play out, it's fundamentally nothing new in German military history, and something that was discussed as a strategic option in OTL as well.
And there is the funny detail that in OTL the Crown Prince loved when people remarked that he looked just like Frederick the Great...
In many TLs the main thing that bothers me is the presumption that if only Germany plays nice, everything will work out just fine.
Well, it says a lot that it's a massive improvement to historical situation that they are all actually sitting in a same room(!) and openly discussing their strategic plans and views together.
Indeed. This is easily in my top three timelines in the post-1900 forum, so I'm pretty much holding my breath for what comes next.
I share the analysis. Moreover, while these elites are in retrospect often lionised as glorified geniuses, they really weren't particularly smart, or prepared for the job they were responsible for. Good or great tactically at times, perhaps. But their arrogance, inferiority complex, willful disregard of modernity and wishful thinking very nearly caused the end of Germany.
Undisputable, although not exceedingly worrisome in my view - in relative terms, every other major country at the time was affected by similar delusions about the nature of modern war. Germany had to fuck up especially egregiously in order to end up where it did IOTL (as you say, not even getting people sitting in the same room, having branches of government constantly fighting each other, etc). I'll settle for an average performance and call myself lucky
The next bit, on the other hand...
Oh no.
Agreed, their agency in the crisis is overstated, both in the negative and the positive sense, imho. On the other hand, I don't want to backpedal far enough to fall off the other side of the cliff and into determinism. A continuing fin de siecle would be a fascinating concept, it just would require a lot of specific groundwork to sell it properly. My entirely personal and uninformed prediction is that there will be some kind of Great War ITTL, but one we'd have trouble recognising (and hopefully a kinder one to the CP, yes I said it don't @ me
)Exactly, it's a low hanging fruit. What's even scarier though is how easily reversible all of these improvements are. This is still a broken institutional set up that only functions right now because of the good will of the institutional actors involved trying to paper over the cracks - yet another eerie similarity between fin de siecle and the present day, I suppose.
My entirely personal and uninformed prediction is that there will be some kind of Great War ITTL, but one we'd have trouble recognising (and hopefully a kinder one to the CP, yes I said it don't @ me
Well that's a great way to get @'ed
I'm actually hoping for a more Entente-positive war! But either way it'll be a fascinating read.