The March of Time - 20th Century History

[DrakonFin]

I have not commented on this TL many times, but I just had to drop in to say that you are doing a very good job here, Karelian. One can see that you have done a lot of research for this and the depth it brings to the story is down right impressive. This is probably the best TL on the forum at the moment, in terms of the historical scholarship involved. This is why I seconded The March of Time for a Turtledove as well.

I'd like to comment more on the actual twists and turns of the story, but some of it goes so much above my head that I would have to do some research of my own first to comment effectively. Maybe in the summer, when the current backlog at work has been sorted through, I'll sit down with a stack of reference material and go through the TL again with some thought to really see what you have actually done here.

 

[Keb]

His upcoming journey would have far-flung consequences to European diplomacy.

Willy never does disappoint, does he?

At a time when Germany needed an Emperor of great cunning, restraint and resolve to negotiate the rough and treacherous waters of early 20th century Europe - Germany got Wilhelm II instead.

 

[Tyr Anazasi]

What Bismarck do you mean? Otto was dead since 1898.

 

[Grand Prince Paul II.]

Willy never does disappoint, does he?

At a time when Germany needed an Emperor of great cunning, restraint and resolve to negotiate the rough and treacherous waters of early 20th century Europe - Germany got Wilhelm II instead.

Better than a bore.

What Bismarck do you mean? Otto was dead since 1898.

He was not dead in 1895.
That is the year when King Oscar II sought his advice.

 

[Karelian]

I have not commented on this TL many times, but I just had to drop in to say that you are doing a very good job here, Karelian. One can see that you have done a lot of research for this and the depth it brings to the story is down right impressive. This is probably the best TL on the forum at the moment, in terms of the historical scholarship involved. This is why I seconded The March of Time for a Turtledove as well.

I've used this TL as a personal excuse for myself to skim and scan through practically all of at least somewhat relevant volumes from the "new history books"-shelf of the local university library. With the centennial of Great War just two years ago, they're amply stocked with the latest research, which has been really pleasant and insightful to read and has provided a lot of food for thought and material to write about.

I'd like to comment more on the actual twists and turns of the story, but some of it goes so much above my head that I would have to do some research of my own first to comment effectively. Maybe in the summer, when the current backlog at work has been sorted through, I'll sit down with a stack of reference material and go through the TL again with some thought to really see what you have actually done here.

Heh, that'd be nice indeed. Just let me know if you want a reading list of the source material.

Willy never does disappoint, does he?

At a time when Germany needed an Emperor of great cunning, restraint and resolve to negotiate the rough and treacherous waters of early 20th century Europe - Germany got Wilhelm II instead.

Better than a bore.

A man who considers himself to be the very epitome of those qualities you listed, and whom others compare to a battleship with steam up and screws going, but with no rudder, or a balloon, since he was air-headed enough that if one did not hold him fast on a string, he could fly away to a random direction...Well, he is certainly delightful source material for alt-history writers. And for all of his faults I cannot help to feel a bit of sympathy for the man - just like Nicholas II, Wilhelm II is the wrong person in a wrong place at a wrong time.

What Bismarck do you mean? Otto was dead since 1898.

He was not dead in 1895.
That is the year when King Oscar II sought his advice.

Quite so, sorry if this was not expressed clearly enough.

 

[Karelian]

Dissolution Crisis of 1905, Part V: Royal Diplomacy

The topics discussed during the latest set of German-Swedish diplomatic contacts reflected the wider concern for the threat the Norwegian secession potentially posed to the stability of Europe. When Crown Prince Gustaf of Sweden-Norway came to Berlin at the beginning of June 1905 to attend the wedding of the German Crown Prince, he had asked Chancellor Eulenburg directly whether, if Russia intervened in Norway, the Kaiser would also take military measures? The Reich Chancellor gave him the ambivalent answer that "he thought it hardly likely that Germany would follow the wishes of the Kaiser in this question." The whole crisis was putting a great strain to the health of venerable old King Oscar II, who was justifiably called the most educated of Europe’s monarchs. He was honorary doctor at a number of academic institutions, knew Latin, Italian, and other languages in addition to the two languages of his realms, which he spoke fluently. He had studied aesthetics, history, philosophy, and math, translated works of Goethe and others into Swedish and wrote own works, including diaries, memoirs, and speeches. While sympathetic towards Wilhelm II and painfully aware of the weak state of his kingdom compared to the might of Germany, he did not personally hold the bombastic German Emperor in high regard. But at their next meeting with Oscar II and the Swedish Crown Prince outside the small Baltic port of Gävle on 13-14 July, Wilhelm II did his best to act in a serious and respectable manner.

It seemed like he had heeded the advice of Eulenburg, and he dutifully relayed the policy line agreed upon with his Chancellor to King Oscar II and his son. Wilhelm II made it very clear that he did not intend to support "some Swedish adventure", that the resolution to the crisis should come about as quickly as conveniently possible, and that Bernadottes should accept the Norwegian offer for sekundogeniture. If a nomination of a Bernadotte to the throne of Norway was out of question, the Swedes should officially support the candidacy of Prince Valdemar of Denmark. The only concession to Swedish cause was a promise to withhold the recognition of Norwegian independence as long the Swedes wished. The Gävle meeting, conducted as a part of the annual Scandinavian summer cruise of the royal yacht Hohenzollern, was initially called as “a new Tangier”, as Wilhelm II once again appeared to the scene of an international crisis, stealing the attention of media and leaving diplomats and statesmen through Europe doubtful about the true intentions of the erratic German Emperor. Yellow press loved Wilhelm II, and soon rumors were circulating that the German Emperor was scheming to promote the cause of electing Prince Eitel Friedrich of Prussia as the new King of Norway. In reality these stories had a grain of truth in them, for it was only with great difficulty that Crown Prince Gustaf and King Oscar II succeeded in convincing Wilhelm II that it was now ‘practically impossible’ to pick a member from the Swedish House of Bernadotte, not to mention anything about a German prince. In return Wilhelm II openly deplored the idea of the candidature of Prince Charles of Denmark and his wife, as ‘the presence of an English Princess on the Norwegian throne’ would signify the ‘vassalage of Norway to England’, and would ensure that Britain would henceforth benefit from ‘commercial preponderance’ in Norway should Charles be elected.

In reality Wilhelm II could hardly conceal his joy from the course of events. Never had the chances of a breakthrough to world power seemed within closer reach than now, through this crisis in God-forsaken North! Now he only would have to convince 'Cousin Nicky' to comply with his plan, and everything would fall in place after years of careful plotting and planning! In their earlier royal meetings at Danzig, Reval, Wiesbaden and Darmstadt, Wilhelm II had for the last three years consistently urged his infantile cousin to turn away from Europe, and instead seek to annex Manchuria and Korea and threaten the British in India, Afghanistan and Persia. For all these years he had told Nicholas II to look East, telling him that his God-given role was the defense of Christendom and the white race in the Asiatic frontiers against the heathen ‘Yellow Peril’, and that while the Czar should justifiably call himself as ‘Admiral of the Pacific’, Wilhelm would play his part as ‘Admiral of the Atlantic.’ Together they would do great things! Together they would forge a grand coalition of the five Great Powers of the European continent, including the hostile and reluctant France, to form a new Holy Alliance ‘against the democratic wind blowing from the Atlantic.’ His bombastic telegrams, written in English as a language both monarchs were fluent with, had for a long time sought to convince the Czar of All the Russias about the benefits of such an arrangement:

"The smaller nations, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Norway will all be attracted to this new great centre of gravity, by quite natural laws of the attraction of smaller bodies by the larger ones. They will revolve in the orbit of the block of powers, the Dual Alliance combining with the Triple Alliance gives a Quintuplet Alliance, well able to hold all unruly neighbours in order, and to impose peace even by force."

For Wilhelm II, such talk represented his desire to realize the dream he had pursued ever since his coronation, when he had declared to Eulenburg that “the fundamental principle of his European policy would be leadership in the peaceful sense - a sort of Napoleonic supremacy.” In order to achieve the “greatest coup of his life” and to unhinge the existing European alliance system to establish a German hegemony, Wilhelm II had used his personal diplomacy towards Nicholas II as a concentrated attempt to draw Russia over into the orbit of German policy by seeking a consensus with her Balkan-oriented new foreign policy. In the plans of Wilhelm II, this would result either in drawing France to the fold, kicking and screaming, and establishing a continent-wide German-Russian-French combination. Or it would result in rupturing the Dual Alliance and re-isolating France. Whether Paris would choose to submit or continue to resist would not make a great difference, for in either case, Germany’s position would be strengthened and she would win the prestige of a diplomatic success. The second method to achieve this long-term goal had been the quest for diplomatic triumphs abroad, backed up by a policy of force, proclaiming that important arrangements in the world could not be made without consulting Germany. In his pursuit of this foreign policy goal Wilhelm II had acted with extraordinary interest and intricacy, and during the last five years the Kaiser had been busy orchestrating the German Weltpolitik at the world stage from Venezuela to China. This year had been no different, for after giving a public speech at Tangiers and causing a domestic policy crisis in France Wilhelm had by now focused himself to Nordic matters, moving to the sunny Baltic summer on board of the Hohenzollern.

Such stunts of naval diplomacy had been his trademark before. A year earlier, on June 25th 1904, William II had heartily welcomed his “Uncle Bertie”, King Edward VII of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, as a honorary admiral of the German fleet to the Kiel regatta to review the German navy:
“Which is the latest creation among the fleets of the world and an expression of the reviving sea power of the German Empire recreated by the great emperor. Destined for the protection of its trade and its territories, it also serves, like the German army, to maintain peace which the German Empire together with Europe has maintained for over thirty years. Everyone knows, too, Your Majesty’s words and work, that Your Majesty’s whole effort is also directed towards this goal - toward the maintenance of peace. As I have steadily set my whole strength to reach this goal, may God give success to our efforts.” Edward VII, normally gloomy and reclusive because of his still painful injuries sustained at the assassination attempt in Belgium had shown a flash of his younger days as a gentlemanly socialite, and had charmed the German press and court circles, making a generally excellent impression on the press and people of Germany. But while this visit was the first positive twist in the badly strained personal relations between Wilhelm II and his uncle in a long time, they did little to change the foreign policy goals of the German Emperor. During the whole previous year Wilhelm II had also active towards Russia, constantly sending Nicholas II new telegrams and letters and seeking to court his favor and show the goodwill of Germany by smaller gestures, such as re-establishing the pre-1890s era system of mutual re-nomination of military plenipotentiaries for both courts. And the Czar, who had privately called his cousin "stark raving mad" after their first meeting and felt isolated and stressed by the internal turmoil of Russia and the lack of a male heir, had gradually grown fond of "cousin Willy", stating in early 1905 to count Witte who was sent to Berlin to negotiate the Russo-German trade agreement that the Czar considered his relationship with Wilhelm II as a “loyal friendship which I trust beyond anything.”

Wilhelm II felt that his ability to sway his cousin would hand him - and through him the German Empire - the keys to the domination of European continent. Confident of his (in essence quite correct) political estimation that Russia and Germany had common ground towards the situation of the Baltic Sea and the crisis in Scandinavia, he hoped to win them over for good. In this sense Wilhelm II was merely one among the many actors in the stage of European top-level diplomacy of summer 1905 with his feeling that one should never waste a good crisis. He decided to use the crisis in Norway as a chance to show his willingness to work together with the Russian leadership, if necessary against British interests, should it suit them to do so.

A week later he casually telegraphed to Nicholas II from Stockholm:

I shall shortly be on my return journey, and cannot pass across entrance of the Finnish Sea without sending you best love and wishes. Should it give you any pleasure to see me - either on shore or your yacht - of course I am always at your disposal.
WILLY

Nicholas II was delighted, and replied:

Would it suit you to meet me at Bjoerkesund, near Viborg, a pleasant, quiet place, living on board our yachts?
NICKY

Shortly before sunset on Sunday evening, July 23, 1905, the Kaiser’s yacht Hohenzollern was thus steaming eastwards across the Bay of Viborg toward the small bay at the pittoresque Björkö Sound, dropping anchor alongside another imperial yacht, the Tsar’s Polar Star. The meeting had been arranged only four days before, and had been kept strictly secret from the public by both emperors. The Kaiser had telegraphed ahead to the Czar:

“Nobody has the slightest idea of meeting. The faces of my guests will be worth seeing when they suddenly behold your yacht. A fine lark. Tableaux. Which dress for the meeting?
WILLY.

As the international media had speculated the likelihood that Wilhelm II would make a detour eastwards to Gulf of Finland on his way to Copenhagen to meet with the Russian Czar, Wilhelm II had been agitated to hear that just when his grand plan was coming to fruition, the shocking news of a terrorist regicide in the Ottoman Empire threatened to remind of the old proverb concerning the best-laid plans of mice and men...

 

[kung Zog]

As the international media had speculated the likelihood that Wilhelm II would make a detour eastwards to Gulf of Finland on his way to Copenhagen to meet with the Russian Czar, Wilhelm II had been agitated to hear that just when his grand plan was coming to fruition, the shocking news of a terrorist regicide in the Ottoman Empire threatened to remind of the old proverb concerning the best-laid plans of mice and men...

Very nice last updates! I will comment more in detail when more info is laid bare.

Thanks also for the throwback to the Ottoman regicide. I had forgotten that these events where more or less parallel.

 

[Karelian]

Dissolution Crisis of 1905, Part VI: The Björkö Treaty and Limits of Royal Authority

Wilhelm II felt that his prospects of achieving a deal with Nicholas II were rather good despite the unexpected setback caused by assassination of Sultan Abdülhamid II. After scoring what seemed like a major diplomatic success at Morocco through instigating the domestic policy crisis in France, and thus indirectly forcing the resignation of M. Delcassé on June 6th, the German Kaiser had contributed to the French acceptance by Combes, two days later, of the principle that Moroccan affairs should be settled by bilateral negotiations of the interested Powers later that year. After leaving Morocco behind and considering the matter settled, Wilhelm II had once again looked East. The search for a suitable new ruler for Norway raised vital questions which ought to be settled with the Czar in person. At the same time Wilhelm II hoped to gain a chance to promote his own geopolitical vision to his cousin.

For the part of Russian leadership, Minister Witte who had visited Berlin a year ago to negotiate a new Russo-German trade agreement of 1904[1] had long desired to see closer relations between the three great Continental Powers. For him, France represented the epitome of European wealth just as Germany held the supreme military power. By allying herself with both, Russia could benefit by the financial resources of Paris and the strength of Berlin. Also supposing that the Kaiser had in mind a defensive alliance into which Russia, France and Germany would enter voluntarily and as equals, Witte had pointed out that that since its success depended on securing the adhesion of France, Paris should not longer be exasperated with issues such as the Moroccan situation. Wilhelm II was happy to agree. He had personally always regarded Morocco as insignificant region that could well fall to French sphere of interest for all he cared, and had originally raised the issue to an international minor crisis to advance his personal diplomatic goals and to placate the chauvinistic German press - and because he had been guided to act in a bellicose manner by Holstein, who had convinced Eulenburg that Germany had to constantly show strength in pursuit of her interests in the international arena because of her vulnerable geopolitical position.

So When Witte dutifully relayed the ideas of a new continental coalition to the Czar after he had returned to St. Petersburg, Nicholas II had ingenuously accepted the idea with the naïve assumption that France was naturally to be included to the treaty as an equal partner. He telegraphed to his cousin:

“Germany, Russia and France united upon an arrangement is a combination that has often come to my mind; it will mean peace and rest for the world. Would you like to lay down and frame the outlines of such a treaty and let me know it?”
NICKY

Wilhelm II had been adamant in his willingness to push such a document through, and Eulenburg had ultimately dropped his resistance to the scheme as pointless, and collaborated in compiling the draft of a final treaty. Unexpectedly the reaction of Nicholas II was one of genuine surprise when the messenger had brought him the draft of the treaty document Wilhelm II had planned to present him at Björkö, and the Russian monarch had replied in his honestly innocent fashion, suggesting that

“Before signing the last draft of treaty I think it advisable to let the French see it. As long as it is not signed one can make small modifications in the text, whereas if already approved by us both it will see as if we tried to enforce the treaty on France. In this case a failure might easily happen, which, I think, is neither your wish. Therefore I ask your agreement to acquaint the government of France with this project.”
NICKY

Wilhelm II, eager to avoid his bluff being called, did his best to maintain his scheme. As the Hohenzollern approached the Russian territorial waters, he compiled a nervous response where he sought to utilize the international tensions in the Ottoman Empire to convince the Czar about the alleged need for secrecy and seclusion of France:

It is my conviction that it would be absolutely dangerous to inform France before we both have signed the treaty. It would have an effect diametrically opposed to our wishes. If England was to find out that a Russo-German treaty including France is only projected, but still unsigned, on a time when the solution of the Eastern Question seems to be finally coming to the fore, the outcome of informing London and Tokyo about an attempt to recreate the Tripartite Intervention coalition of 1895 would doubtless be an instantaneous attack by England and Japan, the two allied Powers, on Germany in Europe as well as in Asia to prevent us from forming such a grand continental coalition against them. Their enormous maritime superiority would soon make short work of my small fleet and Germany would be temporarily crippled...This would upset the scales of equilibrium of the world to our mutual harm. It was my special wish - and as I understand, your intention, too - to maintain and strengthen this endangered equilibrium of the world through expressly the agreement between Russia, Germany and France. A previous information of France will lead to a catastrophe, but once Germany and Russia guarantee one another, we'll be safe to include Paris to the coalition as well. Should you, notwithstanding, think it impossible for you to conclude a treaty with me without the previous consent of France, then it would be a far safer alternative to abstain from concluding any treaty at all.”
WILLY

When he finally met with Nicholas II at Björkö on 23rd of July and the formal niceties were over and done with, Wilhelm II was glad to notice that the Russian monarch seemed to have accepted his last-minute lie and accepted his insistence to keep Paris in the dark about the true their meeting, at least for the time being. He thus lost no opportunity to exploit the tense atmosphere in the Baltic, and begun to exploit the knowledge obtained during the ostensibly secret negotiations with Oscar II and Crown Prince Gustaf for his own ends. No other persons were present at the main part of the royal meeting. The Kaiser began by relating the news which he had picked up from King Oscar of Sweden. He mentioned that King Oscar was totally indifferent towards the question of who should be chosen the new King of Norway; the old monarch hadn’t even objected the idea of a republic! At this, Nicholas II threw his hands over his head, exclaiming; “That too - that is all we need, as if we did not already have enough republics and monarchies like that in the world, what is to become of the monarchical principle?!” Nicholas II then implored that if King Oscar was not ambitious to put a Swedish prince in Norway, and if the Danish royal family was interested in the matter, Prince Valdemar of Denmark, the youngest brother of the widowed Tsaritsa Maria Feodorovna (Empress Dowager Dagmar) could become a potential candidate: “Valdemar might be sent; he has had some experience in life, has an elegant, nice wife (born a Princess of Orleáns), and fine, strapping children?” The Kaiser appeared to agree, but deftly mentioned “private information from Copenhagen” indicating that “the King of England has already given out his approval and consent if his son-in-law were chosen." Nicholas seemed to know nothing about it, and was visibly upset, commenting that his "cousin Charles was completely unsuitable: he had never been anywhere, had no experience, and was insignificant and lazy; with Charles, England would stick her fingers into Norway by fair means or foul, and increase her influence, starting intrigues and eventually close off the Skagerrak by occupying Christiansand and so shut us all into the Baltic; it would also put paid to his ports on the Murman coast in the North! Valdemar would be much better!"

The two Danish princes had little idea that their respective candidacies to the throne of Norway would become a point of contest in European Great Power politics.

Wilhelm II continued his ploy by confessing that Gävle King Oscar II in the course of a conversation had let slip the remark that of course there was nothing to prevent Germany occupying Bergen, and in response to the objection that England might have something to say about that, Wilhelm II boasted to Nicholas II that he had went on to say, "Yes, then they would probably seize Christiansand!" Nicholas II was visibly very worried by the idea of Norway being divided up in such a manner in a direct confrontation of European Powers over the issue of Norwegian succession, and of Britain possibly establishing a firm foothold there, commenting that..."the dangers for Russia of a blockade of the Kattegat are of course obvious." Wilhelm II continued to carefully manipulate his cousin by fluidly moving the topic of the conversation to Britain. It very soon appeared to Wilhelm II that the Czar seemed to truly feel deep personal resentment towards the island nation. He called Edward VII "the greatest mischief- maker and the most dangerous and deceptive intriguer in the world." Having fed him this line of thought for years, Wilhelm II was happy to agree with the notion, adding that "I especially had had to suffer from his intrigues in recent years. He has a passion for plotting against every power, of making a little agreements" whereupon the Tsar interrupted, striking the table with his fist: "Well, I can only say he shall not get one from me, and never in my life against Germany or you, my word of honor upon it!'”

Then the question of Denmark was discussed at length. The Czar asked what measures they could take to assist King Christian and guarantee his position in his country, so that they themselves could be certain in case of war of maintaining the defense of the Baltic north of the Belts. Wilhelm II explained to the Czar that in case of war and impending attack on the Baltic from a foreign Power, the Danes expected, "their inability and helplessness to uphold even the shadow of neutrality against invasion being evident", that Russia and Germany would immediately take up steps to safeguard their interests by laying hands on Denmark and occupying it during the war, as this would at the same time guarantee the territory and future existence of the dynasty and country:"Sensible men in society as well as in Governmental circles are on their own account, little by little, coming to the conclusion, that in the case of war between us both and a foreign Power, the latter attacking our Baltic shores, Denmark would be unable to uphold her neutrality, falling an easy prey to the foreigner. He would create Denmark his base of operations, and thereby draw her on his side as his unwilling ally. This she would have pay for - eventually, by loss of independence after the war, as we would never allow her to suffer such a fate again. As we would not countenance such a development of things, and never allow the door of the Baltic to fall into the hands of an enemy, in case of an outbreak of war, these men are resigned to expect a joint occupation from us, which however would guarantee their territory to remain undiminished and their independence to remain untouched. As this is precisely what we want the Danes to think, and as they are already on the road to it, I thought “let well alone”, and said nothing; they are slowly ripening to the fruit we wish and in time to come it will fall into our laps."

Thus, having arranged amicably between themselves for the fate of this small nation, and through this the virtual exclusion of the hostile Royal Navy from the Baltic in a case of war, the Kaiser then came to the really important matter. He presented the draft of the new treaty to Nicholas II:

Their Imperial Majesties, the Emperor of All the Russias on the one side, and the German Emperor on the other, in order to insure the peace of Europe, have placed themselves in accord on the following points of the herein treaty relative to a defensive alliance:
Art. I. If any European state attacks one of the two empires, the allied party engages to aid the other contracting party with all his military and naval forces.
Art. II. The high contracting parties engage not to conclude with any common enemy a separate peace.
Art. III. The present treaty may be denounced with a year’s previous notification.
Art. IV. When this treaty has become effective, Russia will undertake the necessary steps to inform France of it and to propose the latter to adhere to it as an ally.[2]

Such was the culmination of plans the Kaiser had had in view ever since the Kiel regatta in June 1904. Taken in connection with the understanding in regard to Denmark, the Björkö Treaty as envisioned by Wilhelm II and signed by Nicholas II was obviously directed against Britain. As a diplomatic revolution it would have granted the German Empire the de facto mastery of the Continent. It was in direct conflict with the spirit of the Dual Alliance and the goals of Count Muraviev and General Kuropatkin, as the deal threatened to overthrow the foundations of more than a decade of Russian foreign policy. Should the Treaty be implemented like Wilhelm II hoped it would, France would have been compelled - being suddenly confronted by the united force of a Russo-German alliance - to choose either a subordinate role as an impotent third party in a combination of two great empires, or to stand isolated and stripped of her only major ally before the menacing power of Germany. “The 24th of July 1905 is a cornerstone in European politics, and turns over a new leaf in the history of the world”, Wilhelm II declared in a letter to Nicholas II three days later. But by then the Czar had returned to Tsarskoe-Selo with the secret treaty in his possession, and when he had summoned Count Muraviev and the others “who ought to know its existence", Muraviev had at first been completely dumbstruck. He soon composed himself, and then as calmly as politely as possible, explained to the Czar in detail the significance of the document, making it clear how contrary the treaty was to the spirit of the Dual Alliance, and how unlikely it was that France could be forced, volens nolens, into such a triple combination, and that in the first place it was "inadmissible to promise at the same time the same thing to two governments whose interests were mutually antagonistic." Witte and Kuropatkin were more frank, and informed Nicholas II that they would resign on the spot if the treaty was accepted. The triumvirate and the Supreme Autocrat thus had their first, and last, direct confrontation with all the three original members still alive and unified in their opposition to the folly of Nicholas II. At the end the Czar blinked first. Finally convinced and unwilling to lose his leading ministers in a middle of internal crisis, Nicholas II instructed Muraviev to take steps to annul the treaty by insisting the inclusion of France before the implementation of the treaty. Count Osten-Sacken, the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, was entrusted with the grim task of informing Wilhelm II in person that the Treaty of Björkö was found to be incompatible with the existing diplomatic obligations to France, and therefore it could not be executed. Wilhelm II chose to disregard this first communique, and once again directly contacted ‘Nicky’ with a telegram:

“Our Moroccan business is regulated to entire satisfaction, so that the air is free for better understanding between us. Our treaty is a very good base to build upon. We joined hands and signed before God, who heard our vows! I therefore think that the treaty can well come into existence - for what is signed is signed, and God is our testator!”
Wilhelm

But in the end the influence of the Russian leading ministers on their Czar turned out to be greater than that of the ‘responsible’ Reich Chancellor Eulenburg on the supposedly constitutional German Kaiser. Unwilling to admit that all of his work had been in vain and that the era of royal diplomacy was drawing to an end, Wilhelm II sought in vain to find a new common cause with Nicholas II on the matter of Norwegian succession - only to be frustrated again less than a week later, when the Nordic crisis took a sudden and violent turn to the worse.[3]

1: As Wilhelm II is willing to win Russia over and Russia is not burdened by a war against Japan as in OTL, the TTL version of the Norderney trade agreement is a lot more generous to Russia, granting Russia both the OTL access to Berlin loan markets, and (much to the dismay of the Prussian Junkers estate owners) with much lower duties to rye and wheat than in OTL as well. This leads to all kinds of agricultural butterflies, but on the long term the main effects are further adjustments of German agricultural sector with more pig-raising in nortwestern Germany, as cheap export grain from the ports of Bremen and Hamburg turns these activities into profitable business. This will in turn affect the domestic political relations within the German Empire. Without the OTL policy of determined tariff protection and artificial maintenance of German grain sector, the German agricultural sector does not turn the Catholic peasant population of the south into allies of the Protestant east-Elbean Junkers, as the peasant economy at large becomes much more supportive towards low-tariff agricultural policy.

2: The OTL amendment Wilhelm II personally made to the draft, limiting the treaty to Europe, was approved by Eulenburg in TTL. The TTL III. Article is also different, as the treaty is to become effective immediately instead of the OTL reference to the end of the Russo-Japanese War.

3: As per OTL.

 

[Karelian]

Dissolution Crisis of 1905, Part VII: The Tale of Two Admirals

When the crisis of 1905 begun, the Royal Norwegian Navy was a small, young and forward-looking naval force.

Between 1895 and 1905 the determined drive for naval re-armament had increased the total strength of Norwegian naval forces from a modest coastal defense force of four older ironclad monitors, three unarmored gun vessels, twelve gunboats, sixteen small gunboats and a flotilla of twenty-seven torpedo boats by inclusion of four new armored ships, ten torpedo boats of the 1st class, twelve of 2nd class with a new torpedo division flotilla leader to support them. The Navy was thus stronger than it had ever been, and the decisions and debates of strategy that had led to this point had already divided the small force into two competing groups. These matters were most personal, as the Norwegian naval officer corps itself was still a small, closed group of people - by 1900 the fleet had had only 116 active duty officers (with an additional sixty in reserve) and 700 petty officers and seamen. The debates had culminated to a slow-burning and bitter personal feud between the commanding admiral, vice admiral Christian Sparre and his chief of staff, Rear Admiral Jacob Børresen. Considering these two characters, their shared history and the situation of Norway in summer 1905, a confrontation between them would have been extremely hard to avoid even in better situations, let alone in a crisis like this. The two naval officers were in many ways good representatives of the two polar opposites of Norwegian society at large.

Børresen was a royalist right-wing conservative. Originally he had been a firm supporter of the union with Sweden, and had merely wanted, like most Norwegian right-wing politicians, a greater degree of equality between the two countries. Børresen also had a good and close relationship with King Oscar II. In 1903 he had accompanied the King, together with Prince Carl and Princess Ingeborg, on a voyage to Lyngen in northern Norway. During the journey, he had been captivated by Princess Ingeborg. When the Swedish government presented the "Bernadotte offer" that the Norwegian crown could go to a prince of the house Bernadotte, Børresen secretly wrote to his personal diary that he sincerely hoped that Princess Ingeborg could become the new Queen of Norway. Sparre was a Liberal and and steadfast left-wing Republican, and a dogged opponent of the union with Sweden. During the crisis he supported the hard line that sought to break with Sweden as soon as possible. For a radicals like Sparre, Børresen and the Norwegian conservative politicians in general were to be held in utter contempt because of their close historical contacts to the Swedish elite. Børresen had even served in the Swedish Navy as a squadron commander just a few years ago, and had advocated closer cooperation between the two countries' navies - something that infuriated Sparre as a treason of the Norwegian cause. The two men were thus very different in their political views, and had for long held one another in contempt because of that. Their natures were also like night and day. Børresen was an outgoing and charismatic leader, a womanizer and held the great Norwegian naval hero Tordenskiold as his personal idol, writing several articles about him and wishing to be able to one day mimic the deeds of his great paragon. Sparre was withdrawn, sullen and nervous, methodical and formal. Børresen had a reputation as an impulsive commander. He had eagerly adopted the views of Mahan, and wanted to attack, seek out the enemy's main force and destroy it in a decisive battle. Sparre was cautious, and believed that the inferior force should always avoid decisive battles and maintain a deterring fleet-in-being approach.

This difference in their view of the proper use of naval power also included their views on the role of coastal defense. For Sparre the coastal fortifications and especially coastal artillery were the primarily defense, the shield that the the Norwegian fleet would have to use as a basis for sudden attacks on the enemy landings, and a protective umbrella that they should never abandon. Børresen felt that it would be utter folly to disperse the Navy along the coast to the defense of the main ports. Freed from this purely defensive role they should instead be concentrated to a single mobile squadron, backed by a screen of torpedo boats, which could then be concentrated against invaders as a united and effective offensive force. Børresen already had a reputation as a skillfull tactician - his tactical schemes for combat squadrons had been studied all across Europe, and the Swedish navy had also adopted them for their use during the Baltic training cruises of summer 1903 - a fact which made Sparre doubt the true loyalties of Børresen.

And on top of it all the circumstances surrounding the appointment of Sparre to the position of commanding admiral had had everything to do with the political inclinations of the two men - a fact that had made Børresen feel especially slighted. With no official naval doctrine or tactical regulations for naval operations and no general plans, except for a general mobilization plan that was based on the premise of fighting together with the Swedish navy against a common enemy, the two men both tried to assert their authority over the Norwegian fleet. The disagreement about the fact how the heavy units of the fleet should be allocated in the event of war with Sweden was a central issue in the feud. Sparre wanted to keep the main force of the fleet in readiness at the naval base of Melsomvik, and avoid winding it into a decisive battle against a numerically superior enemy. Børresen wanted to exploit what he perceived as the better seaworthiness, higher speed and greater shooting skills of the Norwegian fleet, and seek out the enemy's main strength in the open sea in order to defeat it in a single decisive battle. As a compromise, the four coastal defense armored cruisers, torpedo boats of 1st class and torpedo leader "Valkyrie" had formed the Skagerrakeskadren, the strongest fleet the Norwegian Navy had ever been able amass together, and this force had been concentrated to the naval base of Melsomvik to protect the approaches to Kristiania under the command of Børresen.

In exchange of this concession, Sparre had strictly ordered that Børresen should sail out from Melsomvik and attack the enemy only once the hostile warships had penetrated into the Kristianiafjord, and that he should by all means do not be cut off from the base in Melsomvik and its hoard of ammunition, water and coal. Børresen believed that under this tactical approach he would be forced to operate in narrow waters which limited his maneuverability on the way out to meet the Swedish fleet, which would be in the open sea and have the freedom to maneuver. Børresen wanted a completely opposite engagement situation, where he had the freedom to maneuver while the Swedes were restricted by narrow waters. In his view such a situation would arise if he were on Breidangen north of Bastøy while the Swedes were on their way up the fjord between Bastøy and Østfoldlandet. From here he could just sail southwards and threaten Gothenburg, forcing the Swedes back to defend the city. Thus would Børresen get the chance to intercept them out in the open sea. With the slightly higher speed and greater seaworthiness of the Norwegian Panserskips he hoped that by using his tactical system he could surprise the Swedes, breaking the ranks of the Swedish squadron, and then defeat the Swedish ships with long-distance gunfire one by one. His concern was that during exercises with the Swedish squadron at autumn 1903 the Swedes had incorporated his formation system to their own fleet as well, and, could now use his own tactics against him. While the plan Børresen advocated was extremely risky, it was based on a firm analysis of the relative strengths and disadvantages of the potential adversary.

The Swedish Kustflottan gathered to Gothenburg consisted of a total of eight coastal defense armored cruisers, four torpedo cruisers, two destroyers, 24 torpedo boats and a submarine (based on the US Holland-class boat). On paper this force was clearly stronger than the Norwegian fleet. But the Swedish armored ships were designed for operations in the Baltic Sea, and were therefore not as seaworthy as their Norwegian counterparts. Only four of them had as much top speed as the Norwegian ships, and the Norwegians had greater range of their main guns, heavier grenade weight and - according to Børresen - shot more accurately than the Swedes.

Sparre was determined to avoid getting into a losing battle with a superior opponent, and thus risking losing the squadron and leaving Kristianiafjord open for enemy invasion. His analysis was based on events of 1814, as in his opinion the military-strategic situation was now very similar than roughly a century ago. Then the Swedes had planned to conduct a naval landing to Kristianiafjord, but in order to be able to do so they had first had to defeat the Norwegian gunboats stationed to the Hvaler Archipelago. Norwegians had withdrew back to Vallø without a fight, but with the Norwegian gunboats still intact, the Swedes were forced to abandon their landing plans. Thus Sparre was convinced that the best method of using the Norwegian fleet was to keep it well-drilled and in high readiness, but out of harms way. Privately Sparre, Defense Minister Olssøn and the rest of the government all feared that allowing Børresen to send the fleet the open sea before a possible outbreak of war was a major security risk, as he could then easily provoke and engage Swedish units without direct orders, thus starting the war the Norwegian government and Sparre himself so strongly wanted to avoid.

The two admirals thus continued their dispute during an intensive series of three-month long training maneuvers. The last weeks of June and early July after Norwegian secession declaration had been filled with intense firing exercises, both with individual ships and tactical shooting in formation. Børresen had decided to open fire at 8000 meters, and he had shared the Panserskips into two groups so that the gun crews could practice in judging exactly that distance against a capital-ship sized target. After almost continuous exercises in all weathers and both during day- and night-time, on 28 July 1905, the Skagerrakeskadren was sailing through Vestfjord near Tønsberg. The flotilla was led by the Norwegian flagship “Eidsvold” with admiral Børresen aboard. In the wake followed other heavy Norwegian capital ships “Norge”, “Tordenskjold” and “Harald Haarfagre.” Eidsvold and Norge were Panserskips, coastal defense armored cruisers, sister ships built for the Norwegian navy by Sir W G Armstrong Whitworth & Co Ltd in 1899 with a displacement of just over 4,000 tons. The two other Panserskips were also sister ships, and the Tordenskjold and Harald Haarfagre had a displacement of little under 4,000 tons.

As the flotilla was passing the Sundåsen and Haaøen coastal forts at the northern side of Veierland on the way to anchor in Melsomvik, it was a grand sight. Flying the Norwegian flag without the hated "herring salad" union ensign, the fleet was crewed by professional, hard-drilled crews and fully ready for combat with live ammunition on board. And then a disaster struck. The armor protection of both classes of Panserskips had been designed primarily with naval gunfire in mind. Both the Tordenskjold- and Eidsvold-class had identical layout - six inches of Harvey steel armor at the sides, and nine inches at the gun-towers. Neither class had a torpedo belt, nor any particular protection against naval mines. Kommandørkaptein Gade and his crew discovered this the hard way when Tordenskjold suddenly disappeared to a devastating underwater explosion that had devastated the ship, capsizing the vessel in mere minutes with the loss of 228 Norwegian seamen. Many historians would later on remark that the chances of a peaceful solution to the secession crisis sank along the Panserskipet Tordenskjold.[1]

1: In OTL the memoirs of captain Gade confirm that his ship did indeed hit a misplaced naval mine at this date, but fortunately it did not explode. In TTL the 100kg nitrocellulose naval mine explodes upon contact of the hull near the broadside twin underwater torpedo launchers, detonating the live torpedoes the ship was carrying in OTL. The resulting explosion tears the ship apart. In TTL Gade is among the few saved men (he was severely wounded in the explosion, and was unconscious as his men dragged him to lifeboat. The observer who saw the mine and informed the rest of the crew in OTL died before he could raise the alarm in TTL, so none of the survivors can confirm what really happened. Gade is alive, and able to confirm that the ship was on a correct route the flotilla had used on previous weeks as well upon the time of the explosion, thus seemingly eliminating the chance of an accident.

 

[SenatorChickpea]

Bloody hell, it'll be war in Scandinavia.

 

[Uff Da the optimist]

 

[Zireael]

Who? I had a vivid memory that had already written about this in some previous update, but I can't find it, so here goes - the Czar was distressed to hear that his beloved Alix had had a stillbirth in 1903 (this is not the pregnancy that led to Alexei in OTL, but an earlier TTL pregnancy), and during this pregnancy Alix (unknown to doctors of the day) becomes afflicted with submucosal fibroids. They are benign growths, but the poor Czarina is not going to able give birth to a son his beloved husband so hopes for.

Thanks for clearing that up, I must have missed that somehow.

 

[Karelian]

Bloody hell, it'll be war in Scandinavia.

The Powers are not pleased about this prospect at all, considering the messy situation in the Ottoman Empire.

"D: or : D - that is the question"

 

[Knightmare]

The Powers are not pleased about this prospect at all, considering the messy situation in the Ottoman Empire.

Plus, it's Scandinavia. They're supposed to be the sane people in Europa.

 

[Karelian]

Plus, it's Scandinavia. They're supposed to be the sane people in Europa.

The funny thing here is that up until the destruction of Tordenskjold everything I've written about Scandinavia has followed OTL course of events to the letter. The threat of an internal conflict within the United Kingdoms was quite real, even though OTL developments ensured that everything went better than expected for everyone involved. But even in OTL the final decision between war and peace was made by a single-vote majority decision in a key cabinet session...

 

[Karelian]

Dissolution Crisis of 1905, Part IX: "For alt vi har. Og alt vi er."

The loss of Tordenskjold was a turning point in the Norwegian secession crisis. Until the dramatic incident, the Swedish and Norwegian governments had been able to keep the situation firmly under control. Few weeks earlier Norwegian delegation led by P.B. Vogt had traveled to Stockholm to discuss the practical matters of possible official breakup of the United Kingdoms. Based on these discussions, King Oscar II had summoned the Swedish parliament, Riksdag, to a new extraordinary session to emphasize the gravity of the situation: personally King, and old, tired and bitter man, just wanted to find a way out of the crisis, being unwilling to maintain the Union or authorize the usage of armed force against a nation whose citizens he still considered as his royal subjects despite their treacherous revolt, and whose best interest he had once sworn to promote. Summoning extraordinary session was relatively uncommon method in Swedish politics, and traditionally used only in time of national emergencies, such as the national and international crises when it was important that the parliament was convened to debate the matter at hand.

The MPs of the two chambers of Riksdag had been divided into three groups with different approaches to the situation. Minority wanted to liquidate the union without further ado. Majority wanted to set conditions for a dissolution of the union, mostly in order to save face of their slighted monarch and to enhance the tarnished international prestige of Sweden. And a third group, a small but vocal minority, wanted maintain the Union by force. A special committee, composed of representatives of all parties and both chambers, with Christian Lundberg as a chairman, had been elected to deal with the crisis. A broad consensus had been achieved when the committee's recommendations were presented to the Riksdag. Both chambers had agreed on a number of requirements that should form the basis of negotiations with Norwegian government and that would have to be met by Norway before the dissolution could be approved by Riksdag. This part of the negotiations had actually been rather smooth, since the committee had presented terms which had gained wide popular support both in public and at Riksdag. Earlier that year, in February 1905, Professor Harald Hjärne of Uppsala University had published a series of articles in Svenska Dagbladet, outlining in dry and fatalistic tone the possible conditions Sweden should set for dissolution of the personal union of the United Kingdoms:

- destruction of the Norwegian border fortifications
- a neutral demilitarized zone on the border
-freedom of transportation and communication
-a treaty to protect the Swedish Samí reindeer herders right to migrate between Sweden and Norway

The conditions presented in the article series formed the basis of the negotiation program that the Swedish government now adopted, with the following additions:

-Official protest against the Norwegian unilateral action in the matter, joined together with an official demand that Norway should request and initiate negotiations on the matter
-A plebiscite in Norway about the secession or new Storting elections
-treaty providing arbitration in possible future conflicts between the two countries.

These terms had just been approved by the Riksdag on 28th of July, when the news from Melsomvik plunged the neatly and efficiently managed negotiations process into disarray. The saber-rattling that the politicians had so far been able to confine to military circles and press wars now quickly begun to escalate. As Norwegian nationalistic newspapers like Verdens Gang begun to raise hell about the "first martyrs who laid down their lives at the altar of our Independence", the Norwegian government raised an armaments loan of 40 million kroner from a leading French bank and partially mobilized its armed forces. The loan was mostly a counter-move to Swedish actions: in order to underline the seriousness of their demands, the Riksdag had placed large military appropriations at the government’s disposal just a few days earlier. But in addition to these measures the Norwegian government, anxious to soothe the wave of anger caused by the destruction of Tordenskjold, made two strategic decisions that escalated the situation further: they appealed to the Powers for support, which affronted the Swedes, and ordered partial mobilization, which further angered them. While the Norwegian approach was completely rational - the destruction of one of their warships on the same day the Swedish government had presented terms to Kristiania hardly looked like a coincidence, the decisions aimed to keep the domestic situation at Norway in control further damaged the strained relations between the Union partners.[1]

Swedish military was quick to answer this perceived challenge. While Swedish government had spent the early July considering how exactly they should respond to the Norwegian "Revolution", the Swedish Navy had wasted no time in showing the military muscle of the dominant partner of the now-reeling Union by moving a naval exercise planned to be held in the Baltic Sea to the area around Gothenburg, and reinforcing it further to include all modern capital ships of the Swedish fleet. The Swedish Army had also been quick to one-up the Navy by stating that the annual autumn training manoeuvres of Swedish reservist formations would be held at the Norwegian border and reinforced to include up to 70 000 reservists. As July turned into August, the tension in the land and sea borders of Sweden and Norway kept growing by the day. The Major Powers, distracted as they were by the events in Macedonia, were beginning to become truly worried about the deteriorating situation in Scandinavia, and acted accordingly.

1: Both Norwegian actions - call for foreign arbitration and a partial mobilization - are actually from OTL from a bit later part of the crisis, and were both aimed to keep the public opinion in control. The way Norwegian hardliner press starts to accuse Swedish submarine or sabotage for the destruction of the Norwegian vessel in TTL further antagonizes the Swedish public opinion, narrowing the negotiation position of the Swedish government and forcing Christian Lundeberg - who led the cabinet revolt against the more conciliatory Ramstedt government and forced it to resign to rethink his potential political allies as he tries to convince Oscar II and the Crown Prince to vest him the powers to form a new government.

 

[Karelian]

Dissolution Crisis of 1905, Part X: British diplomacy and Denmark in the eye of the storm

While Wilhelm II had been busily sailing in the Baltic and getting actively and personally involved to the Nordic crisis through the summer months of 1905, the other Powers had been much more preoccupied with Balkan matters to offer much thought to the matter. The question of Norwegian secession was a divisive issue in European diplomacy. Russians diplomats preferred two smaller and weaker countries as neighbors instead of Norway subjected to traditionally hostile Sweden, while the British for this reason alone would have preferred to see the union upheld to act as a counterbalance to Russian interests in the North. Curiously enough, in this issue London and Paris held similar views - but the French had a different argument for their preference of the old status quo. They were afraid that bereft of the old union arrangement, Sweden would enter into an alliance with Germany. While the eyes of Europe were fixated on Macedonia and the revolutionary turmoil in the Ottoman Empire, few key diplomats were silently working behind the scenes in the capitols of Scandinavia.

Britain's plenipotentiary in Sweden and Norway, Sir James Rennell Rodd, had arrived to his post in January. The crisis was only the latest step in his diplomatic career that had already included work at the embassies of Berlin, Paris and Athens as well as a in Rome and exotic oversea positions at Egypt and Ethiopia. The Foreign Office had made a good call in this appointment, as the polite and scholastic gentleman had gained respect and trust in the Swedish court, and had made a good impression to King Oscar II as well. But he was working from a disadvantageous position, since the delicate situation had more or less forced him to stay at the capitol of Norway to maintain a close view of the situation there.

The British attache in Stockholm, Sir Arthur Grant Duff, had been left in charge in Stockholm, and now he was delivering conflicting messages to Kristiania in his honest-but-misguided attempts to urge the two sides towards compromise after the Norwegian naval debacle. With the technology of the day and the speed the situation was developing, Rodd was simply unable to fully coordinate the numerous negotiations and meetings that were simultaneously taking place at the two capitols. He tried nevertheless remain true to his instructions, and continued to relay the official line: Britain merely wanted hold an oversight of the situation, soliciting Norwegians to remain patient and Swedes not to needlessly rush matters. When Rodd took up the danger of possible Russian invasion in Scandinavia and asked for instructions in the case of such a scenario, Elgin had replied by sending a secret memorandum about official British's views on the union conflict back to Rodd on late April:

The following overview of our line can be of interest to you.

1. 
   
   
   • Our sincere wish is that the Union's integrity should not deteriorate under any circumstances .
   • British interests will be seriously affected if another power came to occupy a port on the Norwegian coast and we should do everything in our power to prevent this.
   • We strongly doubt that the Treaty of 1855 would be still valid, should the two countries break their Union. We should assess such a situation with great care, and also whether to replace the treaty with another international arrangement. Our attitude to the matter will largely depend on the two kingdoms views towards each other and to us.

Thus it was clear that Britain did not want Norway or Sweden would be used militarily, either by Britain or by others. The skepticism towards Russia and the inclusion of "the other Powers," mainly Germany, showed that there was no desire to exclude anyone or having an agreement intended to treat someone as an antagonist either. While the crisis would have been complex enough as it was, the question of Norwegian succession further complicated and damaged the British diplomatic efforts to act on a determined and concentrated fashion.

Wilhelm II, desperate to salvage his grand geopolitical scheme with Nicholas II, wanted to remain informed about developments in Scandinavia and read all possible communiques from the Nordic capitols with great interest. When the throne of Norway became officially vacant, Wilhelm II remained true to his earlier view that he regarded it as unfortunate that it would be given to in-law of Edward VII. He therefore sought to initiate a candidacy for the Danish Prince Carl's uncle Valdemar of Denmark as a better alternative. As if his plans to draw Denmark gradually closer to the German Reich were not grounds enough for disquiet, in the summer of 1905 the Kaiser aroused further mistrust in both Copenhagen and London through his behavior over the succession to the Norwegian throne, and particularly through his intrigues against the candidature of Prince Charles of Denmark. For the Prince’s wife Maud was the youngest daughter of King Edward VII and Queen Alexandra, herself a Danish Princess by birth.

A significant part in the succession part of the crisis was played by a single ambitious Norwegian diplomat accredited to Madrid, Baron Fredrik Wedel Jarlsberg, who had already had consultations with Kaiser Wilhelm during the latter’s visit to Lisbon in March 1905. In his conversations with Cartwright, his British counterpart in Madrid, Baron Wedel had openly stated that he despised Germany and Russia as ‘thieves’ who were out to secure naval bases and trading advantages for themselves in Norway at the first possible opportunity. Wedel considered Wilhelm II particularly dangerous. He told Cartwright that the pleasure given by Wilhelm’s annual visits to the Norwegian coast "had been marred by a feeling that the Kaiser was merely searching a suitable location for a German naval base." Unlike Germany and Russia, he pointed out, both Britain and France had strong interests in Norway’s territorial integrity. In his opinion there was only one effective guarantee of Norway’s independence, and that was the rule of a sovereign related by blood to the British royal family.

Since these discussions in spring Jarlsberg, the key promoter among the Norwegian monarchists, had by now launched the two main candidates from Norwegian side to take over the throne after Oscar II. His two proposals had been Prince Carl of Sweden and Prince Carl of Denmark, the former of courtesy, the latter for the sake of Prince Carl of Denmark's dynastic connections with Britain's monarch. Jarlsberg had sought to intimidate his British colleagues with the danger of an intervention by another Major Power unless Britain would support Norway in the succession. Emphasizing the importance of maintaining the monarchical system and winning British support for the new state, he referred specifically to Prince Charles of Denmark as by far the most suitable future King of Norway. And after the embittered King Oscar had made it plain and public that no member of his house would ever accept the Norwegian throne, Jarlsberg had been content to support the cause of his preferred future king, Charles of Denmark.

In his quest he had found new allies from Copenhagen. While Rodd considered Jarlsberg as an untrustworthy schemer and was thus wary of his formulations, his colleague in Copenhagen, sir Alan Vanden-Bempde-Johnstone, had been far more eager to get himself involved to the secession issue. He actively reported about the matter to Elgin, seeking to gain the favor of Edward VII. Johnstone was willing to support Jarlsberg and his idea that the Danish Prince Carl, the grandson of the Danish King Christian IX and the wife of the British King Edward VII's daughter, Maud, was the perfect future King of Norway.

Johnstone argued that by promoting this candidacy Britain would gain a lot of goodwill from Denmark and Norway, and would be able to force the Swedes to the negotiating table. Rodd considered Johnstone's views as badly informed meddling that threatened to needlessly escalate a delicate and risky situation for no other reason than personal glory-hunting, and the situation soon turned into a thinly-veiled personal fight between Johnstone and Rodd. The matter soon ended with the prevailing of the Foreign Minister and the Minister in Stockholm's vision not to intervene until the situation would become more clear.[1]

While Jarlsberg and his allies were busily promoting their monarchical agenda abroad, The Norwegian government at Kristiania also had to take account of the views of other Great Powers. A dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden would change the balance of power in Northern Europe, and a possible war had a major risk to escalate, as the Powers would send their forces to Scandinavia to secure their geopolitical interests by force of arms. Moreover, an armed conflict was a prospect that seemed to offer little chances of a happy outcome for the considerably less equipped Norwegian military. A war could also have unforeseen consequences at home.

Many Norwegian politicians wanted to take this opportunity to abolish the monarchy for good. But not Prime Minister Christian Michelsen. Although he was known as a Republican, he was a firm supporter of realpolitik. He felt that in this situation Norway's only chance to get foreign support for her independence was to be gained through continuing the monarchy. Norway must have a king, if she was to gain recognition from the major Empires of Europe. But while Michelsen was willing to reluctantly work with the conservative Jarlsberg, Russian and German pressure towards the candidacy of Valdemar made him pause. The succession matter remained unresolved, as the Danish government hesitated to take a side in the crisis by granting Prince Charles or Prince Valdemar the permission to become a candidate for the Norwegian throne. The matter started a major political crisis at Denmark, as the government was now forced to take a firm line in a conflict that was quickly taking a direction that seemed to pit the Major Powers of Europe into opposite camps.

1: in OTL Johnstone was able to sideline Elgin by reaching out directly to Edward VII, who considered it most unfriendly towards him personally if German Emperor’s wish for Valdemar was carried out, as he felt that matters had now gone too far between him and his nephew. He implored the entire Danish royal family to stand firm against the German machinations. Wilhelm II received news that the King “would be glad to know that the Emperor shared his views” As the Danish government hesitated to allow Prince Charles to be sent to Norway until Sweden had finally renounced the candidature of a prince of the House of Bernadotte, the question of the succession remained in the balance for weeks. Irritated at the delay and fearful that Wilhelm II might after all try to put one of his sons on the Norwegian throne, Edward VII decided to take a hand in the negotiations. He ordered the British ambassador to send a blunt message by cipher telegram to Johnstone in Copehagen. “If Prince Charles were not to accept Norwegian Crown now King Edward fears that he and his family will be covered with ridicule. It is generally expected that Prince Charles will go to Norway; should he not King Edward is convinced that German Emperor will send one of his sons and much fears intrigues from that quarter are already going on.”

In TTL Edward VII has been forced to remain away from daily politics due his predicament with the chronic pains caused by the injuries sustained at Belgium in the foiled assassination attempt, and he is not the foreign policy force he was in TTL. As a result Rodd and Elgin are quite capable of putting Johnstone to his place, leaving Jarlsberg without the direct British support he had in TTL.

 

[DumbersTC]

Hopefully that crisis would be solved by the next update. By the way, I would pick for Prince Valdemar to the Norwegian throne.

 

[Karelian]

Hopefully that crisis would be solved by the next update. By the way, I would pick for Prince Valdemar to the Norwegian throne.

Is the subject too obscure to your taste, or do you merely wish a happy ending for everyone involved? The political leaders everywhere in Europe agree you on the latter part, but the destruction of Tordenskjold has greatly complicated the situation.
And Valdemar would be a good candidate - but at this point choosing him would mean a diplomatic victory for Germany and Russia, and a defeat for Britain. And since the opposite is true for Prince Charles, the Norwegian government is starting to have doubts about their international position. And they have it easy compared to the Danes...

 

[SenatorChickpea]

This is fascinating. It's wonderful to read about an early twentieth century flashpoint that isn't in the Balkans or East Asia.