The Luftwaffe has a longrange bomber in 1941

Nazi Germany was not interested in longrange bombers in the 30ties, there for they canceled the development of the Ju 89 and Do 19. But view points can change, aslo within Nazi Germany. According to Wiki, the He177 was larger and had better performance (speed, range bobload) as the Do19 and Ju89 it was more advanced. The Mig3, again acording to Wiki, was hard to fly and inferiour to the Me 109.

The prototype flew late 1939, give it 2 years to solve it to a real 4 engined plane.
I think, when the He177 enters service late 1941, with a normal 4 engine configuration and atered tail, as He277. And suppose Goering changed his mind and again wanted to play again a more prominent role, which he lost after the Battle of Brittain failure. 1941 ended with the failure of capturing Moscow. Perhaps Goering could came up again with a plan as ''the luftwaffe can fix it''

Suppose;
There were sufficient numbers available to start bombing campains against Sovjet industry mid 1942, then 1942 could have a diffierent end as in OTL, not an end ot the east front or colapse of the Sovjet Union, but better start points for 1943. A Sovjet Union, wich will have difficuties to bring Lendlease equipment to the front and the factories. Factories who struggle more than OTL to aquire raw matrials, due to a constant destruction of railways. Facrories who lose a large part of their production capacity for short or longer period due to bombing. The industrial capacity of the Sovjet Union was massive, but by bombing railway links and factories, even there not acurate production could drop just enough to tip the balance a little bit.
As example the railway links, far behind the front lines, to Stalingrad, denying the Sovjets of just enough, men and equipment on a crucial moment.

The He 177B or He277, even it proved not an exelent bomber, it showed the Nazis the value and effects on the front line of longrange bombing campains on strategic targets.
This opens the way to take projects as the Me264 serouis, even large bombers are complex machines the Nazis lacked the will to prioritize these projects. Now with the He277 there is a sence of value for this type of bombers emerging. Especially when the Blitzkrieg concept in the Sovjet Union failed.
 
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Long-range planes for the Atlantic Air Command would mean far better intel for convoy/ship location and forces ships to convoy at ALL times. If a ship is by itself, a heavy bomber can get in close, not drop bombs from 20,000 ft.

This is what I meant by having the German heavies involved in the Battle of the Atlantic. With better intel about convoys and ships, the u-boats and surface raiders can be better coordinated. The British will have to spend more resources on air defense for convoys. The German long range bombers would also make it more difficult for the British maritime patrol planes.

I wonder how the Bismarck chase might go down differently in this case.
 
Generally a strategic bomber force would be better used to take out the enemy's industrial capacity that diverted to fight in the battle of the Atlantic. Bombing of the Russian factories in the Urals, the Russian transportation lines and the Russian oil production would have had a far more important role in the war than trying to take out convoys. Murmansk would be untenable and so would sending any lend-lease suppies through Persia.
 
General Wever would be rotating in his grave...

The obsession of High Command with aircraft as flying support artillery was thankfully a disaster for Germany in the long run. Messerschmitt, Heinkel and Junkers all looked at long-range heavies, but Fat Hermann was the big obstacle.

German air-launched anti-shipping missiles could have massacred the convoys in the Atlantic Ocean and the Norwegian Sea. Fortunately, that was not done. Neither was the widespread use of butterfly bombs, which could have made life hell for Britain's Civil Defence and Fire personnel.

I agree that Germany was severely hampered by not having a decent long-range heavy in Russia - yes, the Murmansk-Archangelsk railway, the Trans-Siberian Railway and similar targets, would have paid dividends. If the resources wasted on the V2 had been invested in heavy bombers, this post might be in German.:rolleyes:
 
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Generally a strategic bomber force would be better used to take out the enemy's industrial capacity that diverted to fight in the battle of the Atlantic. Bombing of the Russian factories in the Urals, the Russian transportation lines and the Russian oil production would have had a far more important role in the war than trying to take out convoys. Murmansk would be untenable and so would sending any lend-lease suppies through Persia.

True, but considering attrition,this would require fleets of bombers. The USA alone produced over 20,000 B-24s. I question whether or not the German aircraft industry would have had the capacity to build sufficient numbers of heavy bombers to maintain a long-term strategic bombing offensive against factories in the Rurals - especially considering this would be outside the range of most German escort fighters. Also, German tactics as used in the BoB favored loose formations, rather than tight box formations as used by the USAAF. Would strategic bombing have that great an impact on Soviet production anyway? Arguably, USAAF bombing did not have that much effect on German production. Finally, to attempt this, the RLM would have to completely eliminate every other twin and multi-engined bomber from production schedules, creating a very unbalanced Luftwaffe, especially when the major need was for interceptors in the west and close support AC in the east.

On the other hand a relatively modest force of purpose-designed long-range bombers of the He-177B type would, as others have said, been been of great value assisting U-boats and harrassing convoys in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Also, a creditable heavy bomber force in the west (along with long range escorts) might provide the Luftwaffe with an ability to harass and attack airbases used in the Allies' bombing offensive, as well as staging areas for the Normandy invasion.
 
Germany woild have needed to stop the production of some of its mediun bombers that were to a great degree obsolete. It was the lack of a long range bomber force that played a critical role in the war. Germany simply lacked the ability to strike at targets in Russia that were out of the rane of its main bomber the He-111. If Germany could have struck at the Rail lines and the factories in the Urals then it might very well have resulted in less loses in 1941 and made the Germans a lot stroner in 1942.

As for the use of Strategic bombers against convoys I have my doubts if it would have been all that effective as it might very well have resulted in the introduction of More Escort carriers much earlier. Striking at bases in the Azores or Iceland yes. The pombers would have had to use a lot of the early smart bombs and missles to really be effective or else they might have suffered heavy lose to the allies carrier fighters,
 
The obsession of High Command with aircraft as flying support artillery was thankfully a disaster for Germany in the long run. Messerschmitt, Heinkel and Junkers all looked at long-range heavies, but Fat Hermann was the big obstacle.

German air-launched anti-shipping missiles could have massacred the convoys in the Atlantic Ocean and the Norwegian Sea. Frtunately, that was not done. Neither was the widespread use of butterfly bombs, which could have made life hell for Britain's Civil Defence and Fire personnel.

I agree that Germany was severely hampered by not having a decent long-range heavy in Russia - yes, the Murmansk-Archangelsk railway, the Trans-Siberian Railway and similar targets, would have paid dividends. If the resources wasted on the V2 had been invested in heavy bombers, this post might be in German.:rolleyes:

Goering wasn't the problem so much as Ernst Udet. Udet developed dive bomber fever after watching exercises in the united states. It should be noted that Germany's dive bombing and level bombing forces relative to their size where very effective...

Udet added the stupid dive bombing requirement to the JU-88 which added a year to its development, reduced its top speed, made it more expensive to produce, increased difficulty of flying the machine, and it wasn't effective as a dive bomber anyway due to its flight characteristics

Even a skilled pilot could only hold the JU-88 in a 60 degree dive for very short periods-Jochim Helbig (the man who flew the most JU-88 missions of the war)

Goring approved of Weaver's ideas when he was alive... when he died the strategic bombing crowd lost their voice in the hall. You could butterfly this away by having Udet be more impressed with the B-17 which was comming into service around the same time as his exercises and have stress strategic bombing to Goering leading to the DO-19 getting produced with priority along with an unmodified JU-88(to function as a multi role tactical aircraft_
 
William Green (among others) believe the death of Wever has been over-emphasized by those who believe that - but for this accident - Germany would have developed a strategic bomber force. Green points out that Germany in the 2nd half of the 1930's simply lacked the capacity in its aircraft industry to turn the Ju-89 and/or Do19 prototypes into fleets of heavy bombers available in 1940-41. Also, the decision to cancel the Do-19/Ju-89 was not an abandonment of the heavy bomber. It was a realistic recognition that, give the current German industrial capacity, Germany would get more bang for its buck with single and twin-engined attack planes.

I agree that Germany would have benefitted by possessing a viable strategic bombing force (who wouldn't?). I just question that it was ever a realistic possibility. The biggest problem Germany faced was the RLM's fascination with designing bombers to fullfill as many possible roles as possible, hence the idiotic requirements placed on Heinkel in the design of the He-177.
 
While Wever may have created a strategic bomber force, his followers seemed to disappear upon his death. Jeschonnek was said to be a protege, but did nothing to prevent the termination of the bomber program. No one rose up to promote it in the way it was promoted in Britain and the US. It is a substantial drain on resources and capacity and it requires a national will to carry it through. There was no national will, no champion. The Luftwaffe also came up short in strategic transport at certain stages. It's all part of losing a war based on production capacity and numbers.
 
Instead of the usual talk of bombing Moscow and Britain, WI the heavy bomber force had concentrated in the Med? There are a handful of crucial ports in Egypt that if well bombed and mined could cripple the British war effort. Similarly the railways in Egypt, which were the keys to British victory despite being very meagre compared to European networks, could also be a great target for heavy bombers.
 

Anaxagoras

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You do realize that high level bombers targeting moving ships at sea have an incredibly poor record? Possibly 0 hits in all WWII?

The Germans used the He 177 bomber withj great success in the Battle of the Atlantic, sinking scores of ships with the Henscel 293 guided bomb. Perhaps this aircraft, with longer range and carrying capacity, would be even more effective.
 

CalBear

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Long-range planes for the Atlantic Air Command would mean far better intel for convoy/ship location and forces ships to convoy at ALL times. If a ship is by itself, a heavy bomber can get in close, not drop bombs from 20,000 ft.

A heavy would have been a threat to unescorted shipping or as a scout, but attacking single ships with a heavy is an utter waste of resources.

You can get nearly the same range out of a Condor (which had a combat radius of about 1,000 miles which is in the ballpark of the B-24 (1,100 miles), as a purpose built heavy but without the additional costs of an extra aircraft.

The only reasonable targets for a heavy bomber would be in the USSR, and even there the target list isn't great. To get at the major industrial locations once the move past the Urals is complete you need super heavy level range, something the Germans had available, albeit in aircraft of questionable combat utility (a 20,000 foot MAXIMUM ceiling, with a practical ceiling of around 17K with a speed of about 250MPH tops with a bomb load aboard, which was what the Ju-390 possessed, is NOT a highly survivable combination, especially outside the range of escorting fighters).

From the Allied perspective, a serious heavy bomber program for the Luftwaffe is a big winner, every bomber means about 6-8 fewer fighters to face the 8th AF and Bomber Command.
 
It could have been used to tear up the Trans-Siberian and slow down the Far East divisions that saved Moscow...take Moscow, cut the railroads...turn the Luftwaffe on Murmansk and Arkhangelsk to reduce Lend-Lease, less Studebakers coming in...

But of course, building these means something else isn't built. Maybe Germany does the sensible thing and shafts the Kriegsmarine? It's not like they had a hope in hell of fighting the Royal Navy anyways.

and where is Germany supposed to produce the number of planes needed to cut the Trans-Siberian? and even if it does so what? the red army has engineer battalions and could easily repair it to keep the trains coming. Sure it can delay the arrival of the Siberian divisions and blunt the Russians counter attack but Germany had already failed to take Moscow and even if by some wildly ASBish action they do take the city ask Napoleon how much good Moscow did him. As for the second point if Germany cuts funding to the Kriegsmarine what is to stop the British and French from doing likewise to their navies? the money saved could result in better equipped armies and air-forces meaning that the French and BEF give a much better account of themselves spreading all sorts of new butterflies.
 
And AGAIN about production capacity, there were 1300 something He 177A build, witch cost just the same material, manhours and crew as the He177B or He277 so there no pain.
Now, what would the effect on the Eastern front will be if these planes were used as like the Blitz but now on Russian war industry, as a real Ural bomber. Suppose Goering want to make up for what he screwed up with the Blitz on Brtitain, and play a part in this big Barbabarossa event.
I won't say bombing raids will be with out losses but a dissaster as Schweinfurt/ Regensburg was possible due to a smaller aera of combat which was fully monitored by radar and had an excelent orginasid, multy layer defence air defence.
I wonder if the Sovjets had a complete radar cover of ther teritory in late 1941, I doubt if they had radar at all, so if there was defence around STRATEGIC targets as; a steel plant, ballbearing factory, a Tank factory or railroads bringing in landlease stuff, it was AA guns and local fighters in an intercepting role. Probably acting too late.

I thought there were only 1100+ He-177s built?
Never mind about those two hundred extra, you do realise those 1300 were the amount built during pretty much entire world war II?
That means you don't have 1000+ He-177's in 1941 or 1942 without changing the priorities of the Luftwaffe.

1300 may sound like a lot, but it isn't when compared to every type of heavy/strategic bomber the British operated during WWII.
On average of each of the Halifax, Short Stirling, Whitley, Hampden, Lancaster, Manchester and Wellington at least 5 times more were built during WWII.

Conclusion:
Building little over a thousand during entire WWII isn't enough to be able to have a viable heavy bomber force. Attrition alone will prevent that.
If they were built in a short timespan you'd be able to have a somewhat viable bomberforce for a few months, but since they weren't that's not going to happen either.
 
Gents,

Allow me to introduce the concept of the Zero Sum Game to many of you.

Nazi Germany builds, supplies, and mans a number of long range bombers by 1941? So, what OTL items will now not be built, supplied, and manned? Where's the shortfall going to occur?

Germany has a fixed amount productive ability a fixed amount of supplies, and a fixed amount of manpower. When you add a new weapon or the change the numbers of OTL weapons produced, you need to rob Peter to pay Paul. Want those bombers in enough numbers to have an effect? Then choose what you're going to give up building, supplying, and manning.

Until you do that, you're just spinning your wheels.


Bill
 

CalBear

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As I noted, I think the Allies would have been happy to deal with 1,000 heavies and 8,000 fewer Fw-190s or Me-110 night fighters. The British civilian population might not agree, but Bomber Command would have danced in the Streets.
Gents,

Allow me to introduce the concept of the Zero Sum Game to many of you.

Nazi Germany builds, supplies, and mans a number of long range bombers by 1941? So, what OTL items will now not be built, supplied, and manned? Where's the shortfall going to occur?

Germany has a fixed amount productive ability a fixed amount of supplies, and a fixed amount of manpower. When you add a new weapon or the change the numbers of OTL weapons produced, you need to rob Peter to pay Paul. Want those bombers in enough numbers to have an effect? Then choose what you're going to give up building, supplying, and manning.

Until you do that, you're just spinning your wheels.


Bill
 
Bill.
Point noted, you are right. According to wikki, the He111 was in production into 1944. Correct me if I am wrong but this aircraft become old fashioned already arroun 1942. So this type and probably other types could be taken out of production. This will release production capacity and material for He177B's. I understand the He177B is twice the size as a He111.
In OTL several squadrons of He111 were replaced by He177A.
Considering the box formations used by the USA, the Americans developte this by trial and error
 
While along range bomber attacking convoys with glide bombs may seem a cool idea, there are a number of problems...

(1) First, you have to find the convoy. not so easy in 42-43 (the earliest the bombs would have been available)

(2) The allies are, by that point, deploying escort carriers. Given the obvious threat posed by the long range bombers, more would have been deployed faster (this was technically possible, as usually politics, particularly by the air marshals, slowed it down). A long range anti-shipping bomber has a problem, it doesnt take too much damage to stop it getting home. So losses are heavier than in a shorter range bombing campaign.

(3) Each 4 engine heavy means 2 less medium bombers, which were already sinking ships with conventional bombs. So do you actually sink more ships with the heavies? Quite possible not.


Bill is quite correct, a cool weapon isnt necessarily justified on cost-benefit grounds. In wartime, these are everything (in peace, there are other issues involved). Its all about doing the most damage for the least cost (material and human).
 
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