Pretty good and interesting. Although expected, it is rather fascinating to see the Middle East, rather than Central/Eastern Europe or East Asia, to become the main flashpoint of early Cold War. I assume that either the author follows the theory that Stalin's 1953 death was a successful assassination, and ITTL the more severe purges snuff his would-be killers, or his stroke was a genuine thing, and it is simply butterflied out. I'm not entirely sure that Stalin's unhealthy lifestyle and paranoid attitude to physicians would grant him an extra decade of life, but it's not wholly impossible, either (late Stalin was not so much the medical basket case that late Hitler was). In the long term, an extra decade of Stalinism is going to wreck the country even more. However the silver lining for Russia is that ITTL the ethnic cleansing, both at Hitler's and Stalins' hands, was so extensive that when the USSR falls, Belarus and Ukraine are likely going to stay united with Russia. OTOH, the Soviet system is going to fall faster, for various reasons (see below).
I do expect Middle East to stay the main CW theater, BTW. Now, decolonization is certainly going to add some new theaters, mainly in Africa, even if with this stronger Western bloc, I think that Moscow is not going to have as much as success expanding its influence in Africa as IOTL.
Some ideas to throw around:
With the Soviet bloc focusing in East Asia and hence Vietnam joining it soon, I guess the Vietnam quagmire is going to be butterflied away. Although its place could theoretically be taken by something else, I can't think of any other Thrid-World country being high-probability of becoming a quagmire of Vietnam severity for America. So it could well go missing. That's going to affect the path of America in substantial ways. Although a big part of the 60s changes are still totally going to happen (the desegregation, the rise of the youth counterculture, the sexual revolution) since they are driven by hardcore social forces, without the Vietnam War (and its by-product, Watergate), the culture clashes are going to be rather less violent. The *Great Society would likely be more successful (e.g. earlier health care reform), and the Reaganite backlash butterflied away or substantially downgraded. However, the energy crisis is still going to happen, but with a less crappy '70s, America could make a more successful bid at energy efficience and independence.
Europe looks like it has achieved basic stabilization (nice to see German and Italian troops back in action in Persia on the side of the good guys


). Although the onset of European integration was likely slightly delayed by having a stronger Germany and weaker Soviet bloc in Europe (but just as strong globally) around, those changes are not so radical (besides, America is still the big guy running the show and herding fractious Europeans together in its Western system, and the USSR is more aggressive globally) that it ought to be butterflied away entirely. With the 60s, and a new generation smoothing out the wounds of the past (besides, the guys that really got it bad from Germany already went in the other block out of spite), European integration should take off for good. With European armies seeing more action in the Middle East and a stronger Germany to rein in, not to mention a more aggressive Soviet bloc, it is quite likely that ITTL European integration gets its EDC/EPC military-political dimension running from the start in parallel to its EEC economic one. That is going to make ADC rather stronger militarily.
With a stronger Germany, which hence gets a stronger "economic miracle" and makes the Italian one and French "good decades" stronger too, not to mention Hungary and Romania getting fully integrated in the EU (as shall Spain and Portugal once they return to democracy), the EU is going to experience a rather stronger economic boom than OTL. That ought to make the European social-democratic system more successful, and the EU even more attractive to neutrals and the peoples of the Soviet bloc.
I do expect the EU core to become Germany, France, Benelux, Italy, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, as well as Spain and Portugal when they return to democracy. Serbia, Albania, Greece, Malta, and Cyprus could join slightly later, owing to their weaker socio-economic development. Thanks to TTL Cold War being focused in the Middle East, we could see Turkey getting the welcome in the EU they deserve when the rest of the Balkans joins up. It is a dice's toss whether Britain, Ireland, and the Nordic countries join, form their own stronger EFTA (rounded-up geopolitically with Finland), or make a looser confederal "outer tier" to the semi-federal EU.
For the Soviet bloc, in the long run, with three potential global powers in the same bloc (Russia, China, and India), and some un-Sovietized allies, things are going to be... interesting in the Chinese sense. The USSR has got an heightened military, economic, and space competition with a stronger ADC, which is going to make them collapse faster. Yet, they have got some un-Sovietized allies/vassals (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria), which are going to be rather less of a resource sink than OTL and more of an asset. However, once WWII lingering animosities die out and the lure of the EU builds, Poles, Czechs, and Bulgarians are going to realize they totally signed out with the wrong team, and try to drop out. Russia is not going to take it nicely, so we might easily see several "fraternal interventions" to stop would-be defectors, which is going to wreck their economic livelihood, esp. if the Soviets take the opportunity to impose their system. At least Poles could easily fight on if the Soviets invade. The ADC may or may not send help and turn the crisis into a confrontation between the blocs.
China, well, is likely going to pull the same bid for independence and split from Soviet hegemony like OTL. With a Soviet bloc more grounded in Asia, it could go both ways, the Soviets reluctantly accepting defection as IOTL which would make China follow the same basic path as OTL, or going to war in order to stop it, which would not be nice. A Sino-Soviet war would wreck China, bleed Russia dry (perhaps even pushing it to collapse), could become a mega-Afghanistan, and anyway would prevent post-Mao economic reforms, delaying China's ascent and making it a huge resource sink to Russia.
India is in the Soviet bloc for opportunistic reasons, and rivalry with China is going to make its membership fraught with tensions. They might easily defect, as post-colonial animosities die out, and go to be their own team like China, or be a loose member up to the fall of the bloc like OTL.
Korea, sadly, gets the Stalinist/Juche long nightmare expanded to the whole nation. Vietnam likely follows the same path as China, whatever it is, either the cautious reforms if China goes the Deng way, or another Stalinist hellhole if China stays bound to Russia. I did not understand if just Vietnam or whole Indochina went Red. If it was just Vietnam, I expect Laos to fall to Commie infiltration, but without the Vietnam war, Cambodia could resist, unless Vietnam invades it. Anyway, likely no Pol Pot genocide. The rest of South East Asia likely gets more American investment in order to stave off Communist infiltration, and likely follows the same path as OTL.
The Middle East remains the main flashpoint of the Cold War. Arab-Israelian wars become confrontation events between the blocs even more so than OTL, although I still expect Israel to come on top again and again. Division of Iran is quite going to butterfly the rise of the Islamists in Iran, as Communist North Iran is going to give the religious radicals a different target for their anger than Westernization, and US and EU likely keep a tighter rein on the Shah's excesses.
OTOH, I would expect that irredentist bid of Iraq on Kuwait becomes yet another Cold War flashpoint, although with Soviet backing perhaps Iraq is able to entrench its conquest of Kuwait (the superpowers could even make it an unspoken trade, Iraq keeps Kuwait and Israel keeps Sinai, Golan, and West Bank, and the world looks the other way as most Palestinians are kicked out). It might even be that the *Gulf War and the *Six-Day War become part of the same event. Perhaps the Iraqi invade Saudi Arabia , too, there is a confrontation between the blocs much like the Cuban Missile crisis, and the superpowers make the above deal, with the Iraqi pulling out of Saudi Arabia. Having even more Palestinian refugees around would make lebanon and Jordan even more instable, too.
In this sequence, Saudi Arabia would become a Western stronghold as it was during the Gulf War, but even more so, it would take the same role as the pre-1979 Iran. This could send the kingdom to some much-needed modernization, but the cultural shock could make the Islamist Revolution happen in Arabia, instead (or possibly, Egypt). Islamist Arabia would wreck the oil market, and force US and EU to take most serious efforts to energy efficiency and independence (a mix of green, coal, and nuclear).
For various reasons, I am under the impression that ITTL the Castrist Revolution would be snuffed out, so South America would be a bit less turbolent and perhaps have a less rocky path to social reform, without Castro and Guevara around as a bad example.