The Little-by-little Emancipator

Now here's an ACW POD EIWP*.

http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/abraham-lincolns-audacious-plan/

Abraham Lincoln’s Audacious Plan
By RICHARD STRINER
Abraham Lincoln is remembered by some as a thoughtful, often cautious leader. But in late 1861 he began to develop a plan that, even during that most unusual of times, was audacious in the extreme: the federal government would buy out Delaware’s entire slave population.

In November 1861 he drafted legislation that he hoped would be introduced in the legislature of Delaware, the smallest of the slave states — and a slave state loyal to the Union. “Be it enacted by the State of Delaware,” Lincoln’s draft began, “that on condition the United States of America will, at the present session of Congress, engage by law to pay . . . in the six per cent bonds of the said United States, the sum of seven hundred and nineteen thousand and two hundred dollars, in five equal annual installments, there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, at any time after the first day of January in the year of our Lord one thousand, eight hundred and sixty-seven, within the said State of Delaware.” An alternative version of Lincoln’s text would have extended the phase-out of slavery in Delaware over 30 years.
The plan might sound outlandish, but it was wholly within Lincoln’s often misunderstood anti-slavery position. The conventional view today holds that Lincoln’s abolitionist sympathies evolved over time. But the real evolution wasn’t in his opposition to slavery per se, but in his thinking on how to bring about its end. Unlike some of his firebrand anti-slavery colleagues, he understood that any plan for blanket abolition would tear the country apart; indeed, he was proven right when the mere fear of such a plan drove 11 Southern states to secede.
Rather, Lincoln, like many in his party, believed that the only workable solution short of violence was to restrict slavery gradually — hence his position, during the 1860 campaign, that slavery remain legal in the South but not be allowed into any new territories or states. The Delaware plan, though never enacted, demonstrates how his thinking was evolving once in office; by the end of 1862, it would flower as the Emancipation Proclamation.
Lincoln’s plan was bigger than Delaware, of course. He hoped that, if the state successfully implemented his plan, it would prove attractive to the other border states and, maybe, even weaken the Confederacy. Lincoln predicted to his friend David Davis that “if Congress will pass a law authorizing the issue of bonds for the payment of the emancipated Negroes in the border states, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri will accept the terms.”
Why Delaware? For one, it was manageable: by 1861 its slave population had shrunk to fewer than 1,800. He also figured he could lean on Delaware Congressmen George P. Fisher and Benjamin Burton, who were friends of the administration — and the state’s two largest slave owners.
And just to make sure that Republicans in Congress would be ready to take fast action in response to the Delaware request, Lincoln inserted some crafty lines in his annual message to Congress, which he delivered in early December 1861. After making reference to the “contraband” slaves who had crossed Union lines, Lincoln wrote that some process ought to be adopted to liberate them. Then he continued; it was “not impossible,” he wrote, “that some of the States will pass similar enactments for their own benefit respectively.”
But his hopes for the Delaware venture came to naught; his plan was rejected by the state house of representatives in February 1862 by a margin of one vote. Then the legislature worsened the situation by passing a declaration that if “the people of Delaware desire to abolish slavery within her borders, they will do so in their own way” and that “any interference from without, and all suggestions of saving expense to the people . . . are improper.”
Though Lincoln’s hopes for the Delaware plan were dashed, the experiment continued in the early months of 1862. In March, the president would send to Congress an unprecedented bill that put the offer of federal money for the liberation of slaves directly on the table. Republicans passed it over Democratic opposition, which declared the concept “taxes to buy Negroes.”
Lincoln persisted. But when the offer of money made no impression on slave-owners, the president decided to radicalize his grand design. He started writing a draft of the Emancipation Proclamation.
WI Delaware had agreed to the offer?

*even I would post
 
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Oh, I get it, it's a political ACW POD. Silly me, of course nobody's interested. OK then, how 'bout this: WI, at the same time that Delaware agreed to the offer, the Battle of Wherever was won by whichever side lost in in OTL?
 
That's pretty cool.

1 vote is a pretty minor difference, so this POD sounds pretty plausible.

If Delaware passes the law, I'm pretty sure Congress will fund it. That funding level is reasonable. Not parsimonious, not extremely generous. (A slightly higher proposed funding level may be what gives you your successful POD).

Here are some possible consequences. The first would be possible abolition in other border states on similar terms. I don't think any of them are inevitable but Missouri is a likely prospect (Maryland and Kentucky less so). In the post-war period when an emancipation amendment is being bruited, Maryland and Kentucky might go for it then and Congress might approve it then as a reward for being loyal, especially for Kentucky.

When the South is close to being defeated in this ATL Civil War (I'm thinking the equivalent of OTL late '64 and '65), you may have more internal dissension in the CSA as slave-owners start to push for peace on the basis of compensated emancipation.

There will also be some pressure to apply this scheme to liberated areas (those not subject to the Emancipation Proclamation, e.g.) which may lead to an increased pressure to reconstruct state governments. Alternatively you may get some kind of compensated emancipation scheme that applies to individual slave-owners and not to entire states.

At the extreme, you might even see state-by-state compensated emancipation being *the* model on which states are emancipated after the war (by reconstructed, GOP-friendly governments), with the *13th Amendment just being a finisher. In that case, you may have some alternate post-war politics. You may have the Grand Old allied with a class of pre-war planters who are now post-war wealthy bondholders with a strong interest in the strength and power of the central government.
 
I don't think any of them are inevitable but Missouri is a likely prospect (Maryland and Kentucky less so).

I don't know anything about slavery in Missouri and Kentucky, but I was under the impression that it was becoming marginalized in Maryland. Baltimore supposedly had more freedmen than slaves on the eve of the war.
 
I don't know anything about slavery in Missouri and Kentucky, but I was under the impression that it was becoming marginalized in Maryland. Baltimore supposedly had more freedmen than slaves on the eve of the war.

My impression has always been that Maryland had a more pro-Southern bias and its legislature retained more sympathizers, regardless of the facts on the ground. If Maryland goes for compensated emancipation I suspect its not until the end of the war or, more likely, right after the end of the war.

Whereas Missouri was basically a proto-Reconstruction state where the government was firmly in Union hands by hook or by crook.
 
Interesting that this was structured basically as a block grant. Congress gives Delaware a lump sum ( in bonds) and Delaware is then responsible for distributing it.

Remember also that the politics of that era were notoriously corrupt.

In places like Missouri or in reconstructed Southern states that adopt compensated emancipation schemes, I could see a strong push to make slaveholders who served as confederate officers or who refuse to take a loyalty oath or something ineligible, making the per capita pot bigger for more "collaborationist" slaveholders.
 
That changes everything! The Battle of Whatever is often mis-understood and really is vital!

No, I said the Battle of Wherever. Must you Whatever-philes bring it into every ACW thread? Isn't it enough that you've monopolized all discussion of General What's-His-Face with minute analyses of what he did at Whatever?
 

Thande

Donor
I wonder, how much would this cost, any guesses?

The average market price for a slave in the United States in 1860 was about $1700. It would probably be more than that in this case to sweeten the deal, maybe $2000 per slave? Based on that assumption, it would cost the Federal Government $3,600,000.
 

mowque

Banned
The average market price for a slave in the United States in 1860 was about $1700. It would probably be more than that in this case to sweeten the deal, maybe $2000 per slave? Based on that assumption, it would cost the Federal Government $3,600,000.

And what was the federal budget back then? I know we raised a pile of money via war bonds, but could Congress use those monies?
 

Thande

Donor
And what was the federal budget back then? I know we raised a pile of money via war bonds, but could Congress use those monies?
The US government spending for the fiscal year of 1860 was $78 million. I suspect loans could be used in any case though.
 
Lincoln's just lost the Abolitionist vote.

They're going to pillory him for compromising with The Slave Power, admitting the validity of slavery, and he was probably fornicating with a slave woman all along. They'll want to tear him limb from limb. NEW JOHN BROWN WANTED will be the poster, along with denunciations of this soft on slavery Abe.
 
I wonder, how much would this cost, any guesses?

$719,200 (1861-62 value) for less than 1,800 people. There were 3,953,761 slaves in the US according to the most recent census. Assuming the same price, that means over $1,579,747,172 to free all the slaves. No idea what that sum "really" means, but Alaska cost $7,200,000 in 1867, so a billion and a half in Civil War dollars should be a scary sum.
 
The US government spending for the fiscal year of 1860 was $78 million. I suspect loans could be used in any case though.

In a way, the whole program is structured as a loan, since the payments to Delaware would be in the form of bonds.
 
Lincoln's just lost the Abolitionist vote.

They're going to pillory him for compromising with The Slave Power, admitting the validity of slavery, and he was probably fornicating with a slave woman all along. They'll want to tear him limb from limb. NEW JOHN BROWN WANTED will be the poster, along with denunciations of this soft on slavery Abe.

Not even close.
 
Lincoln's just lost the Abolitionist vote.

They're going to pillory him for compromising with The Slave Power, admitting the validity of slavery, and he was probably fornicating with a slave woman all along. They'll want to tear him limb from limb. NEW JOHN BROWN WANTED will be the poster, along with denunciations of this soft on slavery Abe.

Sorry...epic fail. Even the radical Abos like William Lloyd Garrison would have approved this measure since there was no way to be sure at that time that slavery was going to be brought to an end by way of the Civil War. The primary problem with the OP's assertion wherein he muses that this may have paved the way for further state by state emancipations is this...Delaware's acceptance of emancipation merely confirms those worse fears of the Deep South. They knew that if slavery was contained and kept from moving into the territories it was only a matter of time before some of the border states will give up the institution all together.

On the other side of the argument by 1864 there is very little chance that the Radical Republicans in Congress will be willing to give the Confederate states anything that even hints of a pay off. If things go different and Lincoln losses the 1864 election there is a slight chance the offer may be extended to the states of the CSA. At that point though, why would they accept it? Lincoln's defeat will just convince them that victory and independence is an actual possibility. Heck they resisted arming any blacks until the bitter end, why would they give up slavery if victory looked any bit likely?

Overall it might make passage of the 14th and 15th Amendments go a bit smoother but really it doesn't change the overall situation as much as one might think.

Benjamin
 
I agree with Benjamin, abolishing slavery in Delaware - even at a financial cost - is not going to anger the Abolitionists. They will probably be impatient for Lincoln to support more measures though. The question is whether this leads to increase support for abolitionist measures overall, or lead to a backlash by people concerned the war's effort this early is being changed from "preserve the union" to "free the slaves."

I doubt the Delaware experiment could be reproduced in other Unionist areas during the war except maybe DC. This link has the populations in 1860 including slaves. Even Maryland has a high enough number that I don't think Congress would approve it during wartime.

I think it's possible that the Emancipation Proclamation - freeing slaves still held in Confederate (not Unionist) hands - might be moved up provided there is a significant enough opportunity in early 1862 (as opposed to waiting until after Antietam). Maybe after Fort Donelson or Corinth? Or after the Union took New Orleans or Memphis?

Those are significant enough victories and they happen before the Union's defeat in either the Penninsular Campaign/Seven Days or Second Bull Run. A proclamation at that time would not be seen as Lincoln relying on blacks to "save" the Union. Also, by June 1862 Tennesse was mostly in Union hands at the time and had a large Unionist population. By excluding emancipation in Tennessee and threatening it in other areas of the Confederacy, it might shore up support for the Union there.

An earlier Emancipation Proclamation would also earlier end the threat that Europe might intervene on behalf of the Confederacy. It might also speed up the raising of black units.
 
This kind of political POD actually could be profoundly destabilizing in the Confederacy, particularly if the Union tries to play up the more Unionist elements who have no investment in slavery anyway to use this as a means akin to the 10% policy to worm into the Confederacy's political system from within. It would be a Xanatos Gambit at its finest as the CSA, no matter what it does here, benefits Lincoln. If it as per OTL expands the war in scale and horror then its leadership looks bloody-minded and deluded just as it did after repeatedly refusing Union peace overtures. If it reacts as it did IOTL to dissidents who see this as a means for a peace with honor, it shows its claims to any legitimacy other than the sword to be completely and utterly bunk. If it reacts to this with a Black and the Grey response then the CSA may survive but it will be so different from OTL that only the name of the state and its initials would be the same.

This, if it had happened, would have been a true political masterstroke.
 
Lincoln's just lost the Abolitionist vote.

They're going to pillory him for compromising with The Slave Power, admitting the validity of slavery, and he was probably fornicating with a slave woman all along. They'll want to tear him limb from limb. NEW JOHN BROWN WANTED will be the poster, along with denunciations of this soft on slavery Abe.

Actually this if anything *helps* him by providing an example of an actual policy to end slavery beyond the Emancipation Proclamation. If this is squared with the proclamation raising armies of USCT, the USA's got a situation where nothing the CSA can do at this point can help it, and everything will make things worse for it.
 
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