The Lights of Liberty - a counterfactual history

[Umbric Man]

Oh man, thank you so much for listening to me. I was reading through this again and noticing the edits, but you crediting me is quite flattering. Thank you!

As for Plymouth, your reasoning ITTL makes plenty of sense. I do admit it's my personal inclination to re-separate them, but the aforementioned reason and that it is your timeline means for me it is a mere observation and if you feel it essential to your work, by all means: keep Plymouth. Besides, the addition of Yankee-settled SJI and Nova Scotia (New England Plus, as it were) offsets the loss of CT and RI for New England representation...and Canada and Montreal as extra northern states in general also helps.

I must note how pleased I am the more idealistic parts of the Revolution weren't lost due to the British's initial harsher response under Wolfe. It is fine to read that America not only gave him a trial (however fated his end was) but to have the Declaration fully damn slavery is....epic, to say the least.

You have (intentionally?) given the Americans a grand step to unification and brotherhood with the generals' initial defensive positions. A Connecticuter (Arnold) defending Nova Scotian Halifax, a New Yorker (Montgomery) defending Montreal, a Virginian (Washington) defending Boston, another Virginian (Gates) defending New York, and an immigrant German (Sanssouci, though he's probably seen as Quebecker as any native by now with how long he's lived there...) defending Quebec, and a Yankee (Greene) defending Pennsylvania...THEN the ENTIRE army coming to 'save the south'....that's a very clever way of making the many different colonies come together as Americans. That WOULD be commented upon by future Patriots.

I can't wait to read more!

 

[Widukind]

Oh man, thank you so much for listening to me. I was reading through this again and noticing the edits, but you crediting me is quite flattering. Thank you!

As for Plymouth, your reasoning ITTL makes plenty of sense. I do admit it's my personal inclination to re-separate them, but the aforementioned reason and that it is your timeline means for me it is a mere observation and if you feel it essential to your work, by all means: keep Plymouth. Besides, the addition of Yankee-settled SJI and Nova Scotia (New England Plus, as it were) offsets the loss of CT and RI for New England representation...and Canada and Montreal as extra northern states in general also helps.

I'll keep Plymouth for now, but I've made a note of it. I think I'll eventually post a final version of this TL, and I'm including this in the list of possible revisions/improvements.

I must note how pleased I am the more idealistic parts of the Revolution weren't lost due to the British's initial harsher response under Wolfe. It is fine to read that America not only gave him a trial (however fated his end was) but to have the Declaration fully damn slavery is....epic, to say the least.

It's a first step on a long and winding road. But you can bet attitudes regarding slavery will be different in TTL's America.

You have (intentionally?) given the Americans a grand step to unification and brotherhood with the generals' initial defensive positions. A Connecticuter (Arnold) defending Nova Scotian Halifax, a New Yorker (Montgomery) defending Montreal, a Virginian (Washington) defending Boston, another Virginian (Gates) defending New York, and an immigrant German (Sanssouci, though he's probably seen as Quebecker as any native by now with how long he's lived there...) defending Quebec, and a Yankee (Greene) defending Pennsylvania...THEN the ENTIRE army coming to 'save the south'....that's a very clever way of making the many different colonies come together as Americans. That WOULD be commented upon by future Patriots.

Tell me honestly... have you somehow managed to read my notes on this project? This is one of the things I'll be playing with in Part V. But I have to keep warning: don't expect America to just be happy and peaceful now. Even though I'd really like that, I remain convinced that alternate history is not about wish-fulfillment. There will be trouble down the road. There always is.

 

[Krases]

Just wanted to say, read your TL front to back and I really look forward to more.

 

[Darth_Kiryan]

BUMP for update.

Need to read more of this fascinating America that you are creating.

 

[Widukind]

Funny you should bump this thread today, of all days, Darth_Kiryan. I was planning to update in a few hours, but what the heck, I'll do it right now.

The reason it has been taking so long to update is that I'm writing this part (about America) and the next two (about Europe) more or less simultaneously, to make sure the years of certain events match up correctly.

Anyway, let's get started on part five. This is where we explore the political, ideological and social tensions within the young USA.



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Part Five
AMERICAN DREAMS



“We have fought a war, not to enslave, but to set a country free, and to make room upon the earth for honest men to live in. This is the true purpose of our American design.”

—Thomas Paine


“Unless our nation is respected, foreigners will invade our rights. To be respected, we must be defended by an adequate power. And to be so defended, we must have a strong government. A nation, despicable by its weakness, cannot maintain tranquility, and forfeits the privilege of peace.”

—Alexander Hamilton


“Some fear that our government is not strong enough; but is it not often observed that the natural progress of things is for liberty to yield, and government to gain ground? And should we then abandon a firmly constrained government, which has so far kept us free, on the theoretic fear that this government may possibly lack the energy to preserve itself? I, for one, would rather be exposed to the inconveniences attending too much liberty, than those attending too small a degree of it.”

—Thomas Jefferson​

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Excerpted from American Enlightenment, by Elizabeth Clarence (Fontaine Publishing House, Confederacy of Southern America, 1942):

The free and independent American confederacy was shaped by ideology as much as it was by the weapons of war—if not more so. How often in the history of the world has it not occurred that a liberator became a conqueror as soon as he had won? All too frequently, victorious generals have seized seized power for themselves. Keep in mind that the late eighteenth century was a time when monarchy was the rule, and republicanism a rare exception. The very few other republics at the time, such as Batavia and Venice, were in many ways not fully republican at all. Not in the modern sense of the word, at least. The Confederacy of the United States saw the first system of government established that was based entirely on the vision of the Enlightenment. Had American society not been thoroughly infused with the ideals of that vision, things would no doubt have been vastly different.

Even as things turned out, there were those, upon the war’s conclusion, crying out for either Washington or Sanssouci to be crowned as king of America—or at least for one of them to replace the unassuming and careful Franklin as Consul. But Washington and Sanssouci were both men of character and intellectual standing. They realized what implications such a development could entail: a tradition of militaristic strongmen ruling over the United States would be a likely outcome. Neither one of them felt inclined to become an American Cromwell. Furthermore, they knew that an electoral competition between the two of them would sharply divide the confederacy. So they made the only choice available to them: they avoided the possiblility of such a development altogether. Immediately after the end of the war, the two men came to a gentlemen’s agreement: both of them could with no effort at all asume tyrannical power, so both of them would refuse any role whatsoever in the general government of the confederacy. I solemnly vow that I shall not go to Philadelphia, their mutual oath declared. And neither man did. Washington happily retired to Mount Vernon, and Sanssouci returned to Montréal, getting involved in state politics after some urging from his countymen, and later becoming president of Montréal.

Not all Americans were pleased by this show of responsibility and restraint; revolutionary zeal was ubiquitous, and many patriots wanted to see one of the great heroes of the war for independence to become the figurehead of the United States. Without unifying symbols, they feared, the union could well dissolve as soon as internal conflicts arose. And what was more unifying than the Continental Army? During the war, Washington and Sanssouci had initiially been presented with army divisions and militia companies that each represented their own native state. With great care, they had re-organized the Continental Army, establisging divisions and companies of troops from various states, fighting side by side. Perhaps more strikingly, they had made it a general policy that generals of the Army should preferably fight in the defence of another state than their own. These were deliberate steps, meant to foster brotherhood, unity and—although that word was not used at the time—solidarity between the states. And it worked; some would say it worked too well, because it made the army a driving force for unification. And there were many who opposed standing armies—often the same men who were also wary of centralization. Near-immediately after the Treaty of Paris was signed, voices arose, calling for the dismantling of the Continental Army. Their central argument was that a standing army could easily become oppressive, and was inherently an un-American concept. Others contended that the Continental Army was fundamentally different from the British military, and was in fact required to prevent Britain from attempting to regain control over the American continent.

Both points, needless to say, had their merits. This first clash of opinions proved hust how differently the Americans envisioned the future of their United States. Of course, the debate was eventually resolved by harsh realities, rather than convincing arguments: there was simply no money to sustain a standing army. Public debt had accumulated during and after the war, and it would have to be paid. At the close of 1781, Congress decided to formally disband the Continental Army. It is often said that the unsatisfying resolution to the debate on the merits of a standing army—which was in many ways a debate on the merits of tight union versus a loose one—led to the cycle of conflicting opions that came to dominate the political landscape in the years to come. Some have even wtitten, hesitantly, that it would perhaps have been better not to disband the army in the first place; that it might have prevented instability. Recently, however, socio-historians have started to abandon such views, adopting instead professor Russo’s theory that social conflict would have been inevitable anyway. As Russo famously wrote: “too many dreamers, too many conflicting dreams. Reality was bound to shake them awake eventually.” There was trouble coming; trouble stemming not from military oppression, but from mutually exclusive ideas.


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Excerpted from Radical Freedom: The Life and Works of Thomas Paine, by Peter Lewis (Shelbeigh Press, Confederacy of Southern America, 1955):

(…) his works played a major part in sparking the revolution, and continued to influence American society during and after the conflict. It was Pain who noted, succinctly, that he was “as confident, as I am that Reason governs the world, that America will never be happy till she gets clear of foreign dominion”. Which he based, not on political or economic arguments, but on the purely philosophical realization that “though the flame of liberty may sometimes cease to shine, the coal can never expire”. Those words capture the American spirit, the very heart and soul of our Confederacy. Not surprising, since Paine helped to shape it, and without him, it would like not exist.

Paine, more than any other Founding Father, bar perhaps Thomas Jefferson himself, urged Americans to embrace reason as their guide, and integrity as their compass. During the war he insisted that “those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom must undergo the hardships of supporting it”. He instilled a firm belief in all of American society, a belief in human liberty and human courage. That belief, so deeply ingrained in the fabric of America, is something we owe to him. More importantly, Paine also served as the herald of the modern age, urging that Americans abandon old dogmatism, and embrace reason. Because, he wrote, “to argue with a man who has renounced the use and authority of reason (…) is like administering medicine to the dead”.

Lastly, most crucially of all, Paine’s idea of human nature became the American idea of human nature: the idea that men are, of themselves, good and noble. That it is only a corrupt and tyrannical society that produces corrupt and tyrannical men. That a virtuous society must by definition be a free society, where the rights of man—life, liberty, private property, the pursuit of his own happiness—are upheld without any reservation of prior condition. This idea rapidly influence scores of American thinkers. Mercy Otis Warren, in her history of the revolution, paraphrased it when she surmised that “it is an undoubted truth, that both the rude savage and the polished citizen are equally tenacious of their innate rights. Whenever the first rudiments of society have been established, the rights of personal freedom and of personal property have been held sacred”.

It is on those very principles that our Confederacy was founded, and it is by those principles that we have since lived—even though our principles have been challenged often, from within and from without.


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Excerpted from The In-Between Years: America, 1779—1799, by Werner Green (United Publishing, Republic of Northern America, 1960):

It was a time of hesitating uncertainty. The revolution was over, the storm had passed, and the United States found themselves in a lull. Patriotic cheer and republican pride swept over the land like a summer heatwave; towns and cities with overtly monarchist names were proudly renamed to reflect the new sensibilities. It was the start of something new, but no-one yet knew what it was to become. Independence had been won, but what did that mean? To someone like Thomas Jefferson, there could be no doubt that his own vision of America was the only true reflection of republican idealism. It soon became clear, however, that there were many views and opinions regarding the nature of this great American Experiment—and it was still entirely uncertain which of those views would ultimately win out. These were the in-between years, the time after the revolution, but before it was ultimately determined how American society should rightfully be organized.

In the years during and after the war, the central government—in its rudimentary form—was headed by Benjamin Franklin, who chose a reserved approach to governing. While Franklin himself remained neutral on many contested issues, his unwillingness to act lended implicit support to his most vocal secretary, mister Jefferson, who loudly expounded upon the political viewpoints which later on became known as “Jeffersonian”, “anti-federalist” or “democratic-republican”, as if these should a priori be accepted as the only correct course. It cannot be doubted that this uncompromising stance greatly contributed to the inherently partisan nature of the in-between years.

One opinion, which soon proved entirely contrary to the Jeffersonian position, was that of the young Alexander Hamilton. From the very outset, the two men were radical opposites in nearly all respects, and whatever other visions for America there may have been, the Hamilton-Jefferson dichotomy inevitably came to dominate the era of the in-between years. In fact, this dichotomy caused the uncertain nature of the in-between years, because the very idea of political harmony soon became impossible. As long as these two opposing ideas of what America should become were forced to coexist, that coexistence could not be peaceful.


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Excerpted from The Hands That Built America, by Emily Wright (Fontaine Publishing House, Confederacy of Southern America, 1978):

(…) have sometimes characterized the period in between by that very fact: that it was a transitional period. The era is then dismissed as a collection of “in-between” years where nothing could be achieved, until the political situation finally came to a head. Given their perspective, such deterministic revisionism can perhaps be excused, but it is far from historically accurate. In fact, the closing decades of the eighteenth century, the decades after the revolution, were politically very productive. It is all too easy to dismiss the entire period as a lead-up to later events, but the truth is that everything that happened from 1800 onward was part of the same chain of events and conflicts that had dominated the last two decades of the century before. The whole series of turbulent developments, clashes and disagreements was simply taken to a higher level, but the events at the turn of the century cannot truly be considered a watershed moment, regardless of outward appearances.

The last decades of the eighteenth century were, in reality, an era of many competing American dreams, sometimes very much at odds with each other. In hindsight, it seems so very inevitable that some of them would turn into American nightmares. But at the time, nothing was determined yet. Nothing except the fact that sooner or later, something would have to give. But even this prospect, while it soon became apparent, was nothing but distant thunder in the immediate aftermath of the Revolutionary War. Benjamin Franklin, ever the cunning politician, capably guided the newly independent States through their first years, clearing some of the debris of the war—both literally and figuratively. His position can perhaps best be characterized as wait-and-see; he took no overly aggressive choices, and let the Americans find their own place in this new, republican society.

Of course, the young Confederacy was beset by a plethora of problems, not all of which could easily be resolved. Consul Franklin was re-elected by Congress in 1780, and did his best to find reasonable approaches to the issues confronting the United States. Nonetheless, a wide variety of far more radical solutions was soon presented for even the most dire of issues, and that in itself was the greatest problem of all. The spectre that haunted the early United States: bitter, unyielding partisanship. The single concrete issue that revealed this problem, more than any other, was the issue of public finance. That was, of course, the issue where Jefferson and Hamilton first clashed…


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GENERAL NOTES

And we're back on the road, folks. But it shall be a rocky road, for all parties involved. Further updates coming soon.

 

[Widukind]

Here is the second installment of Part Five.



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Excerpted from A Monetary History of America, by Roberto DeSanto (Aurora Publishing, Confederacy of Southern America, 1889):

The American Revolutionary War had far-reaching financial implications for all combatant nations. The British were relatively little affected, having spent about £80 million, and ended with a national debt of £250 million, which it easily managed to finance at about £9.5 million a year in interest. The French, on the other hand, had spent 1.3 billion livres—equating to about £56 million, and having a national debt that equated to £187 million. Being a smaller sum, this seems easier to pay off than the British costs at first glance. However, the French had far greater trouble financing their debt, and over half the French national revenue went to debt service in the years following the war. This obviously had major implications for the political situation in France.

The United States had spent $37 million at the confederal level, and a further $114 million had been expended by the individual states. For a considerable part, these sums were covered by loans from France and the Netherlands, loans from individual Americans, and the issuing of an ever-increasing amount of paper money, in the form of Continental Scrip. The Scrip, of course, inflated hugely, leading to the popular phrase “not worth a Continental”—meaning “worthless”. [1]

Essentially, the Finance Secretary of the United States, Robert Morris, had to deal with three major problems. Firstly, there was the instability of the Continental Scrip. Secondly, there was the limited ability of Congress to meet its financial obligations (mainly the pensions for war veterans). Thirdly, there was the vast public debt. These three problems needed solutions, and as soon as possible. Various ideas and plans were presented, but it soon became obvious that one of two approaches would have to be chosen. That is to say: either the Jeffersonian solution was to be used, or the Hamiltonian solution. Both men realized that the Articles of Confederation would need to be altered, but their proposed alterations were as different from one another as they could possibly be. The Jeffersonian plan was firmly confederalist, as one might expect. The Hamiltonian plan, even though Hamilton called himself a federalist, was purely and unabashedly centralist.

Regarding the Continental Scrip, Secretary Jefferson suggested that the Articles be amended: every state would still be allowed to issue Scrip, but only insofar as it was fully backed by gold. This would ensure that the radical inflation, as had been seen during the war, could not be repeated. Congressman Hamilton, on the other hand, suggested that a government-owned Bank of the United States be established, which could then issue money on behalf of Congress, taking the states out of the equation entirely. This would, of course, also require an alteration of the Articles.

Regarding the ability of Congress to meet its financial obligations, Jefferson proposed that the Articles be amended to compel every individual state to pay the pensions owed by veterans of the Continental Army. Hamilton, contrarily, argued that the Articles be altered to enable congress with the power of direct taxation—specifically, to levy a new tariff on all imports and to levy various excise taxes. The revenue could then be used to pay the pensions owed by veterans, and also to fund the establishment of the Bank of the United States.

Regarding the public debt, Jefferson reasoned that since the debt was due to the war, it fell under the cost of war, meaning that the states would have to continue paying the wartime stipend of 2% instead of 1% until the Congressional debt was payed off in full. He additionally proposed an alteration of the Articles that would forever forbid both Congress and the individual states to build up any more public debt, famously stating that “the earth belongs exclusively to the living. The second generation receives it clear of the debts and incumbrances of the first, the third of the second, and so on. For if the first could charge it with a debt, then the earth would belong to the dead and not to the living generation. No generation must be allowed to contract debts greater than may be paid during the course of its own existence. A public debt, then, is a great evil; a burden placed upon our children.”

Hamilton instead proposed that Congress adopt all the outstanding debts of the individual states, argueing that “a public debt, if moderate, will prove a public blessing”—because it could be used to lend more weight to the central government. Only when public debt became a task of the general adminstration would the matter be adequately settled, and then the government could start paying this collective debt off—by levying the taxes Hamilton had already proposed, and raising them just a little further…


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Excerpted from The In-Between Years: America, 1779—1799, by Werner Green (United Publishing, Republic of Northern America, 1960):

To understand Hamilton’s perspective, one must understand his formative experiences. Alexander Hamilton was born out of wedlock in the British West Indies, and raised by his mother on St. Croix in the Virgin Islands, then ruled by Denmark. His mother died when he was about 11 years of age, effectively making him an orphan. From a young age, Hamilton was a man who knew he had to make his own fortune, his own destiny.

It is not certain whether the year of his birth was 1757 or 1755. Hamilton himself claimed 1757 when he first arrived in the Thirteen Colonies. Later, when volunteering to serve under Washington, he instead claimed 1755. Probate papers from St. Croix in 1768, after the death of Hamilton's mother, list him as then 13 years old, a date that would support a birth year of 1755, but it is suspected that the young orphan Hamilton was bravely attempting to pass as 13, in order to be more employable after his mother's death. It is believed he again emplyed this strategy to appear older so he could easily enlist with Washington, and serve his country. [2]

Hamilton became a clerk at Beekman and Cruger, a local trade agency, which imported to and exported from New England; he proved adept, and, though he was no more than a boy, was given full responsibility of running the firm for five months in 1771, while the owner was at sea. He proved an avid reader, developed an interest in writing, and began to yearn for a more fulfulling life, beyond the small island community.

When he published an essay in the Royal Danish-American Gazette in 1772, his intellect greatly impressed community leaders, who collected a fund to send the young Hamilton to the North American mainland for his education. In the autumn of that same year, he travelled via Boston to Elizabethtown, New Jersey, where he attended Elizabethtown Academy, a grammar school, in preparation for college. In Elizabethtown, he was influenced by William Livingston, a leading intellectual and revolutionary, active within the Sons of Liberty. Although Hamilton was instictively a supporter of the Revolutionary cause, he did not approve of mob reprisals against Loyalists. In 1773, Hamilton attended King’s College (now Alexander Hamilton University [3]), in New York City. During this period, the revolution erupted into military conflict.

Shortly after matriculating at King’s College, Hamilton saw his chance to fight for the revolution: in early 1774, then-colonel Washington moved through New York, gathering volunteers for combat in Plymouth Colony. Hamilton had already joined a volunteer militia company after the first engagement of American troops with the British, and extensively studied military history and tactics on his own. When Washington arrived to gather volunteers, Hamilton used his connections with influential New York patriots such as Alexander McDougall and John Jay to raise a volunteer company for Washington. The colonel, impressed by the young man’s abilities, requested that he lead the company himself, as a captain. We must remember that Hamilton was at the time no older than 19, and if his year of birth was indeed 1757, only 17.

Hamilton served Washington throughout the war, eventually as the general’s aide-de-camp, and achieved the rank of lieutenant colonel before the war’s conclusion. During the final battle of the war, at Charleston, Hamilton was in command of three battalions, which were to fight in conjunction with French troops in taking some of the most heavily defended British fortifications. Hamilton and his battalions fought bravely and took the British defences with bayonets. This action forced the British surrender of an entire army, effectively ending British military operations in North America.

Following his heroism at Charleston, Hamilton resigned his commission. He returned to New york, where he became engaged to Elizabeth Schuyler, the daughter of a wealthy landowner from one of the most prominent families in New York state. With his fiancée’s family capital backing him, Hamilton was elected to the Continental Congress in as a New York representative in 1780. That very year, he urged general Washington to actively seek the Consulate, but the general refused, arguing he had made a promise not to aspire to such high office. Instead, Benjamin Franklin was re-elected, after general Washington and marshal Sanssouci both vocally expressed their support for the incumbent Consul.

In Congress, Hamilton quickly proved to be among those who were dissatisfied with the Articles of Confederation, because he found a loose confederacy inadequate as a system of government for the American states. Among his objections to the articles were: that they lacked provisions to give Congress direct and independent taxing powers and that they lacked a centralized system of judicial courts. He tried to argue that the decentralized nature of the Confederacy resulted in the dangerous lack of a stable source of funding. Indeed, during the war, there had been times when various states had been unable to make the agreed fixed stipend to Congress. The Continental Army had, at several instances, encountered difficulties in obtaining the necessary provisions and in its ability to pay its soldiers. By and large, however, Hamilton could not deny that the states had indeed met their obligations. [4]

Hamilton nonetheless perceived the risk of weakness, and kept warning Congress that a stronger central government would be neccesary, but these warnings went unheeded. Congressmen such as James Madison were initially inclined to listed to reason, but were later swayed by Secretary Jefferson’s sophisms. Even Finance Secretary Morris stated that he was satisfied with the revenue that the states provided to Congress, certainly now that this revenue stream had stabilized following the war. [5]

In early 1781, an amendment to the Articles was proposed, to give Congress the power to directly collect a 5% impost—that is, duty on all imports. Hamilton eagerly supported it. But the unwieldy Articles demanded that a change was ratified by all the states; securing its passage as law proved impossible. Hamilton argued that this proved the inadequacy of the Articles, and he presented a report to Congress wherein he made the case that the central government needed not only some level of financial autonomy, but also a greater ability to make laws that superseded those of the individual states. His plans, especially his plans to solve America’s financial woes, inevitably brought him into conflict with Secretary Jefferson.

Unlike the drawing room intellectual that was Thomas Jefferson, colonel Hamilton had actually seen combat. He had fought for the independence of America, and he knew how vital a strong central government was. This is why he opposed Jefferson’s irrisponsible plans for dealing with the financial problems of the United states, and proposed his own alternative, that was—just like he was himself—both daring and innovative.


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Excerpted from The Hands That Built America, by Emily Wright (Fontaine Publishing House, Confederacy of Southern America, 1978):

…the truth is that Hamilton was not the faultless hero his sycophantic followers gladly make him out to be. It is easy to blindly worship our idols, but just as we are willing to cast a critical gaze upon Thomas Jefferson, so must the followers of the Federalist creed be willing to view Hamilton with an unbiased gaze. That would reveal a deeply flawed character. Consider that from his arrival in America, Hamilton lied about himself whenever it suited his purposes. When it was conventient for him to be a little younger, he gave his date of birth as 1757. When more maturity was needed, it suddenly became 1755. He gladly switched between those two. In later life, he tended to give his age only in round figures, partly to avoid being faced with his many contradictory statements on the matter, and partly out of typical vainglory. It simply allowed him to appear younger.

Once involved in the revolutionary underground, Hamilton was given many opportunities to take responsibility within the movement. However, in the belief that his best chance for improving his station in life was glory on the battlefield, he refused to take any responsibility until an option presented itself that suited his purposes. [6] It can be argued that Hamilton was never committed to the ideals of the revolution, and only used it as a vehicle for his own boundless ambition.

When he was in general Washinton’s service, Hamilton handled letters to Congress, state governors, and the most powerful generals in the Continental Army. He drafted orders in Washington’s name, and eventually issued orders, ostensibly from Washington, over his own signature. This was clearly in violation of due protocol, and can be considered as an early demonstration of Hamilton’s tendency to bend the rules, or to simply ignore them, when it suited his puposes—and of his ability to get away with such violations.

As the war began to draw to a close, following French involvement, Hamilton was keenly aware that opportunities to shine were running out. He aggressively sought a return to active combat in a commanding role, for which he was mildly reprimanded by Washington. Hamilton used the “insulting” reprimand as an excuse to resign his staff position. He continued to ask for a field command, even submitted a letter to Washington with his commission enclosed, meant as an implicit threat of resignation if he didn’t get what he wanted. [7]

Washington relented, and assigned Hamilton as commander of a battalion. Hamilton managed to cover himself in glory during the Battle of Charleston. Though he in fact played a minor role, he later saw fit to blow this out of proportion, claiming that his actions were instrumental in ending the battle, and thus forcing the British surrender. Considering his later role in history, one cannot say it was the last time Alexander Hamilton engaged in baseless grandstanding; in Congress, certainly, he hardly did anything else. Even those who were initially sympathetic to parts of the federalist program soon came to lean what an opportunistic schemer Hamilton was. James Madison, initially sympathetic to the charismatic colonel, eventually came to regard Hamilton as a prime example of a Congressman who used the pretense of national interests to serve the particular interests of his own financial backers, particularly the moneyed elite in the northeastern states.

Worried by the fact that those states, influenced by the powerful banking institutions, refused to return to a gold standard and continued the inflationary policy of circulating paper money within their own boundaries, Madison rightly came to regard Hamilton as a stooge for the bankers. Faced with a choice between Jefferson’s proposals (such as mandating a 100% gold standard) and Hamilton’s ideas (such as establishing a government-owned bank which could circulate paper money), Madison learned that he could be nothing other than a staunch Democratic-Republican. He even adopted, in some of his speaches to Congress, Jefferson’s famous adage, “Paper is poverty; it is only the ghost of money, and not money itself”. Others reached the same conclusion, to a degree. Samuel and John Adams remained neutral, neither one committing to either the Democratic-Republican or the Federalist cause, but Samuel Adams at least leaned towards the Democratic-Republicans on many issues. John Adams, the President of the Continental Congress, initially attempted to find middle ground, but in the long run found himself driven away by Hamilton’s incessant scheming. [8]


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Excerpted from A Concise History of our Confederacy by Porfirio Gilchrist (Rockwell Books, Confederacy of Southern America, 1959):

Federalists, they called themselves, denouncing their opponents as anti-federalists. In truth, they were centralists, and their critics were honest confederalists, who were loyal to the republican system established by the Articles. While Alexander Hamilton busied himself by setting up a political machine in the northeastern states, founding Federalist Societies in those states, to serve as instruments to further his own ambition, Secretary Jefferson served the people of the Confederacy through hard work. As Foreign Secretary, he ensured a good working relationship with those nations who had come to the aid of America during the war. Meanwhile, he found time to write several papers wherein he expounded on his vision for America.

This effort soon inspired others, which resulted in the Confederalist Papers, still regarded as the most comprehensive exposition of the Republican ideal. Authors who contributed to the series include, besides Jefferson himself, such great minds as James Madison, Thomas Paine, Maurice Lansquenet, Richard Henry Lee, Mercy Otis Warren and George Clinton. Inspired by the essays, various “Confederalist”, “Democratic” and “Republican” societies were set up throughout the Confederacy, as an answer to the Federalist societies. Eventually, these Jeffersonian societies united into the League of Democratic-Republican Societies, with the aim of electing Democratic-Republican candidates to Congress—and ultimately, to see Thomas Jefferson advanced to the Consulate, lest an ignoble figure like Hamilton end up in that position. [9]

Jefferson was honored by these initiatives, but continued to work just as hard as ever to serve the Confederacy. Together with Richard Henry Lee and the young Congressman Madison, he proposed the world’s first system of universal education. In true confederalist manner, they knew it would be immoral to force such a task on Congress, but as they were all Virginians, they sought to give that state the best system of general education as this coninent, or indeed the whole world, had ever seen. In 1781, the Democratic-Republican Society of Virginia introduced to the state legislature in Williamsburg [10] the Bill for the more General Diffusion of Learning. It was common knowledge who had actually authored it, and it was adopted by a wide margin. Its concept can perhaps best be explained in the words of Jefferson himself:

“This bill proposes to divide every county of Virginia into wards of five or six miles square, like the townships of Plymouth state; to establish in each ward a free school for reading, writing, and common arithmetic; to provide for the annual selection of the best subjects from these schools, who will receive, at the public expense, a higher degree of education at a district school; and from these district schools to select a certain number of the most promising subjects, to be completed at a university, where all the useful sciences shall be taught. Worth and genius will thus be sought out from every condition of life, and completely prepared by education for defeating the competition of wealth and birth for public trusts.” [11]

The Virginia system of education, from that moment on, served to bring out the best in the state’s youth. The bill specifically provided for the education of both boys and girls. There can be no doubt that Jefferson was moved to include that particular provision by his good friend, the famed proto-equalist Mercy Otis Warren. The Virginia education bill is, because of this, hailed to this day as the first equalist law. It was without a doubt part of a great change in American society, which was progressing to embrace the ideals of republicanism, as they were expounded upon by the Democratic-Republicans…


---


Excerpted from Mothers and Daughters of the Revolution, by Maria Heightower (Aurora Publishing, Confederacy of Southern America, 1936):

For a time, the role of women in the Revolutionary Era was underestimated, but that view has since been rejected. Of course, generally held opinions regarding the proper role of men and women were different in those days, but in many ways, the American Revolution sowed the seeds for future advances. Traditionally, women had been viewed as morally inferior to men, especially in the areas of sexuality and religion. This had already begun to change throughout the eighteenth century, but the Revolution hastened the trend. The notion that equalism only emerged in the United States after the Revolution, with the coming of Wollstonecraft to America, must be deemed incorrect.

Revolution Era thought regarding the role of women centered on the belief that mothers, daughters, sisters and wives of patriots should uphold the ideals of republicanism, and pass on these ideas and values to the next generation. Of course, this attitude still confirmed the idea that women should be confined to the domestic sphere, separate from the public sphere, which was entirely male-dominated. At the same time, however, it abolished the notion of female inferiority: the domestic sphere was considered no less important that the public world. In addition, encouraged the education of women, who were permitted—and later, encouraged—to receive more of an education than they previously had been allowed. This greater educational access included making once male-only subjects of classical education, such as mathematics and philosophy, integral to curricula at public and private schools for girls.

Even at the time of the revolution, women were increasingly active in public life, though often in veiled or indirect ways. The flag of our Confederacy is based on a design proposed by Betsy Ross—serving as an everlasting proof of the delicate influence that women had on the Revolutionary Era. [12] The educational system of Virginia, which soon proved to be a model for many other states, was proposed by Jefferson, but he in turn was influenced by Abigail Adams and Mercy Otis Warren. It is no coincidence that Jefferson ensured that the schools he established would educate boys and girls alike. It was a sign of things to come. Great and dazzling things.


---


FOOTNOTES

[1] Yes, the bulk of those sums consists of loans, ITTL as IOTL. But since the Articles of Confederation stipulate that the individual states are obliged to pay fixed stipends to Congress ITTL, the United States are not as deeply in debt as they were IOTL. Oh, and incidentally, the ‘$’ does not stand for “Dollar” ITTL. It stands for “Scrip”.

[2] There are alternative, less flattering theories. Observe that these are not discussed here at all.

[3] Columbia University IOTL.

[4] IOTL, the Articles did not provide for an executive, as they do ITTL, nor did they set fixed stipend that the states had to donate to Congress. Due to the inclusion of such strengthening clauses, the United States ran in to less immediate financial difficulties during the war, and Hamilton’s arguments for a stronger central government are less convincing to Congress than they were IOTL.

[5] IOTL, the was no such revenue stream, as the Articles did not set fixed stipends that the states had to donate to Congress. Therefore, Morris (who was Superintendent of Finance IOTL), agreed with Hamilton IOTL. Not so much ITTL.

[6] Hamilton did this IOTL. Was it cynical ambition that drove him, or was he a true patriot who simply made the best of the situation? ITTL as IOTL, opinions vary. Decide for yourself.

[7] It beggars belief, but again, this is all completely as IOTL.

[8] It’s interesting to note that many politicians in the early USA, ITTL as IOTL, accused each other of “scheming”. This was somehow the worst insult they could imagine. IOTL, Jefferson, Hamilton and Burr all accused the other two of being amoral scheming bastards. ITTL, of course, Aaron Burr is minister to France. Jefferson and Hamilton are free to duke it out amongst themselves.

[9] Hey, that’s funny. When Hamilton sets up a political machine, it’s a terrible thing. When Jefferson does it, it’s all great and good.

[10] ITTL, there was no need, by 1780, to move Virginia’s capital to Richmond due to a perceived British threat—nor was Jefferson, who proposed it IOTL, governor of Virginia during TTL’s Revolutionary War. Williamsburg therefore remains the capital of Virginia.

[11] Jefferson proposed this bill IOTL, just after the United States declared their independence. It got rejected by the state legislature. The quote is OTL, except the tenses are altered (to reflect that it is ITTL something that will be done, rather than wat Jefferson believed should have been done).

[12] ITTL as IOTL, the accuracy of that story is disputed.

 

[Umbric Man]

IT'S BACK.

I have so much to comment on...oh boy. Permit me to make quite the long post....

1) Props to indeed writing on how the solidarity of the states came via the army and generals defending other states. If anything, the USA's a bit tighter in unofficial bonds more than OTL it seems at this point.

2) If Richmond is not state capital, it likely remains a sleepy town. Williamsburg keeping the state capital will allow it to stay a 'big' city ITTL and by staying 'big' it could perhaps diversify its economy enough away from government and only help its fortunes. Basically, Richmond and Williamsburg switched populations between 1776 and 1790 with Richmond ever-growing from then on - and that directly as a result of the capital switcharound. So perhaps Williamsburg will be the Richmond of TTL: a railroad/crossroads city, state capital, and minor port. With Norfolk so close by we may also see a Minneapolis-St. Paul 'Twin Cities' scenario or more likely Baltimore-Washington duality (government town complimenting port town).

3) Republic of Northern America? Uh oh, looks like a north-south split may happen eventually. I hope it's peaceful enough compared to OTL. I'm also wondering if the addition of *Canada forces it earlier due to a 'stronger' north that's even more industrialized and populated, although the addition of the Floridas would help counterbalance that a bit for ole' Dixie. I notice the south remains a 'confederation' while the north is a 'republic' -makes me wonder if the north goes with deeper centralization while Southland stays loose.

4) ...but whatever else, holy crap, props to Jefferson for making such an educational act pass. Virginia's gonna become a powerhouse even moreso in this world, and perhaps as the tobacco crop falters in the 1820s education will allow the Chesapeake region to stay competitive with the Deep South classic...which would only help the homegrown abolitionists (as exemplified by Washington and TJ himself) to stay able to argue against slavery. I also wonder if this educational act will spread to Virginia's fellow Chesapeake states of North Carolina and Maryland (especially MD, caught as it is between the big powerhouse states of Pennsylvania and Virginia).

 

[Widukind]

IT'S BACK.

I have so much to comment on...oh boy. Permit me to make quite the long post....

1) Props to indeed writing on how the solidarity of the states came via the army and generals defending other states. If anything, the USA's a bit tighter in unofficial bonds more than OTL it seems at this point.

Well, certainly the (former) officers of the Continental army view the military as an agent and a symbol of American unity. Expect the Society of the Cincinnati to make the preservation of the union one of their stated objectives.

2) If Richmond is not state capital, it likely remains a sleepy town. Williamsburg keeping the state capital will allow it to stay a 'big' city ITTL and by staying 'big' it could perhaps diversify its economy enough away from government and only help its fortunes. Basically, Richmond and Williamsburg switched populations between 1776 and 1790 with Richmond ever-growing from then on - and that directly as a result of the capital switcharound. So perhaps Williamsburg will be the Richmond of TTL: a railroad/crossroads city, state capital, and minor port. With Norfolk so close by we may also see a Minneapolis-St. Paul 'Twin Cities' scenario or more likely Baltimore-Washington duality (government town complimenting port town).

I was thinking along those lines, yes. My idea here is indeed to have Williamsburg expand, eventually absorbing Newport News. It might try to compete with Norfolk, but I don't think that would work out, so complimenting duality is the more likely result.

3) Republic of Northern America? Uh oh, looks like a north-south split may happen eventually. I hope it's peaceful enough compared to OTL. I'm also wondering if the addition of *Canada forces it earlier due to a 'stronger' north that's even more industrialized and populated, although the addition of the Floridas would help counterbalance that a bit for ole' Dixie. I notice the south remains a 'confederation' while the north is a 'republic' -makes me wonder if the north goes with deeper centralization while Southland stays loose.

I'm not going to give it all away yet, but obviously, there will be multiple nations on the North American continent. Don't expect the cultural identity of a certain region to correspond exactly to the cultural identity of that region IOTL, though. For instance: the Confederacy of Southern America may or may not include the area we sometimes call 'Dixie', but it even if it does, it won't be Dixie. American culture will be different ITTL, in many little ways.

4) ...but whatever else, holy crap, props to Jefferson for making such an educational act pass. Virginia's gonna become a powerhouse even moreso in this world, and perhaps as the tobacco crop falters in the 1820s education will allow the Chesapeake region to stay competitive with the Deep South classic...which would only help the homegrown abolitionists (as exemplified by Washington and TJ himself) to stay able to argue against slavery. I also wonder if this educational act will spread to Virginia's fellow Chesapeake states of North Carolina and Maryland (especially MD, caught as it is between the big powerhouse states of Pennsylvania and Virginia).

I think this eduation proposal is one of the things that most endears Jefferson to me IOTL. The man had so many ideas and visions that he can - with some justification, even! - be claimed as a progenitor by many ideologies, ranging from social democracy to libertarianism. The Enlightenment had many sides, and Jefferson embodied quite a lot of them. It's fun to play with some of his plans that didn't get used IOTL.

As for slavery... that will get plenty of attention later on. That matter, too, will be handled in another way. There might yet be wars to come in North America - but they won't be fought over slavery. That's all I'm going to say about that, for now.

 

[Rich Rostrom]

Here is the second installment of Part Five.

Awesome.

Confederacy of Southern America

Republic of Northern America

One cavil here. IMO, in a breakup of the "United States", the successor would either be explicitly regional ("New England") or would claim the mantle of the national identiy.

That is, they would not explicitly identify as sectional - as "Northern" or
"Southern.

Also - going back to the map of ITTL North America after the Revolution. "Rupert's Land" AIUI was all the land draining into Hudson's Bay and James Bay. This included OTL northern Quebec. These areas were added to Quebec and Ontario at Confederation, in 1867.

This has come up in recent years with separatism in Quebec. The Indians of the northern areas have said that they are subject to Quebec only as Quebec is part of Canada. If Quebec leaves Canada, it thereby undoes the arrangement made as part of Confederation that attached the north. It would then become separate and could remain part of Canada. (A lot of Hydro-Quebec's lucrative power dams are up there.)

So it seems unlikely to me that these areas would be awarded to the U.S.

 

[Rich Rostrom]

Awesome.

Also - going back to the map of ITTL North America after the Revolution. "Rupert's Land" AIUI was all the land draining into Hudson's Bay and James Bay. This included OTL northern Quebec. These areas were added to Quebec and Ontario at Confederation, in 1867.

Correction: Northern Quebec and Ontario were added to those provinces in 1912.

 

[Widukind]

So, time for a new installment. This one (and the next) includes a fair deal of discussion on the federalist versus the democratic-republican (confederalist/anti-federalist) vision of America. We now get to the crossroads, and no matter what road we choose to take, it will be a rocky ride.

Before all that, however, Rich Rostrom raised a couple of points earlier. Rich, sorry for only getting to them now. I haven't even been here in over a week - sometimes life's a little too busy for my liking.

One cavil here. IMO, in a breakup of the "United States", the successor would either be explicitly regional ("New England") or would claim the mantle of the national identiy.

That is, they would not explicitly identify as sectional - as "Northern" or
"Southern.

You are absolutely right. In many such situations that would be the case. But this is not one of those situations. The nations in question will adopt 'Northern' and 'Southern' for separate reasons, and even at separate times. You'll see why, I promise.

Also - going back to the map of ITTL North America after the Revolution. "Rupert's Land" AIUI was all the land draining into Hudson's Bay and James Bay. This included OTL northern Quebec. These areas were added to Quebec and Ontario at Confederation, in 1867.

This has come up in recent years with separatism in Quebec. The Indians of the northern areas have said that they are subject to Quebec only as Quebec is part of Canada. If Quebec leaves Canada, it thereby undoes the arrangement made as part of Confederation that attached the north. It would then become separate and could remain part of Canada. (A lot of Hydro-Quebec's lucrative power dams are up there.)

So it seems unlikely to me that these areas would be awarded to the U.S.

My idea was that ITTL, the British had somewhat reorganized their territories prior to the American revolutionary war, essentially enlarging Montréal (former Québec) at the expense of easternmost Rupert's Land, while splitting off "Canada" in the south, and expanding Rupert's Land to essentially cover all of OTL Western Canada, right up until it runs into Russian and Spanish claims on the Pacific. The result of this being, of course, that Montréal has a claim to the area you mention, and the area therefore having a far greater chance of being ceded to the United States.

That said, I'm reading through my TL now, and I can't find the part where I mentioned this. I was fairly sure I covered it, but not 100% sure.

Anyway, that's my reasoning for it. If it turns out I neglected to insert this information earlier in the TL: mea culpa, and thank you for pointing it out. I'll fix it.

For the moment, I give you the next installment of this TL.



---



Excerpted from American Enlightenment, by Elizabeth Clarence (Fontaine Publishing House, Confederacy of Southern America, 1942):

One of the great American dichotomies concerned the national versus the international. It is interesting that the Democratic-Republicans, who in many ways advocated a policy of non-intervention, represented the internationalist impulse, while the Federalists, who avidly supported strategically useful treaties, became advocates of a nationalist agenda. In practice, of course, things could not be generalized so easily, but in broad strokes, we can discern two different worldviews. The first, embodied by Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson, viewed America as the firstborn child of a worldwide revolution. They advocated a global Enlightenment, wherein the United States could and should provide a guiding light to other revolutionaries. The second, opposing worldview is that of the nationalists, who considered the United States as a special and unique creation, not to be copied or repeated elsewhere. The newborn nation, they felt, should seek a place in the existing world order, and make itself both wealthy and mighty.

It is now believed that Alexander Hamilton, that most ardent nationalist, was really speaking for general Washington—who had vowed not to get involved in continental politics—when he warned Americans against “entangling alliances”. There can be no doubt that he referred to consul Franklin’s habit of inviting foreign intellectuals and politicians of a radical slant to visit the United States. Such actions portrayed America as a centre of worldwide radicalism; internationalists hoped this would spark Enlightened revolutions elsewhere on the globe, leading to ‘sister republics” being established elsewhere. Nationalists feared that exact development, because it might lead the established powers of Europa to declare war on the United States. In reality, Franklin’s goal was more likely to goad radicals and intellectuals to migrate to the United States—a succesful strategy that moved several prominent minds to settle on our fair continent. There can be no doubt, however, that the internationalist faction was very keen to establish links with revolutionary movements throughout the world. Nor can anyone contest that many revolutionaries were indeed inspired by the American example.

Did Francisco de Miranda, after all, not openly declare that his Colombian revolution was “heir to the American example, and a branch of the same tree”? Miranda was one of those who visited the United States during Franklin’s administration, and his links to the confederacy were in fact older yet. At the close of the Revolutionary War, he had participated in the Spanish capture of the Bahamas. His superior, Bernardo de Gálvez, had been so enraged that the that the Bahamas expedition had gone ahead without his permission that he had Miranda and other participants arrested for insubordination. Miranda was later released, but this encounter with Spanish arrogance and bureaucracy proved to be a contributing factor in his developing vision of independence for the spanish colonies. He openly promoted this vision when he visited the United States in 1783. Miranda met with numerous political and civic leaders, including both Democratic-Republicans and Federalists. Unlike many other such revolutionaries, he found broad support, largely because the American nationalists mainly feared angering Britain—and Britain had expressed no opposition to the idea that Spain’s colonies in the Western hemisphere might gain their independence. At the time, British officials tentatively supposed that such a blow to Spain would be advantageous to Britain.

Although Miranda even expressed a desire to meet Hamilton in New York, a meeting between the two never took place. Hamilton had prior commitments, no doubt related to the establishment of the Cincinnati, which came to pass that very year. Observing the political divisions within American society, Miranda accurately observed that they were no less pronounced than those between the conservatives and the reformists in his own country. He urged Jefferson to seek common ground with the Federalists, lest the United States tear themselves apart. Unfortunately, an end to such internal struggles was not in sight. America remained divided against itself.


---


Excerpted from The In-Between Years: America, 1779—1799, by Werner Green (United Publishing, Republic of Northern America, 1960):

While Secretary Jefferson neglected his actual duties and preferred to spend his time on receiving foreign nationals and developing pet projects that reflected his radical and—for that era—unrealistically progressive politics, more patriotic men devoted themselves to strengthening their nation. Looking back, it is difficult to imagine that prominent polticians such as secretary Jefferson could be so blind to the regrettable weakness of the young Union. There can be no doubt that the instigators of American independence, regardless of moral and political affiliation, worked for the betterment of their country. It is baffling that certain men could so delude themselves as to think America already safe and sound. There was no army. No navy to speak of. Divisions within and enemies without both threatened the republican system.

Knowing this, the bravest of our founding fathers established the Order of the Cincinnati. [1] The idea to establish such an organization was first floated during the war. A band of dedicated officers, including Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox, agreed to stay in contact after the peace had been signed. Dedicated patriots, they felt responsible for the continued safety and well-being of the United States. When it became clear, following the war, that Congress would disband the Continental Army, these officers revisited their plans to establish a military order of American patriots. In May 1783, they formally established it. They clearly outlined three goals: “To preserve the rights so dearly won; to ensure [2] the continuing union of the states; and to assist members in need, their widows, and their orphans.”

Membership of the Order was generally limited to officers who had served at least three years in the Continental Army or Navy, ensuring that the organization had a cadre of able and patriotic members. Hamilton offered the position of President General to George Washinton himself, but the earsthwhile commander-in-chief politely declined, and Hamilton himself was elected to head the Order. Unfortunately, many eligible men declined to join the Order due to their links with the Democratic-Republican societies. Men such as George Clinton and Nathanael Greene, despite being offered membership, did not accept it, seeing the Order as an essentially Federalist organization. They could hardly have been aware that they actually excerbated the partisan environment by choosing to neglect the unifying role of military brotherhood. The Order was dedicated to preserving unity, and by rejecting it, the Democratic-Republicans caused futher disunity. We must, then, consider Consul Franklin’s criticism of the Order to be one of his greatest political mistakes.

Despite such setbacks, American patriots, united in organizations such as the Order of the Cincinnati and the United Federalist Societies undauntedly continued their campaign to inform and educate the public of the nation’s dire situation. The central government would need to be bolstered. Congress proved only partially able to deal with various territorial disputed between the states, and the lack of coherence made stable government impossible. It became clear to all parties that the political stalemate would have to be broken one way or another. Regardless of Jefferson’s irresponsible negligence, the Articles of Confederation needed amending. Congressman Hamilton repeatedly called upon Consul Franklin to request support for much-needed reform, but although Franklin saw the urgent need for reform, he insisted that it was up to Congress—up to the states—to revise the Articles if needed. This, we may condider another one of the consul’s major errors.

By 1783, it had already become clear that a revision of the Articles could not be postponed much longer. Several states were entirely debt-free, while others were still debt-ridden. Why should those fiscally healthy states not be compelled to show some solidarity? Only a strengthened central government could achieve that aim. The anti-federalists opposed reform at every turn, however, rejecting all options except continued confederalism—that is: they would only embrace Jefferson’s proposals. Meanwhile, many veterans were still deprived of their pensions, growing dangerously discontented. Congressman Hamilton felt that only a strong central government would be able to take responsibility for problems that would affect all the states. Such was the Federalist opinion, that “general issues demand a general government”.

We can imagine, then, his horror when he learned that his foremost adversary had pre-emped him. Jefferson had gathered all the political support he could muster, and had convinced a majority in Congress to call for a General Convention in Philadelphia the folowing year, to revise the Articles of Confederation. No sooned had the necessity of this Convention been agreed upon, or Jefferson introduced his own proposal—which soon became known as the Virginia Plan, being authored chiefly by two Virginians, namely Jefferson himself and Congressman James Madison.


---


Excerpted from The Hands That Built America, by Emily Wright (Fontaine Publishing House, Confederacy of Southern America, 1978):

The delegates to the General Convention of 1784, which commenced in April of that year, found themselves under great pressure. They would have to find a solution to the various problems that were weighing down on the United States, for there was a widespread concern that if they failed, there might not be a union of United States for very much longer. Great unrest was brewing: in late 1781, nearly a two and a half years before, Congress had voted to formally disband the Continental Army. Since then, war veterans in several states had not received any pensions at all. In other states, pensions were not being paid in full. Whispers of a veteran’s revolt were already spreading. Meanwhile, the Congressional debt would have to be payed off somehow. More importantly, several states were still so deeply in debt that they were on the verge of economic collapse. Those were also the states that faced the most dissent from war veterans, whose pensions the state governments could not afford to pay out. Raising taxes to generate enough revenue would certainly lead to violent revolt, and was out of the question.

The money would have to be fixed, as well—the states that found themselves in dire straits were also the states that suffered from the greatest monetary inflation and, as a result, devaluation. They made an attempt to pay off the veteran’s pensions in devaluated currency, but veteran’s associations naturally would not accept this, and demanded payment in full… and in real value. The states of Plymouth and New York were, more than any other state, in financial distress. Other northeastern states were also troubled, generally, but fortunately to a somewhat lesser extent. Most of the middle and southern colonies, by comparison, were financially healthy. Secretary Jefferson, as a Virginian, knew that the federalist strategy for solving the problems of the United States would rely on extorting money from the south, while bailing out the north.

To Jefferson, this was intensely immoral. His own Virginia, like many other states, had responsibly payed off its own war debts. New York and Plymouth, on the other hand, had been irresponsible, borrowing further sums, increasing their debt, which had led to their predicament. It would simply be unacceptable to punish responsible behaviour, and reward bad decisions. No—if the problems in the northeast were to be solved, it would be the northeast that would have to pay for its own mistakes. Responsibility for keeping order in one’s own house was essential, and burdening one’s neighbor with the cost of one’s own mistakes was not an acceptable strategy. On this premise the Virginia Plan was based.

Knowing that a convention to address the various insufficiencies of the Articles would have to be called, the Democratic-Republicans had waited for the perfect moment to take charge of the situation. That is, they waited for the moment that a Democratic-Republican majority was formed in as many states as possible. In late 1783, that moment came. They had obtained a majority in the representative bodies of ten of the eighteen states [3]: a greater margin was not to be expected, and it should be enough. A majority in the states meant a majority in the Continental Congress [4], and as soon as that was effected, Jefferson and Madison introduced their plan for a General Convention. Their resolution was accepted by Congress, and stipulated that the convention was to be held soon, in early 1784. Additionally, the representative bodies of the states were to select the delegates to the convention—which meant that a majority of the delegates would also, in all likelyhood, be Democratic-Republicans.

Jefferson and Madison drafted a series of proposals, which collectively became known as the Virginia Plan. It was the Democratic-Republican vision of what political reform should entail, and they published it openly prior to the convention, so that all citizens of the United State could see what this vision was. In truth, the plan was on some point the result of a compromise. Even then, the Democratic-Republicans were divided into distinct democrats and distinct republicans. Jefferson himself was of the former faction; a true believer in popular governance. Madison was instead of the latter persuasion, and believed that an excess of democracy would result in mob rule. Such differences of insight meant that Jefferson intended to propose that the Consul was to be directly elected by the people, while Madison was vehemently opposed to this. He was, however, also unhappy with the election of the Consul by Congress, and suggested an separate electoral college. Unable to reach common ground, the two men—and the factions they represented—agreed to simply insist the matter be discussed, without formulating a position on the matter beforehand.

The Viginia Plan, as it was ultimately published, consisted of eight proposed alterations [5] to the Articles of Confederation:

1. The problem of monetary instability would be solved by mandating that each state was allowed to issue Continental Scrip (and no other currency), but only insofar as it was fully backed by gold. In addition, every person would be free to use any other currency if he so wished. This poposal came from Madison, who had observed that during the war, faced with the British counterfeiting of the Scrip, an prominent association of merchants in Virginia had started issuing its own currency, thus largely avoiding the devaluation that the Scrip fell prey to. Wishing to retain that very useful option, he argued that any man should have the right to spend or accept payment in any currency that he desired.
   
2. The insufficient capabilities of the Continental Congress to pay the pensions for war veterans would be addressed by making the states solely responsible for paying such pensions, and compelling them to carry out this task. In that case, it would be sufficient if all states donated an annual stipend of 1% of their revenue to Congress. If Congress was to be held partially responsible for paying the veterans’ pensions, Jefferson argued, then the states should be forced to pay the wartime stipend of 2% for a longer period of time, to compensate Congress for these undue expenses.
   
3. The growing problem of the public debt would be brought to a halt by universally prohibiting both Congress and the individual states from borrowing money. In addition, Congress would be explicitly barred from ever adopting any state’s debt, in part or in full. As long as the states either took full and exclusive responsibility for paying the veterans’ pensions, or agreed to pay the wartime stipend of 2% for a longer period of time, Congress would be able to generate enough revenue to eventually pay off the congressional debt in full.
   
4. In addition, the states would be explicitly determined to enjoy supremacy over Congress when it came to the interpretation of the Articles, meaning that any state would be allowed to nullify an Act of law by Congress (i.e. suspend its application within its own borders) when it considered that Act to be in conflict with the Articles. This proposal originated from the Democratic-Republican desire to prevent Federalist encroachment on the autonomy of the individual states.
   
5. Congress would be granted the power to regulate commerce with other nations, but both Congress and the individual states would be explicitly prohibited from regulating or hindering interstate commerce in any way.
   
6. A policy for the admission of new states would be established.
   
7. A citizen of one state who committed a crime in another state would henceforth be prosecuted under the laws of the state in which the crime was committed.
   
8. The exact tasks and powers of the Consul were to be discussed, as was the method of electing the Consul.

---


Excerpted from The In-Between Years: America, 1779—1799, by Werner Green (United Publishing, Republic of Northern America, 1960):

Shocked by the underhanded manipulations of the Democratic-Republicans, Congressman Hamilton knew he would have to act on short notice. The Jeffersonians had made sure that the selection of delegates to the General Convention would occur at a time when they enjoyed a majority in the greater share of the states. The Federalists would, from the very outset, be working from a disadvantaged position. When the Democratic-Republicans published their own plan for revising the Articles soon after arranging the convention, it was clear that it had all been part of an orchestrated scheme. Jefferson and Madison intended to force the anti-federalist ideas on the entire union, by any means available to them.

Hamilton responded by issuing a reply to the largely inadequate Virginia Plan, in which he outlined the Federalist solutions to the problems confronting the United States at that time. It must be admitted that the resulting New England Plan was clearly a product of Hamilton’s mind. It contained all his personal preferences and wishes, even those that some Federalists perhaps found too extreme. The New England Plan was based on a robust and stable system of government, to replace the chaotic and mercurial system that existed under the Articles. Hamilton, therefore, proposed abolishing the Articles of Confederation altogether, and replacing them with a federal Constitution, which was not neccesarily to be based upon the Articles. The United States were to become a Federal Union, with a strong central government, capable of facing and surmounting any and all obstacles. [6]

The New England Plan consisted of ten points:

1. Congress would gain the power to raise funds directly via federal tariffs and taxes.
   
2. Congress would gain the power to regulate both commerce with other nations and interstate commerce.
   
3. Congress would become solely responsible for paying the pensions of Continental Army veterans, the money for which was to be generated from tax revenue.
   
4. Congress would adopt all the outstanding debts of the individual states, and then start paying off this collective debt.
   
5. In addition to the Continental Congress, a federal Senate would be established. Only members of the Order of the Cincinnati, who had served as officers in the Revolutionary War, would be allowed to become members of the original Senate. They would be elected for life, by the people of the United States. Whenever a seat became vacant, a new Senator would be elected for life, by the people, and all members of the Order of the Cincinnati would be eligible. The Senate would serve the national interest, blocking any undesirable legislation passed by Congress.
   
6. The Consulate would be replaced with a Federal Executive, the head of which would be elected for life, by the Senate.
   
7. A federal judiciary would be established, in the form of a Supreme Tribunal, the members of which would be appointed by the Federal Executive. The Supreme Tribunal would serve as the appeal of last resort in cases dealing with national matters (such as treaties).
   
8. A government-owned Bank of the United States would be established, which could then issue a new currency, Federal Scrip, directly on behalf of Congress. All other currencies would be abolished.
   
9. The Continental Army, previously disbanded by Congress, was to be partially recalled into service, as a permanent standing army. A military training school and a naval base were to be established, funded and controlled by the general government.
   
10. The Constitution and treaties would be the supreme law of the land. The Federal Executive would be authorized to use force to compel non-compliant states to observe the law.

In short, the New England Plan was a blueprint for responsible and stable government: the exact opposite of the Virginia Plan. Realizing that the General Convention would become little more than a contest between the Jeffersonian plan and the Hamiltonian plan, Federalists throughout the union rallied behind Hamilton’s proposals, even if they found them on the radical side. When the convention opened in 1784, the people of the United States were more divided than ever, and there was little room for neutrality. Still, however, there remained citizens and poltiticians who refused to commit to either the Federalist or the anti-federalist program, preferring to urge a compromise. Even in the face of an anti-federalist majority, Hamilton coninued to hope that he could achieve success by persuading uncommitted and moderate delegates. Of course, Jefferson was also vying for the support of those same men…


---


FOOTNOTES

[1] The Society of the Cincinnati IOTL. With less Democratic-Republicans joining the organization ITTL, and with Hamilton firmly in charge of it, he is completely free to give it his own, more aristocratic bent. So no beating around the bush: this is to be a military order, in the same vein as similar European organizations.

[2] IOTL, the second goal was merely to promote the continuing union of the states.

[3] Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia, the Floridas, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Montréal.

[4] Under the Articles of Confederation, ITTL as IOTL, representatives were not neccesarily elected, but could also be selected by the representative bodies of the states, in which case they could be replaced at any time. The Democratic-Republicans use that possibility where they can, to make sure there are as many Democratic-Republicans in Congress as possible.

[5] These proposals reflect various OTL opinions held by Jefferson, Madison, and the anti-federalist movement in general. Interestingly, TTL’s Virginia Plan is in many ways the polar opposite of OTL’s Virginia Plan, and actually much closer to OTL’s New Jersey Plan. Don’t get confused.

[6] Just as the TTL’s Viginia Plan reflects the positions that Jefferson, Madison and the anti-federalist movement held IOTL, the New England Plan reflects Hamilton’s OTL views. Yes, even the parts where Senators and the head of the executive should be elected for life, and only (ex-)military officers should be eligible for those positions. He proposed those ideas. Some think he was purposely being extreme, to make the OTL constitution look moderate to its opponents. I disagree; throughout his life, Hamilton was consistently a supporter of a very strong central government, and an opponent of “too much democracy”. I firmly believe that he aimed for a secure and stable nation, and that this was not some ploy to get the OTL constitution accepted. He really believed in his own vision for America, or at least: I am writing the relevant parts of this TL on that basis.

 

[DarkAvenger]

Still working on this?

 

[JRummy]

Hopefully just some time away because of a busy schedule?

 

[Widukind]

Still working on this?

Hopefully just some time away because of a busy schedule?

I assure you I'm still working on it. I know, it's been exactly two months since my last post on this TL, but there's been a lot on my plate lately, so the transition from lots-of-ideas-and-loose-bits-&-pieces to an installment I can actually post has been rough. You all know the feeling, I'm sure.

Over the last week, I've actually edited a lot of the scraps I've had lying around for two months now. The remainder of Part V is actually finished: there are two more installments. I'll post the penultimate one right now, and the final installment in a few days. Part VI is in the works, and will be posted in multiple installments throughout December. We are back on track, it seems.

Anyway: here's the penultimate installment of Part V:



---



Excerpted from A Concise History of our Confederacy by Porfirio Gilchrist (Rockwell Books, Confederacy of Southern America, 1959):

It was soon determined that the most pressing issues—the need for sound money, the rising public debt, and the proper means of paying the veterans’ pensions—would have to be discussed first, before any further debate could or should take place. The delegates knew that the Democratic-Republican and the Federalist viewpoints were completely opposed on these points, but time was pressing. Plymouth had already seen several minor riots by angry veterans when the General Convention first assembled, and there was no doubt that more unrest and violence would soon follow, unless the Confederavy managed to get its finances in order.

Jefferson and Hamilton—elected as delegates for Virginia and New York respectively, combining this task with their respective fuctions as Secretary and Congressman—debated the matters directly, and at times, the mood of the convention was nothing short of warlike. It was apparent that Jefferson had a majority for the general gist of his plans, but certain states had sent moderate Democratic-Republicans to the convention, and others had sent neutral delegates, not aligned to either Jefferson or Hamilton.

There would not be a majority for Hamilton’s proposed National Bank, that was quickly made evident, but Jefferson’s own proposal of tasking the states with issuing money backed by gold also ran into opposition. Many colonies objected to the idea that they would be bound to such a centrally-mandated gold standard. (It remains ironic that the states most vehemently opposed were the northeastern Federalist states, who supported centralism on nearly all other points.) On the other hand, it was similarly clear that a majority of states opposed Hamilton’s perverse notion that the general government adopt all state debts, and supported Jefferson’s proposal barring all forms of public debt throughout the Confederacy. Still, this only solved half the issue. The congressional debt would also have to be payed off, funding for which undertaking could only be found by resolving the issue of the veterans’ pensions. Congress would be able to generate sufficient revenue to pay off the debt, but only if the states were to either pay the wartime stipend of 2% of their revenue to Congress for some extended period… or if they ware assume took full and exclusive responsibility for paying the veterans’ pensions.

The states were divided on which of these options would be preferable, and the New England states were unwilling to accept either choice. While the debate was being held, news reached Philadelphia that an army of veterans had armed themselves, and were intent on deposing the state government. There was no more time—the issue would have to be resolved at once, or not at all. Hamilton at this point proposed assembling an army under general Washington, and crushing the so-called “Veterans’ Rebellion” by force. While Hamilton sought support for this drastic measure, Jefferson assembled his own delegates, and secretly met with the head of the Plymouth Delegation, the moderate Samuel Adams. Like no other, Adams understood the need for a solution. He frankly admitted to Jefferson that he was willing to back Hamilton, if all else failed. Plymouth and New York were simply unable to pay the pensions in full, or to pay an annual 2% of their revenue to Congress. There seemed to be no way out, no way of avoiding Hamilton’s military solution.

Jefferson knew the time had come to make concessions. Consulting with the Democratic-Republican delegations, Jefferson attempted to reach some came to the compromise that carried the day. It took trouble to convince the Democratic-Republican delagates, but faced with the alternative of Hamilton seizing the moment to promote his own agenda, they chose to back Jefferson. He then went back to Adams, and together, they secretly talked to the two members of the three-man New York delegation who were not named Alexander Hamilton. Both were relatively moderate, and realizing the potential benefits, they were willing to make a deal.


---


Pennsylvania State House, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 29th of April 1784

“—which is why there cannot be any doubt that an unhesitant response is needed this instant, and a response by force if neccesary. I urge the good gentlemen of this convention to consider the peril to our United States…”

Samuel Adams silently made his way into the hall, where Hamilton continued to passionately expound on the need for a military response to the rebellion in Plymouth. He saw the two other delegates from New York make their way to their own seats, and then, just as Hamilton concluded yet another slightly melodramatic appeal for action, Jefferson walked into the room, indicating that he would like to interrupt for a moment. Standing in the middle of the suddenly silent covention hall, Jefferson smiled—a little too smugly, Samuel felt—and announced that he regretted that Hamilton had so wasted his breath with all those impassioned pleas, since a compromise had been reached.

With some satisfaction of his own, Samuel observed that Hamilton’s face turned a particularly unflattering shade of puce at this statement, and the colonel in fact looked ready to murder Secretary Jefferson on the spot. But then, the doors to the hall swung open once more, and Consul Franklin slowly walked in, leaning heavily on his walking stick. All delegates stood, and Franklin cheerily sat down. “So. I hear that a breakthrough has been made. That is very good news, gentlemen. Let’s hear it.”

Samuel was absolutely certain, in that instant, that Franklin was in on it. That Jefferson had told him all about the deal, and made sure the Consul would arrive just in time to lend extra support—and validity—to the compromise. One glance at Hamilton confirmed that the colonel had realized this, too.

Jefferson began to explain. Congress would agree to take responisbility for half the cost of paying the pensions of all Revolutionary War veterans. To this end, the states would pay the wartime stipend of two percent of their annual revenue for a period of ten years, namely the period of 1785 through 1795. As a special exception to this, both New York and Plymouth, being in such dire straits, financially, would only pay the regular one percent—provided they would use the money thus saved to pay off their war debts. When the other two members of his own delegation joined in the applause that this proposal received, Hamilton stood up without a word, and stalked out of the hall. His fury was palpable, and Samuel had to admit: he enjoyed watching Hamilton’s impotent rage. That man had been long overdue a good come-uppance.

Samuel fully expected Hamilton to be back the next day, pushing his other proposals as well as he could, but Samuel had seen the look on Hamilton’s face when his own delegation abandoned him—the man knew he was defeated, that Jefferson had outplayed him. Hamilton had already lost the great debate about the American future, and in his heart, he clearly knew it. Samuel doubted the colonel would ever forgive Jefferson for this.


---


Excerpted from A Concise History of our Confederacy by Porfirio Gilchrist (Rockwell Books, Confederacy of Southern America, 1959):

When Jefferson walked in and announced a compromise had been reached, he was readily supported by the Plymouth delegation and two third of Hamilton’s own delegation. It was not openly stated, but it was clear that these delegates from Plymouth and New York had secretly agreed to back Jefferson’s proposals for the debt issue and the monetary issue. These subjects were discussed in conjection with the subject of the pensions. At the end of the day, the convention had found agreement on all three issues.

Concerning public debt, the convention resolved that “The Continental Congress may under no circumstance borrow Money on the credit of the United States, nor shall it be allowed that the Continental Congress adopts the debt of any State of this Confederacy, in part or in full. Likewise, no State may under any circumstance borrow Money on the credit of the United States, or any of them.” This prohibited both Congress and the states from borrowing any more money.

Concerning the monetary issue, the convention resolved that “The States of this Confederacy shall have the Right and Power to coin Money and to issue Bills of Credit. All Coin and all Bills of Credit issued by the authority of the States of this Confederacy must be fully backed by Gold. All inhabitants of the United States are free to use, if they will, any Medium of Exchange, including Money and Bills of Credit issued by any foreign Government or any other Party.” It was immediately determined that the matter would be further worked out by an Act of Congress.

Concerning the payment of pensions, the convention resolved that “The States exclusively shall be tasked with the payment of pensions to veterans of the Continental Army, but specifically regarding the payment of pensions to veterans of the War that led to American Independence, the Continental Congress shall imburse the States with money equivalent to half the expense incurred in payment of such pensions. In return for this, the States shall, during the years 1785 through 1795, anually supply two percent of their total revenue to the Treasury of the United States. This tax will be levied by the authority of the legislatures of the several States, and under the direction of the Finance Secretary of the United States. The States of Plymouth and New York shall be exempt from this, and shall supply the Treasury of the United States, in times of peace, with one percent of their total revenue during the years 1785 through 1795. These two States will in addition expend at least one percent of their total revenue for the purpose of paying off their public debts, until these debts are eliminated in full.”

Riders were immediately sent to Plymouth, so the news could be delivered to the veterans that the payment of their pensions would resume forthwith. This proved to be Jefferson’s great victory, and it was later recognized as the point where Hamilton lost the initiative. Had a compromise not been reached, Hamilton would in all likelyhood have gotten his wish of military action against the rebelling veterans, and his centralist cause would have been galvanized. History would have been vastly different. But as things actually turned out, the general opnion among the delegates was that Jefferson had proved himself to be right. Voluntary co-operation between the states, without the undue use of force, was clearly viable, and Hamilton’s drastic solutions were unneccesary after all.

This is perhaps why Jefferson was able to denounce and defeat Hamilton’s proposals for a far more centralist federal union so easily, when they were debated just a week later, in the early days of May. It must be admitted: colonel Hamilton recuperated admirably from his defeat a week before, and vehemently defended his New England Plan. The central message of his proposals can best be summed up by quoting from his own closing argument:

“All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are the rich and well born, the other the mass of the people. The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to the first class a distinct, permanent share in the government. They will check the unsteadiness of the second, and as they cannot receive any advantage by a change, they therefore will ever maintain good government. Can a democratic assembly, who annually revolve in the mass of the people, be supposed steadily to pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent body can check the imprudence of democracy. Their turbulent and uncontroling disposition requires checks.” [1]

With such reasoning, Hamilton supported his plans to institute once more a tyrannical aristocracy in America. Jefferson righly attacked these ideas as being monarchial and despotic to the utmost, and many Democratic-Republicans and neutral moderates expressed their disgust at the very idea of such an authoritarian system as Hamilton had in mind. It was James Madison, however, who delived the killing blow to Hamilton’s proposals…


---


Excerpted from James Madison’s speech to the General Convention, in regards to the proposals for political reform introduced by colonel Hamilton:

I frankly admit it: when I first heard him in Congress, I was impressed by the proposals of colonel Hamilton, and not without sympathy towards them. I gave his suggestions all the proper consideration, but I have since abandoned his viewpoints—or rather: the colonel has abandoned me, for his initial promise was to improve our Union, which I applaud, but his aim now is to destroy it altogether, and reduce America to a unitary state under the wicked despotism of a moneyed elite.

It cannot be denied that open debate on this issue is of the utmost importance, for so is the question itself. We have now heard colonel Hamilton’s sentiments on the subject—these, now, are mine. My opinion is that the general government and the state governments each comprise a vital part of our American Union, which is rightfully a Confederacy. The general government serves to secure the state governments. Colonel Hamilton reverse the matter, and argues that the states exist to serve the general government. But this is certainly not the case, as the states declared their independence separately, and then voluntarily joined into a Union, for their mutual benefit.

The present system, under the Articles of Confederation, is in theory a perfect balance of state and general government—without example and without precedent. In practice, that balance must yet be refined, and that is the purpose of our convening here. Colonel Hamilton, on the other hand, desires to smash that balance utterly, and to impose his own will on this convention. He urges for a union of the states which he terms “purely federal in nature”, but which is in fact a unitary system, wherein the states are reduced to mere provinces, fully subjected to the whims of a central authority. That, my good gentlemen, cannot be allowed. It could not even be allowed if that central government were one of somewhat good character, but it can certainly not be tolerated when that central government is one such as colonel Hamilton desires.

The basis of all ancient and modern confederacies is the freedom and the independency of the states composing it. States may surrender their sovereignty, but if they do, the liberties of their peoples are lost also. Were we to yield to colonel Hamilton and his New England Plan, we would be causing the end of our free and voluntary American union, which we fought so hard to establish. Indeed, I would rather dissolve the union altogether, than submit to the New England Plan. I urge the good gentlemen of this convention to keep foremost in their minds that powers once bestowed upon a government, should they be found ever so dangerous or destructive to freedom, can only rarely be wrested from that government but by another revolution. Therefore, in altering or amending our general government, no greater powers ought to be given, than experience has shown to be necessary. The New England Plan, as such, must be firmly rejected.


---


Excerpted from A Concise History of our Confederacy by Porfirio Gilchrist (Rockwell Books, Confederacy of Southern America, 1959):

Immediately after Madison’s speech, the Democratic-Republicans demanded a vote on Hamilton’s proposals—and they were soundly defeated, with half the Plymouth delegation (namely the person of Samual Adams) and one of New York’s delegates voting against most of Hamilton’s proposed reforms. And those were, generally speaking, solidly Federalist states! Hamilton had presented a too ambitious plan, which too few were willing to support.

With the urgently pressing problems resolved, and the fundamental proposal to replace the confederacy with a centralist federal union rejected by the convention, the major points of debate were out of the way. That is not to say the debate went smoothly from the point on. It is often said that men can agree on 90% of an issue, and then spend months debating the remaining 10%. This was the case, certainly, in 1784. In the end, much more debate was needed, lasting several months. But eventually, the convention saw the Virginia Plan largely adopted, be it with several concessions—some cosmetic, some crucially important. Among the more cosmetic points were the concessions to the moderates, such as the changing of the documents name from “Articles of Confederation” to “Continental Charter”—a name first proposed by Thomas Paine—which in no way altered the contents, but which sounded more robust. Similarly, an article was added at the very end, confirming that the States all pledged to “inviolably observe” the Charter, while also determining that in the future, Congress would be responsible for proposing alterations to the Charter, which would subsequently need unanimous ratification by all state legislatures.

More significant concessions by Jefferson included his failure to convince the delegates of his plan to have the Consul directly elected by the people, and the ultimte decision, which he firmly opposed, to establish a permanent Continental Navy. On the other hand, he managed to find support for limiting the navy’s size, and he prevented the establishment of a standing army, so perhaps he suffered no great lossed there. What he considered his greatest defeat during the whole convention was the unwillingness of the majority to support his proposal for nullification. He had to adapt that proposal considerably, which resulted in the now-familiar system of qualified nullification, where at least one-third of the States must object to a Congressional law, before they may move to nullify it within their own territory.

The last major change to the Virginia Plan was an addition, but both Jefferson and Madison supported this: it was the stipulation that strictly defined the consulate as consisting of the consul, and four Secretaries, namely for Finance, for War, for Foreign affairs, and for Domestic affairs. This last, newly-created position would be required, since the proposal also entailed that the general government, in name of Congress, was to administrate and organize all present and future territories of the United States—rather than just the existing ones—until such time that they might join the Confederacy as states. Jefferson fully supported that plan, and was in fact appointed Domestic Secretary immediately following the convention, with Madison taking over as Foreign Secretary.


---


Excerpted from The Hands That Built America, by Emily Wright (Fontaine Publishing House, Confederacy of Southern America, 1978):

(…) have repeatedly asked how it came to be that the General Convention produced a document so favorable to the Jeffersonians, and so unfavorable to the Hamiltonians. Part of the explanation is surely that Hamilton overreached. But this does not fully explain the way things turned out. Why was so little effort invested in seeking a compromise between the centralist and the decentralist positions? From the perspective of the day, would it not have made more sense to aim for moderation? The issue has stumped researchers time and again.

The true reasons are possibly to be found in the way that the peoples and administrations of the several states viewed the general government: as a generally competent, but not yet perfected model. Had circumstances been different, and had the general government been noticably less equiped to deal with the various challenges it faced, popular opinion might have swung towards a more radical reform. [2] But as things were, the common view was that reform would only need to be minor, surgical. No major overhaul was needer or desired. One may in fact conclude that so much of the groundwork was already done in 1774 that a decade later, the work became far more manageble. [3] The British tyranny, so palpable, so very hated, made the American people willing to accept radical plans in 1774. They knew they needed unity, and that they lacked the time and leisure to debate the issue. A general government was established without much fuss. And therein lies the crux: fear of tyranny may have been the motivator to accept general authority in 1774, it made America wary of new oppressors in 1784. With the war over, and the British threat dispelled, state legislatures had no desire to allow further infringements upon their sovereignty.

When the General Convention met, priorities had shifted radically, compared to 1774. A centralist plan for America was simply a desire held by a distinct minority, and a decentralist plan could count on a distinct majority. Certainly, in hindsight, a compromise would have been much the wiser. But to the American people of 1784, a compromise of that kind would have been a betrayal of the principles they held most sacred. Principles that are in many ways, to many citizens of the Confederacy, sacred to this very day.


---


FOOTNOTES

[1] OTL quote; Hamilton said this at the Constitutional Convention IOTL.

[2] Which is exactly what happened IOTL.

[3] Again, ITTL the general government established in 1774 was considerably more bolstered and capable than the OTL system of 1776.


GENERAL NOTES

One installment left to go before Part V is concluded. Before posting that, however, I will post the full text of the Continental Charter. I actually wrote the whole thing down in full, mostly so I can reference it in the future. After all, it wouldn't do to accidentally contradict my own ATL "constitution", now would it? You can expect the text of the Charter to be posted at some point during the weekend, and the final installment of Part V at the start of next week. Probably monday.

 

[Darth_Kiryan]

So Jefferson wins this one.

 

[Widukind]

So Jefferson wins this one.

Yes. Yes, he does.

In many ways, I'm trying to make TTL's America into a mirror of OTL's America: we see different events, but they are caused by the same historical forces. That's inspired by a remark made by George Will (a conservative writer with whom I usually disagree quite vehemently, but in this case he has a point): "There is an elegant memorial in Washington to Jefferson, but none to Hamilton. However, if you seek Hamilton's monument, look around. You are living in it. We honor Jefferson, but live in Hamilton's country, a mighty industrial nation with a strong central government."

And ain't that just the truth? For all the Jeffersonian language politicians tend to use, OTL's America is actually very Hamiltonian. Whereas OTL had Jefferson on the outside looking in for most of the Washington and Adams administrations (while Hamilton exerted great influence), TTL has Jefferson being the influential one, while Hamilton is sidelined and forced into the opposition. But let's not forget that OTL had a Jeffersonian revolution of 1800. So TTL, logically, might just be in for a Hamiltonian revolution a few years down the line...

 

[katchen]

Maybe, just maybe without a British Canada breathing down it's neck there is actually room for two United States of North America: A Hamiltonian, industrial north and a Jeffersonian, slaveholding agrarian south. As two countries they can coexist peacefully. The north (New England) can abolish slavery as IOTL and the south can keep it until such time as slavery by it's own name or by any other name becomes seen as manifestly unjust and an international liability. Which might take until the 1990s judging by what happened to South Africa IOTL.

 

[The Uchronian]

Yes. Yes, he does.

In many ways, I'm trying to make TTL's America into a mirror of OTL's America: we see different events, but they are caused by the same historical forces. That's inspired by a remark made by George Will (a conservative writer with whom I usually disagree quite vehemently, but in this case he has a point): "There is an elegant memorial in Washington to Jefferson, but none to Hamilton. However, if you seek Hamilton's monument, look around. You are living in it. We honor Jefferson, but live in Hamilton's country, a mighty industrial nation with a strong central government."

And ain't that just the truth? For all the Jeffersonian language politicians tend to use, OTL's America is actually very Hamiltonian. Whereas OTL had Jefferson on the outside looking in for most of the Washington and Adams administrations (while Hamilton exerted great influence), TTL has Jefferson being the influential one, while Hamilton is sidelined and forced into the opposition. But let's not forget that OTL had a Jeffersonian revolution of 1800. So TTL, logically, might just be in for a Hamiltonian revolution a few years down the line...

Interesting, btw. Can't wait to see where you end up taking this whole scenario.....

Maybe, just maybe without a British Canada breathing down it's neck there is actually room for two United States of North America: A Hamiltonian, industrial north and a Jeffersonian, slaveholding agrarian south. As two countries they can coexist peacefully.

Maybe, but it'd be far from guaranteed, though.

The north (New England) can abolish slavery as IOTL and the south can keep it until such time as slavery by it's own name or by any other name becomes seen as manifestly unjust and an international liability. Which might take until the 1990s judging by what happened to South Africa IOTL.

Dunno about the '90s for slavery, TBH(barring the rise of a dictatorship, maybe). You might be able to stretch it out to the '60s but there would be a world of *major* economic hurt on the horizon once it *is* forced to end; the longer they try to keep it, the worse they fall.

One more plausible situation that might develop in such a scenario, though, is that slavery peaks at about the turn of the 20th century, give or take a few years, and then it begins to dwindle until it finally disappears sometime in the late 1930s-late '40s, with something similar to *Apartheid takes its place. However, though, the latter *could* potentially last until at least the end of the '80s/early '90s unless a major political movement develops.

 

[fernerdave]

.... As two countries they can coexist peacefully. The north (New England) can abolish slavery as IOTL and the south can keep it until such time as slavery by it's own name or by any other name becomes seen as manifestly unjust and an international liability. Which might take until the 1990s judging by what happened to South Africa IOTL.

I would imagine that escaped slaves would be a big source of contention. Look how the Fugitive Slave laws caused trouble IOTL.. Im looking forward to seeing how our Midwest and western expansion develops ITTL

 

[mlp]

things changed quite a lot since the last time I visited this thread.
What's happening in East Asia now? are we to get some updates?
still lovin' this TL....