The length and nature of occupation of Germany without a cold war

Assuming a Soviet leadership acting differently and better relations 1944-50 between the USSR and the West what would happen to Germany

I assume a more thorough denazification. I am guessing that one effect will be that Von Braun will either end his days as an old man in jail or at the end of a rope. (This has lots of implications)

Does this mean that the 'weirwolves' become a reality?

I assume that any Soviet (or Russian) leadership would wish to be very harsh following the damage done by the Nazi aggression and occupation. France would certainly concur to some degree.


How many years would it take before Germany might be allowed any kind of home rule?
 
Assuming a Soviet leadership acting differently and better relations 1944-50 between the USSR and the West what would happen to Germany

I assume a more thorough denazification. I am guessing that one effect will be that Von Braun will either end his days as an old man in jail or at the end of a rope. (This has lots of implications)

Not necessarily. Even if there is no Cold War, there is no guarantee that the USA will hang someone so valuable. The idea of securing German technology and expertise for their own use predates the rift. But I doubt he would have a career in NASA or citizenship in his future - more like what happened to the rocket technicians the Soviets nabbed: prison, work assignments, and a quiet return to Germany. The knowledge harvested would count as part of reparations.

Does this mean that the 'weirwolves' become a reality?

I think that's vanishingly unlikely. Germany was sick and tired of war. What you would see is populist anger, civil disobedience, rejection of the Allied authorities, possibly even sabotage and ultimately some isolated violence and primitive terrorism if the occupation powers mishandle things. The Werwolf would have to ignite in early '45 or not at all, and I can#t see many people willing to rise in armed insurrection at that point.

I assume that any Soviet (or Russian) leadership would wish to be very harsh following the damage done by the Nazi aggression and occupation. France would certainly concur to some degree.


How many years would it take before Germany might be allowed any kind of home rule?

That would depend on how the scenario plays out IMO. The occupation powers were not interested in holding on to Germany in the long run, so they would be working towards independence. If it works more or less GDR-style, we'd see strongly controlled organs of self-government early and might get a form of German government ion the early to mid 50s (there's no pressure on the Allies, but they want this to be the outcome). But that depends on how harsh the Allied government gets. If the US and British forces adopt a more Soviet stance (isolation, limited contact, tough sanctions on any form of opposition), they'll be able to cow the Germans and install any kind of government they want - for a while. If they soften their stance as per OTL (and I don't buy that this was all due to the Cold War - it was the Soviets that had to work to keep up their system), there's a good chance we'll see the things that happened in OTL's western zones: demonstrations, civil disobedience, public protest and noisy opposition to occupation policies. At this point I think it is unrealistic for the Soviets to go along with any softening of their stance, so this will become a permanent source of friction unless the Western zones crack down. A crackdown would in turn, likely lead to cooperative politicians being branded as collaborators and Quislings and lend credibility to the more nationalist conservative wing and the Communists and the expense of the democratic right, liberals and social democracy. We might not see the invention of Germany's 'social market economy', either (that was, after all, a propaganda device designed to undercut the left and lend credibility to capitalism). Without Allied funding and 'guidance', the CDU/CSU and SPD are unlikely to achieve the commanding roles they had (needless to say the same goes for the SED).

Take it from there in any direction you want. The least attractive realistic idea is Allied troops putting down an ALT-17 June with lethal force and imposing a 'self.government' that hangs on to power through all kinds of undemocratic shenanigans until it gets voted out sometime in the 60s or 70s by an angry, resentful, powerfully anti-Allied populace. This Germany is poor by European standards, Nazi nostalgia is commonplace, any form of commemoration of Hitler's atrocities suspected of being Allied propaganda, and its border issues are unresolved.
 
Assuming a Soviet leadership acting differently and better relations 1944-50 between the USSR and the West what would happen to Germany

I assume a more thorough denazification.
???

No cold war might lead to an earlier retreat from Germany by east and west. Stalin proposed a united neutral Germany (quite possibly knowing the US wouldn't take him up). If the US did, you might end up with a 'western block' an 'eastern block' and a neutral corridor running down the middle Sweden and Finland, Germany, Austria and Yugoslavia. A neutral corridor might help tone down hysteria on both sides.
 
???

No cold war might lead to an earlier retreat from Germany by east and west. Stalin proposed a united neutral Germany (quite possibly knowing the US wouldn't take him up). If the US did, you might end up with a 'western block' an 'eastern block' and a neutral corridor running down the middle Sweden and Finland, Germany, Austria and Yugoslavia. A neutral corridor might help tone down hysteria on both sides.

Though without a cold war, there would be no real need for a neutral corridor. It's kind of hard to wrap my head around the idea anyway: if we are talking just less hostility and paranoia that's a likely outcome: a neutralised, neutered Germany in the 50s. If we are talking real cooperation and amity between the victors, things become more complicated. I'm not entirely sure that the Soviets and the western Allies could cooperate in Germany in the long run, structurally, even if the best of wills prevalied. But if they tried to jointly devolve an independent Germany, it would likely take a long time to hammer out a compromise solution they could all live with.
 
Though without a cold war, there would be no real need for a neutral corridor. It's kind of hard to wrap my head around the idea anyway: if we are talking just less hostility and paranoia that's a likely outcome: a neutralised, neutered Germany in the 50s. If we are talking real cooperation and amity between the victors, things become more complicated. I'm not entirely sure that the Soviets and the western Allies could cooperate in Germany in the long run, structurally, even if the best of wills prevalied. But if they tried to jointly devolve an independent Germany, it would likely take a long time to hammer out a compromise solution they could all live with.
I really really doubt that the two sides would be friendly. But with a neutral corridor, tension might ease below a 'Cold War' state. One of the desperate fears of both sides was that the other would launch a massive attack. With a neutral Germany inbetween, it would be harder to do an offensive, and each side would know that they had a little extra time to prepare defenses. Thus eliminating some of the fear of the Cold War era.
 
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