The Kamikaze Concept Accepted Earlier

Adm. Nimitz once said that the Kamikaze's were the only thing that really came as a surprise to him. I've often wondered; had Japan accepted the Kamikaze concept earlier would it have made a difference? My feeling is, little if any.

Let's make the POD the Battle of Santa Cruz; October 25-26, 1942. In this battle the IJN's air arm suffered heavy losses from USN AA, particularly from BB South Dakota (and this is before the proximity fuze). During the battle a Val dive bomber deliberately crashed into CV Hornet. This act of sacrifice is noted and remembered.

The Naval High Command and surviving pilots discuss the situation. It is agreed, Japan cannot withstand such losses for long. The younger pilots volunteer for Kamikaze duty, knowing that their sacrifice will produce results instead of their dying without acheiving anything. The more experienced pilots also wish to join but are refused, they will attack after their comrades have weaked the US fleet.

The main differences I see are:

1) Higher initial US losses - This is due to both surprise and the difficulity of dealing with these sorts of attacks. The proximity fuze is still not available, AA Batteries still not up to 1944 standards and the "Wildcat" is not as effective as the "Hellcat".
2) The US will push forward development of the "Hellcat" as well as push work on making the "Corsair" and other aircraft carrier-qualified. It would be interesting to see if the "Mustang" or "Thunderbolt" could operate off carriers!
3) Work on the proximity fuze will continue, but I don't think work could be pushed any faster.
4) The most effective anti-kamikaze weapon, the 'big blue blanket' (large numbers of fighters), will quickly be adopted but, as I said, the "Wildcat" isn't as effective as the "Hellcat" so losses will still be high at first until newer and better fighters become available.

There might be a small butterfly effect if aircraft slated for Europe end up in the Pacific, likewise if the carriers are forced to operate more fighters and fewer attack planes this may very well slow up the offensive slightly.

But in the end Japan will still lose, I see this only buying them a little extra time.

Any thoughts?
 
This might actually shorten the war a little. Japan didn't have the industrial capacity of the U.S. and so production of everything was slower. If IJN adopted the Kamakazi earlier, then they probably would have run out of fighter aircraft sooner. You're right, however, about American loses being higher and the march across the Pacific being slowed, at least for the first couple of years. Then, after Japan runs out of fighters and aircrews, the pace picks up and American casulties decrease. Without effective aircover, the Japanese forces and home islands get plastered by American bombers and other ground-attack planes. This could lead up to a senario where neither the A-bomb nor the invation of the home islands is needed to win against Japan.
 
I don't think it would help Japan in the long run. By the time they got around to kamikazies their supurb prewar pilots were gone and the war trained replacements could get the hit percentages. Early in the war IJN dive bombers were getting something like 65% hit rates, but this dropped to 10% and less, so the pilot was neded to bring his bomb right in, and even then they didn't get back to the early war hit rates.
 

JohnJacques

Banned
If Japan's troops collapse earlier though, you have a less war-weary populace and you have an invasion of the Home Islands before the atomic bomb was produced. Imagine something like that plot to destroy the carrier the peace negotiations were on, and then imagine Operation Olympic a few years earlier. Nasty stuff.
 
If they had used suicide planes at Pearl, then they might have been able to take out the fuel tanks. This would have forced the Pacific Fleet to be evacuated back to California. Hawaii could be invaded without a fight and the American Pacific Fleet would have to operate with seriously overstretched supply lines.
 
If they had used suicide planes at Pearl, then they might have been able to take out the fuel tanks. This would have forced the Pacific Fleet to be evacuated back to California. Hawaii could be invaded without a fight and the American Pacific Fleet would have to operate with seriously overstretched supply lines.

There was a serious discussion on this that gradually turned into a flamewar insulting one member who thought he knew everything about WW2. Maybe someone will link it. It's quite fun to read.

And the Japanese attacking the Hawaiian islands is serious ASB. The Japanese themselves are going to be seriously overstretched, and will shorten the war by a lot.
 
There was a serious discussion on this that gradually turned into a flamewar insulting one member who thought he knew everything about WW2. Maybe someone will link it. It's quite fun to read.

And the Japanese attacking the Hawaiian islands is serious ASB. The Japanese themselves are going to be seriously overstretched, and will shorten the war by a lot.

I think you mean this. (?)
 
1) Higher initial US losses - This is due to both surprise and the difficulity of dealing with these sorts of attacks. The proximity fuze is still not available, AA Batteries still not up to 1944 standards and the "Wildcat" is not as effective as the "Hellcat".
2) The US will push forward development of the "Hellcat" as well as push work on making the "Corsair" and other aircraft carrier-qualified. It would be interesting to see if the "Mustang" or "Thunderbolt" could operate off carriers!
3) Work on the proximity fuze will continue, but I don't think work could be pushed any faster.
4) The most effective anti-kamikaze weapon, the 'big blue blanket' (large numbers of fighters), will quickly be adopted but, as I said, the "Wildcat" isn't as effective as the "Hellcat" so losses will still be high at first until newer and better fighters become available.

In Norman Polmar's Carriers 1909-1945 it's said that USN evaluated Mustang but did not find it satisfactory for naval use. As for effects of Kamikazes, they might well be quite devastating for a while, as you say the "big blue blanket" is not really available until early 1944. The big question, IMHO, is the Marianas, which is the first spot where the Japanese have a lot of airfields for a mass effort.

I don't think it would help Japan in the long run. By the time they got around to kamikazies their supurb prewar pilots were gone and the war trained replacements could get the hit percentages. Early in the war IJN dive bombers were getting something like 65% hit rates, but this dropped to 10% and less, so the pilot was neded to bring his bomb right in, and even then they didn't get back to the early war hit rates.

It's still easier to get through flak if the mission is one-way only. Considering that according to one USAF study I've seen Kamikazes launched had a 14% hit rate during last, desperate months of war I think a 1942 started effort would be a lot more succesfull.
 
Enjoying the responses.

Were there enough airfields around Guadalcanal for some sort of mass attack?

Also, the effect of the kamikazes may very well force a reassessment of USN strategy as to what islands are taken and which are bypassed. Of course, the Phillippines can't be bypassed.

Please continue the debate!:)
 
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