The Kaiser hates the waves

Deleted member 1487

The Russian leaders had absolutely no reason to avoid a European war. Serbia was only a convenient pawn in this game. What they really wanted was control over the Turkish Straits, which they couldn't get in peacetime because of British and German opposition. - But Sazonov had realised that in a great European war Britain and France would offer him the Straits on a silver plate (which actually happened - only that the Sultan was able to dance at the Tsar's grave). - So, when the opportunity arose to start a majorwar, why should Sazonov hesitate? France had pledged unconditional support, and the British allowed themselves to be duped about who mobilised when and at what.

Also backing down over Serbia would have eliminated their only pawn in the Balkans and probably caused massive political unrest in Russia over being humiliated again; having harnessed the power of pan-Slavism, the Russian populace saw itself as 'godfather' of the 'little brothers' outside its borders, which meant that they saw any backing down when the issue of supporting a little Slavic brother as almost religious heresy. Already the populace at large was not happy with the Czar and several major, though localized revolts were underway in major Russian cities in 1914 that were put down with violence by the military; backing down would stir up the populace in a really nasty way.
 
backing down would stir up the populace in a really nasty way.

Only the urban elite, hardly the bulk of the (rural) populace. - But timing was essential: Once the British-built Ottoman dreadnoughts arrived at the Bosporus Russia would be severly outgunned in the Black Sea for a couple of years. Thus, Sarajevo and its consequences came in very handy for Sazonov and the rest of the Russian war party. - As it was, it worked out fine. Mister Churchill acted as useful idiot of Russian interests and seized the dreadnoughts. But his plan to conquer the straits - and subsequently hand them over to the Russians - failed for reasons that still generate about 100 books per anno in the ANZAC-British sphere.
 
Also backing down over Serbia would have eliminated their only pawn in the Balkans and probably caused massive political unrest in Russia over being humiliated again; having harnessed the power of pan-Slavism, the Russian populace saw itself as 'godfather' of the 'little brothers' outside its borders, which meant that they saw any backing down when the issue of supporting a little Slavic brother as almost religious heresy. Already the populace at large was not happy with the Czar and several major, though localized revolts were underway in major Russian cities in 1914 that were put down with violence by the military; backing down would stir up the populace in a really nasty way.


May i ask you your opinion, if say in the 1870s
Austria Hungary had collapsed with gallicia going to Russia, Bohemia Moravia
Austria joining germany, Hungary independent, rumanai siezing trasyvania italy siezing bits etc could Germany and Russia have had a workable alliance leaving france isolated.
 

Deleted member 1487

May i ask you your opinion, if say in the 1870s
Austria Hungary had collapsed with gallicia going to Russia, Bohemia Moravia
Austria joining germany, Hungary independent, rumanai siezing trasyvania italy siezing bits etc could Germany and Russia have had a workable alliance leaving france isolated.

Its hard to say what it would mean in the long term, but the three Kaiser's alliance would hold together as the two Kaiser's alliance for quite a bit longer than what historically happened, as AH was the reason Germany and Russia parted ways. France and Britain could then be forced together, as Germany and Russia worked together for a while; the problem would be the Ottoman Empire. Germany would still be looking for Middle Eastern markets, while Russia would be looking to control the Balkans and the Dardanelles. Germany and Russia would likely butt heads over this eventually unless they came to some sort of understanding, but that's hard to say. Maybe the Ottomans ally with the Brits and their traditional ally the French to fend off the Russo-Germans? Then Germany is the Ottoman's enemy, so that eliminates one problem.

As it was German trade accounted for 40% of Russian foreign exchange in 1914, so, just as today, both powers complemented one another, as Russia provided Germany with raw materials and food, while Germany had the industrialized base to trade its manufactured goods. I think it boils down to how well the Germans and Russians work out the Balkans and don't deviate from that formula, while working out a decent trade pact. Russia stays focused on Asia, while Germany stays focused on Africa and the Pacific, while helping the Czar in China and against Japan. That would be a British über-nightmare scenario.
 

Deleted member 1487

Once the British-built Ottoman dreadnoughts arrived at the Bosporus Russia would be severly outgunned in the Black Sea for a couple of years. Thus, Sarajevo and its consequences came in very handy for Sazonov and the rest of the Russian war party. - As it was, it worked out fine. Mister Churchill acted as useful idiot of Russian interests and seized the dreadnoughts. But his plan to conquer the straits - and subsequently hand them over to the Russians - failed for reasons that still generate about 100 books per anno in the ANZAC-British sphere.

Not for long, the Russian dreadnoughts were ready in 1915:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Sea_Fleet#History

Also once the British delivered the Ottoman Dreadnoughts, then the Ottomans lose their main reason for going to war in 1914 in the first place.
 
Also once the British delivered the Ottoman Dreadnoughts, then the Ottomans lose their main reason for going to war in 1914 in the first place.

The main reason to join the war was, for the Ottomans, that Germany (and, okay, Austria-Hungary in her orbit) was the only great power that had no design at desecting the Ottoman Empire. All the rest of the Great Power Gang was avid on devouring some bones and pieces of it. - But yes, if Sultan Osman and Reshadiye had arrived, the Goeben would have had zero impact - and probably might have been sent to Cattaro or Pola instead.
 
As it was German trade accounted for 40% of Russian foreign exchange in 1914, so, just as today, both powers complemented one another, as Russia provided Germany with raw materials and food, while Germany had the industrialized base to trade its manufactured goods.

I think that could be used as a template for the Balkans and the Ottomans as well: if Russia is an open market to an allied Germany, enlarged Russia would be as well.
 
A couple things that have been touched on:

Germany's offer of a 2/3's ratio German navy had to be a non-starter. No British government (or public) could allow that kind of concentrated force sitting off the coast. Sizing the German navy, with only the North Sea to worry about, to a ratio of Britain's worldwide naval commitments, was simply impossible. With the worry that international relations could add the French and/or Russian navies in the balance against the UK, this could not possibly have a chance to succeed. Britian can live with being locally out numbered in the Sea of Japan or the Carribean but not the North Sea or the Channel.

Yes, Germany had to worry about being cut off from international trade, as did Britian, but not in the same way. A navy that can cut of Britain's seaborne trade shuts down the UK. A navy that can cut off Germany's seaborne trade turns her to other existing channels-France, Austria, Russia, etc. Unless, of course, Germany is at war with some or all of them. As August 1914 unfolded, this (German) nightmare scenario fell into place.
 

BlondieBC

Banned

Now it makes sense. Forgot about food tariffs.

In the USA in WW2, it was rural areas like Arkansas where very poor farmers ate such poor diets that they were unfit for service. Rural Arkansas had a much higher % of unfit soldiers than richer places like New York City. Germany probably reversed this with the food tariffs for Junkers. Not only does this make rural areas richer, it makes food more expensive in cities compared to the USA.

Now I view the political issues a bit differently. While the were unsolvable in many ways, this was only because Germany expected to win a land war. You need to have Germany Prussian leaders to have serious doubts about this, and then the policy changes.


Now to be fair, it is only Conrad's incompetence and German diplomatic blunders that cause us to spend so much time reviewing German mistakes. In almost any ATL where either Conrad decisions are better or Germany avoids USW, we would be sitting around all the time talking about how the Anglo-German naval arms race began the process of the destruction of the British Empire and the process of the birth of a German MittelEuropa. It is only because of a series of odd mistakes that the Kaiser's ineffectual surface fleet becomes important.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Not for long, the Russian dreadnoughts were ready in 1915:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Sea_Fleet#History

Also once the British delivered the Ottoman Dreadnoughts, then the Ottomans lose their main reason for going to war in 1914 in the first place.

Don't see it the same. Ottomans have to do a defensive mobilization anytime Russia mobilizes. As a part of this mobilization, the Straights are close, which will cause the UK to eventually attack the Ottomans. Only in an ATL where the UK stays out of the war, can we see the Ottomans stay out. So for discussion purposes, lets say Belgium gives into German demands and the UK stays out. If the war is quick enough (over by Spring), the Ottomans stay out. If the war last til Spring, the Ottomans will be very tempted to try to take some Russian lands, or from their perspective, recovery of Ottomans lands.
 
Germany's offer of a 2/3's ratio German navy had to be a non-starter.

When the whole affair started, the British had something like 130 capital ships, and the Germans (Tirpitz) were proposing to build 30 - 60 (the Reichtags would allow the former number, Tirpitz always was aiming at the latter, and eventually he got his way).
The whole naval 'armaments race' came about when Sir John Fisher introduced the Dreadnought and the Invincibles, because suddenly the vast majority of British pre-dreadnoughts accounted to almost zero, and the Germans - after 1906 - were going to build dreadnoughts only. - Thus, there never was a naval armaments race (except for the British public opinion) - the Germans were building ships according to their naval laws - and the British were imagining there was a race in which they had to match up (secretly thinking that the Germans were lying and building much more vessels than the laws - and the financial limitations - allowed them to.)
When the British eventually managed to build 8 dreadnoughts per annum, they believed they had won - although the Germans never had the money and the means to achieve more than 4 per annum (which already was a happy co-incidence, because German industrial capacity - and the ability of the fleet to cope with new arrivals rather pointed to 2 per annum).
 

BlondieBC

Banned
A couple things that have been touched on:

Germany's offer of a 2/3's ratio German navy had to be a non-starter. No British government (or public) could allow that kind of concentrated force sitting off the coast. Sizing the German navy, with only the North Sea to worry about, to a ratio of Britain's worldwide naval commitments, was simply impossible. With the worry that international relations could add the French and/or Russian navies in the balance against the UK, this could not possibly have a chance to succeed. Britian can live with being locally out numbered in the Sea of Japan or the Carribean but not the North Sea or the Channel.

Yes, Germany had to worry about being cut off from international trade, as did Britian, but not in the same way. A navy that can cut of Britain's seaborne trade shuts down the UK. A navy that can cut off Germany's seaborne trade turns her to other existing channels-France, Austria, Russia, etc. Unless, of course, Germany is at war with some or all of them. As August 1914 unfolded, this (German) nightmare scenario fell into place.

I think it can be worked. Germans were less than 50% of RN when one measure tonnage. Assuming the cabinet and the Sea Lords want a deal, it can be achieve by switching from talking about the number of battleships to total tonnage. And one can talk about how cruisers and smaller ships is what is needed in the Empire. Or we can do the reverse, where the Germans accept some number near 50% of BB, but ask for 65% total tonnage. Prewar public documents indicate the RN was not concerned with lesser ships. Now we can't know for certain, without some ATL Star Trek like device to look into alternative universes. I suspect that initially the Uk would be relieved by deal where Germany went on a cruiser building spree. Say an additional naval bill where Germany cancelled 50K tons of BB building and added 75K tons on cruisers, torpedo boats, U-boats and other ships like seaplane carriers. Or even 100K tons. The more difficult question is how does the UK react when the Germans start littering their colonies and perhaps neutral nations with these smaller ships. How exactly would say the UK react to a 20 ship fleet including 8 cruisers that was perpetually bouncing around various South American ports much like the Germans did in Asia before Tsingtao? Or how does the UK react when Germany has more cruisers in the Pacific than the UK does? These are more challenging questions.

I view a lot of the UK complaining about German BB as a way to get more funding for new, big, sexy ships than as a serious assessment of risk in a war with Germany.
 
I think it can be worked. Germans were less than 50% of RN when one measure tonnage. Assuming the cabinet and the Sea Lords want a deal, it can be achieve by switching from talking about the number of battleships to total tonnage. And one can talk about how cruisers and smaller ships is what is needed in the Empire. Or we can do the reverse, where the Germans accept some number near 50% of BB, but ask for 65% total tonnage. Prewar public documents indicate the RN was not concerned with lesser ships. Now we can't know for certain, without some ATL Star Trek like device to look into alternative universes. I suspect that initially the Uk would be relieved by deal where Germany went on a cruiser building spree. Say an additional naval bill where Germany cancelled 50K tons of BB building and added 75K tons on cruisers, torpedo boats, U-boats and other ships like seaplane carriers. Or even 100K tons. The more difficult question is how does the UK react when the Germans start littering their colonies and perhaps neutral nations with these smaller ships. How exactly would say the UK react to a 20 ship fleet including 8 cruisers that was perpetually bouncing around various South American ports much like the Germans did in Asia before Tsingtao? Or how does the UK react when Germany has more cruisers in the Pacific than the UK does? These are more challenging questions.

I view a lot of the UK complaining about German BB as a way to get more funding for new, big, sexy ships than as a serious assessment of risk in a war with Germany.

Interestingly this scenario might be the perfect situation for the battlecruisers. OTL the temptation to put the battlecruisers into the main battle fleet was too much so they ended up fighting against battleships and lost. IITL Britain could conceivably build a fleet of battleships that would be comfortably superior to the Germans. This means that the battlecruisers would be free to do what they were designed to do. Namely use their speed and guns to run down anything slower or weaker.
 
As an Anglo-German agreement was possible IOTL and only failed because of the Germna fleet expansion, I would tend to say we won't even need the Kaiser to "hate" the fleet. all that is necessary is an agreement between Germany and teh Brits about the size of a German Fleet.

in 1902 the Brits made an agreement with the Japanese that was benefiting the Japanese and allowed them to attack russia without having to fear french intervention (this would activate UK as belligerent nation too).

So you have 2 blocs in the east UK/Japan vs Russia (and France).

If you have a similar agreement between UK and Germany about Afirca (and by extension the Pacific) this would strengthen the British global position. and also secure the German posessions.

The problem is that the german fleet was not only to glorify the empuire it had also practical uses. If one knows his Mayer Tahan he realises that he needs a strong fleet to be a global player (wrong but state of the 1900s mindset). And Germany sees a strong fleet as means to get more colonial influece. So an Anglo-German understanding need a German colonial expansion granted. IMHO this is certainly possible as Russia did occupy Manchuri following the Boxer rebellion. With an Anglo-German-Japanese treaty those 3 powers could try a knockout of Russia (and france) in china.

The other 3 of the "8 powers" are Austria-Hungary (100% German ally and as we know also 99,9% dependent on Germany), Italy - currently also ad odds with france (North Africa) and the US - this one might be interesting....

the OE should also be firmly in the Anglo-German camp - and be it only because of Russia.
 

Deleted member 1487

As an Anglo-German agreement was possible IOTL and only failed because of the Germna fleet expansion, I would tend to say we won't even need the Kaiser to "hate" the fleet. all that is necessary is an agreement between Germany and teh Brits about the size of a German Fleet.

No, the agreement failed, because the British refused to be a full member of the Triple Alliance when the Germans offered to make a formal deal in 1901, as I posted sources for earlier. This was long before German naval building became an issue; the issue was in fact the British not wanting a binding deal with the Germans, but rather an 'understanding' that they could wiggle out of if they wanted at any time, much like the Entente Cordiale. Germany tried to lock them down as an ally, but Britain steadfastly kept with the idea of having only interests, not friends. So the problem in the alliance deal was Britain, not Germany. Its interesting to note that the Naval Race only started AFTER the British rejected the German alliance offer, yet the Germans had already passed their first two naval laws; so the British only decided that the so-called 'Naval Race' was on AFTER they themselves rejected an alliance offer from the Germans that their negotiator had been seeking since 1898.

So ultimately, as has been noted by others in this very thread, the British were the instigators of a faked 'naval race' to justify their own build up of a larger fleet and introduction of a new class of battleships, the Dreadnought class, to the British public.
 
What if the Kaiser of Germany hated the Navy for some reason and built it up to the same size as Frances (thought the quality would be better). Would this allow them to be allied with the British if they didn't a have as big of a navy?

No.

Would less money poured into the navy allow them to do better on both fronts?

Yes.
 
No, the agreement failed, because the British refused to be a full member of the Triple Alliance when the Germans offered to make a formal deal in 1901, as I posted sources for earlier. This was long before German naval building became an issue; the issue was in fact the British not wanting a binding deal with the Germans, but rather an 'understanding' that they could wiggle out of if they wanted at any time, much like the Entente Cordiale. Germany tried to lock them down as an ally, but Britain steadfastly kept with the idea of having only interests, not friends. So the problem in the alliance deal was Britain, not Germany. Its interesting to note that the Naval Race only started AFTER the British rejected the German alliance offer, yet the Germans had already passed their first two naval laws; so the British only decided that the so-called 'Naval Race' was on AFTER they themselves rejected an alliance offer from the Germans that their negotiator had been seeking since 1898.

So ultimately, as has been noted by others in this very thread, the British were the instigators of a faked 'naval race' to justify their own build up of a larger fleet and introduction of a new class of battleships, the Dreadnought class, to the British public.

If the Germans had responded to the Britsh by saying agreeing to an
" 'understanding' that they could wiggle out of if they wanted at any time, much like the Entente Cordiale " how would this have affected the possibility of an Entente Cordiale between Britain and France. Would France have reacted in a frightened and more hostile way towards Britain in the future ? Would it have precluded an Entente Cordiale between Britain and France, and thus the triple Entente.
 

Deleted member 1487

If the Germans had responded to the Britsh by saying agreeing to an
" 'understanding' that they could wiggle out of if they wanted at any time, much like the Entente Cordiale " how would this have affected the possibility of an Entente Cordiale between Britain and France. Would France have reacted in a frightened and more hostile way towards Britain in the future ? Would it have precluded an Entente Cordiale between Britain and France, and thus the triple Entente.

The Entente would remain a two power alliance, while the British might hedge their bets as time goes on and makes and agreement with France and Russia, kind of like how Italy made a secret deal with France in 1902 to stay out of any conflict involving France and Germany, despite having a defensive alliance with Germany that would require them to fight France. Its not like power couldn't and didn't backstab one another in less than binding treaties.

The reason Germany wanted a formal alliance was to prevent Britain from making other secret treaties at the same time. France was safe in the knowledge of Anglo-German hostility when the Entente Cordiale was formed with Britain, so didn't need to worry about Britain making a deal with France's enemy, but that's something Germany cannot rely on, hence why they offered a full defensive alliance, rather than letting Britain have a 'gentleman's agreement' type of understanding.
 
Sorry if i didn't explain myself clearly, if in 1902 Britain and Germany sign some sort of treaty similar to the later Entente Cordial will that not increase French suspicion of Britain making it less likely Britain and France will sign an Entente Cordial.
 

Deleted member 1487

Sorry if i didn't explain myself clearly, if in 1902 Britain and Germany sign some sort of treaty similar to the later Entente Cordial will that not increase French suspicion of Britain making it less likely Britain and France will sign an Entente Cordial.

I think you are misunderstanding what the Entente Cordiale was; there was nothing formally signed other than some colonial border agreements. It was simply an unofficial promise to support France in some capacity if Germany attacks her while officially it was a series of agreements that settled colonial conflicts, publicly signaling rapproachment.
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entente_cordiale
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entente_cordiale
The Entente cordiale regulated the areas of influence of the United Kingdom and France in Africa. Focus of the agreement were the colonies Egypt and Morocco. By the Entente Cordiale Morocco and Egypt France was clearly attributed to the United Kingdom. The Great Powers assured each other but not to change the political status of the colony and to consider the interests of the contractor in the colony. They also assured each other of the free movement through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Gibraltar

If Germany has something like that with Britain, there is nothing to prevent Britain from taking with France in the same capacity. The promise of support was secret, so if Germany and Britain have a similar agreement, there is no reason that France would know about the secret provision. AFAIK Germany and Britain did have a similar series of agreements settling colonial disputes, but didn't have a secret agreement. Basically I think France would want to neutralize Britain even if it were known that Britain agreed to support Germany, much like it did with Italy; Italy was a member of Triple Alliance, a much more formal alliance that Britain IOTL rejected in 1901, which meant that Britain, not bound by formal treaty, could and would do whatever it wanted, which France knew and would try to persuade to stay out of Continental wars or switch sides at some point.

There is no reason that Britain wouldn't abandon Germany at some point with a non-binding 'understanding' and switch sides.
 
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