The July Revolution in Russia

Hnau

Banned
The October Revolution could have happened in early May from a simple POD. What does this mean? Well, the balance of power was different, so maybe a different leader and regime. Russia would be out of the war by the early summer, which means perhaps the Germans could launch a Summer or Autumn Offensive by pulling back divisions from the Eastern Front. This could be decisive in ending the war with the Central Powers claiming victory.

There was significant outcry in the reshuffling of the Duma, after Miliukov proved to have imperialist designs on Galicia and the Bosporus Strait and in general supported new offensives on the Eastern Front. It was almost unanimous: even the Allies wanted him out of the position of Minister of Foreign Relations. Who to replace his seat? Significant thought was given to Victor M. Chernov, the head of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, who had effectively brought this information to the attention of the public. In OTL, there was a last-minute decision to make him Minister of Agriculture and give the Ministry of Foreign Relations to a non-socialist who would be liked better by the Allies, Tereshchenko.

The problem with Tereshchenko was that Miliukov actually recommended him for his replacement, and he differed only in his methods, not motive. He was part of the "defensist" and even the "pro-war" faction. Soon this would be discovered, but not in the last days of April.

Let's say that Chernov is able to maneuver himself into the position of Minister of Foreign Relations, or maybe Tereshchenko dies, or is assassinated... there are numerous PODs on how it could have happened. It isn't likely, but there was a chance it could have happened. The new cabinet is established on May 6.

Victor Chernov becomes Minister of Foreign Relations and begins appealing for "peace without annexations or indemnities". He is, of course, on the left-wing and for immediate peace. This creates tension with the Allies, but mainly the defensist/pro-war factions in Russia, especially in the Provisional Government. Pretty soon, the right-wing and non-socialists of the Provisional Government resign and begin mobilizing 'White forces' for a counterrevolutionary movement. Every party splits between pro-war and anti-war sides. In this atmosphere the Bolsheviks are definitely the strongest, but not as much as in October.

So, there is a crippled, much more illegitimate and ineffectual Provisional Government. Nevertheless, let's say that by June 22, an armistice is signed with Germany and the Central Powers and peace negotiations begin. However, the Petrograd Soviet and other soviets are gaining much more legitimacy and power, with even Chernov saying that his party should concentrate on focusing their efforts through the Soviet system. A huge number of soldiers begin leaving for home, increasing participation and activism in the soviets.

Under Victor Chernov as Foreign Relations Minister, instead of Trotsky, I can see by July 17 a Peace Treaty being signed which hands over all the territories Germany holds currently... unlike Trotsky, Chernov would not make for 'delaying action' in the negotiations, nor would he be so obstinate to walk out. Germany formally establishes military command over Poland, Lithuania, and Courland (western Latvia).

It is this that lights up the July Revolution. Many, even anti-war factions, paint Chernov and the Provisional Government as having failed. Chernov most likely resigns and Vladimir Lenin declares it a good time for the Bolsheviks to seize power. Kerensky won't give up his spot, and will put together a revolt (with Kornilov and other White generals) that could more or less succeed. With the Soviet trying to claim supreme power, the Cossacks rise up, as well as monarchists. The Red Terror begins, which causes more Whites to join reactionary armies.

On August 4, 1917, the Third Battle of Ypres, or the Battle of Passchendaele, is ongoing... but it receives an extra 70 divisions (50 divisions as they gained with peace on the Eastern Front in OTL, and another 20 divisions freed up from occupying Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine). Now, a lot of key tactics haven't been fully established: stormtroopers, Hutier tactics, the Feuerwalze artillery bombardment, so it won't be a clone of the Spring Offensive, but really wrap your head around 70 extra divisions. Sure, the Germans are playing defensive action... but that gives them more time to train stormtroopers. The Germans could very well launch a counter-attack on August 4 and take as much territory as they did in Spring 1918 by November 1917. The Germans could likely control Paris by Spring 1918, in which case the French would most certainly sue for peace.

By October 1917, you have Allied occupation of Archangelsk, Murmansk, and Japanese intervention in Siberia, with White forces intensifying in power, about nine months sooner than OTL. The Soviets would likely be controlled more by the Socialist-Revolutionaries than IOTL, but the right-wing SRs would be dismissed, and Chernov would be trying to rebuild his influence, likely to be overtaken by Vladimir Lenin. Lenin will probably once again take over power very effectively and absorb the fragmented SRs into the Bolshevik Party.

What does this mean in the end, again? Well, a Central Powers victory, surely, although it won't include the Ukraine. I expect the Allied intervention will be more ruthless, though perhaps shorter if the Central Powers win quickly enough... the Allies could very well try to sustain the Soviet Union as a bulwark against the Central Powers at that point. Nevertheless, the White forces will have German and Austrian support, which is huge. In fact, I predict the White forces taking Moscow... the Central Powers would not risk the survival of the Soviet system and would poor a lot of money into it.

Still, I'm not looking at it all very closely. What are your thoughts?
 
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Deleted member 1487

That is a bit optimistic about the Western Front. I don't know if those troops would really be all available that quickly. The circumstances would be different in the east, as OTL the revolutionaries under Kerensky were interested in staying in the war. Now if they weren't and the Kerensky offensive doesn't happen and the Menshevics (sp?) were to seek a peace that much earlier, well, things could get very dicey for the Allies. The French are mutinying and the US is not yet at war. This may mean a lower moral for the Allies, especially the French. OTL the Brits were doing really quite well in Flanders and the Germans were taking terrific casualties as they were having a hard time defending against limited British attacks.

Normally I thought that the Germans had the upperhand in the tactics department in both World Wars, but the Brits, from everything I have read recently, were actually quite good at the operation limited attacks that slaughtered the Germans, even though they had by the 3rd Ypres managed to impliment their excellent defensive tactics. However, these tactics were not the penultimate defensive measure and the Brits were able to exploit the limited bite and hold attacks that kept them ahead of the casualty curve. The only problem was that these attacks only claimed bits of ground and would not win the war, just continue the attrition that was tearing the Germans apart. Later in the campaign the weather turned against the Brits and Haig pushed too hard for too long and allowed the Germans to even the score as far as body count goes, but Ludendorff was not happy with the result.

In any event, Passchendale would not be different even if the Russians were out as early as you postulate. The Eastern Front would need to be stablized, which would require a phased withdrawl of troops. But without the Kerensky offensive, that helps preserve the Austrians a bit more than OTL. The best bet would be to let the Brits batter themselves out in Flanders, let the French alone, as they would defend themselves, but would not attack. Also when if came to defense, the French were a tough nut to crack, they had the best defensive tactics of the Allies, and commanders that generally were aware of how to shut down German attacks, based off their experiences at Verdun. Also they had the highest proportion of Artillery to men in their divisions, as manpower was exhausted and firepower was what they relied on to fight.

So, what would be the most likely/best option for German troops from the East? Well, Italy would be a great start. They were still bloody from Caporetto and pushing back there would help relieve pressure in Flanders without the grinding force on force attacks that would be required to "beat" the Brits. By knocking the Italians out of the war, it saves what remains of AH to try to shore up the Bulgarians, it helps put more moral pressure on the French, who are freaking out that the Russians are gone. It also let the AH return men to food production, which by itself may keep Germany in the game for 1918. With Italy gone, it is likely that the Allies might offer terms. With the Central Powers able to concentrate on the Western Front, without Russia and an uncommitted untouchable AH, it is likely that Clemanceau might lose his position and the French to cave, but the Germans would really have to play their strategic cards right, which historically they did not. Ludendorff was overpromoted to his position as dictator of Germany. He did not really have a strategic vision that was necessary to win, nor the awareness that a political solution was necessary. The hyberbolic German arrogance was truly manifest in this man and would cost Germany the war, probably even in this TL.

I really don't see a German offensive before the historical one, but without the Kerensky offensive and the earlier collapse of Russia, the Central Powers are in a better position to take advantage of the swing in the balance of power. However, they are still hamstrung by several important issues: AH is a basket case and is in the process of falling apart. The return of prisoners from Russia even helped further this process, as many had become communists. Also Ludendorff and the ultranationalists in Germany were running the show and would not take anything but a complete victory, which was unlikely even in this scenario. The Ottomans were falling apart and when they did, hundreds of thousands of Allied soldiers become available in Europe. Not only that, but once the US gets involved, Germany is screwed. The Germans could only hope for a negotiated peace at that point, which would require concessions, namely evacuating France and Belgium. Note, at this point Germany holds many important cards and could retain Alsace-Lorraine. This was not as important as many people think, especially if France is as wobbly as OTL. They were really messed up by 1918 OTL and were essentially riding on the coat tails of the Brits to victory.
 

Hnau

Banned
Well, look, in OTL the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, formalizing the separate peace, was signed and done with on March 3. This is after two weeks of the Germans pushing hundreds of miles into Ukraine and towards Petrograd. On March 21, the Spring Offensive was launched with those 50 extra divisions from the Eastern Front, among which were trained stormtroopers which were crucial to the Spring Offensive.

I believe Ludendorff was planning on an offensive in the spring for a while, but Russia's armistice on December 1917 must have come as a surprise, giving him only three months to figure out the intricacies. Not even that much... those three months were spent mostly on training stormtroopers and incorporating Hutier tactics. I would think its possible at least to shore up Allied advances, and if so, there are going to be so many well-trained stormtroopers for TTL's Spring Offensive, unlike in OTL, that it will no doubt accomplish its objective: the capture of Paris.
 

Deleted member 1487

The preparations for Kaiserschlacht were in the works for a while and moving the peace ahead would not really change things that much. It gives more time for a push elsewhere and lets more units have breathing space for retraining and resting.

The biggest effect would be on the psyche of the Allies. How would they respond? That is going to be the deciding factor. Even with Italy knocked out, the Germans are not going to be able to pull off a knock out blow, even without the Americans. The military strength is just not there. The question is if the Allies fold psychologically and the Germans are more willing to negotiate a peace on favorable terms, ie a so called 'peace with honor'.
 
Actually, I find 4 problems with the premices. ( along with most of the TL which postulate a CP victory in 1917+, even with no US intervention, or stalemate )

1) The way the Germans set up their sturmtruppen precludes any exploitation of their sucess on a strategic level.
I should probably explain this. To create the sturmtruppen, the germans took ALL their best soldiers from the army and outfitted them as light infantry attack troops. Well and good for shock tropps. But that had also the effect of robbing the rest of the army of all their fit soldiers. What was left was either extremely young boys 16-17 or older reservists ( 35-45 ). Good enough to old trenches, but definitely not to advance quickly on a devastated ground. So the German army is NOT going to advance as quickly as in 1914.

2) the french mutinies were nowhere what they seem to be generally tought of in this group. One thing all the mutinees were clear of is that they would fight on the defensive. They wanted a stop to useless offensives and better living conditions ( as well as respect of their military rights and better food ). That's why the movement was stopped with only 50 condemnation to death, after the logistical demands were agreed to. A German attack at this point is definitely going to see all mutins fighting back.

3) EVen if Paris falls, the french are definitely NOT going to throw the towel. They were going to abandon it in 1914; they definitely will fight without it in 1917, when they can expect US help and have a way to break the german trenches ( which is better than the german one as it doesn't preclude exploitation ). The french are also much better than the german economically and manpower-wise, and they know it.

4) Germany also had social troubles in spring 1917. In the armaments industry, which forced the GHQ to use troops to break strikes in the rear. These troops are still going to be needed to maintain order; They cannot be used immediately against the western front.
 

Hnau

Banned
You're talking about OTL. ITTL, there are two differences on the Western Front: A) Earlier reinforcements, similiar to those in March 1918, only in August 1917 and B) 70 divisions instead of 50.

These are huge advantages. Perhaps they will use them to take down Italy. In which case, a lot more soldiers will be pulled up for the Spring Offensive. Also, Greece will be pushed back, keeping Bulgaria in the war. If the Allies don't give up in 1918, then the war would definitely continue through 1919... in which case, who can last the longest.
 
A few points I'd like to throw in. The offensive tactics used IOTL March 1918 were around in 1917, they were used at Caporetto and the counteratack after Cambrai. The manpower situation would have been far rosier in May 1917 than it was IOTL October 1917, when it came to creating stromtroop divisions.

That said, I think 1917 PoDs are a touch too late for the CP to win the war easily. I think earlier PoDs which set the CP up better in the long run are the way for them to win the inevitable long war.
 

Deleted member 1487

Hnau, I don't think you really understand the situation OTL let alone here. The situation in the East was still very fluid and even with the earlier revolution, things don't get better for the Central Powers that quickly. OTL the Germans left 1 million men in the East to prop up the puppet regimes that were trying to be established out of the debris of the Russian Empire. Here they would still try to occupy the Ukraine for the grain supplies that OTL didn't exist and won't exist here. These magically appearing 70 division won't be available until much later in the year. August is far too soon for any major redeployment of troops, as they would be tasked with stablizing the new Kingdoms for Ludendorff, which was more important to him that ending the war in the West. He viewed the eastern empire of Germany as being the ultimate destiny of the German people and was willing to let the Western front wait until he cleans up the uncertain situation there.

In TTL Germany would still demand more than any Russian government would give, even a revolutionary one. The Communists stalled until the Germans basically occupied everything anyway and had to acknowledge the defacto ground situation. And that happened in March 1918 OTL! This means that it could happen here too, and the Germans will have to occupy everything as OTL, but the Russian interm government, instead of launching the Kerensky offensive will just defend themselves against what is perceived as German aggressiveness. Now this could get ugly, but will still wrap the situation up earlier than OTL for the Germans. BUT this means that by the time things are settled enough for the reenforcements (which will be the size of OTL due to the situation in the East, so no 70 divisions), Passchedale is over.

Winter attacks are not launched for a reason, so don't expect the time table in the west to be moved that far forward. It may mean that the retraining is done quicker, but the 1918 attacks were launched as early as possible OTL.
So this means that the only viable option is Italy, which is still not that attractive, especially with the weather. The Balkan front looks stable and did up until after Kaiserschlacht and only deteriorated in September when the Allies transfered forces there.

Look, the reason Kaiserschlacht was launched was that was the decisive front. The earlier revolution helps take out the Communists in Russia and may mean a more stable Russia following the war, without anything resembling the Civil War and foreign inventions, which will help the Russians form a Republic. However, this does not change the course of the war. It is most likely that the Germans do a better job planning their offensives and their troops are better prepared for what comes, but this does not appreciably change the course of the war. The Germans will still return to unrestricted subwarfare, which will bring in the US. Once that happens the Germans cannot win. The Allies will gut it out now that they know they have unlimited fresh manpower coming to stomp the Germans, who are tottering and have a blockade that is destroying the country. The only hope for the Germans is a negotiated peace, which I have stated will not happen with the current leadership.

Basically, the only thing that changes is perhaps the Germans do slightly better in early 1918, but are still defeated by the end of the year. Like Riain stated, there are many better PODs that would enable a German victory. By July 1917 it is too late unless there are some significant leadership changes, or a desire to negotiate suddenly appears, and it will not come from the Allied side.
 

Hnau

Banned
I don't think you read my entire thread. Chernov wasn't Trotsky. He wouldn't draw out the negotiations for months and allow the Germans to seize the Ukraine, Latvia and Estonia. I said this in the OP. Therefore, the Germans aren't using a million troops to occupy Ukraine and steal their grain... its under a Russo-Ukrainian government at this point. Hence, the 20 extra divisions that would have gone towards the occupation IN ADDITION to the other 50 divisions taken in OTL.

And, as these troops were relocated in the interim period between the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the Spring Offensive, that's a very short time to do so. All that needs to be done is get the soldiers onto trains and bound for the Eastern Fronts. The Germans reshuffled a large part of their troops numerous times during the Great War, they had gotten quite good at fighting a two-front war.

In TTL Germany would still demand more than any Russian government would give, even a revolutionary one. The Communists stalled until the Germans basically occupied everything anyway and had to acknowledge the defacto ground situation.

Wrong. Initially, Ludendorff only wanted Poland, Lithuania, and Courland... not the rest of Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine. That was taken after Trotsky foolishly left the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk.

The earlier revolution helps take out the Communists in Russia and may mean a more stable Russia following the war, without anything resembling the Civil War and foreign inventions, which will help the Russians form a Republic.

Wrong. The Allies would want to intervene even more in order to get Russia to resurrect the Eastern Front. There was more of an imperative in Summer 1917, when the Americans hadn't showed up in any significant force, than in Summer 1918, when they were beginning to win. The Civil War would still go on... what, you think the Whites and reactionary generals would just give Russia over to the Soviets? Basically, the same thing is happening: Lenin taking power, only sooner... however, the situation isn't as far gone, the conservatives believe more at this point than later that it can still be saved. the Civil War will be more brutal if anything different.

The Germans will still return to unrestricted subwarfare, which will bring in the US. Once that happens the Germans cannot win.

The Americans joined the war April 1917, before the POD I suggest. That's commonly known. And, its also commonly known that the Americans didn't show up with considerable force until Summer 1918. If the Germans can take Paris before that point, then it could very well be a moot point.
 
You're talking about OTL. ITTL, there are two differences on the Western Front: A) Earlier reinforcements, similiar to those in March 1918, only in August 1917 and B) 70 divisions instead of 50.

These are huge advantages. .

The german also have three less age classes, as the 1918, 1919 and 1920 classes were not called up in August 1917.

That's another big minus for the Gemans.

OH, and if there is not enough tropps left in the East, the Russians WILL strike, even if they are formally out of the war.
 
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