The Japanese take Darwin in World War II.

Ian_W

Banned
I'd like to point out that the Japanese wouldn't just take Darwin, they'd pinch-off the entire Top End to the Roper and Adelaide rivers, indeed both are navigable some distance inland. The NT railway extended some 300 miles south of Darwin, so they could support forces well away from the port.

That said, the Top End is virtually an island, but instead of being surrounded by water it's surrounded by thousands of miles of empty, EMPTY, desert. As such counter offensives need to be seen in that light, attacking a huge, isolated island.

While this is true, it's also true that Darwin is a huge, isolated, militarily useless island with very poor port facilities.

While it is trivial to take Darwin, it's also pointless - unless you want to put a target for the Allies to attack as they move the railway line north from Alice Springs.

An air base in Darwin is, as has been pointed out, a long way from anything meaningful.

By air, it's 2577km from Rabaul to Brisbane.

By air, it's 2848 km from Darwin to Brisbane.
 
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Essentially what everyone else said. A couple of other ways of looking at this:

1. Sabang and Port Blair are closer to Colombo and Trincomalee than Darwin is to Port Moresby and Akyab is not much further. Possession of those bases did not enable the Japanese to hold at risk the approaches to Ceylon.

2. Claiming that having Darwin allows the Japanese to hold at risk the approaches to Port Moresby is like saying you can hold at risk the approaches to New York City by occupying Miami.
 
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I'd like to point out that the Japanese wouldn't just take Darwin, they'd pinch-off the entire Top End to the Roper and Adelaide rivers, indeed both are navigable some distance inland. The NT railway extended some 300 miles south of Darwin, so they could support forces well away from the port.

That said, the Top End is virtually an island, but instead of being surrounded by water it's surrounded by thousands of miles of empty, EMPTY, desert. As such counter offensives need to be seen in that light, attacking a huge, isolated island.

Gee, I wonder who had a large group of well trained and I mean well trained troops in desert warfare at this point in time? Seems like they could put some of those skills to use back home.
 
Gee, I wonder who had a large group of well trained and I mean well trained troops in desert warfare at this point in time? Seems like they could put some of those skills to use back home.

The western desert is very different to the Australian desert, mainly by being only a few dozen miles wide and dotted with ports large and small every few hundred miles. The interior of Australia has none of these things.
 
The western desert is very different to the Australian desert, mainly by being only a few dozen miles wide and dotted with ports large and small every few hundred miles. The interior of Australia has none of these things.

What does having ports every few hundred miles have anything to do with this? Build your water pipeline and drill wells every so many miles like they did any way in the Western desert and expand your road and rail right behind. If the British can put a pipeline across the Sinai in WWI I think Australia and the US can come up with logitical support to move closer. This would be one of the larger self contained self administered POW camps that the Japanese had during the war. You just need to get close enought to keep them busy and not have them go running off.
 
I think the point is that combat in the western desert was basically siege warfare. Form a defensive point near a port with good logistics and dare the enemy to breach you. Or go tramping off across the desert to a defensive point near a port and try and breach them. The main point is that there is no flanking in the deep desert to the south. Just backwards and forwards in a narrow strip.

Combat in northern Australia overland is basically one big flanking action... or not because you have to stick close to that thin supply line. Which is why we keep coming back to amphibious assault.
 
I think the point is that combat in the western desert was basically siege warfare. Form a defensive point near a port with good logistics and dare the enemy to breach you. Or go tramping off across the desert to a defensive point near a port and try and breach them. The main point is that there is no flanking in the deep desert to the south. Just backwards and forwards in a narrow strip.

Combat in northern Australia overland is basically one big flanking action... or not because you have to stick close to that thin supply line. Which is why we keep coming back to amphibious assault.

If the Australian/US troops are going to have problems with flanking and manouver actions, the Japanese army is really gonna be in bad shape. Imagine units stuck in the desert with no water or supplies. Next thing will be someone will say the IJA will capture enough camels to form a special supply train and end up on Canberra's doorstep through a Bushido campaign on the literal back of a Camel.
 
If the Australian/US troops are going to have problems with flanking and manouver actions, the Japanese army is really gonna be in bad shape. Imagine units stuck in the desert with no water or supplies. Next thing will be someone will say the IJA will capture enough camels to form a special supply train and end up on Canberra's doorstep through a Bushido campaign on the literal back of a Camel.
Meanwhile the American servicemen in Australia smoked their Camels.

The Japanese might not have camels or Camels, but they would have the North Australia Railway...
I'd like to point out that the Japanese wouldn't just take Darwin, they'd pinch-off the entire Top End to the Roper and Adelaide rivers, indeed both are navigable some distance inland. The NT railway extended some 300 miles south of Darwin, so they could support forces well away from the port.

That said, the Top End is virtually an island, but instead of being surrounded by water it's surrounded by thousands of miles of empty, EMPTY, desert. As such counter offensives need to be seen in that light, attacking a huge, isolated island.
BTW I'm not suggesting that they would try and extend the NAR to Canberra, only that it would help them defend "The Top End".
 
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With American submarines operating out of Fremantle as has been suggested, how tough would it be for the Darwinian Japanese to get their POL for establishing air superiority?
 
I was hoping that if the Japanese had taken Darwin the Australians would have extended the Central Australian Railway from Alice Springs to Darwin.

I'd not heard of the Great Western Railway of Queensland before. What are the chances of that being completed to support the forces retaking Darwin ITTL?

Though I think completing the Central Australian Railway prior to retaking Darwin is a bit much, the experience and psychological/political trauma of having Darwin taken probably means that at least one railway gets completed after Darwin is retaken, probably after the war.

IMO the most likely POD would be having the Japanese decide to attack Darwin instead of Timor and Bali right around the time they launch their carrier attack on the harbour (Feb 19/20). This was briefly considered IIRC as it would accomplish the same goal of cutting off aerial reinforcements to Java while having a considerable strategic/political upside in threatening Australia (that being said the logistical problems mentioned above probably led to the plan's cancellation in OTL). Assuming they invade on the 19th that means that the invasion predates the departure of the Langley and Sea Witch. With Java totally cut off and Australia threatened by Japanese bombers out of Darwin there's no way that they get sent. Instead, in TTL, the pilots and their aircraft remain in Australia and likely wrack up some needed experience resisting Japanese bomber raids alongside the aforementioned aerial defences. The US might also send more pilots and ground crew that in OTL were diverted from the DEI to India to Australia in TTL due to political pressure (51st FG perhaps other elements of the 10th Air Force).

Taking Darwin also would have an interesting effect on MacArthur's retreat from the Philippines. The US would probably still try to evacuate him, only in TTL it would have to be via submarine instead of by aircraft. I also wonder if it might be an earlier death blow to the remnants of ABDA command with a decisive breach of the Malay Barrier. It could result in the allies deciding to cut their losses in the DEI and trying to get as many ships and troops as possible out earlier.

Timor and Bali still would need to be taken in TTL so that likely results in either fewer Japanese reinforcements going to Burma following the fall of Java or perhaps a delay in their operations in the Eastern DEI/ Iran Jaya, perhaps both. The Japanese might not push north from Rangoon in TTL, they didn't plan to in OTL but did so because the strategic situation allowed for it. In TTL they've expanded beyond their original goals in a different way and need to allocate the necessary shipping to support it properly. There's also a question of where the aircraft come from to pursue a bombing campaign in Australia and how long the Japanese keep it up. I have a hard time seeing them absorbing the casualties that would come with unescorted daytime raids for very long. Might they resort to terror bombing at night as a way to divert even more Allied resources? Or do they simply transform Darwin into another garrison and turn their focus elsewhere (my guess is the latter).

All this to say that the invasion of Darwin probably doesn't prolong the war but it could lead to the Pacific taking a very different course. If the Japanese don't push north from Burma before the onset of the monsoon season the different strategic situation totally changes that campaign and could very well shorten the war.
 
The western desert was leapfrogging from one base of supply to the next, offensives were launched from nearby supply dumps able to get stocked from land and sea. In Australia any overland assault would first entail building a railway capable of supporting whatever forces needed to watch or remove the Japanese from the Top End. My guess is a standard gauge double track, and the US will get no other help unless it is done .
 
There's also a question of where the aircraft come from to pursue a bombing campaign in Australia and how long the Japanese keep it up. I have a hard time seeing them absorbing the casualties that would come with unescorted daytime raids for very long. Might they resort to terror bombing at night as a way to divert even more Allied resources? Or do they simply transform Darwin into another garrison and turn their focus elsewhere (my guess is the latter).
IOTL the Japanese were bombing Darwin from bases in the Dutch East Indies until well into 1943. ITTL they might be moved forward to Darwin. However, I suspect that there would not be enough bombers to be more than a nuisance.

Similarly the RAAF and USAAF bombed the Dutch East Indies from bases in Darwin and the Japanese had to deploy fighters and AA guns there. These might be moved to Darwin ITTL.
 
The western desert was leapfrogging from one base of supply to the next, offensives were launched from nearby supply dumps able to get stocked from land and sea. In Australia any overland assault would first entail building a railway capable of supporting whatever forces needed to watch or remove the Japanese from the Top End. My guess is a standard gauge double track, and the US will get no other help unless it is done .

Quite likely, fortunately, the US had a lot of experience building railroads. I think this is very likely to hurt Japan in the long run. It will be an air , land and sea sink. This could very well be TTL Guadalcanal.
 
Taking Darwin would be similar to taking the out Aleutians. OPERATION AL was meant to block off what the Japanese viewed as a potential invasion route to Japan.

Grabbing Darwin blocks off a direct route to the DEI. It would not be a precursor to seizing more of Australia any more than AL was a precursor to a move against Alaska. It is essentially a defensive move designed to push the defensive perimeter out a little further. Good idea or not I don't know about in that period in 1942 when the Japanese were in the "what the hell do we do next?" mode, I can easily see them adopting this COA.

As a number of us have pointed out, it would create interesting ripples in Allied capitals and there would be a time of panic because many would believe it is a precursor to seizing larger chunks of Australia. After all, why would they just grab Darwin without a plan to go further, that's just dumb (but essentially in line with Japanese strategic thinking). Additionally, this was during the time when many in the Allied camp swung from viewing the Japanese as slanty eyed buck toothed dwarves to being darn near invincible.
 
IOTL the Japanese were bombing Darwin from bases in the Dutch East Indies until well into 1943. ITTL they might be moved forward to Darwin. However, I suspect that there would not be enough bombers to be more than a nuisance.

Similarly the RAAF and USAAF bombed the Dutch East Indies from bases in Darwin and the Japanese had to deploy fighters and AA guns there. These might be moved to Darwin ITTL.

Yes although after May 1942, Japanese raids against Darwin were either nuisance raids at night or daylight raids that got chewed up robust Allied air defenses.
 
You already established that for the purposes of this discussion that air bases and bomber availability is simply assumed, with your assertion that the Imperial Japanese can run dozens and dozens of bombers out of Darwin...
And the allies have control of Timor and Bali because they started off this scenario with control of it, and you cancelled the original timeline invasion. At least on Timor there was a Dutch-Australian force in place to control Timor in December of 1941.

And there's no airbases on Timor to support such a move that I am aware and long term the timetable is only altered; nothing proposed saves Singapore or the rest of the NEI, meaning Timor is just going to be conquered later. The Australians had actually already made the decision to abandon Timor before the Japanese even landed on it.

I wasn't able to put this in my last reply for time reasons.

Although you wrote "see the shutting down of summertime convoys on the Northern route to the USSR in 1942," I think that you are referring to the period March to November 1943 when no Arctic convoys were run.

Yes, but also in 1942 to an extent; after the PQ-17 disaster no convoys were run again until September as you note.

However, they weren't suspended because of the threat of air attack, they were suspended because of the Tirpitz. They were resumed because she was put out of action for 6 months by the midget submarine attack of September 1943.

That's assigning way too much credit to Tirpitz; the Luftwaffe, U-Boats and other surface units formed the main threat and indeed that's entirely why they gave up on summer convoys, due to near 24 hour daylight for aircraft and subs to attack.

here was a gap between PQ17 in July 1942 and PQ18 in September. However, that was because the RN wanted to provide the strongest possible escort to the August Convoy ton Malta, better know as Operation Pedestal and the presence in northern Norway of an insignificant German boat called Tirpitz.

Yes, the threat was so great the Royal Navy had to marshal large amounts of resources to counter it. This is something the Allies won't have in the Pacific until 1943.

Have you actually look at a map? Darwin is hundreds of miles west of Port Moresby. The major garrison on Rabaul is closer. It's roughly 1,800 kilomoters from Darwin to Port Moresby, while the large Japanese garrison of Rabaul was only 800 kilometers.

Taking Darwin does nothing to stop ships coming from the west coast of the US or Hawaii, and it certainly doesn't impact Rabaul, Coral Sea, or the Solomons or New Caledonia.

Please actually look at a map and do some actual research before embarrassing yourself like this.

That's a pretty bad contemporary example IMHO.

The distance between the summertime Arctic Convoy route and the German air bases in Norway was considerably shorter than the distance between Darwin and the convoy routes to New Guinea. It's about 1,100 miles from Darwin to Port Moresby and 1,050 miles from Darwin to Cairns.

As far as I can see Darwin is simply too far away from New Guinea and the Solomon Islands to influence those campaigns.

Actually it massively impacts such and looking at airfields and the sea straits shows this.

From the Allied perspective, the largest and the most important position was Port Moresby, on New Guinea. Port Moresby is separated from northeastern Australia, 310 miles away, by the Gulf of Papua and the ninety-mile-wide Torres Strait. It was excellently located to support air attacks against the eastern and southeastern coast of New Guinea and the Admiralties. Port Moresby was vulnerable to a landing from the sea. The 13,360-foot Owen Stanley Range provided a degree of security from attack overland.39 Control of Port Moresby would allow the Japanese to blockade the eastern sea approaches to Darwin and deny the Allies a forward base in New Guinea. It would also pose a threat of invasion against eastern Australia.40 Port Moresby lacked good port facilities to serve as a base when the Australian troops arrived in early 1941. Port Moresby remained virtually useless for Allied heavy bombers. The nearest supporting airfields were at Townsville, some seven hundred miles away in Australia.41 In the spring of 1942 Port Moresby was defended by several thousand poorly trained and equipped troops. The rest of New Guinea was defended by a local militia called the New Guinea Volunteer Reserve.42

Control of Darwin allows the suppression of the Townsville bomber bases and gives the Japanese air and sea superiority over the approaches to Port Moresby from the West. Port Moresby gives the Japanese the Solomons, and that leads to what the Australians feared was coming to pass in 1942:

At the end of February 1942, the Australian chiefs of staff assessed the country’s defense in light of the fall of Singapore, the raid on Darwin, and the impending Allied collapse in the NEI. They believed that if the Japanese advanced into the Coral Sea to cut off Australia’s communications with North America they might attack Port Moresby and then the Australian mainland. In their view, Port Moresby was too vulnerable to be reinforced but too important to be abandoned. Another option for the Japanese was to advance to the Solomon Islands and then capture the New Hebrides and New Caledonia.25

There is a big differance between having a convoy under basically 24 hour daylight and only a couple of hundred Kilometers from well supplied air bases, with a group of large surface ships ready to attack on short notice, Verses flying up to a 1000 Kilometers with both day and night this at time of year almost equal and no surface units anywhere close to the shipping lanes. Not to mention Japanese maintenace was no where close to what German was.

Yet it took until early 1944 for the RAAF to gain air superiority in Northern Australia even with Darwin in their hands.
 

Darwin is in the Northern Territories, not Queensland. Might want to double check your maps.

While this is true, it's also true that Darwin is a huge, isolated, militarily useless island with very poor port facilities.

While it is trivial to take Darwin, it's also pointless - unless you want to put a target for the Allies to attack as they move the railway line north from Alice Springs.

An air base in Darwin is, as has been pointed out, a long way from anything meaningful.

By air, it's 2577km from Rabaul to Brisbane.

By air, it's 2848 km from Darwin to Brisbane.

Except for the fact the Allies used Darwin to launch commando raids into Timor that died down 20,000 Japanese troops and, more importantly, based bombers in its environs that were used to bomb/mine NEI oil facilities, severely limiting Japanese imports.
 
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