What if Alfred Thayer Mahan never writes The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660-1783? What'd be the consequences for Naval Doctrine going forward and the build up to WW1?
Uh who would that be? France and Russia OTL basically had their own ideas. For Japan, Germany, Italy and Austria-Hungary Mahanian doctrine was in their national interests. Everyone else was too minor to matterThere would be a good chance that various naval personages, especially those outside Britain and the US, would be using their brains instead of trying to comply with a theory which had little to do with their national interests.![]()
While they would probably be better read, I doubt any one in particular would be able to establish itself as dominantly as Mahan, nor have as much impact on the Naval Arms Race.Other theorists, now very obscure, would be better read.
Uh who would that be? ...
Clausewitz didn't really deal much with naval warfare, though Corbutt could probably gain more influence outside of Britain.Clausewitz & Corbutt would be two obvious ones.
He wasn't talking about theorists. He was talking about naval staffs who adopted Mahanian doctrine in contrast to their national interests. I was asking which nations were thoseClausewitz & Corbutt would be two obvious ones.
Wasn't Willy 2 in Germany a big fan of him?
Uh who would that be? France and Russia OTL basically had their own ideas. For Japan, Germany, Italy and Austria-Hungary Mahanian doctrine was in their national interests. Everyone else was too minor to matter
That much is barely enough to defend its coasts given its opposition. Ottomans were going to buy 2 new Dreadnoughts, ergo need 3 or more to counter them, Ottomans increase plans, need to buy more. Similarly for the Baltic, the Germans had far more than 8BB and 4BCIn OTL Russia of post RJW was planning a huge naval expansion which was going well beyond the need to defend its coasts. the head of the Naval Ministry, Admiral Dikov saw the main task of the Russian navy in the geopolitical competition with the leading naval powers: "Russia needs a strong fleet to be a Great Power and it should be able to send it anywhere its interests require". Sentiment was echoed by a Foreign Minister, Izvolsky: "The navy must be free, not to be burdened in its tasks by a need to defend a specific sea. It should be anywhere Russian politics needs it to be." The main way to achieve these goals was a massive construction of the modern battleships. The naval program approved in 1909 involved the following:
On the Baltic Sea - 8 new battleships, 4 battle-cruisers, 9 light cruisers, 20 submarines, 36 big and 36 small destroyers.
On the Black Sea - 3 new battle-cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 18 destroyers and 6 submarines.
On the Pacific - 3 cruisers, 18 big and 9 small destroyers, 12 submarines.
And this was only the beginning: the later plans assumed further developments: in 1911 a decision was made to built 3 new battleships on the Black Sea and in 1913 one more battleship.
In 1912 a plan had been made to create a naval base in French Bizerta and to transfer there part of the Baltic fleet for the "strategic purposes".
If this is not Mahant-influenced schema, I don't know what is.
Germany's fleet was a giant political bludgeon. It meant to be something that the UK cannot ignore and thus would have to be neutralized with diplomatic concessions. The UK certainly did not ignore the German Fleet OTL. That politics ended up with the UK on the other side was besides the point of the fleetFor Germany "Mahanian doctrine" hardly resulted in anything substantial besides huge expenses and worsened relations with Britain and during WWI its submarines and relatively small raiders proved to be much more important factor than its battleships and Mahant's pipe dream of naval supremacy being decided by a modern version of Trafalgar with the mighty battleships confronting each other (all the way to a glorious end) proved, at Jutland, to be a pointless wast of people and material: it changed nothing.
Italy and A-H's biggest concerns at sea were each other. Geography means A-H can't do anything at sea without beating the main body of the Italian Fleet, and means that has to be the focus of both powersA-H as a naval power with a strategic reach was a pipe dream: getting their navy out of Adriatic would be a major task (which, IIRC, it could not accomplish during WWI) and they did not have a colonial empire to defend and/or overseas naval bases to support the strategic operations. Almost the same goes for Italy: it hardly could expect to compete with France on the Med and its colonial "empire" was too small to require dominance on the sea.
Clausewitz didn't really deal much with naval warfare, though Corbutt could probably gain more influence outside of Britain.
That much is barely enough to defend its coasts given its opposition.
In the late 19th century railroads were beginning to turn vast, landlocked territories into an asset and provide a workaround for sea power and expensive canals. Mackinder's model of contiguous, land based empires with railroad-enabled military mobilization is a 20th century model.
Yes and no. Geopolitical influence over eastern Europe doesn't need to translate into genocide against everyone who lives there. Germany's a land power, it has no reason to pointlessly antagonize Britain by building a naval fleet that will be outclassed or trying to invest in colonies that will be cutoff by a blockade in Eastern Europe.Eh, Hitler followed Mackinder, and we all know how that turned out.
Yeah, but at this time a big impact in Germany has pretty significant consequences for the rest of Europe."Those poor French - they have not read their Mahan!" - Wilhelm II
Without him, well, I dunno. A lot of fin de siecle imperial policy was as much about prestige as rational decisionmaking. And battleships are always going to be flashier than subs and cruisers. It might not be that big an impact outside of Germany.