The impossible victory.

every nation could have "done a lot better",the germans too. its just a lot more probable that they would do significantly worse.

This is a statement that rings very true at the sound of it, and is at the core of many of the "Axis could never win" beliefs.

There are nevertheless always a reason for a change, and that may change the preconditions for later rolls of the dice.
Is chaos in German planning for long war a necessity? You need a reason to change it, but no.
3 torpedoes hit and explode on the keel of HMS Nelson, would Britain stay in the war without Churchill making an impact?
Might the Axis have seen the priority in keeping the US out of the war?
The list goes on and on. There is an alternative list were the axis do worse, but of course remarkable changes could ensue.
 
Weren't they aiming for 3 months

They were expecting to be in Moscow in 3 months, but they figured they'd be at the Volga by six months... that is, the entire length of the Volga, not just the little corner they reached OTL 1942 at Stalingrad. Yes, that means they expected to occupy the entire Caucasus in 1941. The Germans didn't expect to reach the A-A line until into 1942, but since according to the plan reaching the Volga alone would have meant the Red Army had already been destroyed as a functioning entity that wouldn't have mattered.
 
This is a statement that rings very true at the sound of it, and is at the core of many of the "Axis could never win" beliefs.

There are nevertheless always a reason for a change, and that may change the preconditions for later rolls of the dice.
Is chaos in German planning for long war a necessity? You need a reason to change it, but no.
3 torpedoes hit and explode on the keel of HMS Nelson, would Britain stay in the war without Churchill making an impact?
Might the Axis have seen the priority in keeping the US out of the war?
The list goes on and on. There is an alternative list were the axis do worse, but of course remarkable changes could ensue.

Well considering Hitler was the one who declared war on the US after the Japanese attack and also promised to back the Japanese up

http://www.amazon.com/The-Rise-Fall-Third-Reich/dp/1451651686

It would require more then one POD in my opinion.

The Nelson scenario is a possibility and I think it should be clear that I have a view identical to Calbear's view in that the War the NAZI's chose to fought was impossible to win (against UK, US and the USSR) I think the question is would War restart if the japnese attack the British as well as the US?

On War planning I think necessity is the wrong word, see they planned badly mainly because of what the NAZI's goals were and people resigning.

They were expecting to be in Moscow in 3 months, but they figured they'd be at the Volga by six months... that is, the entire length of the Volga, not just the little corner they reached OTL 1942 at Stalingrad. Yes, that means they expected to occupy the entire Caucasus in 1941. The Germans didn't expect to reach the A-A line until into 1942, but since according to the plan reaching the Volga alone would have meant the Red Army had already been destroyed as a functioning entity that wouldn't have mattered.

I see, so in short they kept setting impossible goals.
 
No, I'm suggesting that the supplies deposited at the railheads themselves were totally inadequate after the stocks of September had been burned through in their lunge creating the Vyazma-Bryansk pockets.

Lets recap a bit.
While you claim the Vyazma-Bryansk pockets overextended the Germans, I've been saying it was still worthwhile.
Although they would have been better served focusing on destroying as many Soviet units as possible in the immediate aftermath of the encirclements instead of trying to win more terrain.
And then dig in and prepare for the winter. Say on a line going from about Rzhev-Gzhatsk-Sukhinichi-Orel.

You counter by pointing to the supply problems.

But we don't have to argue about that, since we already have the answer.
The germans did manage to bring forward enough supplies to more or less hold that line for the duration of the winter.

Now, the German supply situation in this ATL would be better, given that they would have stockpiled some supplies originally used in the drive on Moscow, while at the same time spending more time improving the lines of communication between the frontline and the railheads.

So for your assertion to work, you have to point to some other fact beyond German supply problems, in order to make your case that they would be unable to hold a line running from for instance Rzhev-Gzhatsk-Sukhinichi-Orel.


Of the armies and army-equivalents involved in Operation Typhoon, only Von Kluge's 4th Army reported in October that the difficulty lay with being able to bring them to the troops from the railheads rather then a lack of arriving at the railheads themselves (Crewald's Supplying War, Page 172).

But 4A was a big part of AGC. While say Sharp in 'the Northern Flank' also points out difficulties in bringing forward supplies to Kalinin, despite that being outside 4A area of operations.

Btw: did your assertion that the trucks spent the bulk of their time at the railheads doing nothing also stem from Crevald? I couldn't find my copy of the book this morning.


Because they have to deal with Soviets rampaging in their rear areas, which is going to take considerable time and inflict notable damage upon the panzer divisions.

Would that be the offensive mentioned in Glantz's Barbarossa Derailed (vol.IV p.120):
"At no time during the initial period of war did a Red Army offensive prove less promising and ultimately more futile than the one conducted by General Eremenko's Briansk Front from 29 August to 14 September."

I'm assuming that he orders it right around the same time.

In the ATL, he's just won even bigger at El'nia and halted 2nd PzGrs drive south as well.
Which leads me to ask again: why would he order a withdrawal from Kiev at such a time, when he historically didn't the day before the door closed? Now I'm not arguing that he certainly would stay put - as I mentioned originally; it's an uncertain point as to whether he would screw up or not.
 
I'm a bit confused.
In this forum seems to be some beliefs on WW-II.
1-Germany must do the war within 1939,otherwise his economy collapses.
2-Are no way that Germany can win WW-II,whatever he does,whatever strategy apply,Germany can not win,neither in 1940-41 before the America intervention,neither if had not missed a move.
No way.
3-Russia is invincible,even without American aids,even with a war on two fronts with Japanese, Germany can not win.

Well seems, that Roosevelt and Churchill,and all these peoples in UK and United States were worried without reason in 40s.
And seems that no one in Germany had understood that any move,any decision,any strategy was useless:war o peace they were over anyway.

Are these beliefs a bit exaggerated?

1) I am by no means an economics expert like many others here, so I will take their word for it and respond, yes, the German economy probably collapses if there is no conquest very soon, maybe not in 1939 then 1940, or even 1941.

2) THIS is false. IF the Germans do EVERYTHING right or the Allies screw MORE things up then it is certainly possible for Germany to win, NOTHINING in world history is inevitable, hence the creation of this forum, despite what some others may think.;) It is just that OTL can already be considered a wank for the Axis in that they did do everything near-perfect and the Allies did screw up pretty much EVERYTHING. So, when you ask for some pro-Axis PODs you get shouts from the Alliedwankers of "WANK!!!!" because to have even more things fall in the favour of the axis IS on the implausible side of things. A certain infamous TL here had the Germans working with seemingly-magical hindsight, yet, how could Hitler have known that the French wouldn't guard the Ardennes or stop the Sedan crossings? He didn't, he took a gamble, couple that with French stupidity, and boom, ASB-like conquest of France. If we were in an ATL where Sealion was pulled off we will probably complaining about how stupid the Brtish were to not move out the Home Fleet, or to not intercept the invasion barges, or to not immediately counter the landings by the Germans. Or going in the opposite direction, people will be hounding a TL where France falls just as much as we hound said infamous TL here, with shouts and complaints of "AXISWANK!!"

In the end, the Axis had a chance, it's just on the lower scale of probability, but by no means impossible.


3) NO. The Soviet Union is BY NO MEANS invincible-sure they might have more or less unlimited manpower, but they needed Western help to completely, militarily defeat the Reich. People here mention how lend-lease only came when the "crisis" was over for the Soviets, yet there was still a long way to go from the "crisis" to the 1945 monster that was the Red Army. Without Western aid at all the Germans might have pulled off a stalemate by the skin of their teeth, but how long they would last after that is debatable. Or, taking aside the issue of lend lease, if Stalin was assassinated and a power struggle took place, or if he purged the red army of its best commanders when they failed against Barbarossa, you can have a much poorer led USSR, and a German win is much more likely.

These are just two ways my own mediocre mind (compared to the experts like wiking and ObssessedNuker-to name a few, one an expert on the Germans, the other an expert on the soviets) the Germans can "win" against the Soviets, and I am pretty sure there are other ways as well. The USSR is far from invincible.


Many of these ideas come from the fact that almost all WWII threads about the Axis doing better are immediately dissed on and hated, for no apparent reason. While the experts on the respective sides have an extremely lively and informative debate most members chose to jump on the bandwagon of "AXIS BAD IN HISTORY SO I SUPPORT ALLIES IN WHATEVER DEBATE THAT COMES UP!!" If we can't even discuss what is still the most popular POD today, then what is the point of this forum? If everything bad in history can not be discussed or used as an POD then wouldn't everything become boring?

The only reason I can think of that people will think that discussing these subjects are bad is that they somehow feel the asker and/or the supporters of the debate for some reason supporting the Axis and what they did, which I find ludicrous and unbelievable. Come on guys, cut the people who ask if the Axis could have done better a break. They just want to learn, not support the Axis....:rolleyes:
 

Read this as I think your generalising why people think the Axis doing better at times is a tank

They are unless there are some modifications to the starting positions.

The Reich had no hope of defeating the wold's great economies on its own, not at the same time. Neither Japan nor Italy (which was actually LESS robust economically than Japan) could make up for the vast difference in relative capabilities.

Hiter made a series of mistakes, starting with his decision to push his luck after a remarkable series of diplomatic victories. His decision to push ahead against Poland put him into the major European War at least a year too soon.

Germany could not fight on multiple fronts, against enemies with effectively unlimited resources of both men and materials. The Reich had to defeat or at least disengage from the UK before engaging the USSR. There are ways that the Reich could have been much better placed to fight the British, starting with the obvious decision to construct more long range u-boats rather than a few vanity heavy warships. There are also diplomatic strategies that could have led to a cessation of hostilities if the effort against the UK supply line had been more successful early in the war. Only after resolving the UK conflict should the Reich had even considered engaging the USSR.

The Soviets could have been broken in the earliest days of Barbarossa. The chances are very low, but the addition of another Army Group+ equivalent that could have been available if the British war had concluded prior to the start of the War with the USSR (troops, and perhaps more critically equipment, from Africa, the Balkans, Norway, and along the Atlantic Wall would have become available).

Perhaps most importantly, an easier resolution of the war with the UK removes the overwhelming manufacturing capabilities and the huge number of personnel that the United States brought to bear. The Soviets would not have been able to produce the materials that came out of their own factories without the materials from the U.S., not without massive reduction in the available manpower that the Red Army burned through.

So it isn't impossible. It is just impossible to do it the way the Reich tried it.
 
Of the armies and army-equivalents involved in Operation Typhoon, only Von Kluge's 4th Army reported in October that the difficulty lay with being able to bring them to the troops from the railheads rather then a lack of arriving at the railheads themselves (Crewald's Supplying War, Page 172).
But 4A was a big part of AGC. While say Sharp in 'the Northern Flank' also points out difficulties in bringing forward supplies to Kalinin, despite that being outside 4A area of operations.

Btw: did your assertion that the trucks spent the bulk of their time at the railheads doing nothing also stem from Crevald? I couldn't find my copy of the book this morning.

I dug up my old copy of Creveld today. With regards to the quote above, it seems a bit inaccurate, as Creveld limits himself to saying 4th Army was the only Army sized command that had problems with bringing supplies forward.

He also writes (on the same page)
"Thus, at Guderian's Panzergruppe 2, the state of the roads led to grave supply problems from 11 October onward."
"There were problems of supply from 4 October when Panzergruppe 4 complained that it had begun the operation with only 50 per cent of it's motor transport still servicable".

So Creveld mentions two army-equivalent units having problems in addition to the army you mentioned.


A few additional comments:

1) He writes that AGC "experienced such tremendous difficulties in building up a base at Smolensk", noting that due to flash flooding and other problems, the buildup ahead of Typhoon didn't start in earnest before 21 September (about 10 days before the start of the offensive).

2) Furthermore, units started experiencing lack of supplies quite early in October, partially due to them being unavailable at the supply depots close to the railheads.

3) He also quotes several army reports lamenting the lack of train arrivals at newly captured cities like Orel and Bryansk, which is natural given that it takes some time repairing damaged lines.

4) The recurring theme is the lack of arriving fuel trains, which "was due partly to its non-availability at home, and partly to the impossibility of supplying six armies...at a distance of 400 miles from their bases."


Based on this, I think it's fair to assume that the available stockpiles of supplies at the start of the offensive were quite small - given the short buildup period and on how quickly they disappeared.
And would thus quickly whittle away even if they had stayed on the defensive.
Trading some of those stockpiles for roughly 600k Soviet irrecoverable losses therefore seems like a very good deal.

While the fuel situation would be a big concern, it would be significantly better than historically (when they managed to hold roughly the same defensive line throughout the winter) due to an earlier end of the offensive. And by staying closer to the railheads, fuel costs associated with bringing supplies forward would drop due to the distances and due to partially replacing motorized supply columns with other means once they'd settled in on defense.
 
I dug up my old copy of Creveld today. With regards to the quote above, it seems a bit inaccurate, as Creveld limits himself to saying 4th Army was the only Army sized command that had problems with bringing supplies forward.

Tooze flat out states that "alone among the armies, Von Kluge reported that his stocks were large enough, but the difficulty lay in bringing them to the troops".

"Thus, at Guderian's Panzergruppe 2, the state of the roads led to grave supply problems from 11 October onward."
You leave out the very next sentence: "At the same time, however, the number of fuel-trains reaching Orel fell very sharply, thus making it impossible to resume the offensive even after frost had hardened the roads and the tactical situation had once more become favorable."

As he concludes that paragraph: "It seems certain, therefore, that the mud was only one factor that brough the Wehrmacht to a halt. No less important were the railways, which had already experienced such tremendous difficulties in building up a base at Smolensk and which were simply unable to cope with the increased demands of a fresh offensive."

Based on this, I think it's fair to assume that the available stockpiles of supplies at the start of the offensive were quite small - given the short buildup period and on how quickly they disappeared. And would thus quickly whittle away even if they had stayed on the defensive.
But not remotely as fast. The German advance at the start of October basically burned up all of those stocks in a few days and forced the forces to subsist hand-to-mouth afterwards. Without it, they would have lasted considerably longer and given the Germans much needed stamina.

Trading some of those stockpiles for roughly 600k Soviet irrecoverable losses therefore seems like a very good deal.
Your not trading "some" of these stockpiles, your trading all of them. Afterwards, your subsisting entirely hand-to-mouth with no capacity for building up any more stocks.

While the fuel situation would be a big concern, it would be significantly better than historically (when they managed to hold roughly the same defensive line throughout the winter) due to an earlier end of the offensive.
The halting of the Soviet offensive later on only occurred after the Soviets themselves had smashed in the German spearheads, advanced, and then strung themselves out in turn. The German supply situation did not improve at all as the railroads remained collapsed. Even then, the Germans survived the winter of 1941-42 just as much from luck and Soviet mistakes as they did their own efforts.

IATL where the Germans go through with a Typhoon, when the Soviets attack they'll be starting from further west and consequently get further west inflicting roughly the same amount of casualties and gaining roughly the same amount of ground. The Germans would thus basically be driven back to their starting position of OTL. Without the Germans gaining the ground between Rzhev and Moscow, those bases and logistical nets will remain intact and allow the Soviets to concentrate more force then they did OTL while the German armies are ultimately just as strung out in positions just as poor.
 
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Tooze flat out states that "alone among the armies, Von Kluge reported that his stocks were large enough, but the difficulty lay in bringing them to the troops".

I browsed through Tooze's Wages of Destruction without finding that quote. Care to provide a page number?

He does however corroborate Crevald with respect to the difficulties AGC had in building up its supply stocks in September, and the general lack of fuel in Germany by the end of the year.

You leave out the very next sentence: "At the same time, however, the number of fuel-trains reaching Orel fell very sharply, thus making it impossible to resume the offensive even after frost had hardened the roads and the tactical situation had once more become favorable."

It wasn't important in that context, where I quoted Crevald that in addition to 1 of 3 armies, 2 out of the 3 panzergroups were also experiencing difficulties with the truck based supplies.

I dealt with the rest of the quote in the other part of my post, where I explained AGC's troubles with fuel deliveries and newly captured rail lines.

As he concludes that paragraph: "It seems certain, therefore, that the mud was only one factor that brough the Wehrmacht to a halt. No less important were the railways, which had already experienced such tremendous difficulties in building up a base at Smolensk and which were simply unable to cope with the increased demands of a fresh offensive."

Compare that to your conclusion previously in this thread, which I questioned:

What the mud and ice did to the trucks was actually rather minor compared to what it did to the railroads, which was the real big killer.

There seems to be a difference between your and Crevald's description of the situation. Do you believe Crevald is wrong, when he merely concludes that the railroad difficulties were "No less important" instead of your "the real big killer" interpretation?

Your not trading "some" of these stockpiles, your trading all of them. Afterwards, your subsisting entirely hand-to-mouth with no capacity for building up any more stocks.

Care to provide some analysis on how big those stockpiles were, given that they were built up in about 10 days, while fighting was ongoing? For how many days, weeks, months would it be able to bridge the gap between supply needs and supply deliveries?

How much of the supplies would be left at the end of November after fighting defensive battles against a numerically stronger Red Army? Or do you believe the supplies would last all the way into December? Or January? Or February?


while the German armies are ultimately just as strung out in positions just as poor

Do you really believe the Germans would have the same imbalance between frontline troops and reserves if they had 6-7 weeks to prepare for a defense?
Or that usage of supplies (fuel in particular) would be the same regardless if they advanced another 150km or not?
Or that available quarters would be just as bad?
Or that a host of other things?

The halting of the Soviet offensive later on only occurred after the Soviets themselves had smashed in the German spearheads, advanced, and then strung themselves out in turn. The German supply situation did not improve at all as the railroads remained collapsed. Even then, the Germans survived the winter of 1941-42 just as much from luck and Soviet mistakes as they did their own efforts.

Any reason as to why the Soviets would make less mistakes or the Germans get more unlucky in this ATL?

As you indicate, the Red Army would attack from a much stronger logistical position regardless of whether the Germans had attacked but limited their eastward advance, or if they had remained in position around Smolensk.

That is; it boils down to whether the Soviets would be better off in a prolonged winter offensive with roughly 600k additional troops, or if they would be better off with the Germans having slightly smaller available supplies.

Since I don't believe their stockpiles of supplies would last long into the winter, I do believe inflicting more casualties was the better option - by far.
 
I browsed through Tooze's Wages of Destruction without finding that quote. Care to provide a page number?

Not sure why I typed Tooze when I should have typed Crewald. WTF was my mind? :confused:

It wasn't important in that context, where I quoted Crevald that in addition to 1 of 3 armies, 2 out of the 3 panzergroups were also experiencing difficulties with the truck based supplies.
No, it was pretty damn important context. Those same 2 out of 3 panzergroups were experiencing difficulties with truck based supplies... when they weren't experiencing them with the railroads. That's the point of Crewalds quote about Guderian. Its the same for the other panzer group you cited on the same page:

"Panzergruppe 4 was still advancing slowly as late as October 25, driving 'a weak opponent' before it and imploring OKH to make 'ruthless use of railways in order to provide it with fuel".

The Panzergruppe wouldn't be screaming at OKH to get supplies via train unless enough supplies weren't arriving via train.

Compare that to your conclusion previously in this thread, which I questioned:

There seems to be a difference between your and Crevald's description of the situation. Do you believe Crevald is wrong, when he merely concludes that the railroad difficulties were "No less important" instead of your "the real big killer" interpretation?
"No less important" means that the railroad crisis was at minimum just as important as the effect of mud upon truck transportation. So there is no difference.

Care to provide some analysis on how big those stockpiles were, given that they were built up in about 10 days, while fighting was ongoing? For how many days, weeks, months would it be able to bridge the gap between supply needs and supply deliveries?
Uncertain since Crewald doesn't provide exacting enough information. They were quite apparently wholly depleted in the period it took to form and reduce the Vyazma-Bryansk pockets. Given that with no Typhoon, the frontline would remain quiet until December (as the Soviets were focusing on recovering from the Yel'niya and Kiev fiascos) and the Germans could get some additional stockpiling done in that first week of October... middle-to-end of December maybe? I'm ballparking obviously

Do you really believe the Germans would have the same imbalance between frontline troops and reserves if they had 6-7 weeks to prepare for a defense?
Yes. They had no reserves left upon commencement of Typhoons and continued to do so throughout the entirety of the autumn-winter battles.

Or that usage of supplies (fuel in particular) would be the same regardless if they advanced another 150km or not?
Fuel, no. Ammunition yes. The fuel will become less important anyways due to how German vehicles didn't handle Soviet winter weather very well.

Or that available quarters would be just as bad?
Given the difficulty of entrenching in mud and then sub-zero temperatures combined with Soviet scorched earth policies, yes. Remaining around Smolensk means they can get these positions set-up before the mud sets in.

Any reason as to why the Soviets would make less mistakes or the Germans get more unlucky in this ATL?
None, really. Hence why the Germans only lose roughly just as much ground and suffer just as much casualties.

As you indicate, the Red Army would attack from a much stronger logistical position regardless of whether the Germans had attacked but limited their eastward advance, or if they had remained in position around Smolensk.
At least by remaining around Smolensk, the Germans would not overextend themselves and leave themselves vulnerable to said counterblow. They could actually muster a reserve and hunker down in prepared positions.

That is; it boils down to whether the Soviets would be better off in a prolonged winter offensive with roughly 600k additional troops, or if they would be better off with the Germans having slightly smaller available supplies.
I could see the Germans safely conducting some much more minor offensive operations to reduce Soviet forces without badly dislocating themselves. So they can reduce the size of Soviet forces that the Soviets won't really have 600K+ additional troops. Its when you start getting to something the size of Vyazma-Bryansk that things start to become unfeasible.
 
Someone already pointed to Adam Tooze's book, which I highly recommend on this subject.

IMO, Germany lost the war in 1936. It was then that Hitler was confronted by the serious businessmen and economist of Germany that pointed out the current rate of re-armerment was unsustainable. Hitler overruled them

And if Hitler had listened them?
If had pointed on a strategy of long game,balancing a re-armement,based on technological innovations and new type of weapons ,on which Germans were masters,with a sane economy of export of goods?
 
No, it was pretty damn important context. Those same 2 out of 3 panzergroups were experiencing difficulties with truck based supplies... when they weren't experiencing them with the railroads.
That's the point of Crewalds quote about Guderian.

Creveld is arguing against the notion that the mud, and only the mud, stalled the German drive on Moscow.
And so he concludes that the problems with the railways were "no less important".
Now, I don't have a problem with that statement.

You presented quotes from him were he point to troubles with the railways.
I supplanted that by presenting quotes where he points to trouble with the trucks.
Read in totality, they underscore Creveld's conclusion that the German had troubles with both.

It seemed however, from your first posts in this thread, as if your were arguing that the mud was inconsequential in the last quarter of '41.
Claiming that the railway was the real big killer, while the trucks spent the bulk of their time idle waiting for something to.
And I do have a problem with that, since it goes much further than Creveld's conclusion.


"No less important" means that the railroad crisis was at minimum just as important as the effect of mud upon truck transportation. So there is no difference.

I disagree. Claiming that something is roughly equal, as opposed to something being far more important, is different.

The Panzergruppe wouldn't be screaming at OKH to get supplies via train unless enough supplies weren't arriving via train.

Specifically, they were screaming at OKH to have supplies delivered to railheads close to the frontline.
Another interpretation than yours would be that the PzGr's wouldn't be screaming at OKH to get supplies delivered close to the frontline, if they had sufficient truck-based capacity
to move them depots further away.

Uncertain since Crewald doesn't provide exacting enough information.
They were quite apparently wholly depleted in the period it took to form and reduce the Vyazma-Bryansk pockets.
Given that with no Typhoon, the frontline would remain quiet until December (as the Soviets were focusing on recovering from the Yel'niya and Kiev fiascos)
and the Germans could get some additional stockpiling done in that first week of October... middle-to-end of December maybe? I'm ballparking obviously

I have a few issues with this as well.
Firstly about the front remaining quiet. One of the reasons for the German success in early October, was the fact that the Red Army had continued attacking throughout September.

From Lopukhovsky's 'The Viaz'ma catastrophe':
"only on 27 September, having detected the enemy's obvious preparations for an offensive, did the Stavka issue a directive for the
forces of the Western Front to adopt a rigid defense". "Similar directives were issued on this day to the Southwestern and Briansk Fronts."

Even after that catastrophe, the Red Army maintained an offensive mindset in mid-November, launching attacks in multiple directions.

Why do you believe the Red Army would lose it's offensive spirit in the absence of a German attack?
Elsewhere in your post, you also indicate that AGC should conduct minor offensive operations in absence of Typhoon.

In combination, I have a hard time seeing that "the frontline would remain quiet until December" as you write.

Now, lets make a ballpark estimate that the stockpiles were enough to cover 6 days of heavy combat.
Lets also remember that the Germans had large problems bringing forward supplies from Oct to mid-Dec, as you've argued.
And thus were living hand-to-mouth, using up the supplies whenever they became available.

Given that, I think your assessment that those 6 days worth of supplies would last 75-90 days, with normal/light combat operations is on the high end of the scale. But still, lets work with those numbers.
By 5 December (that is, after about 65 days), which seems to be the unofficial start of the counter offensive, the German would have used up between 70-90% of their stockpiles.
Leaving them with supplies large enough to sustain heavy combat between 0.5 to 1.5 days. Ballparking of course.

While better than nothing, it's not far from nothing...

Yes. They had no reserves left upon commencement of Typhoons and continued to do so throughout the entirety of the autumn-winter battles.

In an ATL where the Germans abstain from driving on Moscow, and instead focus on maximizing Soviet casualties before settling in for the foreseeable future in late October,
they will have the following advantages:

(1) A shorter frontline. The right wing of AGC was especially overextended in early December
(2) A better defensive terrain. If the Germans halt their advance on their own terms in late October, in the belief that they will remain their for quite a while, they will settle in a better terrain than if they are halted by the Soviets in late Nov / early Dec, in the belief that they will continue the advance tomorrow.
(3) A better prepared position. Which deal with everything from familiarizing themselves with the location, establishing mutually supporting strongholds, working out fields of responsibility between neighbouring units, establishing contingency plans, ranging of artillery fire, establishing communication lines behind the frontline, laying minefields, building fieldworks of various forms and digging in (which is possible, but more difficult in the mud/snow)
(4) More forces available. Assuming a quiet period between the German halt, and the Soviet offensive - reminiscent of what occurred a year later - they might suffer about 40k fewer casualties
(5) Better equipped forces. Not only with regards to fewer losses, but also due to getting several weeks to do much needed maintenance
(6) Better rested troops. Which obviously goes both ways, with the exception that the average German soldier had been in combat far longer than the average Soviet soldier, and thus probably needed it more
(7) Better supplied troops. Halting the advance 150km sooner cuts down on fuel usage. Halting the advance much earlier - thus significantly reducing the combat intensity - cuts down
on ammunition usage. Furthermore, staying in the same position for several weeks enables the build-up of local stockpiles, as opposed to OTL, where a lot of the units where living hand to mouth with regards to supplies.
(8) More available reserves. Being on the defensive, you always try to muster some reserves since you don't know where the blow will come. Even AG B maintained some strong reserves a year later. Being on the offensive however, believing the enemy is close to breaking if you only commit the last battalion, will sometimes lead to all of your force being committed.

Thus, I disagree with your belief that the Soviets would do as well as they did in their historical December counterattack. Even if they are in a slightly better position themselves. If they're not in a better position, they obviously wouldn't do better.

The wildcard in this ATL, and the reason as to why they might do worse, is what would happen further north on the Volkhov if the Germans drop the ill-adviced lunge towards Vyshny Volochyok.

At least by remaining around Smolensk, the Germans would not overextend themselves and leave themselves vulnerable to said counterblow.
They could actually muster a reserve and hunker down in prepared positions.

AGC lost about 60k troops in October. The Red Army more than 10 times that.

Above, you argue that the Germans wouldn't be able to muster any reserve, even if they settled down in late October.
I'm certain that's not because you believe 1 German soldier is better than 10 Soviet soldiers.

So the force correlation between the forces are much too the Soviets advantage in your scenario.

Yet you believe the Germans would be able to muster reserves despite this worsened force correlation. Solely because of better field fortifications?

I could see the Germans safely conducting some much more minor offensive operations to reduce Soviet forces without badly dislocating themselves.

How many troops would that bag in your opinion. At what cost in supplies?
 
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