No, it was pretty damn important context. Those same 2 out of 3 panzergroups were experiencing difficulties with truck based supplies... when they weren't experiencing them with the railroads.
That's the point of Crewalds quote about Guderian.
Creveld is arguing against the notion that the mud, and only the mud, stalled the German drive on Moscow.
And so he concludes that the problems with the railways were "no less important".
Now, I don't have a problem with that statement.
You presented quotes from him were he point to troubles with the railways.
I supplanted that by presenting quotes where he points to trouble with the trucks.
Read in totality, they underscore Creveld's conclusion that the German had troubles with both.
It seemed however, from your first posts in this thread, as if your were arguing that the mud was inconsequential in the last quarter of '41.
Claiming that the railway was the real big killer, while the trucks spent the bulk of their time idle waiting for something to.
And I do have a problem with that, since it goes much further than Creveld's conclusion.
"No less important" means that the railroad crisis was at minimum just as important as the effect of mud upon truck transportation. So there is no difference.
I disagree. Claiming that something is roughly equal, as opposed to something being far more important, is different.
The Panzergruppe wouldn't be screaming at OKH to get supplies via train unless enough supplies weren't arriving via train.
Specifically, they were screaming at OKH to have supplies delivered to railheads close to the frontline.
Another interpretation than yours would be that the PzGr's wouldn't be screaming at OKH to get supplies delivered close to the frontline, if they had sufficient truck-based capacity
to move them depots further away.
Uncertain since Crewald doesn't provide exacting enough information.
They were quite apparently wholly depleted in the period it took to form and reduce the Vyazma-Bryansk pockets.
Given that with no Typhoon, the frontline would remain quiet until December (as the Soviets were focusing on recovering from the Yel'niya and Kiev fiascos)
and the Germans could get some additional stockpiling done in that first week of October... middle-to-end of December maybe? I'm ballparking obviously
I have a few issues with this as well.
Firstly about the front remaining quiet. One of the reasons for the German success in early October, was the fact that the Red Army had continued attacking throughout September.
From Lopukhovsky's 'The Viaz'ma catastrophe':
"only on 27 September, having detected the enemy's obvious preparations for an offensive, did the Stavka issue a directive for the
forces of the Western Front to adopt a rigid defense". "Similar directives were issued on this day to the Southwestern and Briansk Fronts."
Even after that catastrophe, the Red Army maintained an offensive mindset in mid-November, launching attacks in multiple directions.
Why do you believe the Red Army would lose it's offensive spirit in the absence of a German attack?
Elsewhere in your post, you also indicate that AGC should conduct minor offensive operations in absence of Typhoon.
In combination, I have a hard time seeing that "the frontline would remain quiet until December" as you write.
Now, lets make a ballpark estimate that the stockpiles were enough to cover 6 days of heavy combat.
Lets also remember that the Germans had large problems bringing forward supplies from Oct to mid-Dec, as you've argued.
And thus were living hand-to-mouth, using up the supplies whenever they became available.
Given that, I think your assessment that those 6 days worth of supplies would last 75-90 days, with normal/light combat operations is on the high end of the scale. But still, lets work with those numbers.
By 5 December (that is, after about 65 days), which seems to be the unofficial start of the counter offensive, the German would have used up between 70-90% of their stockpiles.
Leaving them with supplies large enough to sustain heavy combat between 0.5 to 1.5 days. Ballparking of course.
While better than nothing, it's not far from nothing...
Yes. They had no reserves left upon commencement of Typhoons and continued to do so throughout the entirety of the autumn-winter battles.
In an ATL where the Germans abstain from driving on Moscow, and instead focus on maximizing Soviet casualties before settling in for the foreseeable future in late October,
they will have the following advantages:
(1) A shorter frontline. The right wing of AGC was especially overextended in early December
(2) A better defensive terrain. If the Germans halt their advance on their own terms in late October, in the belief that they will remain their for quite a while, they will settle in a better terrain than if they are halted by the Soviets in late Nov / early Dec, in the belief that they will continue the advance tomorrow.
(3) A better prepared position. Which deal with everything from familiarizing themselves with the location, establishing mutually supporting strongholds, working out fields of responsibility between neighbouring units, establishing contingency plans, ranging of artillery fire, establishing communication lines behind the frontline, laying minefields, building fieldworks of various forms and digging in (which is possible, but more difficult in the mud/snow)
(4) More forces available. Assuming a quiet period between the German halt, and the Soviet offensive - reminiscent of what occurred a year later - they might suffer about 40k fewer casualties
(5) Better equipped forces. Not only with regards to fewer losses, but also due to getting several weeks to do much needed maintenance
(6) Better rested troops. Which obviously goes both ways, with the exception that the average German soldier had been in combat far longer than the average Soviet soldier, and thus probably needed it more
(7) Better supplied troops. Halting the advance 150km sooner cuts down on fuel usage. Halting the advance much earlier - thus significantly reducing the combat intensity - cuts down
on ammunition usage. Furthermore, staying in the same position for several weeks enables the build-up of local stockpiles, as opposed to OTL, where a lot of the units where living hand to mouth with regards to supplies.
(8) More available reserves. Being on the defensive, you always try to muster some reserves since you don't know where the blow will come. Even AG B maintained some strong reserves a year later. Being on the offensive however, believing the enemy is close to breaking if you only commit the last battalion, will sometimes lead to all of your force being committed.
Thus, I disagree with your belief that the Soviets would do as well as they did in their historical December counterattack. Even if they are in a slightly better position themselves. If they're not in a better position, they obviously wouldn't do better.
The wildcard in this ATL, and the reason as to why they might do worse, is what would happen further north on the Volkhov if the Germans drop the ill-adviced lunge towards Vyshny Volochyok.
At least by remaining around Smolensk, the Germans would not overextend themselves and leave themselves vulnerable to said counterblow.
They could actually muster a reserve and hunker down in prepared positions.
AGC lost about 60k troops in October. The Red Army more than 10 times that.
Above, you argue that the Germans wouldn't be able to muster any reserve, even if they settled down in late October.
I'm certain that's not because you believe 1 German soldier is better than 10 Soviet soldiers.
So the force correlation between the forces are much too the Soviets advantage in your scenario.
Yet you believe the Germans would be able to muster reserves despite this worsened force correlation. Solely because of better field fortifications?
I could see the Germans safely conducting some much more minor offensive operations to reduce Soviet forces without badly dislocating themselves.
How many troops would that bag in your opinion. At what cost in supplies?