I just started reading this yesterday, having stumbled across your link in your signature.
I admire this work quite a lot. I don't feel competent to comment on the likelihood of the particular Kremlin sort-out that's happened to this point; heck, even having taken a few Masters level classes on Soviet history I had never even heard of Sverdlov!
I'm pretty sure if I attempted something like this, I'd sentimentalize and romanticize the hell out of it; I'd make Sverdlov, who is to an extent apparently a blank slate we can write whatever we like on, a great uniter and mediator and have all the rivals shaking hands and partying together and stop knifing each other in the back.
At the very least, I'd have had Sv and Trotsky form an alliance of sincerity and trust and never ever break it, running the USSR as Best Buds Forever.
And all of that would clearly be wrong as well as soppy and stupid.
Trotsky had a way of pissing people off. To be sure I suppose I can be forgiven some sentimentality for him when you consider that hitherto,
this eulogy of Sverdlov is most of what I know as of this moment of Sverdlov OTL. That eulogy is not the work of a monster of blind vanity. Perhaps Trotsky only knew a good thing when it was dead and gone. I still think it's a tragic waste that men of his level of talent could not all work together in the Politburo for a superior outcome.
But there it is. These guys did lay these high-stakes games and I have to admire a timeline which does not flinch from that reality.
Some other grim realities, some of which have actually solicited comment from other readers (this TL deserves a lot more comment dang it!
)--the only issue of substance you've had the rival revolving-door troikaites take stands on is the matter of foreign policy of the revolutionary worker's state--to push for mature Red revolution in the developed world (that is, Europe--for contingent reasons they aren't even talking about the USA) versus to push for a more general revolutionary upheaval in the colonial world (ie pretty much most of the planet) versus finally leaving overseas alone and focusing on building revolution in one country. You have Sverdlov going crosswise with Lenin over this issue, each taking a position the other considers unforgivable.
And yet it is not clear to me which side Sverdlov actually takes in the ATL!
If I had to attribute just one of these views to Lenin and freeze him for all times in conceptual amber, I'd say Lenin favored the Big Bang of European revolution. Presumably therefore Sverdlov is on one of the other two sides, and since we are distinguishing him from Stalin who infamously (or famously, depending on who one is and what one wants) took the "socialism in one country" banner, Sv is left to advocate colonial revolution.
So several comments have worried--"OMG, what terrible consequences will that bring vis a vis European diplomacy?"
Well, actually--I'd venture to offer--none!
These three positions, it seems to me, are not really policy choices at all--they are courses of action that the Bolsheviks can take depending on the situation, a situation they don't control. If an opportunity arises to support a suitably socialistic, suitably Marxist, close enough to Leninist, revolution in either the developed nations or their colonies, clearly Leninists should take it! But what can they do, exactly? The closest thing to spreading revolution by armed force the Bolsheviks ever envisioned was their attempt at conquering Poland which had the aim pretty much entirely of opening up contact directly with Germany--in the hope that the German working classes would then rise up, overthrow their bourgeois rulers (both native German and their foreign occupiers) and throw in with Lenin. Since Poland would not voluntarily join this revolution and since they were in the way, that country would have to be held down by armed force from outside.
But that was an extreme situation, and it did not work--the Germans did not rise; the Poles could not be held.
Generally speaking any good Bolshevik should be prepared to back all three of these "alternatives" at the same time. It is clearly necessary that the territory the Bolsheviks have liberated should be developed, both for the sake of the people liberated there and for the benefit of the larger world revolution. Therefore they are all "socialism in one country" types. Clearly if a revolutionary opportunity arises anywhere, the Bolsheviks should support it--as much as they are able, which given the balance of power and the USSR's limited power projection, is not much. In the end, Leninism holds that the working classes of each nation must rise up on their own and overthrow their own oppressors.
So, first of all I wonder if it is fair to have either Lenin or Sverdlov taking "one" of these three lines and denouncing the other three for all time in quite undialectical fashion. OTL Lenin can be seen emphasizing each of them from moment to moment--"colonial" revolution being the October Revolution itself, with the Russian rising being the act of a peripheral weak proletariat breaking the chains of an even weaker, more peripheral bourgeois--that's the position that Lenin and his followers uniquely held among Marxist Social Democrats, that the Third World did count--otherwise of course Russia would be out of the revolutionary picture. But even before winning the Civil War and securing the Red revolution in that peripheral project he was already agitating for revolution in Germany and France. Finally, the years before he dies both OTL and here are the years of NEP, a period where the Soviet state presents a smiling face (a tight smile to be sure given that the Western powers had been trying to kill them!) to the West and capitalists, and permits all manner of unmanaged or weakly governed entrepreneurs to build up private fortunes.
Clearly, the imperial powers that might seek to crush the Worker's State are not really going to lose a lot of sleep over whether the Premier in the Kremlin is spewing out rhetoric about their inevitable downfall at the hands of their own workers or not. The Entente powers picked up where the now-defeated Germans had left off, supporting Whites against the Reds. Perhaps they did fear Red revolution in London and Paris as well as Berlin and therefore were in an existential fight, as they saw it; perhaps they merely wanted to put down a rabble in arms that had ousted an ally (a shaky and expensive one, to be sure, still, an ally) from power. They fought and the Civil War was terrible for the Bolsheviks (and anyone else left in Russia)--but they did not escalate to full on WWI level deployments; they did not counterattack a second time into Soviet territory even when the Red Army had invaded Poland, nearly took it, then were sent on the run eastward again.
None of these ebbs and flows of Entente intervention had much to do with what Lenin, Trotsky and other Red leaders were saying; it had to do with what forces the Entente had at its disposal. Lenin did not adopt NEP in capitulation to Entente demands; the Reds defeated the Whites entirely (in a Phyric victory to be sure) and then the Bolsheviks realized on their own they'd better do something like NEP if they wanted an economy to command. The fact that for the better part of a decade the Soviets were committed to a semi-privatized economy and seeking normalized relations with other nations cut no ice with anti-Communists who hated them regardless of whatever line they currently adopted.
So I don't think very much of consequence hinges on which of the three foreign/revolutionary policy modes a particular Bolshevik leader might be pinned down to favoring in a particular debate at a particular time; in reality all of them were flexible about moving from one to the other and back; in reality the foreign powers will do with the USSR what they will regardless of what words are coming out of the Kremlin.
----
Of more consequence would be another debate that was held in OTL where Bolshevik leaders took positions, and that would be the answer to the so-called "scissors" crisis. Basically no Bolsheviks loved NEP as a permanent policy, all of them wanted to turn on the newly developing private sector and re-appropriate it into a command economy as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the essential primary recovery NEP was needed for involved recovery on the land; the peasants of the countryside had lost their bid for political power (their party had been the Social Revolutionaries; the Left SR's caucused with the Bolsheviks in October 1917 but soon after the parties split) but now enjoyed peace and prosperity--which made it difficult for the Bolsheviks to prioritize industrial build-up. The "Scissors" was that the Bolshevik-favored industrial sector needed resources from the land (mainly food for the workers) but could not produce enough to simply barter to the farmers for it--Russia was recovering, but it was recovering in the wrong way, and Bolsheviks wanted to figure out how to convert wealth trickling to a million peasant farms into wealth flowing into a hundred super-factories.
When you put the problem that way, the solution seems obvious if one is not burdened by sentiment or bourgeois notions of justice and fair play. Sverdlov has already been shown taking a hard verbal line against the "kulaks," I'm just pointing out his attitude would be typical of all Bolsheviks--Trotsky and Stalin were in agreement on this point too. The Kulaks were doomed if the Bolsheviks were to stay in power.
Now, having said that I want to suggest that maybe there is more latitude for variation in detail. The Kulaks have no friends in the Kremlin, but on what model should industry be developed, assuming the funds are squeezed out of the land and NEP private sector somehow?
I've got a book which is admittedly slow and dull reading for me
that is about the choices the Soviet system faced OTL in the late 20s and early 30s; about how a strategy of highly centralized, top-down industrial commands was imposed for entirely political reasons when a distinctly nonprivate, still state-owned and controllable system of "syndicates" that marketed products to final consumers had evolved that were in the process of taking control of the production facilities, doing design work for them, and directing their production decisions toward filling demands the syndics knew existed. The book clearly disapproves of the clumsy Stalinist system that did evolve--not so much evolve in fact as was vigorously and violently imposed by the state and Party. The Party chose it because it seemed more advanced and post-capitalist, to "simply" command factories into being and send their products where needed according to the five-year Plan.
It isn't clear to me just what the troika of Sverdlov, Kirov and Rykov would do with these options. I was writing some wrong stuff because I had Rykov mixed up with Tomsky, the trade-unionist. Broadly speaking Rykov was sort of the conservative flavor of Bolshevism. Kirov like Sverdlov is someone who was much loved and lauded after he was dead; OTL he ran Leningrad and was considered promising and bright; then he was suddenly murdered in the mid-30s--modern scholars are pretty sure it was Stalin who had it done, but then Stalin immediately used Kirov's death as the justification for the Great Purges.
Yagoda by the way was involved in the latter--if I recall correctly the head of the security organs (OGPU at that point? It will have different initials here anyway!) when the first wave of Purges began was Yezhov, hence the term "yezovchina;" Stalin abruptly jailed Yezhov himself putting Yagoda in charge of the purge of the purgers, only to turn on Yagoda in turn (I think this is the point where Lavrenti Beria rose to the top of security, rebranded "NKVD" if I'm not mistaken, by then).
I suppose we have to assume the times made the men what they were and not the men the times; if the new Troika, or some reshuffled version of it, feels the need for the Purges, we know Yagoda could run that show for them; vice versa if they can hit upon a less crude and brutal way to get the results they need, perhaps nothing like that ever needs to happen here.
In my classes on the Stalin era, it seemed that what Stalin achieved in the 1930s was to produce an expanding "supply" as it were of enthusiastic if only marginally trained new Party members recruited from the factory floors and newly collectivized farms; these recruits were filtered "upward" through plant and sector management--then, at some level or other, the waves of purges would find fault with them sooner or later; at one level or another on their way up, they'd be brutally removed and some up-and-coming enthusiast would take their places, blithe and serene that since they were neither disloyal nor fools, they needn't worry the axe would fall on them. Until it did.
So with this conveyor belt raising up managers from the masses and then terminating them before they gain too much power combined with too much worldly wisdom and cynicism, Stalin got a compliant and at least serviceably competent layer of middle management that would seek to implement his priorities without questioning them.
Will Sverdlov, Kirov and Rykov find it necessary or anyway desirable to hit upon the same wasteful and brutal method, or will they find a way to promote, identify and sustain loyal and competent managers who will use the resources they are allocated efficiently and not plot to break off little kingdoms of their own? Can this stable Bolshevik managerial level have leverage and persuasion with the actual workforce to inspire them to produce diligently without pilferage or excessive slacking off?
In general, can any complex integrated industrial system exist without some sort of terror in the background to compel workers and managers to behave? Can it be done by positive means, with everyone persuaded that teamwork now will lead to improved lives for everyone in the near future?
If not the Troika has the OTL Stalinist model available.
And perhaps some other brutal alternatives not explored OTL.
---
Despite political positions in the Politburo on questions of revolutionary foreign policy being the only concrete policy issues discussed here yet, we haven't been told what has been going on in the larger world outside.
Presumably the world is broadly similar to OTL--we have to assume the end of WWI and the Versailles Treaty went as OTL, and indeed it would be some time before a different face in the Kremlin would lead to any noticeable changes. Germany (and other former Central Powers lands) would still be wracked by turmoil and revolution--no reason to think any of them are more likely to prevail than OTL though. Presumably Hitler still lives and is being cultivated by Army Intelligence to go into politics--he could be butterflied away if you like, but I'd say the likely thing is that he's out there, and the conditions that eventually let him take power still exist in Germany. The Entente powers are still exhausted in their victory and society and politics still bitter, mainly sweetened by the hope of a post-war world beyond war where technology and economic development will heal all wounds and be a tide raising all boats--the spirit of Locarno (which OTL also led to diplomatic doors opening to the USSR as well).
One systematic difference that may arise from shuffling Stalin out of the deck--perhaps the Troika will manage the Communist International with a lighter hand, and with more focus on progress and success by the local Parties and less on compliance, obedience to Moscow and flattery of the supreme power there. Stalin remained a Bolshevik and revolutionary, and looked forward to successful revolutions overseas--if and only if their new regimes would be obedient to himself, thus expanding his reach. However, "revolutionary" leaders who are suitably obedient to a foreign master like that are generally not very effective. OTL outside of the reach of a conquering Red Army (which only went a-conquering to retaliate against a rival imperial power that tried to invade them) the only Leninist countries that ever arose were led by loose cannon leadership the Kremlin did not control at all--Mao in China, Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, Castro in Cuba. If in this ATL the Troika are not so concerned with being able to control the foreign comrades but are interested in helping them get revolutionary results, will we see more successful revolutions in the 1930s, and still more unsuccessful attempts as well? In places like India, China, South Africa, the more developed parts of South America? What if Communists are more popular in the USA and Britain themselves?
On one hand if this happens, positive alliances between the USSR and established Western powers like the USA and Britain might be more difficult or even impossible.
On the other hand, could a more flexible and intelligent German Communist Party that doesn't have to toe a line drawn in Moscow slavishly have more pull with Germans, perhaps even form an effective alliance with the Social Democrats, or alternatively undercutting them and taking most of their voters--could such a KPD pre-empt the rise of the Nazis, or anyway fight them effectively and honorably well enough that if a Second Great War comes (and you've already told us it would) the Soviets have earned a place on the Allied side, despite a few quarrels about revolutions in various spheres of influence.
We know the War will not be pre-empted. I'm of the belief that WWII of OTL in Europe was all about Hitler's ambitions. Had Hitler been butterflied perhaps some other German of similar sweeping desires would have taken his place. If not--I don't think there'd be a war in Europe at all; Mussolini is likely to come to power but is unlikely to wish to take on the Entente powers without someone else strong in his corner to beat them up for him.
As for the Troika itself (or some successor team or supreme honcho) starting the war on the Soviet side--I don't believe that is in the cards. It wasn't with Stalin OTL, it wasn't with his successors when he died. The Soviet system favors caution even if the rhetoric of the Party is inflammatory about raising revolutionary heck all around the world. The thing is, it is the people in those overseas countries who are supposed to rise up themselves; the Worker's Motherland will then stand ready to back them up and protect them from capitalist counterrevolution, but they are under no obligation to invade the reactionary nations of the world and try to force Communism on people who aren't ready for it yet. As Leninists they are supposed to be rational, and they will always calculate the strength of the capitalists to be pretty high while the Soviet Union is vulnerable.
Therefore if there is going to be a Second Great War, I suppose it means another power strikes at Russia first, and that power seems just about certain to be Germany and no other.
Therefore the Troika may have had some greater success compared to Stalin's heavy hand in fostering the Third International, but clearly are not so good at it as to prevent Hitler or someone as bad from taking control in Germany. With a hit or miss record like that I suppose Western diplomats will treat with them without demanding they recant all revolutionary ambitions.
Will the Troika have more honor than Stalin, and refuse to make deals with Hitler? Or will the Entente as OTL betray Czechoslovakia, frightening the Kremlin with the impression that there is no power left to help them stand against the Reich, and that cutting a deal with them will be no worse than the faithless behavior of Czechoslovakia's false friends?
I suppose we'll see.
Looking forward to the Space Race!
