the impact/viability of a land value tax in antiquity?

What if the Georgist philosophy of the land value tax was conceptualized much earlier in say Antiquity, what would be its impact on the development of ancient civilizations and empires?

I'm thinking if Principate or Dominate era Rome had a philosopher emperor who had an epiphany or even the Byzantines. Was a land value tax back then even viable, could it be properly measured and was it easy to enforce and collect? Would the elites have accepted it?

I'm thinking since the Roman Empire was historically crushed by the insane tax burden on the poor which depressed demographics and led to collapsing support for imperial authorities, and since the elites that were NOT being taxed were equally disdainful of the uncouth military class, a land value tax might rectify the inequalities of concentrated ownership of land, generate a reliable source of income, and improve demographics?
 
Last edited:
The Gracchi represent at least some of these ideas during the Roman Republic. It didn't end too well for the Gracchi...or the Republic. Maybe the Principate could expand land taxes but I'd guess that it'd upset the balance between senate and people on which Imperial authority depends. By the Domitiate there's simply too much chaos to stably overhaul the tax-collecting bureaucracy without opening it up to massive corruption.
 
As you point out, an effective land tax would require efficient, periodic and non-corrupt surveying to ensure that the the tax burden was somewhat fair.

One could well argue that achieving all three on a regular basis was beyond the capabilities of premodern states which relied on little-supervised local elites/magistrates for tax collection and surveying.

An example of these problems can be seen in the Ming Dynasty of China, which conducted pop censuses and land surveys every 10 years or so in order to update the tax base. However, since a county/ward etc. with a population/land productivity base would have to contribute higher tax to the government, most leaders just made minor tweaks to the last census' numbers instead of actually surveying, meaning that the tax burden for prosperous people/areas became increasingly light over time. To this day, historians continue to debate the actual population of the Ming because of this practice.

Another way land tax led to a less equitable tax burden was through bribery/intimidation of local government clerks. Wealthy landlords who served as lenders to peasant farmers, and who would 'foreclose' on property if the latter defaulted, were nevertheless able to evade the land tax by bribing clerks not to register the change. The farmer therefore turns not just into a tenant of the landlord, but also remains on the hook for land tax, worsening his situation.

Lastly, a system of land tax can depress productivity especially if the tax is not 'recycled' into the local community. Official Ming efforts to cultivate rice (which has higher yields compared to millet) in Northern China met with resistance because local officials and gentry did not want to see upwards revisions of a county/ward etc.'s tax burden, while peasants were wary that a higher land tax might drive them further into a cycle of indebtedness etc.
 
Last edited:
The Gracchi represent at least some of these ideas during the Roman Republic. It didn't end too well for the Gracchi...or the Republic. Maybe the Principate could expand land taxes but I'd guess that it'd upset the balance between senate and people on which Imperial authority depends. By the Domitiate there's simply too much chaos to stably overhaul the tax-collecting bureaucracy without opening it up to massive corruption.

Given the extensive reforms Diocletian made couldn't it be argued that it was possible? Instead of the rigid caste system he implemented, simply a high land value tax ruthlessly enforced by the state military?
 
example of these problems can be seen in the Ming Dynasty of China, which conducted pop censuses and land surveys every 10 years or so in order to update the tax base. However, since a county/ward etc. with a population/land productivity base would have to contribute higher tax to the government, most leaders just made minor tweaks to the last census' numbers instead of actually surveying, meaning that the tax burden for prosperous people/areas became increasingly light over time. To this day, historians continue to debate the actual population of the Ming because of this practice.

But demographics and land values don't change all that much in a primitive and ancient economy like Rome's. The Ming Dynasty was affected by changes like the potato crop for example.

Another way land tax led to a less equitable tax burden was through bribery/intimidation of local government clerks. Wealthy landlords who served as lenders to peasant farmers, and who would 'foreclose' on property if the latter defaulted, were nevertheless able to evade the land tax by bribing clerks not to register the change. The farmer therefore turns not just into a tenant of the landlord, but also remains on the hook for land tax, worsening his situation.

Yeah I see that corruption would be a major issue but in ancient Rome there were extremely few peasant small time landowners especially in the Dominate period. All land was held by great landowners as estates and worked by slaves or serfs who would be required by law to stay where they lived and have their descendents continue working that land. That helps with tax collection i suppose. Maybe introducing these reforms after diocletian may be viable.

Lastly, a system of land tax can depress productivity especially if the tax is not 'recycled' into the local community. Official Ming efforts to cultivate rice (which has higher yields compared to millet) in Northern China met with resistance because local officials and gentry did not want to see upwards revisions of a county/ward etc.'s tax burden, while peasants were wary that a higher land tax might drive them further into a cycle of indebtedness etc.

First time I've heard a land value tax can lower productivity. It should be the case that given the assessed capability of land to grow rice instead of millet we could tax the land at a higher value rate already thus incentivizing the switch.
 
But demographics and land values don't change all that much in a primitive and ancient economy like Rome's. The Ming Dynasty was affected by changes like the potato crop for example.



Yeah I see that corruption would be a major issue but in ancient Rome there were extremely few peasant small time landowners especially in the Dominate period. All land was held by great landowners as estates and worked by slaves or serfs who would be required by law to stay where they lived and have their descendents continue working that land. That helps with tax collection i suppose. Maybe introducing these reforms after diocletian may be viable.



First time I've heard a land value tax can lower productivity. It should be the case that given the assessed capability of land to grow rice instead of millet we could tax the land at a higher value rate already thus incentivizing the switch.
In China,peasants often give away their land to the local landlord because the landlord was tax exempt,and come into the arrangement that they pay lower rent instead.Overtime however,the landlords just increase the rent to be much higher than the tax rate.
 
Last edited:
In China,peasants are often give away their land to the local landlord because the landlord was tax exempt,and come into the arrangement that they pay lower rent instead.Overtime however,the landlords just increase the rent to be much higher than the tax rate.

In Rome peasants paid taxes regardless of whether or not they owned land. Taxation was not land based.
 
In Rome peasants paid taxes regardless of whether or not they owned land. Taxation was not land based.
In China,depending on the time and period,there’s either a poll tax,land tax only,or both.Therefore,it’s highly possible that people can evade the land tax.In the Qing Dynasty for example,due to the reforms of the Yongzheng emperor,peasants did not pay any poll tax,their landlords however have to pay landtax.
 
In China,depending on the time and period,there’s either a poll tax,land tax only,or both.Therefore,it’s highly possible that people can evade the land tax.In the Qing Dynasty for example,due to the reforms of the Yongzheng emperor,peasants did not pay any poll tax,their landlords however have to pay landtax.

Well the main problem of a land value tax as you seem to make out is corruption. Landlords can bribe their way to not paying anything while small time landowners can't. What's needed is a rigid diocletian policy that all landlords have to stay put, keep their land and pay the tax or foreclose to the state. This allows the state to keep track of who owns what and where. Corruption will then be more difficult as expected annual tax revenue would be kept constant.
 
Well the main problem of a land value tax as you seem to make out is corruption. Landlords can bribe their way to not paying anything while small time landowners can't. What's needed is a rigid diocletian policy that all landlords have to stay put, keep their land and pay the tax or foreclose to the state. This allows the state to keep track of who owns what and where. Corruption will then be more difficult as expected annual tax revenue would be kept constant.
The Ming Dynasty set up quotas of how much taxes a county had to yield at minimum,but what ended up happening was that the landlords and officials just transferred the bulk of the burden to the peasants,taxing them to the bone. The peasants subsequently rose up,killed the landlords and officials,in the end destroying the Ming Dynasty.
 
The Ming Dynasty set up quotas of how much taxes a county had to yield at minimum,but what ended up happening was that the landlords and officials just transferred the bulk of the burden to the peasants,taxing them to the bone. The peasants subsequently rose up,killed the landlords and officials,in the end destroying the Ming Dynasty.

Time to put the army in charge of tax collection then rather than tax collectors who come straight from the landowning class. That way if landlords try to bribe officials to collect taxes from landless peasants instead, the soldiers will mutiny and kill him if he tried.

If what you just mean is that landowners raised rents to cover for their taxation thats impossible. Since land supply is by definition fixed a land value tax can't be transferred to the peasantry since demand for land is also constant. So higher land value taxes cant translate to higher rents.

So you have said that Ming peasants handed land to landowners to avoid being taxed as rents were promised to be lower than taxes but eventually they had to pay both high rents and land value taxes. But under my proposed system selling land would be forbidden except to the state. So peasants can't give up land to landlords to be cheated on rents later and landlords can't fool the state that the land owned by them is owned by the peasant. Corruption will be stamped out by a populist army drawn from the peasantry (Byzantine theme system). And higher rents passed on to peasants as a consequence of land value taxes is by definition impossible under economic theory. (But this is essentially how a land value tax that ends up being paid by landless peasants instead would operate: whether by landlord attempts to raise rents to cover the tax or corrupt officials levying the tax from landless peasants.)
 
Last edited:
Time to put the army in charge of tax collection then rather than tax collectors who come straight from the landowning class. That way if landlords try to bribe officials to collect taxes from landless peasants instead, the soldiers will mutiny and kill him if he tried.

If what you just mean is that landowners raised rents to cover for their taxation thats impossible. Since land supply is by definition fixed a land value tax can't be transferred to the peasantry since demand for land is also constant. So higher land value taxes cant translate to higher rents.

So you have said that Ming peasants handed land to landowners to avoid being taxed as rents were promised to be lower than taxes but eventually they had to pay both high rents and land value taxes. But under my proposed system selling land would be forbidden except to the state. So peasants can't give up land to landlords to be cheated on rents later and landlords can't fool the state that the land owned by them is owned by the peasant. Corruption will be stamped out by a populist army drawn from the peasantry (Byzantine theme system). And higher rents passed on to peasants as a consequence of land value taxes is by definition impossible under economic theory. (But this is essentially how a land value tax that ends up being paid by landless peasants instead would operate: whether by landlord attempts to raise rents to cover the tax or corrupt officials levying the tax from landless peasants.)
The commanders are in cahoots with the officials and landlords too. Technically,the Ming Dynasty had a theme system too,but the commanders have taken all of their soldiers’ lands and forced them into serfdom.There’s also a regular,professional army,but quite often,this army just robs the peasants to enrich themselves.
 
Last edited:
The commanders are in cahoots with the officials and landlords too. Technically,the Ming Dynasty had a theme system too,but the commanders have taken all of their soldiers’ lands and forced them into serfdom.That’s a regular,professional army,but quite often,this army just robs the peasants to enrich themselves.

Here's how I see this proposed system and how it at least mitigates some of the problems talked about. Also some additional clarifications thanks to the critiques.

Problem #1: Landlords persuades tax-collectors to tax landless peasants to pay for land tax. This is essentially additional rent passed on to peasants to pay for the land value tax. Per economic theory this doesn't work because land is a fixed supply.

Problem #2: Landlords are given land from peasants to avoid land tax while they can charge rent. The first thing to realize that the Roman tax burden was only 5% of GDP, so a land value tax of equivalent would not be a heavy burden for small landowners. The second thing is that under these land reforms, anyone who owns land must either keep their land and pay the tax or sell/foreclose to the state if unable to do so. Thus peasants would soon learn that they would still be on the hook as landlords cannot protect them from the tax, since the state has registered them as owners of the land.

Problem #3: Landlords pretend land is actually peasant-owned for tax purposes. Firstly all land has to be registered with the state based on who owns it and thus is obliged to pay the tax. (The tax would signify ownership) This should spell clear to peasants that if they pay the tax they don't pay the rent, and if they pay the rent they don't pay the tax. If landlords violate this with corrupt officials they would rebel, the state would support them and the landlord loses his property.

Problem #4: Corruption and how to deal with it. I see the best solution is officials being given tax collector or tax assessor roles but not both, and have them supervised by a band of soldiers as they carry out these tasks. It makes them harder to bribe, the number of soldiers will be relatively small and will be led by an officer promoted from the ranks rather than drawn from the landowning class. Foreclosed land sold back to the state will be used to create a class of loyal soldiers under a Theme system. Since land is rigidly registered with the state, commanders can't steal their soldier's land without risking a mutiny. Soldiers and promoted officers will be paired together from different themes to form units, reducing collusion and predatory behaviour. Soldiers hopefully will find it easier to just rob/tax landowners instead of peasants who can always rebel and cause problems.
 
Top