The Holocaust and Zionism in a no-Fall-of-France scenario?

CaliGuy

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Also, a "compromise deal" where Hitler is killed but Himmler and the SS leadership survives could perhaps be worked out where Himmler and the SS leadership pledge loyalty to the new anti-Nazi German regime (of course, Himmler and the SS would need to be sufficiently weak to be incapable of seizing power in Germany on their own in this TL) in exchange for them being allowed to continue the Holocaust as long as they want. Indeed, a compromise deal such as that would certainly be scary as Hell! :(
 
It should be noted, and Tooze points this out as well, that the holocaust did serve the awful purpose of freeing up food for German citizens. If France doesn't fall, then the prospect of famine on Germany will loom even larger then OTL 1940-42 without looting foodstuffs from Europe and with the Soviets more willing to play hardball with their trade. So while stuff like the gas chambers and execution pits (the Shoah by Gas and Shoah by bullets, to use Jewish terminology) will have a harder time getting off the ground, the effort to starve the Jews (the Shoah by Hunger) will in all likelihood be accelerated as the Nazis try and export as much of the suffering as possible on their victims.
 

CaliGuy

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It should be noted, and Tooze points this out as well, that the holocaust did serve the awful purpose of freeing up food for German citizens. If France doesn't fall, then the prospect of famine on Germany will loom even larger then OTL 1940-42 without looting foodstuffs from Europe and with the Soviets more willing to play hardball with their trade. So while stuff like the gas chambers and execution pits (the Shoah by Gas and Shoah by bullets, to use Jewish terminology) will have a harder time getting off the ground, the effort to starve the Jews (the Shoah by Hunger) will in all likelihood be accelerated as the Nazis try and export as much of the suffering as possible on their victims.
Yes, this appears to be correct; indeed, I can certainly imagine mass hunger combined with mass Babi Yar-style shootings for the Jews under Nazi rule in this TL! :(

However, even with all of this, there would still probably be more Jews who have experienced the horrors of Nazism but who are still alive; in turn, this would probably provide additional strength to the Zionist movement. Now, the crucial question is this: Then what? Who decides what happens to Palestine in this TL and what exactly do they decide?

Any thoughts on this?
 
I started a similar thread about this some time ago. Ultimately, I think in a war where France did not fall, there would not be a Holocaust at the same level as OTL. The Einsatzgruppen activities in the Soviet Union, which came about on the heels of Barbarossa, opened up the way to industrialized mass murder. Furthermore, the invasion added a much larger number of Jews in areas controlled by the Nazis, essentially doubling their amount or more in Nazi-occupied territory. They began to think differently of what to do with them. Lastly, the Wannsee Conference which began the process of the "Final Solution" was done when it was obvious the war was going to be much longer than expected, and the initial proposed solutions to the "Jewish Problem", such as expulsion to Madagascar, simply were not going to happen in a world where Germany was fighting the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and the United States of America.

There would still be mass deaths, but it would come about as the result of disease and starvation in the ghettoes, accompanied by the occasional massacre, rather than the industrial genocide of OTL. The death toll would be in the many hundreds of thousands rather than millions, i.e., similar to the death toll of the Armenian Genocide in World War I. Bureaucratic inertia would prevent the enactment of a more organized program of mass killing until the final months of the war, which might get interrupted in any case by Stalin seeing that Germany's time is up and moving in to carve out as much as he can before the Anglo-French armies can overrun Germany.

EDIT: added link.
 
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CaliGuy

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I started a similar thread about this some time ago.

Link, please?

Ultimately, I think in a war where France did not fall, there would not be a Holocaust at the same level as OTL. The Einsatzgruppen activities in the Soviet Union, which came about on the heels of Barbarossa, opened up the way to industrialized mass murder. Furthermore, the invasion added a much larger number of Jews in areas controlled by the Nazis, essentially doubling their amount or more in Nazi-occupied territory. They began to think differently of what to do with them.

They already had a couple of million Jews from Poland beforehand, though.

Lastly, the Wannsee Conference which began the process of the "Final Solution" was done when it was obvious the war was going to be much longer than expected, and the initial proposed solutions to the "Jewish Problem", such as expulsion to Madagascar, simply were not going to happen in a world where Germany was fighting the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and the United States of America.

If France doesn't fall, though, Germany is still going to suspect that it might not win the war.

There would still be mass deaths, but it would come about as the result of disease and starvation in the ghettoes, accompanied by the occasional massacre, rather than the industrial genocide of OTL. The death toll would be in the many hundreds of thousands rather than millions, i.e., similar to the death toll of the Armenian Genocide in World War I. Bureaucratic inertia would prevent the enactment of a more organized program of mass killing until the final months of the war, which might get interrupted in any case by Stalin seeing that Germany's time is up and moving in to carve out as much as he can before the Anglo-French armies can overrun Germany.

Maybe ... maybe; also, though, what happens to the Zionist movement after the end of WWII in this TL?
 

CalBear

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The difficulty with this sort of question is that it leaves far too much up in the air for a reasonable answer.

WHY did France survive? Was it a near run thing? Did the lines stabilize with Alsace/Lorraine going back to German hands? Did the Heer get its teeth kicked in? If so, how?

Without this being in the scenario and explained there is no real answer. The great mass of Jews were not from the West, they fell under Nazi control in Poland and the parts of the USSR that the Reich occupied. If the Reich duplicates the temporary success in the East then the Holocaust is going to be so similar to OTL as to be indistinguishable. Total French Jewish deaths in the Holocaust were under 75K (out of the 340K living in the country), Belgium 24K, The Netherlands 105K. As unquestionably horrific as these figures are, they literally represent only 3% of the total Jewish victim of the Reich.

So, to answer the OP question - If nothing changes except France hanging on in full or in part, the Holocaust is exactly the same. It is likely that even the same number of deaths would occur, with additional General Government and occupied USSR victims replacing those who are not shipped out of the West.
 

CaliGuy

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The difficulty with this sort of question is that it leaves far too much up in the air for a reasonable answer.

OK; understood.

WHY did France survive? Was it a near run thing? Did the lines stabilize with Alsace/Lorraine going back to German hands? Did the Heer get its teeth kicked in? If so, how?

Since you appear to be an expert on military matters, maybe you can help answer this question: What would happen if France would keep its strategic reserve at Rheims as per the original plan (instead of sending it over to the Low Countries) and thus using it at Sedan to stop the Manstein Plan in its tracks? How decisive of a victory would this be for France?

Without this being in the scenario and explained there is no real answer. The great mass of Jews were not from the West, they fell under Nazi control in Poland and the parts of the USSR that the Reich occupied. If the Reich duplicates the temporary success in the East then the Holocaust is going to be so similar to OTL as to be indistinguishable. Total French Jewish deaths in the Holocaust were under 75K (out of the 340K living in the country), Belgium 24K, The Netherlands 105K. As unquestionably horrific as these figures are, they literally represent only 3% of the total Jewish victim of the Reich.

So, to answer the OP question - If nothing changes except France hanging on in full or in part, the Holocaust is exactly the same. It is likely that even the same number of deaths would occur, with additional General Government and occupied USSR victims replacing those who are not shipped out of the West.

Would the Nazis actually invade the Soviet Union without a prior Fall of France, though?
 

CaliGuy

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My impression is that Hitler wanted to avoid a two-front war and thus--short of some extreme desperation--would not have invaded the Soviet Union had he still been fighting against France in the West.
 

CalBear

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OK; understood.



Since you appear to be an expert on military matters, maybe you can help answer this question: What would happen if France would keep its strategic reserve at Rheims as per the original plan (instead of sending it over to the Low Countries) and thus using it at Sedan to stop the Manstein Plan in its tracks? How decisive of a victory would this be for France?



Would the Nazis actually invade the Soviet Union without a prior Fall of France, though?
The French plan was far too reliant on the enemy following their playbook and lacked the sort of flexibility necessary to react to the Heer. This is, in part, due to the weakness in French communications, especially between armored units and between battalion and higher commands once the battle became fluid, and in part due to the French planning to refight the last war (a very common error by military staff planners). French commanders had serious problems with controlling their forces (the disaster at Sedan is a classic example of this, as well as a solid example of the hazards of poor training). Given the remarkably poor state of French AAA, particularly their mobile AAA, adding more divisions to the battle at Sedan just allows the Luftwaffe to stack up more bodies.

Hitler's entire goal was to destroy the USSR which he considered to be a wholly owned subsidiary of "World Jewry". Destroying the USS would wipe out the Jews, the Bolsheviks, AND the Slavs while gaining the German Volk the living space it "needed". Unless the French and BEF crushed the Heer in May of 1940 (which would likely have been fatal for the Nazis) the REich was going to attack the Soviet Union.
 

CaliGuy

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The French plan was far too reliant on the enemy following their playbook and lacked the sort of flexibility necessary to react to the Heer. This is, in part, due to the weakness in French communications, especially between armored units and between battalion and higher commands once the battle became fluid, and in part due to the French planning to refight the last war (a very common error by military staff planners). French commanders had serious problems with controlling their forces (the disaster at Sedan is a classic example of this, as well as a solid example of the hazards of poor training). Given the remarkably poor state of French AAA, particularly their mobile AAA, adding more divisions to the battle at Sedan just allows the Luftwaffe to stack up more bodies.

So you're saying that General Gamelin's decision to move the French strategic reserve to the Low Countries in itself wasn't an error?

Hitler's entire goal was to destroy the USSR which he considered to be a wholly owned subsidiary of "World Jewry". Destroying the USS would wipe out the Jews, the Bolsheviks, AND the Slavs while gaining the German Volk the living space it "needed". Unless the French and BEF crushed the Heer in May of 1940 (which would likely have been fatal for the Nazis) the REich was going to attack the Soviet Union.

Sure, Hitler considered the Soviet Union to be the ultimate evil; however, where exactly would he get the resources to invade the Soviet Union if his troops are all busy tied up in the West?
 

CalBear

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So you're saying that General Gamelin's decision to move the French strategic reserve to the Low Countries in itself wasn't an error?

Sure it was an error, a severe one. The reality, unfortunately, is that there was very little any of sernior officer in the French Army would do that would not have been a disaster. Their focus was too narrow to overcome the scenario.



Sure, Hitler considered the Soviet Union to be the ultimate evil; however, where exactly would he get the resources to invade the Soviet Union if his troops are all busy tied up in the West?

Once again, I will come back to what I said initially. It entirely depends on what happened in France. The French had absolutely no interest or intention of advancing into Germany until the British were fully mobilized. Without the defeat it is entirely possible that the French government decides to come to an accommodation, it all depends on what happens on the battlefield. It is difficult to see a way that the French inflict a crushing defeat on the Reich, at least without some near ASB wholesale change in the French command structure in late 1939.
 

CaliGuy

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Sure it was an error, a severe one. The reality, unfortunately, is that there was very little any of sernior officer in the French Army would do that would not have been a disaster. Their focus was too narrow to overcome the scenario.

Thus, the success of the Manstein Plan was virtually inevitable, correct?

Once again, I will come back to what I said initially. It entirely depends on what happened in France. The French had absolutely no interest or intention of advancing into Germany until the British were fully mobilized. Without the defeat it is entirely possible that the French government decides to come to an accommodation, it all depends on what happens on the battlefield. It is difficult to see a way that the French inflict a crushing defeat on the Reich, at least without some near ASB wholesale change in the French command structure in late 1939.

Wouldn't a long war of attrition have been to France's benefit since Britain and its empire can mobilize and help France and since France + Britain + their empires can outbleed Germany in a war of attrition, though?
 

CalBear

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Thus, the success of the Manstein Plan was virtually inevitable, correct?



Wouldn't a long war of attrition have been to France's benefit since Britain and its empire can mobilize and help France and since France + Britain + their empires can outbleed Germany in a war of attrition, though?
The German offensive could have been defeated. In retrospect doing so would be relatively easy, but retrospect is like that. The French would have required a aggressive field commander, with full backing, and a few month to get the troops squared away (Philippe Leclerc with de Gaulle as Corps commander might have been able to do it, but there was no chance that officers that young (38 and 50 respectively) would be trusted with that level of responsibility in an army where most general officers were into their 60s (Gamelin was 68, Huntziger 61, Giraud, 62).

France as a nation, much less as an army, was in no way, shape or form ready for another massive bloodletting on the scale of WW I. The British were casualty sensitive after the trenches, France was that x100. From the very top of the Army to the newest recruit French troops, with rare exceptions, have poor morale and were dismally led.
 

CaliGuy

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The German offensive could have been defeated. In retrospect doing so would be relatively easy, but retrospect is like that. The French would have required a aggressive field commander, with full backing, and a few month to get the troops squared away (Philippe Leclerc with de Gaulle as Corps commander might have been able to do it, but there was no chance that officers that young (38 and 50 respectively) would be trusted with that level of responsibility in an army where most general officers were into their 60s (Gamelin was 68, Huntziger 61, Giraud, 62).

OK; thus, please let me rephrase that question--realistically speaking, the German offensive couldn't have been defeated as long as younger commanders didn't have leadership positions in the French military in 1940, correct?

France as a nation, much less as an army, was in no way, shape or form ready for another massive bloodletting on the scale of WW I. The British were casualty sensitive after the trenches, France was that x100. From the very top of the Army to the newest recruit French troops, with rare exceptions, have poor morale and were dismally led.

Isn't the poor French morale in 1940 a myth, though?

Also, isn't that why France built the Maginot Line, et cetera?

Finally, as much as France hated extremely massive casualties, the speech that I linked to above also shows that France had absolutely no desire to reach any kind of accommodation with Nazi Germany in any form in early 1940.
 
Given the remarkably poor state of French AAA, particularly their mobile AAA, adding more divisions to the battle at Sedan just allows the Luftwaffe to stack up more bodies.

Gotta interject on this extremely specific point and observe that's rather dubious. The actual physical damage inflicted by WW2 was usually quite modest. Had the vaunted Stuka attack at Sedan not immediately been followed up by the ground assault, the French would have rallied their troops, patched up the damage to their equipment, and the bombardment would be remembered as largely ineffective. What made it effective was that it was coupled with the ground assault, which allowed the disruptive psychological effect of airpower to terrify inexperienced French troops, distract them from stopping the German river crossing, and then left their morale in a fragile state in the following battle leading to a quick collapse.
 

CalBear

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OK; thus, please let me rephrase that question--realistically speaking, the German offensive couldn't have been defeated as long as younger commanders didn't have leadership positions in the French military in 1940, correct?



Isn't the poor French morale in 1940 a myth, though?

Also, isn't that why France built the Maginot Line, et cetera?

Finally, as much as France hated extremely massive casualties, the speech that I linked to above also shows that France had absolutely no desire to reach any kind of accommodation with Nazi Germany in any form in early 1940.
As long as the French Army was commanded by men who were still stuck in the passive defense mode they had little to no hope against an aggressive and flexible enemy.

Morale is a fragile thing. It is very much dependent on local and divisions/corps commanders. When senior leadership is indecisive or when local reversals are treated as being disasters the morale of the ranks turns into spun sugar constructs.

A speech means almost nothing beyond making a politician feel good. The French had political leaders who were willing to talk defiance, but they had no desire to act on those noble words. The French could have prevented WW II as we know it if they had advanced into the Rhineland when the Reich sent troops into the region (Hitler had actually ordered that the Heer forces should retreat if the French reacted, the political damage that would have had on the Party would have been enormous) They didn't because they were in a passive defense mode.

When the war did begin, the French made a token advance (less than 10 miles) and then immediately withdrew behind the Maginot Line despite having a 2-1 advantage in troops (much of the French force was reservists, but almost ALL of the Reich's forces were also reservists, and much more poorly equipped reservists at that), a 40-1 advantage in towed/mobile artillery and better than a 20-1 advantage in armor (with French tanks being of higher quality, although with much worse fuel economy). The Reich had almost literally nothing in the West, virtually the entire Luftwaffe, all panzer divisions, and nearly all front line infantry formations were engaged in Poland. The French could have been in Frankfurt, if not Munich, before the Heer could have redeployed. The French civilian AND military leadership were utterly unwilling to act offensively until the British were fully deployed. They missed the chance to END the War by October 1st (The Heer did not manage to launch a reasonable counterattack until October 17th, and it was in anything but strength.

tl;dr: Talk is cheap.
 

CalBear

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Gotta interject on this extremely specific point and observe that's rather dubious. The actual physical damage inflicted by WW2 was usually quite modest. Had the vaunted Stuka attack at Sedan not immediately been followed up by the ground assault, the French would have rallied their troops, patched up the damage to their equipment, and the bombardment would be remembered as largely ineffective. What made it effective was that it was coupled with the ground assault, which allowed the disruptive psychological effect of airpower to terrify inexperienced French troops, distract them from stopping the German river crossing, and then left their morale in a fragile state in the following battle leading to a quick collapse.
I would agree to a point, especially that the air attacks were much more effective on the morale of the French than on the physical. Where I would disagree is that the lack of AAA was WHY the French morale was so devastated. The impression was that the Luftwaffe was unopposed, causing units to break. Troops in the open are the ones who early WW II air power could slaughter. More troops in full rout means more meat for the grinder.
 

CaliGuy

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As long as the French Army was commanded by men who were still stuck in the passive defense mode they had little to no hope against an aggressive and flexible enemy.

OK; also, though, there were genuinely no insightful old French generals in regards to more modern methods of warfare?

Morale is a fragile thing. It is very much dependent on local and divisions/corps commanders. When senior leadership is indecisive or when local reversals are treated as being disasters the morale of the ranks turns into spun sugar constructs.

OK.

A speech means almost nothing beyond making a politician feel good. The French had political leaders who were willing to talk defiance, but they had no desire to act on those noble words. The French could have prevented WW II as we know it if they had advanced into the Rhineland when the Reich sent troops into the region (Hitler had actually ordered that the Heer forces should retreat if the French reacted, the political damage that would have had on the Party would have been enormous) They didn't because they were in a passive defense mode.

Two things:

1. I doubt that a failure in the Rhineland would have been enough to topple Hitler; sure, it would have hurt him for being too brash, but a more careful policy on his part afterwards would have probably made him hold onto power in Germany.
2. Weren't finances a large part of the French failure to act in 1936? Indeed, wasn't France bankrupt or at least in a state of severe financial crisis back then?

When the war did begin, the French made a token advance (less than 10 miles) and then immediately withdrew behind the Maginot Line despite having a 2-1 advantage in troops (much of the French force was reservists, but almost ALL of the Reich's forces were also reservists, and much more poorly equipped reservists at that), a 40-1 advantage in towed/mobile artillery and better than a 20-1 advantage in armor (with French tanks being of higher quality, although with much worse fuel economy). The Reich had almost literally nothing in the West, virtually the entire Luftwaffe, all panzer divisions, and nearly all front line infantry formations were engaged in Poland. The French could have been in Frankfurt, if not Munich, before the Heer could have redeployed. The French civilian AND military leadership were utterly unwilling to act offensively until the British were fully deployed. They missed the chance to END the War by October 1st (The Heer did not manage to launch a reasonable counterattack until October 17th, and it was in anything but strength.

tl;dr: Talk is cheap.

Fair enough, I suppose; however, France really does appear to have been traumatized by the experience of World War I in 1939-1940.
 

CaliGuy

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I would agree to a point, especially that the air attacks were much more effective on the morale of the French than on the physical. Where I would disagree is that the lack of AAA was WHY the French morale was so devastated. The impression was that the Luftwaffe was unopposed, causing units to break. Troops in the open are the ones who early WW II air power could slaughter. More troops in full rout means more meat for the grinder.
Question--why exactly did Nazi Germany have air superiority in France in 1940?
 
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