How d'you do that with those HL designs ? Or Hermes ? Or the Russian wingy-thingies ? No, like the much lamented Shuttle, they're dorsal docking.
If the vehicle is designed to act as a tug for something attached to its dorsal surface, it would work fine I would think.
Certainly with 90s era technology, it would be less of an issue than with 60s era technology (which had to be more intuitive to the pilots and had to be built around a limited number of view screens and cameras).
Re: Phobos as a goal:
Eh, the 'argument' is pretty much the same as the 'utility' of a flyby mission versus landing
Phobos takes time to get to, but the deltaV required to get there and land is less than the deltaV required to get to Luna and land. And of course, it takes much less deltaV to take off from Phobos. Since Phobos has a high ice content, the idea is that it makes a perfect place to set up a fuel mining/production/depot center.
the POWOW, (POWer With Out Wires) concept
That is a pretty neat way of saving on the costs of landing the reactor on Mars itself. And might have political advantages due to not having a heavy nuclear reactor.
The military liked the smaller stations mainly because they could done more cost effectively but they had been 'coming around' to some possibilities of what Mir could be used for. Oddly enough just about everyone initially considered Mir much to large to be a practical space station "unless" the Russians were going to use it for staging flights to the Moon or Mars. Which was exactly the reason the US station design kept getting smaller.
Ahh. I'd thought it was just cost that made Congress space station shy.
And what uses were the Soviet military interested in Mir for?
That's a good possibility and one of the main reason neither the HL20 or HL42 got any significant traction and the main 'reason' the X-38 was canceled even before it flew. But had the Shuttle been less trustworthy and less political support, (possible) and they are looking for an alternative the HL20 had a very good possibility of being that alternative. The thing with down-sizing the HL20 was that it was about the smallest workable size as it was for the mass. One thing I point out when people bring up the idea of the X-37B as a manned vehicle is that this will significantly increase its mass which will make its reentry MUCH harsher and probably require a significantly more robust TPS. The Shuttle had issues even the size it was due to down-mass and the TPS and it was found during design and testing of the Hermes its TPS would be inadequate for the mass involved. The HL20 on the other hand was actually significantly lighter and therefore the TPS requirements were significantly less and could be handled by a lighter, but more robust TPS.
The entire reason the HL42 was designed was to make the HL20 'closer' in capability to the Shuttle. On the down side it was as noted significantly heavier and LESS capable than the HL20 as a result. It was understood during the early lifting body tests that for the most part they were 'as-good' as the were BECAUSE they were significantly lighter than they would be in any actual 'flight' condition other than the low-speed regime they were tested at. (One of the reasons the only one that continued testing was the X-24B is because it was planned from the start to have a VERY robust, fully metallic, titanium in fact, reentry system specifically designed for it)
All very interesting.
When you talk about the HL-20 being much lighter - is that assuming the vehicle is 150%-200% heavier than the initial design, as you mused upon earlier in the thread (quite soundly, I think, from what I read most aerospace designs are about 150% heavier than the initial paper design assumes).
I could see the HL-20 getting into real trouble if they don't over-engineer the TPS from the start so that it can handle the mass of the vehicle increasing. Redesigning the TPS every time some unforeseen need increases the mass of the vehicle could get expensive.
How was the HL-20 going to be more capable than the HL-42?
And interestingly, reading up on the X-38,
I see that it was intended to be launched on the Ariane 5. That bodes well for the HL-20 being made available to the Europeans in some way. Hmm... Here's a crazy idea:
The Europeans are brought on board in a minimal capacity and the HL-20 is designed to be launched on both the Titan IV and on Ariane 5, with the idea being that US companies will get some nice sales out of this. ITAR ends up getting signed as per OTL and as per OTL, Congress decides civilian space technology should not be exported. The ESA can't get its HL-20s and justly throws a hissy fit. To calm them down, the US agrees to buy Ariane 5 rockets from them, resulting in the Ariane 5 becoming the sole launcher for the HL-20 and retrofits to allow Canaveral to launch Ariane 5s...
OK, probably not very likely, but it is a funny thought.
Somewhat. Assuming a "problem" with the Shuttle and the need to move forward with a new LV system your situation is actually still "similar" to the EELV but differs in more entrenched interest in a utility system that is NOT the Shuttle but also does not require a totally "new" LV system. I'll point out again that you would not necessarily have in TTL the complete shut down of the Delta II/III (the former still flying and the latter due around 1998) as the EELVs came online. So you pretty much have a far better "commercial" launch vehicle market even if the competition IS getting rather stiff with artificially discounted "Russian" LVs available.
No Delta IV would almost certainly mean Delta III is in use longer, and without EELV, there would be no Delta IV.
Also, McDonnell-Douglas may avoid getting bought by Boeing in TTL, since the ongoing cold war would mean they have a fatter order book. As I understand, Delta IV owed a number of important design decisions to Boeing, so even if there is an EELV program, the Delta IV entered into it may have a first stage that is directly descended from the Thor missile.
I'm not sure that the Soviet Union surviving longer would mean the commercial launch market was healthier - orders will probably crash much as OTL. However, the Soviets may be able to compete as well as the Russians did in the commercial launch market, since the rouble is unlikely to collapse to the lows seen in OTL and the .
(Older Europeans for the most part were less concerned over the US/USSR tensions where as younger generations were rather more nervous of being 'ground-zero' in any conflict. This was having the effect that "younger" European leaders were seeking more cooperative or common ground with Russia while still maintaining their distance so as to give the USSR/Russia 'pause' over starting anything where they had interests. At the same time the Reagan era had generated increased tension where it had been waning during the 70s and with it a definite feeling that the previous "cooperative" efforts had not served Europe as well as had been expected. A surviving USSR would continue this and probably "penetration" worries and issues would have had Europe backing off again over time, but as I noted the US was lacking in incentives to really draw them back towards us. I have to wonder if the idea of Europe being a 'third force' might not have gotten better traction TTL)
I can certainly see Europe cutting more of a 3rd way if Germany doesn't re-unite and Eastern Europe remains locked behind the iron curtain.
The US had incurred a major debt issue with the Reagan build up coupled with lower taxes, and frankly everyone knew it. But both Reagan and Bush had promised and laid their campaign's on reducing taxes despite continuing to build up the military. Bush ended up having to break his campaign promise of "no new taxes" due to the Gulf War but if that hadn't happened the 'break' was going to come around the end of his second term anyway. The Republicans had been struggling to balance the increased military spending with the decreased tax revenue and have never really reconciled them despite Democratic efforts to do so. It wasn't so much a "sea-change" as trying to avoid paying for the expanded military by kicking the can down the road. They'd hoped to use the "Peace Dividend" but as it never actually existed and the cuts only succeeded in job losses and economic problems which linger today. In order to keep pandering to their base they need to keep throwing out tax cuts but what they really need to do is increase some so we can finally balance out the Reagan expenditures but I don't see it happening and in fact they are talking MORE tax cuts coupled with MORE spending which makes no damn sense at all but...
Given a still active Cold War it's quite likely they could have snuck some tax increases back in with little protest and reached a balance again by the late 90s to early 2000s.
Having looked up
the US Fed. Gov't. budget deficits since WW2, I am wondering if the US would control its deficit.
While debt was increasing faster under Reagan, the real turning point seems to have come back in 1975 under Gerald Ford. So it may well be that there would be no return to surplus in TTL's 90s (though I have a hard time seeing anyone who'd have power from 1988-1998 being willing to borrow as heavily as Reagan did).
Now as to the Titan IV...
I suspect we've read the same sources but have different perspectives more than anything else

I was a very active "space fan" from a young age and got to access a lot of 'non-linear' information over the years by being associated with the Air Force. Having said that there are others around who had even deeper access, (fellow named "Jim" over on the NSF forums was an Air Force officer and then transferred to NASA as an Air Force liaison during the Shuttle program for example) which all pretty much showed that Air Force was never really a fan of the Shuttle and didn't in fact like the idea of a "national" launch system at the most basic level. They WOULD have liked it somewhat if it had been: 1) "their" system and 2) been fully under their control, but they had made it clear very early on they were not really in step either with NASA or the NRO both of which were the major drivers for the idea of a "national" launch system. (I suspect where you read "Air Force" it wasn't clear that it actually meant NRO which being part CIA and part Air Force was simply referred to as the "Air Force" before the NRO was revealed) The NRO wanted a specific "National" launch capacity which they continually tried to get political support for, but meanwhile a rather visible portion of the supposedly "same" Air Force would be disinterested to say the least in the concept. Similarly during the Shuttle "design" process the actual Air Force gave a set of very specific but not actually 'required' parameters to NASA that had to be met to get Air Force buy-in. Shortly thereafter an "Under Secretary" of the Air Force met with some NASA higher ups to inform them that given 'requirements' were not as "set-in-stone" as the Air Force had implied. Due to security at the time no one was aware that "Under Secretary" was actually head of the NRO and was much more intimately familiar with what was NEEDED than the regular "Air Force" was so NASA went with the 'official' requirements, (which more closely matched what they wanted to have anyway) rather than what was really needed.
The regular Air Force jumped on the Shuttle bandwagon because they were promised dedicated Air Force missions and a Shuttle launch facility at Vandenberg. The NRO "Air Force" however kept insisting that the Titan-IV be developed because it, (and the Titan-III before it) more closely matched what they actually needed. Then Challenger happened and even the lukewarm, (would have been 'hot' but Congress didn't authorize the Air Force to actually get Shuttles) Air Force support dried up. But the Titan-IV was expensive and had issues so the NRO kept looking for 'alternative' launch vehicles and finally managed to get enough support for the EELV. It was a mess even from inside. At the core you had a very basic unhappiness of the "main" Air Force that they got "space" taken away from them. First by the NRO which took over the spy sat programs because the Air Force was more interested in a "manned" space flight capability and then NASA took even that away from them. The Shuttle looked like a chance to get that back even if only partially and then they didn't get the promised Shuttles and worse Challenger happened. Neither the actual Air Force or the NRO have any interest in SLS nor any derivatives thereof because it offers neither anything they want. Hence SLS is a NASA-only platform.
Economics of scale is a factor as it the repeated use of facilities and personnel which actually reduces the direct costs. Further the Titan-IV production lines could have been kept active which again would provide economy of scale and more efficient use of personnel and systems. A side benefit overall would be that Titan-IV was useful this way to more than a single, (NRO mind you who is the 'real' owner) user. As an "attraction" you end up with a launcher capable of not only launching crewed payloads, (which was specifically the main reason NASA designed the Shuttle the way they did so that it would require a crew EVERY flight) but could launch NRO assets AND unmanned spacecraft which is where the Shuttle was lacking. (Never mind the Astronauts Office was "nervous" about carrying liquid propellant "upper stages" the Orbiter would have required major modifications to actually carry them! Cryogenic stages VENT and there was no way to vent that hydrogen and oxygen from the bay!)
EELV was "organized" in 1994, it really didn't get started till nearly 1996/7 at which time the Titan-IV was being retired. (Which is the main reason the EELV program was finally getting going in fact) The HL20 would have been getting really going around 1994, (first flight test was optimistically suggested to be no later than 1997/98 if fully funded by 1992/3 it would depend on the amount of effort/support) under the circumstances so the "requirement" of a capable and "man-rated" Titan-IV would have been coming up around that same time. You could argue that the there might be a viable case for the development of an "Atlas-V-like" ELV but it would be hard to justify the Delta-IV as despite the often quoted idea it is a "direct descendent" of the Thor via the Delta is was, (and is) obviously a new design vehicle. Boeing didn't even seriously start design work until they got funds from the EELV program in the middle of 1995 and did not actually submit a 'design' until the propellant question, (there was one, NASA was pushing for LH2 while the Air Force, {NRO} preferred kerolox for operational purposes, they both 'won' as obviously one LV used kerolox and the other used LH2) was finally decided in 1996.
In TTL the HL20/Titan-IV is rather obviously a much 'nearer' term solution than designing a fully new LV, (Delta-IV) or a questionable heritage (no Russian engines TTL) and development LV such as the Atlas-V. And ALS/NLS is worse because while it "may" use some Shuttle legacy technology it is obviously going to be long in development and testing so it would make much better sense to simply use the Titan-IV and the Air Force, (both) will support that even if NASA probably won't. Assuming any reason that NASA might in fact support such a system and it's a shoe in.
At its most basic the equation is that having NASA and the DoD/Air Force using the same launchers give economy of scale to an extent and reduces the expenses of shared personnel and facilities. So the argument would be if the DoD/Air Force is using Titan-IV NASA should, as much as practical, (note that part) do so as well. Then there is the obvious "payback" in having NASA 'forced' to use an Air Force LV which is non-trivial. Lastly, politically it's much easier to 'convince' the American taxpayers to fund what can be touted as a 'multi-user' LV "made in America" like the Titan-IV. Not that a clever politician, (and say what you will they do tend to be that more often than not) can't find a way to sell it for "occasional" use but if we imagine the OTL "mentality" carrying over TTL with a longer Cold War situation it's hard to see attitudes changing enough to encompass an American use of an Ariane 5. I can see HL20s being 'sold' to Europe for their use and it being touted as "cooperative" (and frankly it would be more than Europe had gotten in the past space program wise but right in line with Cold War military policy/sales) but it would be hard to "sell" if "cooperation" had been increasing between Europe and Russia as it was in the late-80s early-90s period OTL. Especially if the Cold War in ongoing. (The "closer" relationship between Europe and the USSR was worrisome to the US when it happened OTL and caused quite a few 'joint' programs to fall apart due to concerns about security, penetration and "leakage" over closer ties to Russia)
My sources have only spoken about ALS, NLS and EELV programs in passing or have been rather vague.
Thanks for explaining all of that. The politics between the USAF and the NRO were particularly interesting - the USAF having resentment for the NRO was new to me.
One of the problems the Titan IV had (which NASA committing to the vehicle might help, or might not) was that Lockheed Martin made a real mess of the manufacturing. Quality was extremely poor and costs were high (partly due to having to fix mistakes earlier in the manufacturing process partly due to the organization being that poor). If NASA buying more Titan IVs gives LM the practice to iron out their difficulties, I can see the Titan IV continuing in use for longer.
It would be fun to see the Titan IV getting incrementally upgraded...
fasquardon