And now, before continuing with the legacy chapters, the first in a series of interludes wrapping up loose ends around the world. I'll start with Asia and then move my way to Latin America and Europe before finishing up the Legacy bits and making way for the Final Chapters.
Some important countries aren't mentioned because enough changes haven't occurred in them, namely Mexico, India, Pakistan, Canada, Burma, Japan, North Korea, etc.
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Armies in Mainland Asia
According to data presented by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights Report on Iran in 1984, it is estimated that at least 2 million Iranians were displaced as a direct consequence of the Iranian Civil War. The United States State Department released its own projection that year, estimating a more conservative figure of around one and a half million Iranian citizens being displaced by the War, a majority of the refugees settling in Iraq and Turkey. Iranian refugee communities have also grown in Pakistan, the United States, Bahrain, Oman, Libya, the United Kingdom, France and to a lesser degree the Soviet Union and Jordan. In the aftermath of the Coalition entry in Teheran and the end of the Iranian War in the summer of 1982, analysts have put the death toll of the conflict north of the one million mark, although no definitive consensus has been reached and numbers vary from eight hundred thousand deaths to two and a half million with three million refugees. By any estimate, the Iranian Civil War of 1978-1982 was the bloodiest conflict in the Middle East since the Crusades, and quite possibly one of the greatest post-world war two humanitarian disasters.
[A History of Violence: The Middle East in the 20th Century]
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To which degree can it be argued that the creation of the Free State of Conchinchina was not done solely for pragmatic and fairly cynical reasons? For twenty years, the Government of the Free State has proclaimed itself as the sole voice of the oppressed and tired people of Conchinchina and the vindicator of the National Spirit that kept the people of Conchinchina strong and united against the French, the Japanese and the Communists of Hanoi who styled themselves as “Vietnamese”, as both a masturbatory, self-congratulatory ideologically driven exercise to create an artificial sense of regional chauvinism and an ideologically sound excuse for abandoning the northern provinces and the highlands to North Vietnam. With time, thanks to endless propaganda and a carefully crafted grand official history, the Northern provinces came to be thought of as a load on the backs of the proud, hard-working and often exploited workers of Conchinchina, and thus had to be sacrificed to the godless, ruthless Communist hordes of North Vietnam. All sacrifice is worthwhile when it comes to preserving the Great Nation of Conchinchina, would say the ideologues that have been crafting this line of thought for the past twenty years.
It is of course important to note that while the public face of the Free State and the National Civic Justice Party of Conchinchina which has been in power since the Revolution of May 2nd of 1979, that is to say the Thirteen Generals, with President Le Van Hung at the helm, are all natives from Conchinchina and predominantly from Saigon or the Mekong Delta, the military Coup that brought the Thirteen Generals to power was the work of a large cadre of South Vietnamese officers, many of them born in the northern provinces of the country or even in North Vietnam and Laos. Generals Le Minh Dao, Pham Van Phu, Cao Van Vien, Do Mau and Tôn Thất Đính, amongst another half a dozen officers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, active and retired, formed the backbone of the military arm that overthrew Marshal Cao Ky during the May Coup of 1979. What is more, General Cao Van Vien, Commander in chief of the Conchinchina Army and Minister of War for a considerable time in the history of the Free State, was born in Vientiane, capital of Laos, yet was not only one of the chief leaders of the Camarilla that brought the National Civic Justice Party and Le Van Hung to power, but also one of the architects of the Free State of Conchinchina and the idea of fostering a nationalist movement and identity in the southern state was necessary for the survival of the south-Vietnamese state and the model of government they were trying to create.
[Taken from…The Land of the Blind]
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Yasser Arafat’s death on April of 1980 and the effective annihilation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Southern Lebanon forced Israel to reconsider its place and role in the Lebanese Civil War. As the war raged between 1979 and 1980, it became increasingly clear for the commanders of the Israel Defense Forces that achieving a definitive victory in Lebanon was becoming both increasingly harder to obtain and tied with the need of stabilizing the country and ending the Civil War with a result that was favorable to Israel. Yet more than four years of war and the alliance to the Government of the Maronite Phalange and the Gemayel Family had not only not brought an end to the Lebanese Civil War, but even escalated the conflict and pushed Israel into an impossibly difficult situation in the region. North of the Crimson Line, there were over 80,000 Syrian troops stationed as part of a “peace-keeping mission” authorized by the Arab League Mandate, with the help of collaborationist Shia militias and Palestine exiles. It soon became clear to all involved and even outside observers that the war was growing unsustainable for Begin’s Government, which along with the Israeli public had expected a quick and decisive victory. Even the death of Arafat was not enough to calm the public mood and the protests against Begin. Finally, the destruction of the Palestine Refugee camps at Nabatieh on June of 1982 and at Rashidie on July of that year at the hand of Phalangist militias with alleged Israeli complicity forced the downfall of the Begin Government.
Yitzhak Shamir took office on August of 1982. Three months later, a now disgraced Ariel Sharon abandoned Beirut. The Syrian Army would enter the Lebanese Capital by September 3rd, inaugurating a new phase in the Lebanese Civil War and the thirteen year-long Syrian intervention in Lebanon.
[A History of Violence: The Middle East in the 20th Century]
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C
HAIRMAN HUA DISPELS RUMORS ABOUT RETIREMENT
Hua Guofeng, Chairman of the Communist Party of China, has once again come out to deny the rumors about his alleged retirement, on the twentieth anniversary of his ascension to power in 1976. As celebrations to commemorate the death of Chairman Mao Zedong and the coming to power of Hua Guofeng, rumors regarding the possible retirement of the seventy-five year old Communist Leader have been floating around in the midst of a continuous Chinese crisis at Sinkiang and Tibet. Amidst criticism from the United Nations and the European Community about Chinese tactics in the Sinkiang Emergency and the alleged intervention of the People’s Republic in the Afghan Civil War, Chairman Hua has defended the policies of the People’s Republic and declared that he will remain as Party Chairman for “as long as the Revolution needs me.”
[Taken from…The New York Times, August of 1996]
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IRAQI ELECTIONS: END OF THE HOUSE OF AL-SADR?
Less than a week has passed since the General Elections in the Islamic Republic and the air is rife with speculation about the meaning of the results. The upset victory of the Rally for the Republic coalition last Sunday not only stunned political analysts and foreign observers, but also the old guard of Iraqi politics, whose House of Wisdom’s Coalition had controlled the state politics of Iraq with the blessing of the House of Councilors since the advent of the October Revolution of 1976 in one way or the other. Prime Minister Abdul Sahib Dekhail was quick to acknowledge the defeat of the ruling party, thus sparking massive outburst of celebration in the streets of Baghdad as supporters of the reformist Rally for the Republic marched and chanted in front of the Palace of Government before even waiting for the final decree of Grand Ayatollah Al-Sadr or the Chamber of Councilors. But it wasn’t until October 25th, three days later, with the announcement that Mohammad Sadeq al Sadr, would be stepping down from his position as President of the House of Councilors and Head of State of the Islamic Republic that the people of Iraq have truly begun to believe that reform is possible.
In the thirty years that have passed since the foundation of the Islamic Republic, the Al-Sadr name has been synonymous with that of the Islamic Republic and its institutions, and a member of the family, whose lineage can be traced all the way to the Prophet Mohammad, has occupied the office of Head of State and Leader of the Revolution since 1976, starting with the Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, ideological and institutional father of the Islamic Republic, and Mohammad Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr, whose twenty years in power saw the Islamic Republic grow from a war-torn, poor and exhausted nation to a prosper, peaceful and democratic society. What exactly motivated the young Ayatollah, Muqtada al-Sadr to resign? Most popular amongst the speculators is the theory that the Ayatollah has resigned as a sign from the House of Councilors and the Clerical leadership of the Islamic Republic that the voice of the people has been heard and that the time for reform has arrived.
The Iraqi society of 1976, destitute and on the brink of death in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war, the civil war and the October Revolution, is far from the society of 2006, to whom memories of war, revolution, hardship and Baathist tyranny are just nebulous concepts compared to the very present reality of a stagnantly conservative society, ruled by the same clique of individuals, the same faces, the same ideas for thirty years straight. Indeed, the driving forces behind the Eight-Party Coalition of the Rally for the Republic, also known as the House of Freedoms by its supporters, are both the ever growing youth of Iraq and Sunni Muslims who wished to see their influence in government expanded from that allotted to them by the Government quotas. A third important constituency that we cannot ignore is of course composed of disaffected voters and independents that ached for change after three decades of the “same old, same old.”
Issues like the need to restructure the massive, sclerotic government bureaucracy, curb the power of the House of Councilors and reform the institution so as to democratize it, streamline the Healthcare and Welfare systems and end the dependency of the Iraqi economy on the OPEC and the Oil Market have been ignored for too long, yell the voices of the New Iraq. (…)
KURDISTAN: MEET THE NEW BOSS, SAME AS THE OLD BOSS
At Irbil, capital of the Autonomous Kurd State, the mood is less celebratory than that of Baghdad, and Election Day is seen as just another Sunday as far as the Kurds are concerned. In the autonomous province, where the Prime Minister is not subjected to the honor rule which precludes the head of government from reelection after a four year mandate, everyone votes knowing that Nechervan Idris Barzani will be reelected. This year, whereas in the rest of the country the House of Freedoms achieved an historical victory over the old establishment, their Kurdish allies, the People’s Kurdish Union for Reform, were unable to force an end to Barzani’s government, which this year was reelected for its fourth term.
[Taken from…Noticias, November 2nd of 2006]
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UNITED STATES VOWS TO CONTINUE CONCHICHINA EMBARGO
Today, Secretary of State James L. Buckley has announced that the embargo which weighs on the Free State of Conchinchina will continue for the foreseeable future, despite protests from House Democrats and the Government of China. In his speech, Secretary Buckley made reference to the South China Seas Incident as an “unfortunate accident” but refused to make comments on the progress of talks with the Chinese government or Chairman Hua Guofeng. Instead, Buckley focused entirely on the development of diplomatic and naval operations against the “rogue narco-state” and the “unconditional, unwavering” support of the regional allies against Le Van Hung.
[Taken from…The Washington Post, April of 1998]
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Today’s Feature:
Letters from Kampuchea (2001)
Continuing our cycle of documentaries tonight is Wes Anderson’s “
Letters from Kampuchea”, perhaps Anderson’s best known and most acclaimed work. The story revolves around the 1985 Kampuchean Intervention against the bloody Khmer Rouge regime. The film, the first to deal with the horrors of the Cambodian Genocide so openly, does not approach the genocide in on itself, but rather the world’s reaction to developments in the Southeast Asian nation leading up to the 1985 Invasion as a denouncement of the world’s inaction during the early stages of the vicious communist dictatorship that ruled Cambodia between 1979 and 1985.
Notes:
First, yes, most of the characters mentioned are IOTL, except for Muqtada Al-Sadr, who rather than being the IOTL one is an ITTL version who is somewhat older by a few years and also an Ayatollah (but not Grand Ayatollah like the other ones)
Secondly, the Islamic Republic of Iraq is not Iran transplanted to Mesopotamia, but rather a different entity. It's somewhat conservative socially, but not crazy fundamentalist like Iran and Saudi Arabia. People aren't stoned to death, women aren't particularly abused, people aren't accused of witchcraft or converting to Christianity.
The state is pluralistic out of a necessity to keep the minorities happy. Having the Sunni, Kurds, Christians and a few others, along with nearly a million Iranian exiles, the state has decided that Islamic Democracy is the thing to keep people together rather than fundamentalist dogma. I guess things like Homosexuality might be technically illegal, although not subjected to death or long prison sentences.
The Lower house is basically a regular lower house parliament, whereas the House of Councilors is mostly staffed by Religious figures, Islamic jurists, clerics and a minority of Sunni and other smaller religions representatives appointed by the lower house. This is a mix between the House of Lords and the Iranian Guardian Council. There is also an Iraqi Assembly of Experts, whose job is basically to regulate the House of Councilors once or twice a year, nominate people for the place and make sure the rulings made by the President of the House of Councilors (the Iraqi version of the Supreme Leader of Iran) are in accordance to Islamic tradition.
The Councilors can veto laws although have been relinquishing power over issues such as the Economy and Foreign relations since the 1980s, as the society became accustomed to democracy.
Otherwise, the state is not particularly restrictive. There are quotas for Sunni and other minorities that assure that they have a proper amount of seats in the lower house and in the Cabinet, Healthcare, some sort of welfare and the ever increasing problem of an Iranian refugee community that's having problems integrating.
As for Lebanon, I changed the timetable, having earlier interventions, Israeli invasions and withdrawals, etc. Ultimately, I don't know if I made things worse or better, but I'll have it figured out by the time of the epilogue.
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Coming soon: John Wayne and Ideology.