The Guns of the West: WI breech-loading artillery in the ACW

[Saphroneth]

Of course, OTL in the American Civil War most of the artillery consisted of either muzzle loading rifles (such as the Ordnance 3") or smoothbores (such as the 12lb Napoleon).

But in the time of the ACW, there were rather more modern guns elsewhere in the world - in particular, at this time the British Army has large numbers of the Armstrong RBL 12 lb 8 cwt.
So... would either side have gained much benefit from using RBL field guns to supplement their RML and SBML guns?

 

[Delta Force]

What about Whitworth artillery? It was on par with far more modern pieces. There were also Whitworth rifles (accuracy on par with modern rifles), but they weren't breech loading. There's more information on Whitworth rifles here, artillery here, and the systems in general here.

 

[Byzantion]

Of course, OTL in the American Civil War most of the artillery consisted of either muzzle loading rifles (such as the Ordnance 3") or smoothbores (such as the 12lb Napoleon).

But in the time of the ACW, there were rather more modern guns elsewhere in the world - in particular, at this time the British Army has large numbers of the Armstrong RBL 12 lb 8 cwt.
So... would either side have gained much benefit from using RBL field guns to supplement their RML and SBML guns?

Maybe the Union buys Krupp´s newest breach-loading artillery from Prussia or from Krupp company . These things did a lot of damage in the German-Danish, the German-Austrian and the German-French war. The ACW saw mostly muzzle-loaded Napoleonic age canons. the C/67 canon was able to shoot 10 times a minute and had a 3 450 meter distance . (11318,897 feet)

 

[riggerrob]

WI Confederate artillery got breech-loading guns?
Would their increased rate of fire win more battles?
Would their increased fire-power compensate for a man-power shortage?
Would Southern supply trains be able to feed the guns?

 

[Saphroneth]

WI Confederate artillery got breech-loading guns?
Would their increased rate of fire win more battles?
Would their increased fire-power compensate for a man-power shortage?
Would Southern supply trains be able to feed the guns?

Well, what's almost as important as rate of fire is accuracy - the forging quality required for a BL gun means that it does end up being quite accurate too. So, for example, that would permit counter-battery fire to a much greater extent.


Supply train wise, it might be a concern- but I have a suspicion that a single RBL gun is worth two or more of the slower firing, less accurate RMLs. So in effect you get the same fighting power and more staying power from removing two 3" RML, replacing with one 3" RBL and using the spare motive power for even more shells.


Though manufacturing the shells could prove to be a problem - there's a definite tradeoff there.

 

[robcraufurd]

Maybe the Union buys Krupp´s newest breach-loading artillery from Prussia or from Krupp company

Krupp was doing a pretty good trade in Germany in the period:

Prussia bought 312 6pdrs in 1859 and 300 4pdrs in 1864: in 1861 Hanover, Baden, Wurttemberg, and Hesse-Darmstadt all followed suit. Despite the low level of military spending and general lack of urgency for reform in the Confederation, almost all German states had purchased a number of Krupps by the time war broke out [1866]. Breech-loading Krupp steel artillery formed two of Baden's four field batteries; armed Brunswick's single field battery; formed four of Hanover's six (despite their rushed departure from the kingdom resulting in them leaving behind a fully equipped 6pdr battery in Stade to be captured by the Prussians); equipped all three of Grand Ducal Hesse's field batteries and two of the three field batteries belonging to the Mecklenburgs; represented one of the two field batteries that Nassau, Oldenburg and Wurttemberg each deployed; and furnished five of the nine Saxon foot batteries.

However, I'd guess he probably had enough spare capacity to turn out a few guns for one side or another as well.

WI Confederate artillery got breech-loading guns?

I think the Confederates would struggle simply because they'd have a far harder time machining new parts or repairing old ones. There's a reason they ended up using cast bronze Napoleons, after all. The Union probably wasn't sophisticated to turn out an Armstrong built-up wrought iron gun or a Krupp steel gun themselves- compare the simplicity of the Parrott gun to the complex Armstrong- but they could at least have kept them in service given enough spare vent-pieces and breech-blocks.

for example, that would permit counter-battery fire to a much greater extent.

I think the best way to use them might well have been as an army artillery reserve. Once you've decided where the main force of your attack is going to go, swing an artillery mass of RBL guns into place and hammer the relevant section so your infantry can just walk over to victory. By 1870 the Prussians were doing rather clever things with dispersed batteries firing concentrically onto a range of targets, but the Union could just have lined them up wheel-to-wheel out of musket range and knocked seven bells out of the opponent's line.

 

[galveston bay]

the Whitworth had reliability issues, and of course was a bit more expensive as it was imported (shipping costs) and even more so for the Confederacy (extra shipping costs for running the blockade)

a bit on it here

http://www.civilwaracademy.com/whitworth.html

Early breechloading guns had a significant failure rate compared to muzzle loaders. Note that the RN went back to muzzle loaders in the 1870s before finally re adopting the more reliable breechloaders available in the 1880s. That failure rate was more serious for naval guns, because either higher velocities or bigger projectiles were required to penetrate armor, and the muzzle loaders were better able to handle the greater explosives forces in the chamber (or breach).


Note that the British Army phased them out and went back to muzzle loading weapons until around 1880.. High intensity fire caused the breech and weapon to get hotter and hotter this increased the chances of premature detonation in an intense battle. As high intensity fire is normal in a large battle, this could be a problem which meant that soon the breech loaders would have to slow their rate of fire significantly compared to muzzle loaders.

As land battles restricted artillery to line of sight (no system for directing or calling indirect fire existed) the effective range was restricted by terrain to the extent that maximum effective range for the weapon mattered less than maximum effective spotting distance.

The reason that the breech loading mechanism had a high failure rate because it was still in the early stages of development. Once it was better perfected, the British reembraced, as did the US Army when Congress finally let them spend some money.

the Krupp artillery had metal cartridges and for the same reason metal cartridges were eagerly embraced for small arms the artillery men loved then. They had a better seal than previous weapons (which used powder bag charges and separate shot) which reduced the stresses on the breach (more of the power of the explosion is focused forward for one thing) and they are far easier to handle. Note that this type of artillery did not see service until 1863, and the Prussians only ordered 300 initially to try it out.

So although revolutionary, and a hell of a weapon, a reasonable artillerymen would be a little wary of buying large numbers of untested foreign artillery in 1864 (as they are still basically in trials) and by 1865 the CSA couldn't really get enough past the blockade to make a difference while huge numbers of muzzle loaders are in US Army service and thus buying a lot of new guns at that point would have been a hard sell in Congress. Especially since the war was OVER in April 1865. As the US Army at this point has literally thousands of guns, and the Navy thousands more, replacing them at that point would have been a huge expense

nice little article here on all of that

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/new-navy2.htm

Now if the war had come a bit later, I feel reasonably sure the Union at the very least would have bought large numbers, or bought a few and copied it if possible. The Krupp C64 in particular was ideal for horse artillery

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C64_%28field_gun%29

 

[galveston bay]

and then there is the other problem

The Union is in far better shape to acquire or build huge numbers of guns and more importantly, shells. Particularly complex metal cartridges used by Krupp style artillery as seen in the ability of the Union to equip large numbers of its troops with repeating rifles (with metal cartridges) that the Confederacy simply could not match as it requires precise machining and that is exactly the area the Confederacy was weakest in.

Metal cartridges are also a lot more expensive than paper or linen powder bags and separate rounds for that powder.

Another issue is that this is still prior to the era of smokeless powder (1870s) and smoke was a real factor in accuracy for Civil War artillery. At Gettysburg, in the attempt to soften up the Union positions prior to Picketts Charge, the overwhelming number of Confederate artillery rounds went well over the Union troops (who were either prone or lying behind cover) and for that matter over the crest of the hill to smash into unimportant (relatively speaking) personnel or nothing at all behind the main Union positions. The reason was that after the first few rounds, the CSA artillery was enveloped in smoke and they literally could not see any longer what they were shooting at.

This was hardly atypical. It wasn't until smokeless powder, in a metal cartridge, that artillery truly became the long range weapon that would along with the machine gun dominate World War I.

The most likely army able to get the Krupp guns would have been the Union Army, probably 1864 or later, and sure, those would have been murderous. But whether they would have been murderous enough to justify replacing large numbers of reliable, relatively cheap, and domestically manufactured artillery (which makes Union industrialists happy) seems like a central question.

 

[Hotpoint]

Early breechloading guns had a significant failure rate compared to muzzle loaders. Note that the RN went back to muzzle loaders in the 1870s before finally re adopting the more reliable breechloaders available in the 1880s.

You know the Armstrong 12 Pounder was safer for its crews than contemporary muzzle loaders, even the Committee that recommended switching back to the latter conceded there was no occasion when an Armstrong 12 Pounder had burst whereas it was hardly unknown for other guns.

 

[Saphroneth]

You know the Armstrong 12 Pounder was safer for its crews than contemporary muzzle loaders, even the Committee that recommended switching back to the latter conceded there was no occasion when an Armstrong 12 Pounder had burst whereas it was hardly unknown for other guns.

As far as I'm aware, the issue for the RBL 12 lber was essentially cost - it was too expensive for the performance it could achieve. It was, however, a reliable gun which could achieve startling performance for the time... and fire after being rained on for a month or dragged through a swamp.
In short, it's much better than anything actually used in the ACW.

 

[Reader347]

WI Confederate artillery got breech-loading guns?
Would their increased rate of fire win more battles?
Would their increased fire-power compensate for a man-power shortage?
Would Southern supply trains be able to feed the guns?

The southern troops were constantly strapped for powder. Give them quick firing artillery and they run out faster. At Gettysburg, on the third day, they couldn't keep firing and have any powder left for another battle.

 

[Alt History Buff]

and then there is the other problem

The Union is in far better shape to acquire or build huge numbers of guns and more importantly, shells. Particularly complex metal cartridges used by Krupp style artillery as seen in the ability of the Union to equip large numbers of its troops with repeating rifles (with metal cartridges) that the Confederacy simply could not match as it requires precise machining and that is exactly the area the Confederacy was weakest in.

Metal cartridges are also a lot more expensive than paper or linen powder bags and separate rounds for that powder.

Another issue is that this is still prior to the era of smokeless powder (1870s) and smoke was a real factor in accuracy for Civil War artillery. At Gettysburg, in the attempt to soften up the Union positions prior to Picketts Charge, the overwhelming number of Confederate artillery rounds went well over the Union troops (who were either prone or lying behind cover) and for that matter over the crest of the hill to smash into unimportant (relatively speaking) personnel or nothing at all behind the main Union positions. The reason was that after the first few rounds, the CSA artillery was enveloped in smoke and they literally could not see any longer what they were shooting at.

This was hardly atypical. It wasn't until smokeless powder, in a metal cartridge, that artillery truly became the long range weapon that would along with the machine gun dominate World War I.

The most likely army able to get the Krupp guns would have been the Union Army, probably 1864 or later, and sure, those would have been murderous. But whether they would have been murderous enough to justify replacing large numbers of reliable, relatively cheap, and domestically manufactured artillery (which makes Union industrialists happy) seems like a central question.

I tend to agree with the advantages that the new technologies would be to the Union whom could manufacture them easier (and their ordanance).

But I think the big questionsis how this would actually affect the battlefield, namely would more accurate and faster rate of fire help the defender (usually the South) or the attacker (usually the North).

I lean towards the attack on this one. Even if both sides had equal access, I would think this would be an advantage to the north as these updated weapons would be more useful against defensive positions.

This would help swing the balance away from the defensive side given by the faster firing and more accurate rifles of the mid-19th century.

 

[TFSmith121]

GB summed it up; when the "world-beating" technologies

I tend to agree with the advantages that the new technologies would be to the Union whom could manufacture them easier (and their ordanance).

But I think the big questionsis how this would actually affect the battlefield, namely would more accurate and faster rate of fire help the defender (usually the South) or the attacker (usually the North).

I lean towards the attack on this one. Even if both sides had equal access, I would think this would be an advantage to the north as these updated weapons would be more useful against defensive positions.

This would help swing the balance away from the defensive side given by the faster firing and more accurate rifles of the mid-19th century.

GB summed it up; when the "world-beating" technologies of the 1860s ended up as so much scrap in the 1870s, one had to think the officers and men dealing with the ordnance - and their equivalent of Private Snuffy - understood the engineering had outstripped the human factors.

There are, however, some interesting test cases of "modern" technology overpowering "obsolescent" technologies (in the eye of the beholder, at least) in this era, as early as 1863 - the US mounted infantry (Wilder's brigade) with Sharps at Hoover's Gap during the Tullahoma Campaign, for example. Interestingly enough, the same campaign saw the triumph of US troops with muzzle-loaders and better tactics over the rebels, most arguably with Willich's brigade over the rebs at Liberty Gap.

So, based on the Civil War record, the combatant with the better economy, better demographics, and a more professional army and officer corps in the theater - namely, the US, by the time any of these advanced weapons are in wide enough service to make a difference - is going to win out over the poorer economy, poorer manpower, and less professional army and officer corps.

Of course, there are examples of men with decidely inferior personal weapons triumphing over troops with better, as late as the 1870s (Isandhlwana) and 1890s (Adowa), so it can cut both ways; as ever (almost), it comes down to the soldiers and their commanders, as opposed to the technology.

Best,