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Spun off from here: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=206731

This is a continuation of the "Death of Saddam Hussein in 1976" timeline. It should not be taken as an "Official" continuation, just a continuation in my own eyes, though inspiration is welcome to be taken.

Following the deteriorating situation in Kurdistan, Iraq has been sending larger and larger quantities of troops to the north. It and Syria have formed the Euphrates Defense Co-operation Organization (EDCO), although a summit on October 15 in Hama, Syria involving many other Arab states and Turkey was inconclusive.

The Iraqis, already having six divisions in Kurdistan, have managed to bring up two more. One was army units relieved of security duties by the Popular Army, and the other was a green, newly-minted division. The army units have waited, not just for military reactions, but for political reactions as well.
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To think that a tussle in the Mideast could've decided the presidential election seemed absurd, but Ford's support for an independent Kurdistan, following Carter's opposition to it, gave the president a full term of his own in the White House.

Carter had still won in the South, but just enough voters in the Midwest, and, surprisingly enough, New York, had given Ford the victory he needed to win. New York was key-for enough Jews and pro-Israel voters had switched over to help someone who'd at least stood against the country who'd attacked Israel in 1973 to give that state and its boatload of electoral votes to Ford.

The popular vote was a tiny 50.3% victory for Ford, but he had gained a solid 321-217 electoral victory, at least partially on the backs of romantics who saw the notion of standing up for an oppressed people more appealing than 'detente', especially in the wake of Vietnam.

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In Baghdad, Izzat ad-Douri and the Iraqi generals feared the electoral victory. On November 4, shortly after Carter's concession, ad-Douri ordered the hastily planned contingency operation to be launched. It took some time to get ready, and it wasn't until November 6 that the offensive was actually launched.

Kurdish leaders had learned from their foolish mistakes of trying to stand and fight with the Iraqis in the 1974-1975 war, and had ordered a semi-guerilla campaign-with the help of many goodies that the Israelis, and to a greater extent the Iranians, unable to directly intervene for fear of provoking the Soviets on their border, had given him.

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The operation was a slow failure. Envisioned as an evelopment cutting off the Kurds from the Iranian border, the northernmost force was soon reduced to almost nothing. The typical engagement in the early stages of the offensive went as follows: A small group of Kurds would fire one or two rounds from a heavy weapon at an approaching Iraqi column, almost always missing, before running away. This, however, was enough to cause the Iraqis to stop, fire wildly, dig in, and blast the surrounding area with tank, artillery, and sometimes aircraft fire until they were sure the Kurds had been dealt with, then keep the advance moving forward. The Iraqi advance had slowed to a crawl by November 10, falling well short of its intended goals.

Although there was little direct contact, in the first four days of the attack Iraq still suffered dozens of deaths and more wounded. There was a one-day lull in the action to ready dozens of Iraqi and Syrian aircraft in an attempt to regain momentum.

On November 12, Iraq attempted to clear the passes with sweeps by Alouette and Gazelle helicopters moving ahead of the main force. This plan, suggested by an air force officer promoted in the shuffle following Saddam's death, may have been good in theory, but it failed in practice. The sweeps consisted of a pair of helicopters flying robotically forward, firing at the first thing they saw that looked like the enemy, often inaccurately, then returning back to base. Furthermore, the helicopters were easily destroyed and even more easily spooked away by enemy fire-nearly 10% of Iraq's helicopter force was destroyed on November 12, in exchange for a small, barely noticeable increase in the rate of advance that day.

The fixed-wing sorties fared little better. Two fighter/bombers were downed by Kurdish anti-aircraft fire, and the rest flew at such a great height that they missed. The next four days were those of slow advances and "air interdiction" sorties to avoid friendly fire-which in practice meant either bombing country villages or flailing around looking for Kurdish fighters until they were shot at and either forced away or destroyed.

On November 16, ad-Douri, realizing that the attack was going nowhere, not accomplishing its mission of quickly destroying Kurdistan, and frustrated with the timidness of his subordinates, issued a decree that the standoff destruction with heavy firepower tactics were to be stopped.

"You are to close with and destroy the enemy, and press the advance, regardless of casualties."

The next day, the new tactics were put into effect....
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