The Great Pacific War aftermath

There were the Martin T1-T3 torpedo plane series and, well you know? None of these planes had a ship killing punch.
The Martin/Great Lakes Torpedo planes did have the WWI era Mk 7, a 1600 pound, 36 knot air droppable torpedo with 466 pound TNT warhead, but did have drop limits of 95 knots and under 40 feet by 1930, at which time the USN dithered on what would become the short and chubby Mk 13

So like the other WWI era fish, would work,, given that that the depth setting would be off, as all the other WWI leftover proven when used after 1941. And those stats are not far off from the WWI German G7 Torpedo, that did sink a good number of ships in WWI

There was a 1000 pound class Mk 7, with a lighter warhead, but limited number were made
The bedspring CXAM is deceptive. it is fairly lightweight for a radar aerial.
It was mostly aluminum
 
Was the Army of the same opinion as the Navy that the PI were lost no-matter-what, with a full-on Japanese attack? How deeply did the Army game out how to extend the campaign? (for example, a common AH theme is for the campaign to carry on in other parts of the archipelago, either by USA and Filipino uniformed soldiers, or as guerillas as historically occurred)

The Army was so reduced from 1919 it had nothing to defend PI with. Congress funded some Coastal Artillery installations. a 1920s era Army Air Corps installation, and the Phillipino Scouts at regimental strength. In the US the Army had four infantry and a cavalry division funded at maybe 75% strength, a few other divisions funded at half strength. There was a field brigade in Hawaii & what amounted to another brigade @ Panama. the Coastal Artillery still had a lot of installations, partially because the made for good pork barrel projects what with all that concrete, steel, & labor. The National Guard with its 25 Divisions was popular. The pork barrel opportunities were large as every county could have a small armory, and every city a big one. & all those Great War training camps could be made into permanent National Guard training sites generating more guvmint money for local construction companies.

All the above was in the 1920s. In the 1930s the Army had its field forces slashed to where the standing Regular Army consisted of four half strength divisions, a cavalry division of reduced brigade strength, a experimental mechanized brigade, & reduced brigades of a couple battalions each in Panama, Hawaii, & PI. The Coastal Artillery batteries were manned as low as 25% strength. The Army Air Corps was reduced to a organization for training pilots and testing new aircraft, with no meaningful combat capability. Every other division or corps was nothing more than a cadre. Mobilization for war revolved around activating approx 60,000 reserve officers and recruiting/drafting however many 18-36 year olds you needed.

I have not found details for the Army in WP ORANGE. There was a Joint Board established in the 1920s where tiny group of Army and Navy officers planned for combined operations in a variety of wars. ie: WP TAN, YELLOW, GREY, BLACK, RED, CRIMSON, GREEN, ect... ect... ect... I suspect ORANGE served as the model for most & most were neglected other than as War College & Naval College material. I did find a third hand source that claimed the Army intended for WP ORANGE to have 50,000 men equipped and trained for overseas service by Mobilization Day +180, & 100,000 by M +365. Since the USN did not plan to start offensive operations until after a year at the earliest that sounds about right.

The USN did have a couple of Expeditionary Brigades organized. Mostly Marines these were true combined arms brigades, with their own logistics element. They included a composite aircraft group, engineers, armor, artillery, HMG companies, and some rifle battalions. There was one of these on each coast, & the wherewithal to organize a couple more should war occur. These two Expeditionary Brigades & maybe four Army infantry regiments represented the only ready ground forces from circa 1925 thru 1938. In 1938 Congress finally provided for 1939 & 1940 funds to return the Army field forces to their 1920s strength.
 
(^^^)

6. The Japanese field army is much better trained and equipped than the American one at the start. Murphy help the Americans if the IJA get a lodgement in the Philippine Islands.
7. The Americans will win, if they have the stomach for it. Longer war than the 1941-1945 horror show, because the Americans will have to build faster ships without the 2 year lead, more ships, work out their gunnery and torpedo problems and create a new army to replace the one the IJA destroyed. STEEP learning curve.

I thought the US Army had 4 cadre infantry divisions and a cavalry division by 1931. I see I was way off the mark.
 

Driftless

Donor
^^^^ Your laying out of the extent of the anaemic state of the US Army for much of the Interwar years is an eye-opener for me. I think of it as being greatly whittled back, but your summary puts it as mostly a shell organization. It also points out what a thorough turn around started in the late 30's.

So, basically, the short answer to my second question is that even a notion of layered defense of the PI wasn't remotely possible during the Interwar period. Extremely insufficient manpower, material, leadership - on scene - leaves little purpose to a larger plan?
 
In 1925, Hector Bywater wrote the Great Pacific War, in it he has Japan and the US fight in 1931.

Bith sides fight amazingly well but it ends with a US victory (one the Japanese were on the cusp of winning). As a result Japans fleet and armies are in shambles due to a unified China taking over Manchuria, the US on the verge of an economic depression (although that may be the Great Depression starting), Europe heavily beneffiting from the war, and poison gas being thrown about like candy.

What would be some possible aftermaths of this affair? ...

Agree more or less. The after effects are multiple. In no particular order: The Washington Naval treaty is dead. It maybe something is negotiated to replace it, but I'd not bet on it. The only thing holding back naval construction would be the economics of the 1930s.

The US is a step up on the development of amphibious warfare. Not as advanced as in 1945, but at the 1942 or perhaps 1943 level.

The US is a step up on combat aircraft design, or at least specifications for th 1940s generation of aircraft.

...ditto for carrier & other warship design. I'd also expect to see some fast & easy to build designs for cargo ships on the drawing board.

The Army ground corps would have a lot of theoretical doctrine & plans from the 1920s validated, or tossed out.

The National Guard would be subject to a house cleaning to reduce the old 19th Century 'Gun Club' social connection for membership. I can't recall if Bywater addressed the National Guard in his book. I do know the Army could not mobilize efficiently a 100,000 man expeditionary corps for a Pacific War, or War Plan ORANGE without two division of NG. The residual Social Club atmosphere in the NG OTL caused problems in many, tho not all, units when mobilized into national service 1940-41.


The USN reaches 1940 with a more effective suite of weapons. ie: The torpedoes work, radar is a bit further along in development. CiC & in general a more efficient fighter defense system.

But, we have to keep in mind the probable Depression keeps much of this at the school house level & in limited deployment. Theres probably not the money to build and train entirely to the lessons learned. When the funds do arrive the advance will be faster & surer than OTL.

Adding to the above:

Amphibious warfare-forcible entry; Post Great War there was a popular notion amphibious warfare was no longer possible in the modern age. Exactly why is a bit fuzzy, but it was popular. Still the Japanese, USN, & a few others thought otherwise & continued to practice it. After this Pacific War the general attitudes will change and more militaries will study up on this subject.

Both good and bad conclusions will be drawn about air power. Lacking direct experience, but seeing the air war here from afar may not provide any large improvement in doctrines, or equipment. So folks will guess right. Others will get it wrong. Be interesting to speculate on the US Army & Navy specification for the next generation aircraft after this war.

While Bywater & his USN sources saw the aircraft carrier as a sort of 'super cruiser', a new auxiliary to the battle fleet there were a number of forward thinking admirals and junior officers in the 1920s who saw the truth. I don't know what the Japanese were up to in the 1920s but Admiral 'Bull' Reeves at least saw a deeper into the future. Its correct the aircraft ordnance of the 1920s & of this 1931 war was inadequate. But, its also true new weapons were just around the corner. Post war Reeves & his fellow travelers would have had much grist for their mill from the operations Bywater describes, or any more realistic events in such a war. Its also probable Reeves would have still advanced to senior command in the 1930s and had a even deeper influence on USN doctrine and air power development within the US Navy.

The Army with its experience in expeditionary warfare would be a much different animal as WWII approached. The experiment with the new triangular division would be over and the square organization and accompanying doctrinal baggage abandoned. If the mobilization for the new war in Europe occurs as OTL the experimental nature of 'Amphibious Forces Atlantic Fleet' will be unnecessary & that organization in 1940-41 be a much more dangerous weapon in US hands. Ditto for the Atlantic fleet in general.

Politically its a wash in trying to predict if the US voters will be more isolationist or less in 1939-41. If Japan seeks alignment with the Axis to avenge its early 1930s defeat. The isolationist cause will be DOA. If Japan is quiescent then the isolationists have more traction.
 
^^^^ Your laying out of the extent of the anaemic state of the US Army for much of the Interwar years is an eye-opener for me. I think of it as being greatly whittled back, but your summary puts it as mostly a shell organization. It also points out what a thorough turn around started in the late 30's. ...

The Chiefs of Staff wisely configured the Regular Army and reserve officers corps as a training organization, giving up any effort to keep the residual 200,000 or 100,000 as a actual field force. If there were a genuine emergency the National Guard would have to do.
 
Based on OP.

Carl Schwamberger said:

Agree more or less. The after effects are multiple. In no particular order: The Washington Naval treaty is dead. It maybe something is negotiated to replace it, but I'd not bet on it. The only thing holding back naval construction would be the economics of the 1930s.

War in 1931, the brakes are off. Hoover is an organizer and he knows the talent pool. He just was lousy at the domestic politics thing. He will have his industrial mobilization board and more importantly, engineers can talk to him without baby talk. Lot better than Wilson, because of what follows.

Example:

Battlecruisers with thick armor. The US needs fast gunships. Somehow I see those turkeys as future candidates for 'conversions'. Call the postwar modernizations; "Constellations". Hoover will understand the C and R flakes when they explain "angled decks".

The US is a step up on the development of amphibious warfare. Not as advanced as in 1945, but at the 1942 or perhaps 1943 level.

Not so fast. Alligators and Dukws are not possible yet. Better dust off some of those old Winfield Scott landing barge designs until Henry Ford can get his designers to whip up a sea-going tracklayer.

The US is a step up on combat aircraft design, or at least specifications for the 1940s generation of aircraft.

1931, it is 400 kWatts or bust. Pratt and Whitney is still a half decade away from its beautiful 1500 kWatt engines.

...ditto for carrier & other warship design. I'd also expect to see some fast & easy to build designs for cargo ships on the drawing board.

Dust off the WW I Hog Islanders and build some more of them.

As for the flattops? Angled Deck makes an EARLY appearance because Moffett says so. War will do that with that joker at BuAir.

The Army ground corps would have a lot of theoretical doctrine & plans from the 1920s validated, or tossed out.

Goodbye "Horse", hello Christie combat car? What do you mean we go metric?

The National Guard would be subject to a house cleaning to reduce the old 19th Century 'Gun Club' social connection for membership. I can't recall if Bywater addressed the National Guard in his book. I do know the Army could not mobilize efficiently a 100,000 man expeditionary corps for a Pacific War, or War Plan ORANGE without two division of NG. The residual Social Club atmosphere in the NG OTL caused problems in many, tho not all, units when mobilized into national service 1940-41.

Where is Marshall in all this kerfluffle? If he is anywhere near the Guard, those Elmer Fudds will never know what hit them.
The USN reaches 1940 with a more effective suite of weapons. ie: The torpedoes work, radar is a bit further along in development. CiC & in general a more efficient fighter defense system.

The Mark XIII might be the baseline, for a whole family of 60 cm x 6 meter heavyweights. One thing will be pushed hard; self loading gas operated auto-cannons in 2 and 3 cm. Expect pom poms to make a dramatic appearance.

Radar is definite. It will be pushed so hard, that the British will be trying to steal it from us, instead of the other way around.

But, we have to keep in mind the probable Depression keeps much of this at the school house level & in limited deployment. Theres probably not the money to build and train entirely to the lessons learned. When the funds do arrive the advance will be faster & surer than OTL.

The USG just deficit spent its way through a Pacific War. (Estimated cost 50 BILLION 1931 US dollars.) Japan is in ruins. Chinese school kids are singing "My Country 'Tis of Thee", and MG Smedley Butler is raising hell in the CONUS about how MacArthur screwed up the war by adopting the Pedersen rifle in 7mm. Depression? I'm scared Mr. Corncob Pipe is running for President. That is the stuff of nightmares.
 
Adding to the above:

Amphibious warfare-forcible entry; Post Great War there was a popular notion amphibious warfare was no longer possible in the modern age. Exactly why is a bit fuzzy, but it was popular. Still the Japanese, USN, & a few others thought otherwise & continued to practice it. After this Pacific War the general attitudes will change and more militaries will study up on this subject.

Mr. Hoover, I would like to introduce you to Major Pete Ellis.
Both good and bad conclusions will be drawn about air power. Lacking direct experience, but seeing the air war here from afar may not provide any large improvement in doctrines, or equipment. So folks will guess right. Others will get it wrong. Be interesting to speculate on the US Army & Navy specification for the next generation aircraft after this war.

Goodbye Keystone deathtraps, Hello Boeings.
While Bywater & his USN sources saw the aircraft carrier as a sort of 'super cruiser', a new auxiliary to the battle fleet there were a number of forward thinking admirals and junior officers in the 1920s who saw the truth. I don't know what the Japanese were up to in the 1920s but Admiral 'Bull' Reeves at least saw a deeper into the future. Its correct the aircraft ordnance of the 1920s & of this 1931 war was inadequate. But, its also true new weapons were just around the corner. Post war Reeves & his fellow travelers would have had much grist for their mill from the operations Bywater describes, or any more realistic events in such a war. Its also probable Reeves would have still advanced to senior command in the 1930s and had a even deeper influence on USN doctrine and air power development within the US Navy.

The Japanese were taking notes from William Forbes-Sempill, 19th Lord Sempill and another helpful tutor, Frederick Rutland. Both should be jailed early and often.
The Army with its experience in expeditionary warfare would be a much different animal as WWII approached. The experiment with the new triangular division would be over and the square organization and accompanying doctrinal baggage abandoned. If the mobilization for the new war in Europe occurs as OTL the experimental nature of 'Amphibious Forces Atlantic Fleet' will be unnecessary & that organization in 1940-41 be a much more dangerous weapon in US hands. Ditto for the Atlantic fleet in general.

Salerno will still be a mess, but the other stuff will land on the bewildered Germans like Old 97. It, the Pacific Way, was not too pretty when it came at you. No Drumbeat, either. Hat on Too Tight (Raeder) )will have to explain to the Berlin Maniac, "Ich habe Fido wirklich gestört und nicht in einer guten Art und Weise." (I bothered the dog in a censored manner.)

Politically its a wash in trying to predict if the US voters will be more isolationist or less in 1939-41. If Japan seeks alignment with the Axis to avenge its early 1930s defeat. The isolationist cause will be DOA. If Japan is quiescent then the isolationists have more traction.

The US will be up to its ears in East Asia post war. Europe may be secondary as the US sorts the chaos it finds out; until France is invaded in 1940. Then it is in Murphy's hands.
 
While OTL, a lot of people including the British and the US Army thought amphibious warfare/amphibious assault was no-go territory, as early as 1919 the Marines saw that as their raison d'etre especially since of all the color warplans ORANGE was really the only one that was being considered seriously and being worked on (RED and variations were for war with the UK +/- various dominions not happening, BLACK was Germany who until Hitler began rearming in the 30s were no threat to anybody, etc). The main reason amphibious warfare was seen as someplace you did not want to go was Gallipoli and the disaster that was. The USMC, and to a lesser extent parts of the Navy saw amphibious assault as the only way to island hop and get fleet support bases as the USA moved west across the Pacific, to culminate in a Mahanian fleet encounter somewhere in the Western Pacific. To make a long story short those who saw amphibious assault as a necessity for WPO and other reasons, said "lets analyze Gallipoli and use it as an example of what not to do".

During the interwar period the Army was glad to let amphibious warfare being an entirely Marine thing, not touching it with a ten foot pole. Towards the end of the 30s, the Army took the Landing Force Manual the Marines created in the early-mid 30s and translated it in to "Army" and the first Army units trained in amphibious warfare/landing techniques were trained by the Marines in 1938.

My masters thesis was on the development of medical doctrine for amphibious warfare by the USN and USMC, in the interwar period so I know whereof I speak (lots of time with original documents in archives) - published as a three part article in "Marine Corps History". On a similar note I have a chapter in a book on WWI medicine analyzing medical planning for Gallipoli also from original documents in British archives...
 
...
Not so fast. Alligators and Dukws are not possible yet. Better dust off some of those old Winfield Scott landing barge designs until Henry Ford can get his designers to whip up a sea-going tracklayer. ...

You must be a engineer. You are conflating gizmos & whizzbangs for sophistication. The skill set was in organizing & execution. The procedures, communications, organization. Question: In a a ship to shore amphib operation who had senior command, the admiral of the naval force, or the general of the landing force? What about a shore to shore operation? Question: Who has final control of a component unit landing and transiting the beach after the assault; the unit commander, the boat squadron commander, the next senior commander ashore? In 1922 the term Beach Master was unknown & the job only the vaguest idea. In 1942 the Beach Master was a critical control node in any landing operation larger than a battalion of infantry. Things as simple as first out last in combat loading of transports, or having a staff section keeping track of what items were loaded on what ship, and what hold, were refined & refined again.

There a quaint little idea that amphibious operations, combined operations as some style it, or littoral operations as others describe it consist of combat units charging a beach. That little event is hardly 5% of the overall effort. the other 95% are guys doing really complex planning and execution tasks, mostly at sea & mostly weeks or months ahead of the actual landing or hour. Just picking the optimal day & hour is demanding staff task.
 
One thing will be pushed hard; self loading gas operated auto-cannons in 2 and 3 cm.

In the Interwar period, there was both Browning (not the same as the later Oldsmobile M4 37mm) and American Armaments Corp 37mm semiauto cannons fitted to tanks, slightly less powerful than the late '30s M5 and M6 37mm guns, but had 5 round clips

Marmon Herrington MTLS with dual 37mmL44 autocannons
0yv9XuN.jpg

Per US doctrine, had Machine guns all over, each of the ball mounts could have a .30 fitted in the hull and turret

Made for the Dutch
 
... and MG Smedley Butler is raising hell in the CONUS ...

I can't recall the exact dates of Bywaters war. Butler was retired 1 October 1931. By then he'd lost his political backers in DC and was fading fast into life as a source for color in news articles. Butler also was badly out of sync. In the 1920s he thought the USMC experiments with landing operations a waste & the staff studying such operation "Drones". He argued such activity at Quantico be shut down and the Marine Corps trained for expeditionary warfare operations ashore. The Navy admirals needed and wanted a component capable of "Seizing and defending advanced naval bases." Butler was clueless in this & pretty much marched off the wrong side of the dock.

...
During the interwar period the Army was glad to let amphibious warfare being an entirely Marine thing, not touching it with a ten foot pole.
...

The Joint Board was the Armys eleven foot pole. Army officer Walther Kruger got to attend the Navy War College, teach there, and serve a tour on the Joint Board. During WWII he commanded more amphib or littoral operations than any other Army officer.

Through the 1920s the Army did participate in some amphibious training, keeping in mind a actual battalion size activity was a big event in the interwar Army. It was during the Depression when the Army ceased participation. In 1938 CoS Malin seems to have directed that ball be put back in play. The 1st Division began preparing for landing training with the Navy that year. In November 1939 the 3rd Div was ordered to do a landing operation on the west coast, Oregon or Northern California? That joint Army navy operation was executed in February 1940. The chief planner on the Army side was a hotshot major in the division G3 Section named Mark Clark. The Colonel running the G3 was headed for retirement & let Major Clark do all the work and pick up the credit. Clark had to send to the Staff and Command School at Leavenworth for the relevant documents. The division possessed nothing useful on the subject.
 
...
Where is Marshall in all this kerfluffle? If he is anywhere near the Guard, those Elmer Fudds will never know what hit them. ...

Lt Col Marshal was still at the Infantry School @ Ft Benning in 1931. He was deep into supervising the instructors, mostly captains and majors, and writing doctrinal documents like Infantry in Battle.

In 1931 a large portion of the NG officers were still Great War combat veterans. Unlike Marshal who spent the war on Pershings staff.
 
You must be a engineer. You are conflating gizmos & whizzbangs for sophistication. The skill set was in organizing & execution. The procedures, communications, organization. Question: In a a ship to shore amphib operation who had senior command, the admiral of the naval force, or the general of the landing force? What about a shore to shore operation? Question: Who has final control of a component unit landing and transiting the beach after the assault; the unit commander, the boat squadron commander, the next senior commander ashore? In 1922 the term Beach Master was unknown & the job only the vaguest idea. In 1942 the Beach Master was a critical control node in any landing operation larger than a battalion of infantry. Things as simple as first out last in combat loading of transports, or having a staff section keeping track of what items were loaded on what ship, and what hold, were refined & refined again.

There a quaint little idea that amphibious operations, combined operations as some style it, or littoral operations as others describe it consist of combat units charging a beach. That little event is hardly 5% of the overall effort. the other 95% are guys doing really complex planning and execution tasks, mostly at sea & mostly weeks or months ahead of the actual landing or hour. Just picking the optimal day & hour is demanding staff task.

I actually do know a little about organizing logistics and long distance movement, but I pointed out that you might need Dukws and Alligators to physically move your loadouts across, oh I don't know... a coral reef? or breakwater?

By the way, if I have heartburn about M. Mitscher when it comes to naval/air warfare nuts and bolts; you can add R.K. Turner, too.
 
Lt Col Marshal was still at the Infantry School @ Ft Benning in 1931. He was deep into supervising the instructors, mostly captains and majors, and writing doctrinal documents like Infantry in Battle.

In 1931 a large portion of the NG officers were still Great War combat veterans. Unlike Marshal who spent the war on Pershings staff.

10 years is a long time away from the trade. Things change. Attitudes harden. Might need to send a "staff colonel", as an inspector during an exercise, to shake some of those Fudds up.

Staff is not a dirty word if the man knows his stuff.
 
Didn't the existing Hog Islanders create a serious glut in the market anyway? Got to admit that it is a fiendish problem for the US. I wonder if they could lease ships from other nations? Ditto for the Japanese.

The US had in its recent past, sent out purchase agents who just roamed the world and bought anything that floated that could carry troops or cargo in war. (Spanish American War.). "Full, Faith and Credit" allowed Dewey to buy supply ships loaded with coal for his squadron in Hong Kong; for example. Some of them were intended for Montojo, but dollars can be a weapon?
 
Through the 1920s the Army did participate in some amphibious training, keeping in mind a actual battalion size activity was a big event in the interwar Army. It was during the Depression when the Army ceased participation. In 1938 CoS Malin seems to have directed that ball be put back in play. The 1st Division began preparing for landing training with the Navy that year. In November 1939 the 3rd Div was ordered to do a landing operation on the west coast, Oregon or Northern California? That joint Army navy operation was executed in February 1940. The chief planner on the Army side was a hotshot major in the division G3 Section named Mark Clark. The Colonel running the G3 was headed for retirement & let Major Clark do all the work and pick up the credit. Clark had to send to the Staff and Command School at Leavenworth for the relevant documents. The division possessed nothing useful on the subject.

Remember, I mentioned Salerno? Might add Anzio, too. M. Clark can join Mitscher and Turner.

On the goofiness front...

In the Interwar period, there was both Browning (not the same as the later Oldsmobile M4 37mm) and American Armaments Corp 37mm semiauto cannons fitted to tanks, slightly less powerful than the late '30s M5 and M6 37mm guns, but had 5 round clips

Marmon Herrington MTLS with dual 37mmL44 autocannons
0yv9XuN.jpg

Per US doctrine, had Machine guns all over, each of the ball mounts could have a .30 fitted in the hull and turret

Made for the Dutch

I think the basic idea, using a bodge of COTS parts to make a tank sounds like a good idea, but this result is Type 95 Ha Go territory.

marmon.jpg


Not a Ha Go. A CTMS-1TBI tank?

1200px-Japanese_type_95_3.jpg


Definitely a Type 95 Ha Go. Both are decidedly not going to impress; but it is better than nothing.
 
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