The Great Pacific War aftermath

It was used in fleet actions liberally with planes spraying it from dispensers similar to the smoke dispensers that were supposed to be used to support Torpedo attacks at the beginning of WWII.

Well, with that much poison gas being used at sea, I wouldn't be surprised if there was some kind of impact on the environment, maybe entire stretches of ocean become dead zones?
 
Well, with that much poison gas being used at sea, I wouldn't be surprised if there was some kind of impact on the environment, maybe entire stretches of ocean become dead zones?

Why? Are there parts of France that are dead zones because of the use of gas in WWI? The Pacific is a large place and the few tons 9at the most) of gas that is used in the air would disperse over time
 
Unlike radiation, poison gas generally degrades pretty rapidly. If you have a high concentration of certain ones in the soil, basically around labs or factories, that is more problematic. A lot of the chemical weapons degrade even faster in salt water.
 
Most chemical weapons are acidic base & alkaline compounds degrad them extremely fast. Supertropical bleach was our common decontaminant. They are relatively unstable & some are rapidly degraded by direct ultraviolet spectrum and heat as low as 100 Farhenheit.
 
Converting carriers back into capital ships was the oddest thing that I remember about it...
Going off that, it seems Akagi and Kaga, the ships in question were poorly converted (given the fact they're destroyed at all despite their advantages).

However one other I forsee in the aftermath of the boo is that the US and China will have a 'Special' relationship in every way due to the roles they played in the war (China managed to keep some Japanese armies preoccupied and the US weakened Japan enough to allow China to overthrow the Japenese
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
Source for Japanese and treatment of PoWs and other laws of war - Soldiers of the Rising Sun, by Susan and Meiron Herries
 
Interesting, Here is a quote post war concerning the war-games that worked out War Plan Orange, & a broader view than Bywaters 1920s snapshot novel. This from Zimms article on the US Naval War College & preparations for a war with Japan.

Often quoted is the statement from Fleet Admiral Nimitz that: The war with Japan had been enacted in the game rooms at the War College by so many people and in so many different ways that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise—absolutely nothing except the kamikaze tactics toward the end of the war.39

There may be a bit of hyperbole in this, but it does indicate a attitude about the US Navies preparations.
 
Not surprised, the US had been planning for the war since the 1890s in one way or another.
They were literally the worst enemy the Japanese could've faced
 
The basic plan for the island hopping campaign including many of the islands on the list was put forth in 1920/21. The only real change to the overall concept was necessitated by the Japanese advances capturing islands not held by Japan prior to the war. Obviously exactly which islands on the initial list were hit and when changed (although not a lot). War Plan Orange basically saw the PI as being lost, although not as badly as happened in OTL - they were too far from the USA and too close to Japan.
 
The basic plan for the island hopping campaign including many of the islands on the list was put forth in 1920/21. The only real change to the overall concept was necessitated by the Japanese advances capturing islands not held by Japan prior to the war. Obviously exactly which islands on the initial list were hit and when changed (although not a lot). War Plan Orange basically saw the PI as being lost, although not as badly as happened in OTL - they were too far from the USA and too close to Japan.
TBT, Baywaters claims that the Philippines needed a defense fleet of battleships which just seems ridiculous given the dangers of air attack. One of the main reasons Admiral Jellicoe opposed Singapore being the main base in the region.
 
TBT, Baywaters claims that the Philippines needed a defense fleet of battleships which just seems ridiculous given the dangers of air attack. One of the main reasons Admiral Jellicoe opposed Singapore being the main base in the region.

Bywaters remarks on that reflected a faction that argued for a PI defense. That had its roots in US businessmen with deep roots in PI. I recall claims MacArthurs family was among those. There were also US Army and Navy officers who claimed the 'Fleet Problems', Navy War College war-games, and staff studies on logistics, were wrong. There were also businessmen who were benefiting from 1920s contracts to upgrade the Navy base at Cavite & who were lobbying for a lot more naval base construction there. If the PI got a BB squadron for its defense it would be happy days for the concrete industry ect...

Post publication of Bywaters book there was the 1927-28 Shanghai expedition. Civil war in China caused the US (among others) to send peace keeping forces to protect their enclaves in China. In the US case a fair chunk of the Pacific fleet, and a combined brigade of Marines and US Army appeared at Shanghai and hung around through the winter. Many folks interpreted this as the US taking a larger hand in Asia and thought it a argument for that naval base in PI everyone had been talking about for years. Of course Congress had zero interest in funding any of this, and the business interests who wanted it thought paying for it the taxpayers job, not theirs. So the fleet came home & so did most of the Marines. That ended the high point in US Navy presence in the Far East, until it came back for blood fifteen year later.

The panic over the 1930 'Depression' led to deep cuts in the War Dept & Navy Dept budgets for the next eight years. While there were still holdouts pounding the table over the need for a fleet to protect the Philippines & the China trade there was zero interest in paying for it.
 
Bywaters remarks on that reflected a faction that argued for a PI defense. That had its roots in US businessmen with deep roots in PI. I recall claims MacArthurs family was among those. There were also US Army and Navy officers who claimed the 'Fleet Problems', Navy War College war-games, and staff studies on logistics, were wrong. There were also businessmen who were benefiting from 1920s contracts to upgrade the Navy base at Cavite & who were lobbying for a lot more naval base construction there. If the PI got a BB squadron for its defense it would be happy days for the concrete industry ect...

Post publication of Bywaters book there was the 1927-28 Shanghai expedition. Civil war in China caused the US (among others) to send peace keeping forces to protect their enclaves in China. In the US case a fair chunk of the Pacific fleet, and a combined brigade of Marines and US Army appeared at Shanghai and hung around through the winter. Many folks interpreted this as the US taking a larger hand in Asia and thought it a argument for that naval base in PI everyone had been talking about for years. Of course Congress had zero interest in funding any of this, and the business interests who wanted it thought paying for it the taxpayers job, not theirs. So the fleet came home & so did most of the Marines. That ended the high point in US Navy presence in the Far East, until it came back for blood fifteen year later.

The panic over the 1930 'Depression' led to deep cuts in the War Dept & Navy Dept budgets for the next eight years. While there were still holdouts pounding the table over the need for a fleet to protect the Philippines & the China trade there was zero interest in paying for it.
The best plan in the book would've been a strong aerial fleet of 100 plus aerial machines, submarines (long range), and no units heavier than a long range light cruiser. The goal would be to strike at the invasion forces and delay the Japanese as that type of defense (especially the airplanes and submarines) nearly vanquished the invaders.

In real life, the best that could be hoped for was a valiant end
 
The best plan in the book would've been a strong aerial fleet of 100 plus aerial machines, submarines (long range), and no units heavier than a long range light cruiser. The goal would be to strike at the invasion forces and delay the Japanese as that type of defense (especially the airplanes and submarines) nearly vanquished the invaders.

In real life, the best that could be hoped for was a valiant end

OTL that was attempted in 1941, & failed. I wonder how it looked in fleet exercises circa 1921, or 1928?
 

Driftless

Donor
Was the Army of the same opinion as the Navy that the PI were lost no-matter-what, with a full-on Japanese attack? How deeply did the Army game out how to extend the campaign? (for example, a common AH theme is for the campaign to carry on in other parts of the archipelago, either by USA and Filipino uniformed soldiers, or as guerillas as historically occurred)
 
A lot to unpack and a lot of myths to destroy.

In 1925, Hector Bywater wrote the Great Pacific War, in it he has Japan and the US fight in 1931.

Note the year, 1931? None of the Great Powers have naval aviation worth a sack full of brown goo. The Japanese have Hosho and the Americans have Langley. The Kaga and Akagi are 4 years old. Lexington and Saratoga ditto.

Any idea what was being flown?

IJN
Nakajima A1N
Nakajima A2N
Mitsubishi 1MF
Mitsubishi 1MT
Mitsubishi B1M

IJA
Nakajima Army Type 91 Fighter
Kawasaki Army Type 92 Model 1 Fighter

Not bad, but comparatively speaking, ineffectual until we see the 1938 revolution in aero-engines into the 750 + kWatt class.

The Americans?

BM - Martin
F6C Hawk - Curtiss
F7C Seahawk - Curtiss
F8C Falcon/Helldiver - Curtiss
F9C Sparrowhawk - Curtiss

and of course

PH - Hall

There were the Martin T1-T3 torpedo plane series and, well you know? None of these planes had a ship killing punch. Not one for either the IJN or the USN. So it comes down to gun and torpedo and the ship based launch platforms for those two weapons. The planes could scout and harass, but that is about it. Why do I have heartburn about it? 1931, the IJN has a 2 m/s speed advantage uniform across its fleet. They have the option of accept/.refuse battle and the "weather gauge". Plus they are the attackers. That is a tactical no-no in naval warfare.

Both sides fight amazingly well but it ends with a US victory (one the Japanese were on the cusp of winning). As a result Japan's fleet and armies are in shambles due to a unified China taking over Manchuria, the US on the verge of an economic depression (although that may be the Great Depression starting), Europe heavily benefiting from the war, and poison gas being thrown about like candy.

The US will be in the midst of rampaging inflation, with a full blown naval armaments program in progress. No slump, rather a superheated economy that will take some cooling off.

What would be some possible aftermaths of this affair?

I'll come to it in a moment.

Military wise, I'd think the carriers roles would be realized and the sea going nations would build them up as they did quite well (including gassing an entire cruiser) Second is the importance of good airfields and aircraft being recognized as the US nearly defeated the invasion of the Philippines with a small number of aircraft (if they had 100 or so, the invasion would've been defeated). The importance of submarines and defending against them would become paramount as the Japanese waged a Marvelous sub campaign on the US (one sub nearly got a shot at the battlefleet). And more importantly, hanging on to obsolete ships is just asking for trouble given what happens to the Asiatic squadron (entire group destroyed, 1 japanese destroyer fell to them).

First of all, as the Italians soon demonstrated in their wargames, if you gas seal your gun-houses and run at flank, poison gas at sea is USELESS. You simply blow through it. Kinetics is the only certain ship killer. The USN intended to use Mustard to mission kill IJA and IJN island garrison airfields. The IJN intended to return the favor. This was soon demonstrated not to work, either. One good rain and you were back in business. You could not guarantee a knocked out airfield except by putting your own troops on it. Sound familiar? And if Joe Infantry holds the runway, then you are going to fly from that base. I.E. Guadalcanal with 1931 biplanes little better than 1921 biplanes.

Bywater is clueless about sub warfare as are the IJN. USN by 1929 was very interested in sinking freighters. They just pretended not to allow it. Sort of like city killing for the army air corps. Not allowed, but it was understood the Keystones were gonna bomb civilians if Orange kicked off.

Socially, the Japanese would be seen as a sort of Asian British Empire as they fought honorably and gallantly (the navy that is)

The Japanese in the first Sino-Japanese War machine gunned enemy sailors in the water. The Americans massacred Koreans in an island clearing campaign a decade earlier in 1884. Let us not kid ourselves. The Spanish American War may have seemed "chivalrous" but the Americans used ammunition designed to cause fires on enemy warships and they kept shooting at the Spaniards long after another navy would have seen the Spaniards were beaten and done. So... it is a "Maybe" as to hard the war would be fought. Both nations tended to not half step when they were up against a "real" opponent. My prediction is very ugly very soon. California shenanigans and Japanese shoving Americans around in China, the specter of bigotry is very real as an inflammatory agency to the quality of total war.
Do you guys agree with this assessment?

No.

1. Battleships still remain the arm of decision.
2. Air scouting will be terrible, so it will be more like Jutland with cruisers playing tag and a lot less like Midway.
3. Unrestricted submarine warfare will be the American forte, but it will take a while (2 years) for the sub drivers to figure it out.
4. American gunnery is terrible. Japanese gunnery is equally mediocre. The shooting will come down to short ranges where the Americans have the armor advantage, but the Japanese CAN DICTATE because of their speed edge.
5. Torpedoes for both navies are a joke. It is 1931, remember?
6. The Japanese field army is much better trained and equipped than the American one at the start. Murphy help the Americans if the IJA get a lodgement in the Philippine Islands.
7. The Americans will win, if they have the stomach for it. Longer war than the 1941-1945 horror show, because the Americans will have to build faster ships without the 2 year lead, more ships, work out their gunnery and torpedo problems and create a new army to replace the one the IJA destroyed. STEEP learning curve.

BTW, I still hate the 1927 SoDaks.

Might see something like this instead.

8d50a7abfa49d75e1fc9b9e2458f24eb--us-battleships-military-equipment.jpg


cited from My Starship.com

That's my opinion. Remember, it is not gospel. YMMV and IT SHOULD.
 
Thanks, the subs are something I can agree on. Using subs as commerce raiders WW1 style is suicidal given increasing anti submarine measures. Plus the Submarine cruiser ideal for the Japanese was just, fuck, horrifying to behold. The fact Bywater gave any of them use (where it kills the Clemson and mission kills two others) is really a failure to realize how bad the idea is.

I'd argue the gunnery of both sides would be decent by the final battle as they have two years (in the book) to prepare.

My point on the carriers (apart from that interesting point you made about gas) was that the amount of damage the planes do during this conflict is stunning for the US. (Whose personnel would probably just be better than their counterparts by vitrue of being used more often than the Japanese). However, I can definitely see them being used more and more to replace cruisers post war.

The aerial torpedoes lack of killing power is something I overlooked. That I will concede to Brycewater as he he pointed out that only land planes have a chance at sinking battle wagons.

Thanks again for the response.
 
Got to agree with McPherson. Too many immature technologies and not enough practical experience all around.

Indiana has gained a fair bit of top weight there. Is she going to stay upright?
 
Indiana has gained a fair bit of top weight there. Is she going to stay upright?

The bedspring CXAM is deceptive. it is fairly lightweight for a radar aerial. If a Pensacola or Northampton can carry the contraption and not roll too much, then a SoDak 1944 should do fine. OTOH, I would like to cut down that gonzo superstructure aft and clear up amidships deck space for barbette and hoist mounts for sensible staggered 5"/38s. Also that hull has been blistered to a fare thee well to handle some of that additional top weight.
 
Top