The Great Pacific War aftermath

In 1925, Hector Bywater wrote the Great Pacific War, in it he has Japan and the US fight in 1931.

Bith sides fight amazingly well but it ends with a US victory (one the Japanese were on the cusp of winning). As a result Japans fleet and armies are in shambles due to a unified China taking over Manchuria, the US on the verge of an economic depression (although that may be the Great Depression starting), Europe heavily beneffiting from the war, and poison gas being thrown about like candy.

What would be some possible aftermaths of this affair?

Military wise, Id think the carriers roles would be realized and the sea going nations would build them up as they did quite well (including gassing an entire cruiser) Second is the importance of good airfields and aircraft being recognized as the US nearly defeated the invasion of the Philippines with a small number of aircraft (if they had 100 or so, the invasion would've been defeated). The importance of submarines and defending against them would become paramount as the Japanese waged a Marvellous sub campaign on the US (one sub nearly got a shot at the battlefleet). And more importantly, hanging on to obsolete ships is just asking for trouble given what happens to the Asiatic squadron (entire group destroyed, 1 japanese destroyer fell to them).

Socially, the Japanese would be seen as a sort of Asian British Empire as they fought honorably and gallantly (the navy that is)

Do you guys agree with this assessment?
 
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The book is entertaining, but gets an awful lot wrong as far as predicting WWII goes. One thing in particular is Bywater's assumption that the war would be fought in a gentlemanly style with each side respecting the other, taking good care of prisoners, etc. No inkling of the savage, war to the knife conflict that really happened. That alone would change the outcome enormously.
 
Well, I realized that.
What I was asking is what if the war in the book was fought. Strategically its correct but not tactically. However the gentlemanly warfare by the navies would create a precedent to other navies I imagine.
And the concern for native populations and civilians would prbobably give cities some security for a while.
 
In 1925, Hector Bywater wrote the Great Pacific War, in it he has Japan and the US fight in 1931.

... What would be some possible aftermaths of this affair?

... Do you guys agree with this assessment?

Agree more or less. The after effects are multiple. In no particular order: The Washington Naval treaty is dead. It maybe something is negotiated to replace it, but I'd not bet on it. The only thing holding back naval construction would be the economics of the 1930s.

The US is a step up on the development of amphibious warfare. Not as advanced as in 1945, but at the 1942 or perhaps 1943 level.

The US is a step up on combat aircraft design, or at least specifications for th 1940s generation of aircraft.

...ditto for carrier & other warship design. I'd also expect to see some fast & easy to build designs for cargo ships on the drawing board.

The Army ground corps would have a lot of theoretical doctrine & plans from the 1920s validated, or tossed out.

The National Guard would be subject to a house cleaning to reduce the old 19th Century 'Gun Club' social connection for membership. I can't recall if Bywater addressed the National Guard in his book. I do know the Army could not mobilize efficiently a 100,000 man expeditionary corps for a Pacific War, or War Plan ORANGE without two division of NG. The residual Social Club atmosphere in the NG OTL caused problems in many, tho not all, units when mobilized into national service 1940-41.


The USN reaches 1940 with a more effective suite of weapons. ie: The torpedoes work, radar is a bit further along in development. CiC & in general a more efficient fighter defense system.

But, we have to keep in mind the probable Depression keeps much of this at the school house level & in limited deployment. Theres probably not the money to build and train entirely to the lessons learned. When the funds do arrive the advance will be faster & surer than OTL.
 
The irony of all this is that Germany probably gets money, real money flowing in from America and Japan for supplies (or loan forgiveness for the former). This might possibly limit the economic damage done through all of this.
 
The book is entertaining, but gets an awful lot wrong as far as predicting WWII goes. One thing in particular is Bywater's assumption that the war would be fought in a gentlemanly style with each side respecting the other, taking good care of prisoners, etc. No inkling of the savage, war to the knife conflict that really happened. That alone would change the outcome enormously.
I am not surprised by this outlook in book. In 1905 RussoJapanese war, the Japanese took many Russian prisoners and treated them with great courtesy and respect.
 
The irony of all this is that Germany probably gets money, real money flowing in from America and Japan for supplies (or loan forgiveness for the former). This might possibly limit the economic damage done through all of this.

Twice, the Dawes Plan in 1925 & the Young Plan in 1929 German reparations payments, and loans were reworked to keep Germany afloat and the post war financial system afloat. Neither got the German or European economy where it needed to be. What was necessary was a large scale reworking of the post war economic structure and abandonment of the Treaty of Versailles and its distortions. The slide into global Depression after 1929 & the 1934 nazi abrogation of the Versailles Treaty did rework things, but not in a good way.

... money, real money flowing in from America and Japan ...

Japan lacked capitol for significant loans outside its economy. It was a net borrower & into the early 20th Century depended on Londons banks, then later New York for short and long term capitol. The most devastating segment of the US embargoes on Japan in 1941 was the freezing of Japans government & business accounts in the US banks. The rest of the Acts were irrelevant in the long run as without access to the global banking represented in the US and London Japan could not purchase oil, machine tools or other exports, nor pay for the foreign flagged ships to carry Japans imports/exports. In 1940 near 60% of the cargos passing thru Japans ports were carried on ships under US or British control.
 
Scott Washburn said:
The book is entertaining, but gets an awful lot wrong as far as predicting WWII goes. One thing in particular is Bywater's assumption that the war would be fought in a gentlemanly style with each side respecting the other, taking good care of prisoners, etc. No inkling of the savage, war to the knife conflict that really happened. That alone would change the outcome enormously.

I am not surprised by this outlook in book. In 1905 RussoJapanese war, the Japanese took many Russian prisoners and treated them with great courtesy and respect.

Yup, the nastiness of the Japanese military in WWII grew out of cultural changes wrought by the imperialist policies, and xenophobic propaganda in the 1920s & 30s. The war in China allowed the ranks and leaders to become used to such attitudes.

Japan & nazi Germany of the era are a case study in how a extremist & moral minority can turn a nations population into a tool for genocide. Propaganda phrases like "Send em home", & characterizing the target groups as criminals, and a threat were core building blocks in the culture of hate & abuse these leaders built.
 
Twice, the Dawes Plan in 1925 & the Young Plan in 1929 German reparations payments, and loans were reworked to keep Germany afloat and the post war financial system afloat. Neither got the German or European economy where it needed to be. What was necessary was a large scale reworking of the post war economic structure and abandonment of the Treaty of Versailles and its distortions. The slide into global Depression after 1929 & the 1934 nazi abrogation of the Versailles Treaty did rework things, but not in a good way.



Japan lacked capitol for significant loans outside its economy. It was a net borrower & into the early 20th Century depended on Londons banks, then later New York for short and long term capitol. The most devastating segment of the US embargoes on Japan in 1941 was the freezing of Japans government & business accounts in the US banks. The rest of the Acts were irrelevant in the long run as without access to the global banking represented in the US and London Japan could not purchase oil, machine tools or other exports, nor pay for the foreign flagged ships to carry Japans imports/exports. In 1940 near 60% of the cargos passing thru Japans ports were carried on ships under US or British control.

In the book, both sides declare a neutrality war by buying resources and services from neutral nations meaning British, French, Italian, Polish, and all other nations were getting a lot of money through the combatants
 
In the book, both sides declare a neutrality war by buying resources and services from neutral nations meaning British, French, Italian, Polish, and all other nations were getting a lot of money through the combatants

Bywater may not have understood, or thought it unimportant that Japan in 1924 or 1931 was heavily dependent on US, and some British money. Or perhaps there was a assumption Britain was financing Japans war with the US? When the book was written the change in Japans capitol source from London to New York amy not have been understood?
 
Bywater may not have understood, or thought it unimportant that Japan in 1924 or 1931 was heavily dependent on US, and some British money. Or perhaps there was a assumption Britain was financing Japans war with the US? When the book was written the change in Japans capitol source from London to New York amy not have been understood?
Or it may not have been announced at the time he wrote that.
That or Japan was seriously taking our ruinous loans to try to preserve their hold on China (The goal of the entire war)
 

raharris1973

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I am not surprised by this outlook in book. In 1905 RussoJapanese war, the Japanese took many Russian prisoners and treated them with great courtesy and respect.

And a war a full ten years before OTL's genuinely might not have been as brutal with regard to PoW matters.

There were likely some atrocities during the Manchurian, Rehe and Shanghai campaigns of the early 1930s, but I don't think any of this was at the level of the Nanjing massacre of '37. And in any case even in the R-J war the Japanese followed rules versus the Russians while being more cavalier with the Chinese population.

In a war a decade more earlier than OTL's, sad to say, the Americans might have taken the initiative in prisoner abuse or take-no-prisoners. Maybe things worse than internment would have happened to Japanese Americans.
 
In the book, the biggest issue would probably be US treatment of Nisei du to the Japanese causing a rebellion in Hawaii.
 

Khanzeer

Banned
Bywater may not have understood, or thought it unimportant that Japan in 1924 or 1931 was heavily dependent on US, and some British money. Or perhaps there was a assumption Britain was financing Japans war with the US? When the book was written the change in Japans capitol source from London to New York amy not have been understood?
How was Japanese treatment towards german pow from tsingtao
 
Can you please expand on this? Were any cities exposed to poison gas or was it just used against soldier ala World War I?
It was used in fleet actions liberally with planes spraying it from dispensers similar to the smoke dispensers that were supposed to be used to support Torpedo attacks at the beginning of WWII.
 
In the English language literature covering Japans path to WWII theres remarks and sometimes more about the cultural change that led to the Japanese reputation for brutality. Much of it revolved around political leaders pushing a line about the superior Japanese under siege by outsiders. Sound familiar? Part of that was the line about the European colonial intrusion into Asia. The Europeans were barbarian immigrants who were stealing the rightful Japanese position as master of Asia. This racial & imperialistic view connected to the leaders pushing the idea that the end justifies the means & how the Japanese outnumbered by inferior barbarian had to resort to the 'efficiency' of swift and unconcioused brutality. Herding the inconvenient and dangerous inferiors into dangerous conditions of neglect was both a matter of efficiency and justified by the inferiority of the prisoner. 'They are people we do not like or want around, theres no point in caring for their health or lives.' Sound familiar?

This propaganda line went deepest in the Japanese Army. Perhaps because they were in closest contact with a enemy in Asia. It was more uneven among the Naval service, or civilians, there are plenty of incidents of Japanese navy personnel acting by Western ideals of humanity. Of course other were as brutal or sick as any, but the behavior was less consistent the in the Army.

In any case the Japanese of the pre 1930s were no more or less brutal than the Americans on the frontier, or in the Civil War, or Europeans in the Great War era. Its clear there was a cultural change purposely wrought by political leaders that corrupted Japanese culture after the mid 1920s. It revolved around the ideal of intrusive and inferior foreigners and racial differences as a threat. To belabor the point modern politicians still use this to exploit their voters and create cultural trends they can use to exert power over those supporters
 
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