The Great Crusade (Reds! Part 3)

So Bordiga is around ITTL so what does he think of the UASR you guys think? I know he was anti-soviet union but if he was completly against democracy as an idea than I don't think he would like the UASR very much if he thinks democracy is bad.
The UASR would definitely present a challenge to Bordiga's theories.

The UASR is unambiguously a dictatorship of the proletariat. The working class based communistic parties have undisputed mastery over the state, society and economy. While they haven't achieved to the complete destruction of traditional economy, which Bordiga thought essential, the core truth is that proletarian power coexists with pluralism, and Bordiga is just gonna have to deal with that.

I think that would be a lesser issue than money still existing. I think the UASR is "close enough" to his concept of proletarian dictatorship expressing authentic workers' power. It has more in common with direct democracy, mitigating the problem he saw with representative democracy: a disconnected elite manipulating formless masses.
That's very nice of you, mam. I was thinking of writing a short story regarding the Philippines and their whole transition from American occupation to be liberated under a democratic communist government (unless you wrote something along those lines a while ago).

Although I already have a bunch of projects I was supposed to do. But a short snippet wouldn't really hurt my procrastinating backlog.
That's the plan in WW2. They're one of the first Cold War battle grounds, as both the FBU and the UASR will try to ensure the post-occupation provisional government swings their direction.
 

ZGradt

Banned
That's the plan in WW2. They're one of the first Cold War battle grounds, as both the FBU and the UASR will try to ensure the post-occupation provisional government swings their direction.

Ooh, that sounds good then. Let me know if there's anything I can do to help with that. And if there's anything I can't answer definitively, I'll ask the other Filipino board members here.
 
By the way, am I the only one who's noticed that the article on Bordiga on Wikipedia is almost ridiculously fawning in how it talks about him? Literally every point on his theory is some kind of statement on how he had a superior view of theory than Trotsky and Stalin; how he represented the pure undiluted Leninist and Marxist correctness in the face of detractors, etc etc etc. it's insane.

And I think Bordiga would either come around to respecting the American Revolution or simply fade into total unimportance. It represents the ultimate challenge to his viewpoint on what the communist party should be in the time before revolution.

I'd also say he's not critical of the idea of democracy, he was a democratic centralist in a technical sense. I just think his actual belief and theory make a substantive democratic centralism impossible. It shears all questions of actual major importance from actually being debatable. Anything to the effect that his conception of how the soviet, party, and economy should function are tantamount to petty-bourgeoise degeneration. Thus making it an absolutely feeble mechanism.
 
Ooh, that sounds good then. Let me know if there's anything I can do to help with that. And if there's anything I can't answer definitively, I'll ask the other Filipino board members here.

I am Filipino actually. :)

And I think the previous idea is that the Philippines shall remain a FBU dominion after the postwar provisional government expelled communist and farmer-labor Sakdalista and Huk elements from the government, probably under Manuel Roxas. I am thinking that Emilio Aguinaldo might be appointed as a Governor-General and a ceremonial head of state of the country.
 
I'd also say he's not critical of the idea of democracy, he was a democratic centralist in a technical sense. I just think his actual belief and theory make a substantive democratic centralism impossible. It shears all questions of actual major importance from actually being debatable. Anything to the effect that his conception of how the soviet, party, and economy should function are tantamount to petty-bourgeoise degeneration. Thus making it an absolutely feeble mechanism.

I believe the correct definition is "organic centralist". Bordiga's theories were born from a conception which sees in Communist society and the Communist party (which is the forerunner of the former) an organic structure akin to living organisms, where the various components cooperate and function not according to hierarchical decrees or electoral mechanisms, but following and obeying a fundamental "genetic program" in an utterly spontaneous and natural way, also working so as to eliminate the ever-present individualistic drives, along the same lines of biologic physiology.

That system made sense in context when we take into account that the Communist Party of Italy was quite a different organism from the other parties which had joined the COMINTERN, at least at its inception. The decidedly working-class composition hadn't produced the usual pyramid-like internal hierarchy with intellectuals occupying all the spots on top. That also explains why the Left component led by Bordiga was defeated by Togliatti and Gramsci's pro-Stalin Centre in 1926 mostly through Congress tricks, since the Leftists still held a majority thanks to their egalitarian program.
 
I believe the correct definition is "organic centralist". Bordiga's theories were born from a conception which sees in Communist society and the Communist party (which is the forerunner of the former) an organic structure akin to living organisms, where the various components cooperate and function not according to hierarchical decrees or electoral mechanisms, but following and obeying a fundamental "genetic program" in an utterly spontaneous and natural way, also working so as to eliminate the ever-present individualistic drives, along the same lines of biologic physiology.

That system made sense in context when we take into account that the Communist Party of Italy was quite a different organism from the other parties which had joined the COMINTERN, at least at its inception. The decidedly working-class composition hadn't produced the usual pyramid-like internal hierarchy with intellectuals occupying all the spots on top. That also explains why the Left component led by Bordiga was defeated by Togliatti and Gramsci's pro-Stalin Centre in 1926 mostly through Congress tricks, since the Leftists still held a majority thanks to their egalitarian program.

I'm still gonna point out that makes very little sense even in the context of the Italian communists being different, because that structure obviously lends itself to the power of an internal ideological elite, vs structures of democratic control which can actually maintain a true proletarian character to the party.
 
I'm still gonna point out that makes very little sense even in the context of the Italian communists being different, because that structure obviously lends itself to the power of an internal ideological elite, vs structures of democratic control which can actually maintain a true proletarian character to the party.

Democratic control in a Party that was conceived as a coalition of insurrectionary cells (though this wasn't the preferred terminology)? Bordiga may have been many things, but his choices were always dictated by observation of reality and reality for Italian Marxists in the early Twenties was very bleak. After the end of the Biennio Rosso came the Biennio Nero, when the Fascist squadristi really started to gain the spotlight across the nation, with the complicity of increasingly ineffective and ever-changing governments in Rome. Organic centralism made sense for Bordiga's supporters because 1) it reflected a reality on the ground, since in the first years the workman with a PCd'I card was in the same boat with the intellectual with a degree in economics, both in fear that a bunch of Blackshirts were waiting for him behind the corner with batons and a bottle of castor oil, 2) it was the stance of the majority of the PCd'I membership and therefore in the few years of Bordiga's supremacy it was perfectly adequate for the needs of the Party as a whole. It could in fact have been what helped so many Italian Communists going underground after the Fascists ended the last semblance of democracy in 1924, since PCd'I members received a proper training on how to disappear from the public eye when necessity arises (the PNF couldn't even manage to arrest every Communist MP after the Party was declared illegal).
 
Democratic control in a Party that was conceived as a coalition of insurrectionary cells (though this wasn't the preferred terminology)? Bordiga may have been many things, but his choices were always dictated by observation of reality and reality for Italian Marxists in the early Twenties was very bleak. After the end of the Biennio Rosso came the Biennio Nero, when the Fascist squadristi really started to gain the spotlight across the nation, with the complicity of increasingly ineffective and ever-changing governments in Rome. Organic centralism made sense for Bordiga's supporters because 1) it reflected a reality on the ground, since in the first years the workman with a PCd'I card was in the same boat with the intellectual with a degree in economics, both in fear that a bunch of Blackshirts were waiting for him behind the corner with batons and a bottle of castor oil, 2) it was the stance of the majority of the PCd'I membership and therefore in the few years of Bordiga's supremacy it was perfectly adequate for the needs of the Party as a whole. It could in fact have been what helped so many Italian Communists going underground after the Fascists ended the last semblance of democracy in 1924, since PCd'I members received a proper training on how to disappear from the public eye when necessity arises (the PNF couldn't even manage to arrest every Communist MP after the Party was declared illegal).

I don't think that has anything to do with the efficacy of Organic Centralism though as a method. It has to do with a smart careful perpetration for the lily event that the party must adopt entirely criminal methods in the near future. Bolshevisation was clearly a problem but the answer didn't rest with its own method of wrote centralism, but with the questioning of why the bolshevisation was a disaster. Organic centralism lends itself to the exact same flaws as the malformed democratic centralism of the Bolshevised parties. Which is telling in how the remaining Stalinist communist parties in most countries have ended up falling into a lot of the same ideological tendencies as Bordigism. In the absence of outside Stalinist control it almost innevitably devolves into either bourgeoise progressivism, or bordigist ideological formulations.
 

E. Burke

Banned
By the way, am I the only one who's noticed that the article on Bordiga on Wikipedia is almost ridiculously fawning in how it talks about him? Literally every point on his theory is some kind of statement on how he had a superior view of theory than Trotsky and Stalin; how he represented the pure undiluted Leninist and Marxist correctness in the face of detractors, etc etc etc. it's insane.

And I think Bordiga would either come around to respecting the American Revolution or simply fade into total unimportance. It represents the ultimate challenge to his viewpoint on what the communist party should be in the time before revolution.

I'd also say he's not critical of the idea of democracy, he was a democratic centralist in a technical sense. I just think his actual belief and theory make a substantive democratic centralism impossible. It shears all questions of actual major importance from actually being debatable. Anything to the effect that his conception of how the soviet, party, and economy should function are tantamount to petty-bourgeoise degeneration. Thus making it an absolutely feeble mechanism.

Also Bordiga was mostly talking shit, his party was as much of a one man show as all the other left sects. He had some interesting ideas, but, his critique of activism for example, was actually shadow boxxing with his opponents in the International Communist Party.
 
I don't think that has anything to do with the efficacy of Organic Centralism though as a method. It has to do with a smart careful perpetration for the lily event that the party must adopt entirely criminal methods in the near future. Bolshevisation was clearly a problem but the answer didn't rest with its own method of wrote centralism, but with the questioning of why the bolshevisation was a disaster. Organic centralism lends itself to the exact same flaws as the malformed democratic centralism of the Bolshevised parties. Which is telling in how the remaining Stalinist communist parties in most countries have ended up falling into a lot of the same ideological tendencies as Bordigism. In the absence of outside Stalinist control it almost innevitably devolves into either bourgeoise progressivism, or bordigist ideological formulations.

To be honest, it's not my intention to be the defender of Organic Centralism since you're not the only one in this conversation who thinks that it's the typical system that works perfectly in abstract but inevitably stumbles when applied to a real situation, at least in the long term. However, I believe you're being a tad too harsh on Comrade Amadeo for several reasons.

While it's true that the PCd'I starting as a network of insurrectionary cells is very reminiscent of the early years of a political movement of pre-revolutionary Russia, I think that speaking of Bolshevization of the Italian Communists is very ingenerous. The PCd'I membership knew that a vast underground organisation was necessary since they could find themselves hunted down at a moment's notice and they needed to be ready to protect their lives and those of their loved ones, but that underground network was criminal exclusively in the sense that it was created to escape the wrath of authorities who hated them to begin with and had "oppression of the leftist cause" as an item of their political manifesto. Up until wartime (which never ceases to compel good men into doing bad things, unfortunately) there were no Jozib Dzugashvillis robbing banks to provide hard cash to the cause, since the underground network was used to survive until a window of opportunity presented itself, rather than a system to grant self-sufficiency to the Party.

Then, we should look deeper to Bordiga's role as a teacher, since his legacy goes far beyond the concept of Organic Centralism. Antonio Gramsci, the true father of Italian Communism and Bordiga's great adversary, had also been his protégé and many non-conformist passages of his philosophy were derived from his teacher's influence. Indeed, Gramsci was unashamedly anti-deterministic (not an easy position to justify in a Movement where "historical inevitability" was a keyword) and his attitude towards the Soviet Revolution revealed that if the establishment of the Worker's State was going to happen in Italy, it couldn't have possibly proceeded as in Russia. Even Togliatti, the greatest fanboy of the Soviet Union in Western Europe, was influenced by Bordiga's teachings at least in the part concerning the revolutionary proletariat being master of their own future social and economic systems; IMHO his statements about the chance that a "positive" form of nationalism could be born after the workers reached full emancipation, as opposed to the "negative" one exploited by the homeland-less plutocrats to justify their wars, are a direct evolution of a central component of Bordiga's Organic Centralism.

Finally, we shouldn't discount the difference between Bordiga the commenter and Bordiga the man. We can limit ourselves to hear an old man saying that democracy is wrong in any way it's applied, but that means forgetting that when that old man was younger his purpose in life was doing something to show the average Italian (whom Eric Hobsbawm, showing to be a good observer, paints as anarchic and conservative) that things can change if enough people believe that 1. change is possible and not intrinsically bad, 3. change is not attained by blindly following a leader or a clique of intellectuals and 3. the specifics of change must work on the small scale before they are applied to something bigger. We can just look at Bordiga's life on Ustica after his internal exile: on the island he met Gramsci who had also been arrested and the first thing these two political adversaries did after being reunited was... founding a school, where no subject was excluded and each one of this weird duo used to teach the subject according to the views of the other. I personally prefer to look up at the man who knew (better than many, many others, in fact) how to show respect and understanding of his interlocutor's stances. Isn't that the very core of democracy, after all?
 
I started a commie group in NJ here's a thread about it

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=354211

Hmmm... So you're a high school kid as I've observed there. I'm not trying to demean you because of your age anyway... but... good luck but I doubt what you are trying to do is going to work or something. I don't want to discourage you but... it's just something is wrong in what you are trying to do...or something. I can't explain it. Well... I think you just have to learn things on your own along the way. Just be careful as I am saying.
 

E. Burke

Banned
Saw that, I was saying how Socialist Alternative also established a branch in Jersey recently probably in a similar area.


Yea, I interacted with them allot in relation to 15 Now. They have a couple active members. Newark is weird, the only 2 groups with an active base are Progressive Labor and fucking Ray O'light (yes the clandestine people)
 
Well, back here in this little portion of the country I came from, there is a myriad of radical left farmer-labor organizations around along with an anarchist affinity group. I met one of their members who paint all sort of stuff in public spaces and organize anarcho-punk concerts locally and there's some overlap and mutual cooperation going on despite differences. There is also a local Food Not Bombs campaign here of soup kitchens along with classes being done by this anarchist group teaching poor children. I find all of that awesome. :) So, despite all of my suspicion of such organizations because of how they might devolve towards cultism, I know some here locally and I know that they are doing well fighting for the ordinary folk. There are disagreements of course and some verbal altercations and stuff but it's fine once people start working together for common causes like demonstrating against corruption or something. That's what I wish to see more actually. So I wish all here on this thread that do their own activities to fight for the working class and if you start young like E. Burke here, the better. Beware of dogmatism and useless meetings stuff. So, I wish you both the best, E. Burke and eliphas8. :)
 
Summer 1941: The Ukrainian Offensive, the formation of the Comintern Armed Forces
1941 cont'd

Some clips from the BBC documentary series "The Second world war," originally broadcast 6 June to 4 July 1976.

Considered one of the masterpieces of documentary filmmaking, the epic series "The Second world war," utilized archive film footage, expert testimony by military historians, and interviews by participants and survivors of the war to bring the history of the era to life for a new generation. Broadcast in two hour segments each Sunday night, narrated by Richard Burton, legend of stage and screen, each episode featured a different director from among the auteurs of Franco-British New Wave cinema, such as Jean-Luc Goddard and John Boorman.

EXT. KOLKHOZE - DAY

A panning shot of green country side. In some of the fields, wheat is beginning to sprout in the rich black earth. A kolkhoznik tries, in vain, to mend a broken-down tractor. The camera stops on the tractor.


TITLE CARD: "The Ukraine"
VOICEOVER:​
Semyon works on a collective farm seventy kilometers south of Kharkiv. Last week, a comrade of his was tilling this field. Unbeknownst to the diligent Ukrainian ploughman, seeds from more than thirty years ago had begun to sprout.
Closeup on the tractor. The undercarriage is devastated, and the engine block appears to have fallen from its mounting. It lays sideways in in a shallow crater.

SEMYON, a weatherbeaten farmer in his late 40s, explains in thickly accented English. He points at the tractor with oil stained hands.
SEMYON:​

(subtitled)​
My nephew was ploughing field for potato planting early this week. His tractor struck a shell left over from Great Patriotic War. My nephew very badly hurt, but most of the blast was absorbed by tractor engine and body. I visit him in hospital yesterday; he say tractor bucked like a horse, and next thing he knew, he was on the ground in much pain.
Semyon gathers metal fragments from the ground.
VOICEOVER:​
This lush country field was part of several great battles in the Second World War. Battles which left numerous unexploded munitions which plague residents to this day. The shell that damaged Semyon's tractor was likely a German 10 cm shell from the First Battle of Kharkiv.
DISSOLVE TO:​

ARCHIVAL NEWSREELS

Tanks cross over hedges. They bear the Iron Cross of the Wehrmacht. Artillery crews fire their guns frantically. Cut to gun camera footage from Soviet fighters diving on German Stukas. Soviet defenders man the trenches, armed with a motley of old Mosin-Nagants and newer SKG-40 rifles.(1) Wagon trains of civilians in exodus, leaving behind burning fields and homes.
VOICEOVER:​

(interleaved)​
On the 7th of April 1941, the Nazi Army Group South renewed its offensive. Its objective, delivered on high from the Overkommando der Wehrmacht and Hitler himself: conquer the remaining sliver of Ukraine that had held on defiantly during Operation Teutonic, and race across the steppes of the Caucasus peninsula to the Caspian Sea.
An animated map. On it, the various units corps size and above are displayed. Black arrows emanate from Army Group South. One plunges down from occupied Ukraine in the Crimea peninsula. Another juts straight west from the Dneiper River, crossing Rostov before splitting. One angles north towards Stalingrad, another south to the Kuban River. A third strikes out from Kiev towards Kharkiv. It too continues to Stalingrad. Further lines can be scene, though out of focus. They strike from Army Group Center to encircle Moscow.
VOICOVER:​

(cont'd)​
For the ensuing attack, called Operation Frederick by the OKW, the Axis amassed a sizeable host of nearly two million strong. The core of the attack would be led by 1.2 million German soldiers, 3,100 tanks and nearly two thousand aircraft. Sizeable contingents from Italy and the Balkan nations would form the reserve. British and French SS detachments made their first appearance.(2)
Bf 110 Zerstörer fly in formation with Ju 288 medium bombers.(3) A bomb bay view over the Soviet city of Stalingrad, as bombs rain downwards. American F-34s and portly Soviet Il-3s(4) dogfight with Bf 109Gs and make diving attacks on Luftwaffe bombers.

DISSOLVE TO:​

Military historian KENNETH MACKSEY sits to be interviewed. He wears the purple beret of the Entente Armored Corps alongside his civilian professional attire. The interview is smartly edited, making it appear that he is lecturing.
MACKSEY:​
The Germans began the summer offensive as part of a new strategy of economic warfare. The Soviet Union had survived the previous year. Its beating heart, Moscow, had remained unmolested. The German command resolved to decide the contest by crippling the Soviet's ability to make war. The oil fields of the Caucasus were targeted, ostensibly as part of Hitler's vision of Lebensraum for Aryan settlement.
FAST CUT TO:​

A man stands beside an oil drum. The camera zooms out to reveal the drum is part of a small mountain of oil drums.

TITLE CARD: "Armored division fuel consumption per day"​
MACKSEY:​

(cont'd)​
In actuality, the immediate war aim was to deny their use to the Soviets. Both American and Soviet forces relied heavily on fuel produced and refined from the Caucasus. Their capture would greatly hinder the ability of the Comintern to make war in the Soviet theater.
Excerpts from the AH.com thread "Found some primary sources for you guys"

DeOppressoLiber said:
Well, like I talked about a couple weeks ago, I've hit up some of my old army comrades working at HKMA, and we went digging through the musty archives for some primary documents from WW2.

There's a lot of neat stuff there that hasn't been digitized yet. I've made some rough scans for you guys, but rest assured it has been uploaded to InterLib. I've already PMed AdmiralSanders about one of them that I think will be particularly interesting to him: an official Stavka report assessing the combat capabilities of the British Cruiser Mk V. A lot of direct tactical comparison for a contest that never ended up occurring, but what's most interesting are the classified British Army reports it references. I knew British intelligence was heavily compromised, but I had no idea it was that thorough.
Ubermunch said:
You Reds always had an advantage in espionage that we could never replicate. You could make a man betray his country and feel like a hero for doing it. All in the service of your international revolution. :C

But thanks for the info dumps. It will take a while to piece through. I noticed there were some German documents in the dump as well, which I would very much love to be able to use for my Hitler Goes West TL, but unfortunately I don't speak a word of German.
UlrikeMeinhof said:
Well, I could give you some summaries and pick out the important parts, I don't really have time to do a full translation.

Good stuff, DOL. I'm not very big into military AH, but it seems to be the board's bread and butter. Anything that is good for the commune I certainly can approve of. There's one I'm really interested in reading for its own sake though: "Strategies for Regime Change." Looks like it is a summary report by the CSS on working with German dissidents to stoke anti-Nazi sentiment and encourage war resistance. Even seems to have a sort of an endgame in mind, judging by the table of contents, for post-war occupation.

I have to say, what an amazing find. I've always loved reading the histories of anti-Nazi resistance. You've given me a piece of that history.
AdmiralSanders said:
What I find most amazing is that even in the dark days of 1941 and 42, you Reds still believed that good would triumph over evil, and you'd win. When all of the Soviet Union from the Baltic to Astrakhan is occupied, Leningrad, Moscow, Volgograd and Baku are under siege, and now the Axis are spilling into Turkey and Scandanavia, and then the Petain betrayal in 42…that's an amazing level of faith.

My German is pretty basic, but it looks like some of them should go a long way in helping debunk the Nazi wunderwaffe crap…ah who am I kidding. Wehrjunkies are impervious to reason.

Looks like it'll be dry reading, so this'll take up a fair bit of my time. Doesn't really tell us anything we don't know already. We've all read military history books that had access to these primary sources, but it is nice to have it all available.
Empire of Endless Monologues said:
Tell me, are we any closer to settling the age-old Tiger vs. T-5 debate yet?
LeninsBeard said:
You should know better than to ask such a silly question, Empire. :p

Real nice finds there DOL. I'm particularly interested in General Patton's personal analysis of the proposed United Comintern Armed Forces. You know me, the incorrigible internationalist :p

Overview: The Armed Forces of the Communist International

Great Patriotic War or Revolutionary Struggle? This was the question before the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in 1941. The Americans had been very keen on internationalizing the struggle against fascism. They had wished to formalize this policy by welding the various forces deployed in Eurasia and South America into a single Comintern military, to transform each struggle for national defense into a coherent struggle for world revolution.

The Soviet military had resisted initially. But the complexity of different national chains of command fighting in concert in a single theater had proven overwhelming. The path towards a unified military strategy was paved in December 1940 with the formation of a Combined Chief of Staff Committee to serve as an overarching leadership for the Soviet and American militaries.

The barrier was further broken down when Stalin acquiesced to the military's proposal of forming mixed commands on the tactical level. The defense of Leningrad demonstrated that Soviet officers could and would adapt to the different leadership expectations of American troops, and that American officers could reliably lead Soviet soldiers in the defense of the rodina.

On 4 July, the Comintern Treaty was amended to include military articles. These new articles established the Armed Forces of the Communist International, consisting of three branches: Army, Navy and Air Defense. The further established the laws of war, the definitions and punishments for war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. In content, this was not significantly different than the preceding international laws such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions, League of Nations Charter or the Kellog-Briand Pact, which both the UASR and Soviet Union had been signatories of.(5) There was a radical difference, which drew condemnation from the rest of the international community.

The Communist International, under these articles, asserted universal jurisdiction to prevent and punish such acts. It held violations of the laws of war, democide, slavery and other crimes against humanity as preemptory norms. Morever, it explicitly rejected the notion of the sovereign nation-state. It was a notion the communist parties had long trumpeted, but had never taken concrete steps to realize.

The new accord also took steps to synchronize the differences between the Soviet and American military traditions. On the surface, this included some minor rank reforms. It was quick and easy enough to make up for the lack of a Brigadier rank in the Soviet military. The difficult part came in reconciling matters of doctrine, training and operational art. It was a task that would essentially take the rest of the war to be fully completed, but would succeed in combining the strengths of the two into a world-beating military machine, and mold the military experience of the many minor Comintern participants into effective participants.

In naval affairs, America naturally held prominence. Ships remained crewed substantially by sailors of their nation of origin. For a mix of solidarity and training reasons, many warships would participate in crew exchanges. The Soviet naval establishment was very keen to gain more experience in anti-submarine and carrier warfare. Over the brief life of the Unified Comintern Navy, the Soviets would achieve a great leap forward in naval architecture, doctrine and training. In total, they acquired four fleet carriers, two battleships, a dozen cruisers and a multitude of smaller escort vessels, many of which would serve with distinction in the war's final days, securing the downfall of the Empire of Japan. In the post-war era, they would form the nucleus of the Soviet Navy.

The Unified Comintern Army would provide a number of shakeups for both. Both the Soviets and the Americans were peers in land warfare. The compromises could at times be ugly. The engineering and technical services were regularized, receiving normal military ranks. The regiment would become the organic unit, and the institution of regimental soviets was reluctantly accepted by the Soviet military hierarchy. For most purposes, units of corps level or higher would regularly consist of units from multiple nations. While they attempted to preserve national chain of command in divisions and lower units, the practical requirements of warfare often saw this rule abandoned. Temporary task forces would routinely see the cooperation of American, Soviet, and other national troops.

Meanwhile, the American Army Air Forces generals griped at the loss of air defense duties to a dedicated Air Defense Force, which would include interceptor forces as well as strategic anti-aircraft artillery. Tactical and strategic airpower would remain part of the Comintern Army Air Forces for the time being, though some continued to call for an independent air force.

The most trying task was reforming the political commissars. The politruks were defanged, a reform the Soviet Communist Party accepted reluctantly. Many were drummed out of service or reassigned to rear-echelon roles. At American insistence, tested communists within the military hierarchy would assume the role of political commissar, serving as the moral and educational core of the unit, and if necessary the redress against officers too accustomed to brutalism. Summary execution for cowardice was abolished, and those practicing it would be face court-martial.

Minor offenses would be dealt with by the regimental soviets. Serious offenses would result in court-martial. Even then, it was emphasized, the death penalty would be applied sparingly.

(1) Samazaryadnyj Karabin sistemy Garand, 1940. Self-loading Carbine of (the) Garand system. A Soviet made version of the M1C carbine, a select fire light battle rifle chambered in the 7 x 51 mm Pedersen, with 20 round detachable box magazine.

(2) Fascist volunteers, particularly before the FBU entry in the war, is a taboo subject. Their acknowledgement here caused quite a scandal when the documentary was broadcast. It brings into focus the history of fascist collaboration by the pre-war governments. While they quite zealously blocked their nationals from joining the Comintern's International Brigades, they put up token resistance to their nationals volunteering for the fascist side.

(3) Twin engine medium bomber, entering limited service in early 1941. Powered by two license-built copies of the Bristol Centaurus two-row radial engine, it had a large 4,000kg bomb load, protected by a 15 mm MG 151 cannon in a stinger, two 13 mm MG 131s in a dorsal turret, and two MG 131 waist gunners. Later variants had cabin pressurization, remotely operated turrets and improved range.

(4) A stout radial engine fighter, built more like a carrier fighter. Armed with two 20 x 102 mm ShVAK cannons in wing mountings, increased to four in later models.

(5) The UASR is considered the lawful successor to the USA, inheriting its rights and obligations. This was indeed part of the pre-revision TL, but that was so long ago I can scarcely expect anyone to remember.
 
Last edited:
Ooh, more on the second world war.

I can almost imagine the Britsh documentary narrator very hurriedly mentioning the British and French SS regiments before continuing onto something else as fast as he could without being conspicuous. And it seems that the Axis is going for Stalingrad first and not Moscow? Pretty bold strategy, but I suppose we can only wait and see how it plays out. I've noticed something of a lack of mention of the Axis minors and Italy when I think that with Germany's disparity in manpower and even with Fordist industrial reforms; industry, Germany would lean on their allies to some degree, especially if they could be trusted with holding positions or partaking in offensives without relentless German babysitters. And seeing if Finland starts up a continuation war would also be worth a look.

On the subject of Turkey, I think one reason for the Axis to strongarm Turkey into the Axis besides giving them an easy access route into western Asia would be to open up the Dardenelles to the Italian and Vichy French navy, which could cause quite a few headaches in the black sea. OTL, Italy could never contribute more than some boats to the black sea because they couldn't get anything that they couldn't drag overland. Some of Mussolini's cruisers and other ships he feels can be spared from the Mediterranean theater there could wreak a lot of havoc. Of course, I think the Axis would try to get Turkey to open up the Bosporus even before they brought Turkey into their camp to get heavier ships into that theater.

On the navy: It's interesting to see that the USSR gets experience with operating full capital ships, and I presume that with the UASR's help, even pre-war the USSR could avoid some of the industrial problems that made building larger ships difficult for them in OTL (like the Soviet union not being able to cast steel plates thicker than nine inches, forcing them to have to stack two plates on top of each other to get battleship level thickness for the Sovietsky Soyuz class) as well as technical expertise than in OTL, they tried; among other places getting from Italy for things like their Grevny class destroyers.

There are some soviet naval weapons that I feel are actually significantly superior to their American counterparts, not the least of which are Soviet torpedoes and the 130mm naval gun which certainly put the guns America put on its destroyers to shame in many categories. Would America adopt any of these? Though the problem with better American torpedoes is that America's torpedoes being as abysmal as they were was quite beneficial to Japan's early war situation as American submarines had a lot of trouble disrupting the Japanese merchant marine, and cemented the supremacy of the dive-bomber as the American carrier attack plane of choice since their torpedo bombers could not be particularly relied on. In addition to making American destroyers mostly serve more as escorts and light gun support rather than having torpedo runs as an option like Japanese destroyers did.

Though if I do remember, the American decision to not have their cruisers double as torpedo platforms to the degree that the Japanese did predates the discovery of the problems with American torpedoes.
 
Top