The German Century

The Italian Cannae – Part One
(Taken and condensed from: Rise and fall of the “Entente Cordiale” – George S. Patton, Erwin Rommel, Washington, 1950)

After the 11th Battle of the Isonzo it became obvious to the Austro-Hungarian Military Headquarter in Baden (near Vienna) that Austria-Hungarian forces could not withstand another attack of this magnitude. An own offensive was seen as only alternative. But the available Austrian forces were not sufficient to carry the fight to the Italians. Thus the German Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL) was approached and after some consideration the 14. Army under General der Infantrie Otto von Below was sent to the Italian front. The OHL would have preferred to strike against Russia, but it was obvious that it was more important to keep Austria-Hungary fighting.

The original plan was to reach the Tagliamento, stop there and entrench to form a new defensive line. This would allow for a better future defense. But Generalfeldmarschall von Hindenburg suggested a more ambitious approach. But only after much threats from the German sides the Austrians were willing to follow this suggestion.

The former 1st and 2nd Austrian Armies were combined to form Heeresgruppe Boroëvić (Österreich-Ungarn/ Generaloberst Boroević) and the German 14th Army should strike westward. The experienced German troops were expected to carry the attack and tear through the Italian lines of the Second Army.The 10 Austrian Army should strike from the Carnic Alps into the flank of the Italian Second Army and thus support the attack.

This was in line with the original Austrian plans. But in addition to this attacks The Austrian 11th Army should strike south from the Trentino along the shores of Lago Garda and taking Verona and encircle all of Italys armies in the Region (1st to 4th). Additional German troops (including the Alpenkorps) would be supporting this move south.

Despite the overall problematic logistical situation an extended logistical support was set up to support this strike. And despite the outcry of other Army commander which were plundered of their support train a massive support organisation was assembled for this strike. The OHL rightfully believed that at other fronts the Allies would not mount a big offensive this late in the year.

On October 24th 02.00 am an artillery barrage marked the start of this offensive. The Italian troops of the right sector of the 2nd Italian army – who were not used to an barrage of this proportions and especially not the massive use of gas – almost immediate began to move backward. And so expose the flanks of neighbouring units.

At the evening of this day the 12th (German) Infanteriedivision under Generalmajor Arnold Lequis had advanced 27 kilometers.
 

Deleted member 1487

And the POD is?
It seems that the Austrians are mounting a bigger attack from South Tyrol during Caporetto, which is going to probably knock Italy out of the war when it destroys more than one army during the battle.
 
And the POD is?

It seems that the Austrians are mounting a bigger attack from South Tyrol during Caporetto, which is going to probably knock Italy out of the war when it destroys more than one army during the battle.

Correct.

OTls offensive was planned as a minor attack meant to stop at the Tagliamneto, but it reached the Piave as Italian resistance effetively crumbled.

If my sources are correct Hindenburg suggested a strike from the 11th Army towards Milano (I am a bit more conservative), but the A-H military did not agree IOTL.

So I assume TTL Hindenburg got his way and they did it right and also set up a decent supply train.

I am looking forward to the (enraged) outcries of all the Italophiles here... Actually I hope to learn more of the Italian point of view here...
 
I am looking forward to the (enraged) outcries of all the Italophiles here... Actually I hope to learn more of the Italian point of view here...

From Italy Pow...well you must consider that the Italian army stopping A-H at the Piave LIne was a surprise...for the italian high command they alredy considerd the fourth army lost; the army brass original intention was to create a defense line more attuned to face the precise operation you outlined (if this can be done succesfully is another question).
 
The Italian Cannae – Part Two
(Taken and condensed from: Rise and fall of the “Entente Cordiale” – George S. Patton, Erwin Rommel, Washington, 1950)

The large Italian reserves were committed piecemeal and were easily dispersed. On the evening of the 25th the first Italian line was broken and annihilated. As their left flank was exposed the third Italian Army began slowly to retreat – their units would soon add to the panic. The northern parts of the Italian 2nd army also gave in to the attacking A-H 10th army, but also to avoid encirclement by the 14th army (German/A-H). The overall command now considered their first goal – reaching the Tagliamento – to be not only probably, but guaranteed.

On the 26th Monte Majur, Monte Hum and Globocak were taken – this meant the second Italian line was also broken. There was no third line…

The only part of the front where the Central Powers attack was not as successful as anticipated was the Rombon sector. Some claim it was the weather but most Austrian officers leading units in the sector attribute it to stiff Italian resistance.

Görz (Gorizia) fell without resistance on the 27th. The 14th army (G/A-H) pursued the fleeing Italian troops. Several thousand Italian Soldiers were captured without resistance.

The Italian Army had already lost 200.000 captured.

In the evening orders for the second phase of the offensive were issued.

The capture of intact Bridges over Tagliamento at Ragogne-Dignano-Codroipa had priority. Also important was to destroy as much Italian troops as possible before they crossed the river.

Chief of Staff General Cadorna ordered general retreat and left Udine. Unfortunately for the Italians civilians also started to leave the town and added to the chaos at the streets.

Also on the October 26th the 11th A-H Army started their attack with light forces along the rail line from Trient to Bassano and ultimately to Padua. But this was only a diversion. When General Brusati ordered a few units of his First Italian Army to shift east to counter the expected attack – he feared that 2nd and third army would be encircled by this move – the real push came on the 27th along the shores of Lake Garda and the Adige valley. This push hit the shifting Italians hard and caused immediate panic and a huge gap opened as the units ordered east continued their movement while the left flank of the 1st army moved fast west and south.
 
Last edited:
Top