The Italian Cannae – Part One
(Taken and condensed from: Rise and fall of the “Entente Cordiale” – George S. Patton, Erwin Rommel, Washington, 1950)
After the 11th Battle of the Isonzo it became obvious to the Austro-Hungarian Military Headquarter in Baden (near Vienna) that Austria-Hungarian forces could not withstand another attack of this magnitude. An own offensive was seen as only alternative. But the available Austrian forces were not sufficient to carry the fight to the Italians. Thus the German Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL) was approached and after some consideration the 14. Army under General der Infantrie Otto von Below was sent to the Italian front. The OHL would have preferred to strike against Russia, but it was obvious that it was more important to keep Austria-Hungary fighting.
The original plan was to reach the Tagliamento, stop there and entrench to form a new defensive line. This would allow for a better future defense. But Generalfeldmarschall von Hindenburg suggested a more ambitious approach. But only after much threats from the German sides the Austrians were willing to follow this suggestion.
The former 1st and 2nd Austrian Armies were combined to form Heeresgruppe Boroëvić (Österreich-Ungarn/ Generaloberst Boroević) and the German 14th Army should strike westward. The experienced German troops were expected to carry the attack and tear through the Italian lines of the Second Army.The 10 Austrian Army should strike from the Carnic Alps into the flank of the Italian Second Army and thus support the attack.
This was in line with the original Austrian plans. But in addition to this attacks The Austrian 11th Army should strike south from the Trentino along the shores of Lago Garda and taking Verona and encircle all of Italys armies in the Region (1st to 4th). Additional German troops (including the Alpenkorps) would be supporting this move south.
Despite the overall problematic logistical situation an extended logistical support was set up to support this strike. And despite the outcry of other Army commander which were plundered of their support train a massive support organisation was assembled for this strike. The OHL rightfully believed that at other fronts the Allies would not mount a big offensive this late in the year.
On October 24th 02.00 am an artillery barrage marked the start of this offensive. The Italian troops of the right sector of the 2nd Italian army – who were not used to an barrage of this proportions and especially not the massive use of gas – almost immediate began to move backward. And so expose the flanks of neighbouring units.
At the evening of this day the 12th (German) Infanteriedivision under Generalmajor Arnold Lequis had advanced 27 kilometers.
(Taken and condensed from: Rise and fall of the “Entente Cordiale” – George S. Patton, Erwin Rommel, Washington, 1950)
After the 11th Battle of the Isonzo it became obvious to the Austro-Hungarian Military Headquarter in Baden (near Vienna) that Austria-Hungarian forces could not withstand another attack of this magnitude. An own offensive was seen as only alternative. But the available Austrian forces were not sufficient to carry the fight to the Italians. Thus the German Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL) was approached and after some consideration the 14. Army under General der Infantrie Otto von Below was sent to the Italian front. The OHL would have preferred to strike against Russia, but it was obvious that it was more important to keep Austria-Hungary fighting.
The original plan was to reach the Tagliamento, stop there and entrench to form a new defensive line. This would allow for a better future defense. But Generalfeldmarschall von Hindenburg suggested a more ambitious approach. But only after much threats from the German sides the Austrians were willing to follow this suggestion.
The former 1st and 2nd Austrian Armies were combined to form Heeresgruppe Boroëvić (Österreich-Ungarn/ Generaloberst Boroević) and the German 14th Army should strike westward. The experienced German troops were expected to carry the attack and tear through the Italian lines of the Second Army.The 10 Austrian Army should strike from the Carnic Alps into the flank of the Italian Second Army and thus support the attack.
This was in line with the original Austrian plans. But in addition to this attacks The Austrian 11th Army should strike south from the Trentino along the shores of Lago Garda and taking Verona and encircle all of Italys armies in the Region (1st to 4th). Additional German troops (including the Alpenkorps) would be supporting this move south.
Despite the overall problematic logistical situation an extended logistical support was set up to support this strike. And despite the outcry of other Army commander which were plundered of their support train a massive support organisation was assembled for this strike. The OHL rightfully believed that at other fronts the Allies would not mount a big offensive this late in the year.
On October 24th 02.00 am an artillery barrage marked the start of this offensive. The Italian troops of the right sector of the 2nd Italian army – who were not used to an barrage of this proportions and especially not the massive use of gas – almost immediate began to move backward. And so expose the flanks of neighbouring units.
At the evening of this day the 12th (German) Infanteriedivision under Generalmajor Arnold Lequis had advanced 27 kilometers.